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ABSTRACT
This thesis is i^estricted to a study of pol­
itical persuasion on the part of the Vietnamese Comm­
unists. It is further limited to a period of some 
ten years, from the political debut of the Viet Minh 
(1944-45) until their victory at Dien Bien Phu and 
triumphal return to Hanoi, towards the end of 1954.
The aim of the research is to evaluate the 
elements essential to the success of Communist per­
suasion in North Viet Nam.
To achieve this, it is necessary briefly to re­
view the perennial struggle of the Vietnamese nation, 
which Communist agit-prop successfully exploited. 
Another background chapter ‘describes the socio-politi­
cal context of the ear3.y 1940* s when the Viet Minh 
prepared their public appearance.
Then, political persuasion is studied through 
Communist documents and publications, especially the 
numerous addresses and messages of Ho Chi Minh, These 
are related to the principal campaigns organised by 
the Communists in order to attract, inspire, and moti­
vate the Vietnamese people to co-operate with them: 
the National Salvation organisations and the theme of 
Independence and Freedom; the Alliance policy and the 
theme of National Unity; the consolidation of national 
power amidst conflicts and the theme of conailiation 
for future advance; the nation-wide war and the theme 
of certain victory; and the complex programme of 
national resistance and nation-building with the theme
of llPeace and Democracy11,
The final chapter attempts to identify the 
principal elements which made possible the Viet Minhfs 
success in persuading and mobilising the people to 
implement their political plans which finally led to 
the establishment of a socialist-communist regime.
This study contributes a more comprehensive pre­
sentation of theVietnamese literature of Gommunist 
persuasion than was previously available* It offers 
a tentative analysis of the method and techniques 
successfully applied by the Vietnamese Communists to 
the preparation, dissemination, and exploitation of 
the persuasive message in the achievement of their 
political aims.
It is suggested that further researches and sim­
ilar analysis concerning the post-G-eneva period (from 
1955-56 to 1973), which coincides with the American 
involvment in Viet Nam, will produce rewarding results 
and provide a highly interesting comparative study.
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INTRODUCTION
Though, not directly involved in the Second World 
War, Viet Nam was an area of dispute between the 
French and the Japanese. Consequently, the outcome 
of the War deeply affected the people of that tiny 
country.
Together with the complex international events 
of the early 19401 s, the French defeat in* March 1945 
and the Japanese surrender in August of the same year 
precipitated the final collapse of the old order: 
eighty years of French colonial rule came to an end 
and the Nguyen dynasty which had, lasted nearly 250 
years, was removed, A new chapter opened in the 
history of the nation with the public appearance of 
the Viet Minh and the birth of the Democratic Repub­
lic of Viet Nam.
In fact, the situation which the Viet Minh encoun­
tered in 1945, was confused, riddled with conflicts, 
and fraught with seemingly insuperable difficulties. 
International observers and Vietnamese nationalist 
leaders were pessimistic to the point of agreeing with 
some prophets of doom that the Viet Minh days were 
numbered.
However, the Viet Minh survived. The Provisional 
Government of Ho Chi Minh became official and permanent. 
When the French forces returned, militarily well equiped, 
to insist on a modus vivendi. the almost empty handed 
Viet Minh left Hanoi for the jungle to wage a protracted 
war of resistance.
iv
Eight years later, the Viet Minh surprised the 
whole world with their historic victory at Dien Bien 
Phu» After signing the Geneva Accords in July 1954* 
the same Government of Ho Chi Minh triumphantly re­
occupied Hanoi to install a Communist regime in the 
northern half of Viet Ham*
Phis remarkable achievement deserves close study, 
in particular the element on which the whole Viet 
Minh success was founded, namely political persuasion.
Before examining the Viet Minh literature of 
persuasion, it is necessary, briefly, to review the 
history of the Vietnamese people, which records their 
persistent struggle through the centuries and offers 
an inspirational source of persuasion (Chapter I),
Next, a brief account of the Indochinese Communist 
Party is presented against the background of Viet­
namese society in the early 1940fs (Chapter II),
Then, the Communist work of persuasion is studied 
through the plans, directives, appeals, publications, 
and other forms of agit-prop of the''Viet .Minh Govern­
ment and Party, from the early 1940*s to 1954. Since 
Ho Chi Minh was the founder of the Indochinese Commun­
ist Party, prime mover of the Viet Minh organisation, 
father of the Democratic Republic, and president of 
the Government, his appeals are cited as principal' 
sources and are corroborated by quotations from other 
11 comrade leaders11, such as Truong-Chinh and Vo Nguyen 
Giap.
In general, chronological order is followed because 
it is useful in unfolding the gradual implementation of
VCommunist plans* N e v e r t h e l e s s t h e  study concentrates 
on the principal campaigns and their themes which prov­
ed irresistible as they reflected the aspirations of 
the people, and represent, at the same time, the succ­
essive milestones in the "minimum programme" of the 
Viet Minh towards socialism.
Thus, the noble ideal of Independence and Free­
dom attracted the Vietnamese to the Quu Quoc (Saving 
the Country) organisations of the Yiet Minh Front 
(Chapter III), while the theme of National Unity per­
suaded other political parties and different social, 
political, and religious elements, to ally themselves 
with the undeclared Communists within a national unit­
ed front such as the Lien Yiet (Chapter IV). If 
conflicting forces prevented the progressive implement­
ation of Communist plans, the Yiet Minh leaders proved 
flexible enough to practice conciliation, conduct 
negotiation, and sign compromise agreements, with a 
view to disarming their opponents, and gaining time 
for future advance (Chapter V),
When the French Government decided to use superior 
military power to enforce a modus vivendi. the Yiet 
Minh appealed to patriotic sentiments, ,invoiced the tra­
dition of persistent struggle, and cited the "indomit­
able spirit" of the most respected national heroes to 
thrust the people into the battlefield with the deep 
conviction of final success (Chapter V I ),
Chapter YII presents the complex programme during 
the Resistance War, which demanded of the entire nation
total sacrifice for complete victory, and at the same 
time, urged enthusiastic co-operation in the great 
task of nation-building. Every Vietnamese was strong- 
ly motivated to concentrate all his efforts on achiev­
ing Peace and Democracy only to find later, after
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paying a high price for the patriotic war, a "peace­
ful" installation of "Peopled Democracy", i.e., the 
dictatorship of the proletariat which brooked no oppos­
ition. In a sense, this exploitation of ambiguity 
summarises the Communist success in Viet Nam, and points 
to the adroit way by which the Viet Minh reached their 
goals.
Chapter VIII, the last one, attempts a short analy­
sis of the surprising success of the Communist Viet Minh 
in North Viet Nam, by describing the magnetic person­
ality of Ho Chi Minh and briefly explaining the five- 
point methodical approach and the ten principal tech­
niques employed in Communist persuasion.
Chapter I
VIET-NAM: an indomitable nation
Though the Republic of Viet-Nam is very young, the 
Vietnamese nation is ancient, with an often turbulent 
recorded history extending back over two millenia.
While the earliest periods remain shrouded in myths 
and legends, it is generally accepted by ethnographers 
that'the Vietnamese people, if their ancestry is traced 
back to the stone age, are products of an admixture of 
the Austronesians, the Mongoloid-Thais and Yueh of South 
China. This heterogeneous make-up may still be discerned 
in the complex population of Viet-Nam today.
From its first emergence as a tiny independent 
state it had to face, not only periodic calamities of 
drought and flood, but the constant threat of invasion 
from its powerful neighbour, the "Celestial Empire" of 
China. Indeed, the early history of Viet-Nam records 
little else but a continuous struggle with "the North".
One consequence of so great a power imbalance between 
two neighbours was that Viet-Nam underwent a long Chinese 
domination that lasted from 111 B.C. to 938 A.D. Thus 
this tiny state near the Southern border was reduced 
to a Chinese "Chou" (i.e., district) and named, some­
what contemptuously, "the Pacified South" (AN-NAM).
The Vietnamese spirit, however, was subdued but 
never truly pacified. Despite the fact that Chinese 
administrators contributed so greatly to the developing 
Vietnamese culture and civilization, it required no more
than abuse of power from some of their number to induce
the indigenous people to take up arms and engage in bitter
2conflict against their rulers. But insurrections of 
this nature were always quickly put down by the over­
whelming might of imperial forces from the North, Only 
towards the middle of the tenth century, when they were 
enabled to exploit Ohinafs serious domestic political 
difficulties, did the Viets successfully terminate the 
ten-century domination by force of arms. Concerning the 
emergence of Viet-Nam as an autonomous kingdom plractically 
independent of the huge Empire of China, a recent 
historian has commented; 11 The very existence of Viet- 
Nam as a separate country, and the survival of the Viet­
namese as a distinct people, must be regarded as a mir­
acle, for which scores of historians have so far tried 
vainly to find a satisfactory explanation,11
Whatever the reasons, the conservation of national 
identity of the Vietnamese people was ultimately rewarded 
with nine hundred years of independence and separate 
development. But even after she had established national 
sovereignty, Viet-Nam still had* to struggle for survival 
and national government until the emergence of two great 
dynasties, the Ly (1010-1225) and the Tran (1225-1400), 
During that period, Viet-Nam enjoyed a large measure of 
national security and achieved considerable progress in 
the spheres of economics, government and culture. To 
the indigenous traditions and Buddhist heritage, was added 
the Confucianist system of political and social organis­
ation, National unity was personified in the supreme
3 *
power of the king, whse power extended downwards 
(through the nine degrees of civil and military mand- 
arinal hierarchy), to the lowest social and admini­
strative unit, the village. Universal military service, 
a national system of tax collection, relief funds, the 
development of irrigation and agriculture; these were 
the outstanding hallmarks of this period of growth. But 
growth was not the only feature of "the era of indepen­
dence and great dynasties" as it is usually called*
Those dynasties, long or short-lived, like any other 
human institution, inevitably suffered at one time or 
another, from the poisons of human ambitions, political 
plotting and power corruption* It was the dispute over 
the royal throne between the Tan and the Ho dynasties 
that made possible a second Chinese intervention and a 
fourth period of Chinese domination from 1407 to 1427? in 
which great suffering and hardship afflicted the Viet­
namese,
The Ming occupation appeared to have two principal 
objectives, the maximum economic exploitation of Viet­
namese resources and the replacement of Vietnamese culture, 
which had developed during the centuries of independence, 
by that of China. Wood mineral products, extracted by 
enforced Vietnamese labour, were transported to China.
Cults and rites, dress and customs, language and writings, 
in fact, every indigenous feature, was replaced by a 
Chinese counterpart in a deliberate attempt to destroy 
Vietnamese separate national identity. The resulting 
deep sense of grievance, which developed among the Viet­
namese, was later described in a typically oriental
fashion by the great writer Nguyen Trai: "All the bamboo
of the Southern Mountains would not be sufficient to 
provide the paper for recording all their crimes".
It was just such fiery language of this statesman 
and writer that stirred up the hearts and rallied the 
hands of the "Vietnamese around the national hero of the 
15th century, Le loi. After ten years of protracted 
guerilla warfare, this outstanding leader succeeded in 
expelling the Chinese to re-establish Viet-Nam's indepen­
dence, rebuild national unity and found another great 
dynasty, the later l e 0
That long enduring dynasty (1428-1739) can boast of 
the efforts to execute an altruistic land reform and an 
austerity programme under Le loi, of exceptional cultural 
achievements during the reign of le Thanh Ton (1461-1497) 
such as the blossoming of Chu Nom literature, the compil­
ation of the Hong Due legal code, the social and political 
ethics inspired by neo-Confucianism, the military reforms 
and the successful southward expansion. But decadence 
inevitably overtook this dynasty too, so that its later 
rulers became the instigators of base and often brutal 
political intrigues, of local revolts, palace coups and 
civil wars.
Twice was the country divided into two warring 
halves: once (1527-1592) by the Mac and the le, and a
second time (1620-1788) by the Trinh and the Nguyen.
Both periods of partition were marked by bitter and bloody 
civil wars, each lasting for half a century.
Profiting from the unrest and instability occasioned 
by a developing political and economic crisis in South
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Vietnam, the Tay Son Brothers  ^ led a successful peasant 
revolt to grasp the power from the Nguyen, When the 
Trinh troops came to conquer the South, the Tay Son 
chased them hack to the frontier of China thus talking 
over both the North and the South of Viet-Nam* The Le 
King, a figurehead in the North, appealed to China for 
help. Once again, Chinese troops came down as volun­
teers to help the dethroned Le King hut were defeated 
hy Nguyen Hue, one of the Tay Son brothers who had 
assumed the royal title of Quang Trung,
Having acceded to power in the wake of internal 
disorders, the Tay Son engaged in family discord and 
political malpractice, thereby generating fresh disorders« 
They were themselves overthrown in 1802 by Prince Nguyen 
Anh, who re-unified the country after nearly two cent­
uries of partition* This prince was proclaimed Emperor 
and, with the reign title G-ia Long, founded the later 
Nguyen dynasty that was to last nearly 150 years*
In his struggle to recapture that authority wielded 
by his ancestors and lost to the Tay Son, G-ia Long had 
been obliged to accept military and technical assistance 
from a group of French men* Even after the successful 
conclusion of the war their expertise was still needed, 
but the new Emperor managed his dealings with these 
valuable,but politically troublesome, Westerners so skil­
fully that their relations remained harmonious* His 
immediate successors, Ming Mang and Tu Due, men& edu­
cated and trained in the sthict Oonfucianist tradition, 
believed their throne to be seriously threatened by the 
"dangerous impact11 of the industrialized West on Vietnam,
an influence they regarded as "■barbarous" and "uncivilised"* 
Their reaction to the threat was to adopt an attitude of 
arrogance and a policy of isolationism*
The behaviour of the royal court, together with the 
complex haughtiness of manner displayed by the out-dated 
mandarinate as they met the inflexibility of French autho­
rities, increased the mutual misunderstanding and religious 
tension, building up tov/ards violent confrontation and 
open hostility* Torn by internal crisis and being in­
ferior in military equipment, Viet-Nam again lost her 
independence, to be dominated by the French for nearly a 
century*
From the day hostilities broke out and continually 
during the whole period of French rule, the Vietnamese 
people, brooding over their loss of national sovereignty, 
refused to let their resentment and opposition die* This 
incessant undercurrent of resistance was discernible in 
every possible form; popular songs, satiric writings, 
political essays, formal petitions, secret organisations, 
and so forth* Better known were the insurrections led
by Emperor Ham Nghi, Phan Dinh Phung and the Literati, by
S 6Be Tham and Tan Thuat , the resistance movements headed
by Phan Boi Chau, Phan Chau Trinh, Prince Cuong Be * * * *
From the 1920s, many new organisations were set up 
with the aim of ending the French domination: the
Constitutionalist Party of Cochinchina (1923), the Revol­
utionary Association for a new Viet-Nam (Tan Viet Cach 
Mang Bang, 1924), the Revolutionary Youth League (1925), 
the People*s Party of Viet-Nam (Viet Nam Quoc Ban Bang,
1927), the Communist Party of Indochina (1930), to name 
only the important ones,
7Even French writers were moved to deplore the
continuous political crisis in 'Viet~Nam. This crisis
8came to a head with the Yen Bad revolt and the Nghe-
Q
Tinh Soviet. Though these bloody encounters ended in 
complete military failure, they were unmistakable 
manifestations of a continuous resistance against French 
rulers.
It was, indeed* characteristic of the Vietnamese 
people that, as a result of long historical experience, 
they were obsessed by a phobia of foreign domination 
and exploitation. Sustained by the inspiring memory 
of so many heroic leaders, they were stubbornly deter­
mined to oppose by all means, the French rule over Viet- 
ham. But, until the 1940!s the formidable Secret 
Service and the overwhelming legionary forces had crush­
ed all insurrections and choked to death all nationalist 
aspirations.
The Second World War, however, witnessed many 
drastic changes in apparently stable situations all over 
the world. The French administration in Indochina was 
gradually eclipsed by the rising power of Japan until 
the coup de grace of 9 B/Earch 1945 brought the French 
domination to an abrupt end.
Emperor Bao Dai introduced the Tran Trong Kim 
Oabinet with several young ministers while several;: 
Vietnamese political banners made their appearance and
and various rumours were circulating... After a few months 
of frustration* the New Cabinet resigned when it became 
obvious that the Japanese had dislodged the French only 
to occupy their seat and did not want Viet-Nam to have 
its own army.
But only a week later* Japan was obliged to surr­
ender to the Allied forces. Taking advantage of the 
opportunity this offered* the Communists quickly decided 
to march out under the banner of the Vietnam league for 
Independence and to take over the country before the 
arrival of allied forces. In the ensuing period the 
Viet Minh (Vietnamese League for Independence) succeeded 
in taking over the city of Hanoi, obtaining the resig­
nation of Bao Dai* establishing a "coalition Government" 
under its own control and rallying the people for a 
protracted war of resistance, that led to the partition 
of Viet-Nam in the 1954 Geneva agreements.
After 25 years* it is still substantially the same 
group of Viet Minh leaders who are building socialism in 
the North and continuing the "liberation war" in the 
South. Among the various elements contributing to their 
success* persuasion* based on Vietnam's historic national 
consciousness* played a very important* even fundamental 
role.
While historians and ethnologists may still dispute 
about the genesis of the Vietnamese national identity* 
there exists no doubt that the Vietnamese people have 
acquired an extraordinarily strong national consciousness 
of which they have always been proud. For centuries, 
Confucianism, the officially recognised doctrine in polit­
ical* social and educational fields* has inculcated in
the Vietnamese mind and heart a strong sense of tradition. 
In the most cherished heritage handed down from one gener­
ation to the next, was their tradition of heroic struggle 
and amazing success against such powerful enemies as 
China and Mongolia. The memory of their glorious vic­
tories, certainly offered a very effective element of 
persuasion that the Communist leaders, as will he shown 
later* never failed to exploit. But, before observing 
the persuasion at work* it will be very helpful to examine 
the concrete situation inside Viet-Nam* with its enormous 
difficulties* just before the Viet Minh made their debut.
1 0 .
inflomitable nation
1# Throughout the centuries, this country has been 
known by several names: Van-lang (5th century
B.C. - 257 B.C.), An-Lac (257-207 B.C.), Nam- 
Viet (207-111 B.C.), G-iao-Chi (111 B.C. - 205 A.D), 
G-iao-Chau (205-544), Van-Xuan (544-605), An-Nam 
(605-959), Dai-Co-Viet (969-1054), Dai-Viet 
(1054-1400), Dai-Ngu (1400-1407), An-Nam (1407- 
1427), Dai-Viet (1428-1802), Viet-Nam (1802- 
1852), Dau-Nam (1852-1945), Viet-Nam (from 1945), 
Thus there have been at least twelve national 
names, most of them have the term Viet (Yueh in 
Chinese) which designates the leading ethnic 
group. For convenience, the present name, Viet- 
Bam, is being used throughout this study. Its 
inhabitants are called Vietnamese or Viets for 
short.
2. During the Chinese domination, there were many up­
risings. Better known were the revolts led by 
the Trung Sisters (40-45), by Madam Irieu (248), 
by Ly-Bon (544), by Mai Thuc Loan (722), by Khuc 
Thua Du (905) and by Ngo Quyen who had won a 
famous victory on the Bach Dang river (959)°
5° Joseph Buttinger, The Smaller Dragon, hew York:
P. Praeger, 1958, p* 11.
4, They were Nhac, Lu and Hue, of a Ho family that 
had emigrated from Nghe-An to Tay-Son, a small 
village of the Binh-Dinh province. In order to 
overcome the people's sense of loyalty to the 
ruling dynasty in the South (the Nguyen), they 
assumed the family name Nguyen. They also
nleaked outn the rumour that the Tay Son Brothers 
had received the mandate of Heaven on a high 
mountain.
5. His real name was Hoang Hoa Tham. This die-hard 
guerilla leader, nicknamed "The Tiger of Yen-The",
was harassing the French for some twenty years 
(1887-1913) in the Bac-G-iang area.
fan Thuat or Nguyen Tien Thuat led an insurrec­
tion in Hai-Duon until 1892, when he had to take 
refuge in China.
See for example Fernand Bernard, 1*Indochine« 
erreurs et dangers; Un programme. Paris: 
Charpentier, 1901.
The revolt Broke out on 10 February 1930, being 
led by the Nationalist Party.
Violent insiirrections took place in many areas. 
Under the leadership of the Communist Party of 
Indochina, 11 soviets” were set up in some areas 
of the provinces of Nghe-An and Ha-Tinh (1930- 
1931), but the whole movement was quickly 
drowned in blood.
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The COMMUNIST PARTY and VIET-NAM 
in the early 1940's
At the beginning of the second World War, the 
situation in Viet-Nam was fraught with difficulties.
The events of World War II, particularly those directly 
affecting French Indochina, further aggravated an al­
ready tense situation and precipitated a crisis in 1945? 
a year which proved to be a turning-point in the history 
of the nation.
Already, during the middle and late nineteen thir­
ties, discouraged by both their advancing years and 
repeated failures, many of the former mandarins and old 
Confucianist scholars, who had comprised the nucleus of 
the nationalist movement since the beginning of French 
rule, quietly withdrew from the political scene. They 
then chose to express any resentment or opposition they 
still nurtured, by non-cooperation rather than violence, 
apparently seeking consolation in the tradition of Taoist 
contentment and Confucianist harmony.
This was the time, when the cumulative effects of 
prolonged French influence, became most apparent in 
Vietnamese society. Customs, beliefs, education, comm­
unication, administration, living standards and scales 
of value•- the list could be extended even further - 
virtually every facet of life was undergoing western­
ization to a greater or lesser degree. A whole gener­
ation had grown up during this era of change and measured 
its achievements in terms of graduates from the University
of Hanoi and the G-randes Fcoles of France instead of more 
traditional criteria. The leaders of these new style 
Vietnamese, having qualified themselves to become teachers 
doctors, lawyers, civil servants, administrative officials 
and the like, received relatively large material awards 
which enabled them to live in conditions of some comfort, 
if not luxury. Such persons constituted an affluent 
bourgeois social class hitherto unknown in Vietnam which 
tended to collaborate with the French rulers for reasons 
of self-interest and security rather than because of any 
moral conviction. All of these men had studied French 
literature in the course of their schooling, and the 
majority continued to read French books for pleasure 
thereafter. Some of their number received their higher 
education in Metropolitan France, where they were uni­
versally accepted, and made a wide variety of French 
friends and acquaintances. Inevitably they were interest 
ed in the many new and unfamiliar ideas they encountered, 
not least in the greater freedom permitted in French 
political life. nLibertea Bgalite. Fraternite” ceased 
to be an empty slogan, for they observed it in its appli­
cation, and most were deeply influenced by what they saw. 
Inspired by the results of the French and American 
Revolutions, the Meiji Transformation in Japan and the 
proletarian Revolution in Russia, they discussed these and 
examined the conditions in Vietnam from a different per­
spective. It was but a step from there to demand the 
right to work, to voice their ideas, freely to participate 
in the administration of their own country. This led 
them to become increasingly enthusiastic in their support
for demands to establish Vietf-Nam's independence but, 
that newly engendered sentiment o f :nationalism was en­
hanced by an important trend they believed they had 
perceived taking place at that time: the rise of Japan
and the decadence of Prance. Indeed, the Japanese 
occupation of Hainan and their subsequent intervention 
in Indochina, apparently confirmed this view and raised 
the hope of a number of Vietnamese nationalist revolu­
tionaries. The G-erman occupation of Prance provided 
still further evidence and inspiration the southern 
segment of the Indochinese Communist Party to organise 
and lead an insurrection in Cochinchina (September 1940). 
But the French colonial rulers did not share this Viet­
namese interpellation of events and remained determined 
to retain a firm hold on Viet-Nan^espite setbacks else­
where. They reacted swiftly to suppress the uprising 
and did not baulk at strong measures: prisons and
special detention camps were soon filled to overcrowding 
with arrested Communists or suspected sympathisers.
Several high ranking revolutionary leaders whose number 
included Le Hong Phong, Ha Huy Tap, Phan Bang luu,
Hguyen Thi Minh Khai - all of these had returned after 
training from Moscow - w$ereygaoled or executed and the 
nucleus of the Communist Party in Viet-Nam was practically 
destroyed.
After such a failure, Viet-Nam had to endure a double 
burden, the tightening control of the French administration 
and the increasing economic pressure resulting from 
Japanese expansion. The Vietnamese economy depended 
heavily upon trade with France, but the war in Europe and
the German occupation of Prance terminated this traffic 
and produced a serious economic deterioration. The sub­
sequent arrival of increasing numbers of Japanese troops 
further aggravated the situation. Under the terms of 
"bilateral agreements" negotiated under duress in May 
1941, the French authorities were obliged to direct the 
greater part of Indochina's exports in rice and other 
materials to Japan. Shortages of materials to satisfy 
pressing military needs, forced the Japanese authorities 
in Indochina to manufacture badly needed fuel from 
locally grown grain and to order jute and cotton to be 
planted in large numbers of ricefields instead of rice.
At the same time, because the railways were used almost 
exclusively by the Japanese military, it became impossible 
to despatch rail freight, so that the rice surplus in 
South Viet-Nam had to be burnt to make fertilizer at a 
time when Central and North Viet-Nam were suffering severe 
food shortages. Rice became hard to find in these regions 
and its scarcity produced monetary inflation. Still 
later, when the harvests of 1944 failed, a disastrous 
famine ravaged the country, causing the deaths of a 
million people I
While the economic situation grew progressively worse 
and approached a point at which there would be a chance 
of violent^public protest, the whole country remained un­
informed about political developments. The ordinary 
people were not only completely ignorant of the outside 
world but even of other parts of their own country beyond 
the limits of the districts in which they lived. The 
better educated, whose activities were constantly subject
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to supervision by both French and Japanese authorities, 
were reduced to mental confusion by ceasless changes on 
the international stage and by the contradictory news 
and rumours from the various sources available to them*
It was rumoured, and widely believed, that the Japanese 
would help Viet-Ram to regain her independence, that the 
exiled prince Ciidng-De would return to head a new inde­
pendent Government, that some of the clandestine nation­
alist organisations like the Phuc-Quoc (Restoration),
Tan~Viet (Few Viet-Ram) or Dai-Viet (Great Viet-Ram) 
were ready to cooperate with the new Government* Since 
the name Cddng-B'e had long been linked with that of Phan 
Boi Chau as twin symbols of Vietnamese nationalism, these 
rumours won additional credence because people wanted to 
believe them*
The appearance of special courses in Japanese 
language, which were then being offered in a number of 
localities, together with the growth in the number of 
self-professed pro-Japanese officials, served to lend 
added plausibility to the rumours*
In Viet-Ram, a country not remarkable for clemency 
towards the defeated side in war, there had always 
existed a strong impulsion to place oneself on the side of 
the victors* At the period in question, it appeared very 
plain to all Vietnamese that French power was visibly 
declining whereas the authority of the Japanese was grow­
ing, Political opportunists sought to further their own 
careers by early collaboration with the Japanese while 
ordinary citizens deemed collaboration to be no more than 
prudent. Personal ambition and the more fundamental
instinct of self-preservation dictated the course of co­
operation with the Japanese, while thoughts of resisting 
their seemingly overwhelming military might appeared 
entirely unrealistic<* Moreover, many of the Vietnamese
people were genuinely impressed by the high capability 
and strict discipline of the Japanese troops, just as 
they were frightened by the instant and drastic punish­
ment inflicted on all who offended against them.
Even the French administrators of Indochina, long 
regarded by the Vietnamese as arrogant and unheeding, 
then found it politic to show themselves extremely 
"flexible" and to offer concession after concession.
In the South, several nationalist leaders> prominent 
Trotskyites and the two politico-religious bodies, the 
Cao-Dai and the Hoa-Hao evinced their willingness to co­
operate with the Nippon forces in the "G-reater East-Asia 
programme"*
This delicate situation was capable of placing in­
superable tactical difficulties in the path of the 
revolutionary group headed by Nguyen Ai Quoc, who later
adopted the name Ho Chi Minh. lot only had Japan been
2for many years an enemy of the Soviet Union, " but she 
was also engaged in a devastating war against China, the 
country in which Nguyen Ai Quoc had been appointed to 
work by the Comintern, and where he had been ordered to 
collaborate closely with the Chinese Communist Party.
A further complicating factor was the conviction incul­
cated into all Communist Party members, that the Chinese 
Red forces would inevitably emerge victorious from the 
armed struggle. Moreover, since Japan had signed with
Germany an antiComintern pact: (25 November 1936), no 
dedicated Comintern agent could ever contemplate cooper­
ation with the Japanese forces *
On the other hand, the Stalin-Hitler pact of 29 
September 1939 and later, the Russo-Japanese agreement of 
non-agression (13 April 1941) seemed to suggest that coal 
ition with a rising power, be it Germany or Japan, might 
be viewed as a temporary policy of expediency under 
certain circumstances* Because, since the fall of Franc 
in Europe (June 1940), French power in Indochina had de­
clined steadily and Japanese forces were plainly engaged 
in a campaign to terminate it altogether, fighting the 
Japanese might well be construed as assisting France to 
maintain her colonial empire* Such action would surely 
destroy the anti-colonial image which constituted the 
principal popular attraction of any Vietnamese revol­
utionary organisation* ^
Anti-French feeling was undeniably rising to new 
heights in Viet-Nam, but it was accompanied by a deep and 
widespread apprehension*
In thejNghe-Tinh area, the home of many Vietnamese
revolutionaries, the French authorities had only just
5suppressed the mutiny of Do-Luong when they introduced
new measures designed to inspire terror and obedience in 
6the people* Many known opponents of the administration, 
together with suspects who included several Catholic 
priests, were arrested and incarcerated in the special
7political prisons of Dak To, Lao Beo, Boulo Condor aae
The painful and tragic aftermath of the Nghe-Tinh 
insurrection in 1930-1931 was vividly recalled so that
the majority of the people became fearful and compliant. 
The Nghe-Tinh movement had, indeed, been understood by 
the common people at that time, to be nothing more than 
a peasant demonstration to demand food and justice from 
the authorities. When it ended in several tumultuous 
riots which brought a heavy toll in human lives and in 
which red flags bearing the hammer-and-sickle emblem 
were everywhere carried, most of the participants were 
dismayed. When French forces started their onslaught, 
poor uncomprehending peasants with no means of defending 
themselves were left to die alone without any of the help 
or succour some of the instigators of the disturbances 
had promised them. To make matters worse, some of the 
rioters, identifying the French with Roman Catholicism, 
shouted anti-religious slogans and made vicious assaults 
on Vietnamese Christians, killing a few of them, includ­
ing one parish priest in Ha™Tinh* The campaign of 
religious conflict conducted by the Literati movement 
some forty years earlier recommenced. Moreover, the 
frightening slogan "Away with all intellectuals,,rich 
men, landlords and notabilities" which gained wide
currency at the time, installed terror and disillusion,
8
alienating a large section of the population* That 
Nghe-Tinh insurrection was later termed "anti-imperialist" 
but the overwhelming majority of Vietnamese people did 
not understand what it meant in 1930™1931 and even in the 
1940’s still could not grasp its meaning* For these 
people, the whole episode was simply a bloody Communist 
riot enticing the pointless shedding of much innocent 
blood* The formation of some revolutionary adminis­
trative committees, which, somewhat pretentiously termed 
themselves soviets, un Nghe-An and Ha-Tinh (hence the 
name Nghe-Tinh SOVIET given later to the event) confirmed 
the Communist character and the Russian origin of the
whole movement which proved to be, in several instances,
9anti-religious as well.
Thus, during this period, many people, Christian or
otherwise, were understandably afraid of being involved
in a Communist outbreak or a religious conflict under the
10banner of some strange revolutionary organisation*
Such was the situation of Viet-Nam in the early 
1940!s, a situation characterized by misery, oppression 
and fear, also confusion, pessimism and much division*
In some sections of the population, there was an obvious 
rebelling mood, especially among the poor and the young* 
Yet, Confucianist tradition was still the rule of life 
for the whole country, and people still believed that the 
destiny of the nation was entrusted in the hands of the 
emperor Bao Dai, together with the mandate of Heaven* 
Along this traditional respect for the legitimate auth­
ority, there was a widespread and strong feeling against 
Communism.
This was, indeed,not an entirely favourable"revol­
utionary situation". To avoid a disastrous failure 
like that of 1930, the Vietnamese Communists adopted, at 
first, a cautious attitude and remained faithful to the 
guidelines given to them some time before, namely
11... * to abstain from aiming too 
high in its demands (independence, 
parliament etc**.) lest it^iould
fall into the trap of the Japanese 
Fascists;
.... to claim only for the demo­
cratic rights - freedom of assoc­
iation, meeting, press and opinion, 
general amnesty for political 
prisoners;
to fight for the right of partici­
pating in legal activities."
This was really a safe measure to protect the secret 
organisation from French and Japanese suppression, to 
prepare and save its well-trained cadres for action at 
some more propitious juncture in the future, and also to 
avoid alienating the sympathies of other nationalist organ 
isations or of the very large numbers of ordinary people 
who had suffered severly in the wake of the Nghe-Tinh 
Soviet.
The second stage of this policy of caution demanded 
the erection of an entirely new revolutionary organis­
ation. In order to be effective, the new body would need 
not only a carefully elaborated and realistic plan of 
campaign, but the active support of the great majority of 
ordinary Vietnamese people. Moreover, the organisation 
would have to have competent leaders capable of attracting 
to it, people from all walks of life. The man who drew 
up the policy of caution which was adopted and imple­
mented by the Party, was Nguyen Ai Quoc, a Comintern staff 
member and the founder of the Indochinese Communist Party.
Nguyen was well aware that, in circumstances fraught 
with the many difficulties set out above, any revolution­
ary plan, to be successful, must first secure the approval 
of the patriotic educated classes, the collaboration of
all the divers Vietnamese political parties such as the 
Royalist, the Phuc Quoc (Restoration), the Dai-Viet 
(Great Viet Nam), the Quoc Dan Dang (Nationalist Party), 
and required above all else, the support of the people 
as a whole. There existed only one political course 
common to all strata of Vietnamese society as well as to 
every political party, the cause of national liberation 
from French colonial rule and the establishment of an 
independent Viet-Nam. If the unified support of the 
whole Vietnamese nation were to be won, then that cause 
alone should be propagated and every other political or 
ideological matter should be set aside.
Accordingly, Nguyen, who was a co-founder of the 
French Communist Party in the 1920's and had devoted 
the whole of his adult life exclusively to the estab­
lishment of a Communist regime in Viet-Nam, went to un­
paralleled lengths to conceal his own ideology and to 
extend to every Vietnamese, a patriotic appeal to join 
the struggle for national independence. His action 
represented no more than a tactical move made to 
satisfy the immediate requirements of the moment, and 
he certainly contemplated no abandonment of his Communist 
objectives. He was simply applying to the situation 
which existed in Vietnam, the political techniques he 
had acquired during his years of training in Moscow and 
implementing the strategy which had been successfully 
employed in Russia some years earlier, the two-stage 
revolution. The first stage demanded by that struggle
was a bourgeois-democratic revolution, to be followed
12later by the socialist or Communist revolution.
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Success in the first stage, namely the democratic 
revolution, demanded obtaining the actual participation 
of the whole population, old and young, rich and poor, 
workers, peasants, bourgeois and intellectuals as well, 
in a united national front, which aimed at a single 
objective, national independence* Such a national front 
was already in Nguyen Ai Quoc1s mind when he reported to 
the Comintern;
To attain those objectives, the Party 
must do its best to create a wide 
national democratic front which would 
include not only Indochinese but also 
progressive French, not only the 
iabouring classes but also the national 
bourgeoisie *
Towards the national bourgeoisie, the 
Party must be clever and flexible*
It must do its best to win the bour­
geoisie over to the cause of this Front, 
rallying to it all those who could be 
rallied, neutralizing all those who 
could be neutralized* They must not be 
excluded from the Front because that 
would push them over into the arms of the 
counter revolutionaries, thus rein­
forcing the reactionary camp* 13
Before it could command the approval and partic­
ipation of the whole people, a front of this kind had to 
be led by a man whose name could inspire respect and 
confidence* Since the name Nguyen Ai Quoc (Nguyen, the 
Patriot), had been identified with the disastrous Soviet 
movement of 1930-1931, this extremely shrewd and resource­
ful man prudently decided to shed that once magnetic name 
and adopt a new one; Ho Chi Minh (Ho, the most enlight­
ened) *
A most enlightened revolutionary to lead a united 
front for the salvation of the whole country! What 
could he better suited to the task? This was indeed, 
the first example of Vietnamese Communist persuasion at 
work.
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Footnotes for chapter II
1, The Japanese required the closing of the supply 
line to China and themselves assumed control of 
the Sino-Vietnamese border (19 June 1940);
G-overnor G-eneral Decoux was obliged to accept 
the entry of the Japanese forces into Indochina 
(September 1940), to yield specified tracts of 
Cambodian and Laotian territory to Thailand
upon a Japanese request, and to export Indochina’s 
rice, corn, rubber, coal and minerals to Japan 
(May 1941).
2. Russia can never forget her defeat by Japan in 
the 1904-1905 war* It is of interest that, 
during that war, Russian warships had to take 
shelter once at Cam Ranh Bay which, during the 
1960’s was to become a huge American base 
established to support South Viet Ram in the 
Vietnamese war*
3* As early as 1930, Ho Chi Minh told Nguyen Liidng
Bang in China: !tIf we wish to make further
progress, we must accept help from the Chinese 
Communist Party* Wherever he is working, a 
Communist must always place himself under the 
leadership of the local Party.” (Bac Ho\
Hanoi, 1960; p.60). See also the letter sent 
by the Chinese Communist Party to the Indo­
chinese Communist Party in 1934, quoted in 
Thirty Years of Struggle of the Party, pp.45-46,
4* Applying the tactic of ”phase politics”, the
Communist Party continuously changed their 
various fronts so as to remain in step with the 
requirements of the international situation or 
events: Anti-f^cist Front (1935), Anti­
imperialist people’s Front (1936), Indochina 
Democratic Front (1937), Anti-imperialist 
National Unified Front (1939), League for the 
Independence of Viet-Nam and National Salvation 
Front (1941) and so forth.
26.
5* Led by Sergeant Cung, a group of soldiers
mutinied and occupied the Cho Rang Post in 
Do-Luong, Nghe-An (13 January 1941)*
6* In Pho Ch.au (Huong-Son, Ha-Tinh) , Ho Hao
killed a Prench officer in protest and es­
caped with some of his men. After he had 
been captured and executed, by the order of 
the French, authorities at the Post of Pho 
Chau, H o 1s body was hung in a public place 
to be cursed by the passers-by. This king| 
of intimidation produced a double effect; 
people were genuinely frightened by it but 
they also came to hate their French rulers 
more.
7* Among the priests taken prisoner were Revs.
Le Suong Hue, Nguyen Hong An, Rev. Trieu and 
Rev. Huan.
/ v t!
8 . In ,Vietnamese; "Tri, Phu, BJ.a, Hao, Dao tan .goc, 
Troc tan r§?1. Later, the Central Committee
of Propaganda of the Vietnamese Communist 
Party declared it an incorrect slogan: "I tils
aim was to strengthen the Party hut it was 
found, in practice, to create difficulties 
for the movement" * Ba rmidi nam tranh dau 
cua -Bang (Thirty years of Struggle of the 
Party), Hanoi 1960); p.31.
9. This writer, while still a child, witnessed 
the funeral of Rev, Nguyen Nhang, the parish 
priest of Trang-Binh (Ha Tinh province) who 
had been killed and then burnt in his own 
church, Many of his parishoners and rela­
tives survive today in both North and South 
Viet Nam. A detailed account can be found 
in the Annales of the Society of Foreign 
Missions of Paris (1931)*
10. In the wake of the Nghe-Tinh Soviet, an anti­
communist campaign was launched; newspapers,
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pamphlets, folksongs.., tried to ”unmask 
Soviet Communism, denoixnce its violent, 
subversive, inhuman, anti-religious schemes11. 
The 11 Association of Reasonable Men” , was 
set up to warn the notabilities and the ed­
ucated people against the dangers of the 
!lThree Without',!1 (without family, without 
fatherland, without religion), propagated 
by the Communists and against the follhardy 
rashness of the pro-Soviet agitators” . The 
Catholic Church also strongly condemned the 
anti-religious deeds of the Nghe-Tinh 
Soviet Movement and denounced the militant 
atheism of the Communist doctrine. Con­
sequently, Communis^m came to be regarded 
as a curse and the name Nguyen Ai Quoc, 
closely identified with Communism, as an 
object of hatred. Offended by his sonfs 
disrespect, a father did not hesitate to 
call him ”a communist” (personal experience 
of this writer). A dog stealing a piece 
of meat in the kitchen was also compared to 
a communist (anecdote told by Dong Tung, a 
former comrade of Ho" Chi Minh). This 
anti-communist feeling, which was wide­
spread in the Nghe-Tinh area, was under­
standably denounced later by the Communist 
Party as "reactionary and anti-revolutionary”. 
Rf, Thirty Years of Struggle of the Party,
IianoiT^"T96Ql^T ^ ^ ^ o ^ T e t s d u " N g h e - T i n h , Hanoi; 
Editions en Langues Etrangeres, 1960, p.34.
1?
11. Ho Chi Minh, Tuyen Tap (Selected works),
Hanoi; 1960, p.201*
12. This two-stage procedure was also applied 
in the very beginning of his revolutionary 
career: Nguyen Ai Quoc first founded the 
Vietnamese Revolutionary Youth Association 
which was transformed only later into the 
Indochinese Communist Party. This same
28*
tactic regulated the whole course of his 
life-long political activities*
13. Ho Chi Minh, Op* cit* t p.201*
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Chapter III 
The Cuu Quoc Organisation 
and the DOG DAP, TU DO Theme,
As related in the previous chapter, throughout 
the period of the second World War, Viet Kara underwent 
a profound change in social life and a disastrous econ­
omic depression while the political atmosphere was 
tense and suffocating "because of the double yoke of 
Drench and Japanese domination at the same Time,
As misery became increasingly widespread, resent­
ment grew deeper and the Vietnamese people grew in­
creasingly restless, Nguyen Ai Quoc issued a letter 
solemnly indicting both “the French invaders” and the 
“Japanese plunderers”. Then, citing the “Heroic 
spirit” of the indomitable nation throughout the cen­
turies, the “Heroic feats” of the recent Viet revolu­
tionaries, and "the heroic example of the Chinese 
people” in their fight against the Japanese invaders, 
“Nguyen, the Patriot” raised high the banner of Doc 
Lap, Tu Do (Independence and l^reedom), to advocate an 
immediate national uprising:
The opportunity has come for our 
liberation,,,,Compatriots through­
out the country! Rise up quickly!
Saving the country is the common 
duty of the whole of our people.
Every Vietnamese must take part in 
it* He who has money will con- 
tribute his money, he who has 
strength will contribute his strength, 
he who has talent will contribute his 
talent.... 1
This “sacred call of the Fatherland”, Nguyen the 
Patriot took pains to address explicitly to “the elders
and prominent personalitites” , ”to rick x^eople, 
soldiers, workers, peasants, intellectuals, em­
ployees, traders, youth and women who warmly love
2youx* country1 *
Realizing the necessity of cooperation from all 
revolutionary forces, especially those elders and 
scholars, intellectuals and bourgeois who had taken 
part in previous organisations and activities dir­
ected by nationalist leaders like Phan Boi Chau and 
Phan Chu Trj.nh, he has a special message for them:
Revolutionary fighters!
The hour has struck! Raise aloft 
the insurrectionary banner and 
guide the people throughout the 
country to overthrow the Japanese 
and French! The sacred call of 
the Fatherland is resounding in 
your ears; the blood of our heroic 
predecessors who sacrificed their 
lives is stiring in your hearts!
The fighting spirit of the people 
is displayed everywhere before 
you! Let us rise up quickly! 3
After asking all his compatriots to "unite to­
gether” , to "have the same heart and mind” to save 
the country, he offered himself totally to serve the 
noble cause of the whole nation;
I pledge to use all my modest abilities 
to follow you, and am ready for the 
last sacrifice* 4
Olearly but indirectly, those brief words immed 
iately enthroned Kguyen the Patriot, as a shining ex 
ample of total dedication and skilful leadership* 
This moving appeal brought back to the mind of 
the Vietnamese people the fiery language of their
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national heroes, Iran Hiing Bao and Nguyen Trai, 
who had hoth successfully mobilized the whole people 
against foreign domination.
In Hanoi,undeclared Communists whose Party affi­
liation was still unsuspected, infiltrated various or­
ganisations, newspapers and other activities in order 
to make contact with their members and to urge these 
to work for "independence and freedom". They organ­
ized a Cultural Program to discuss the "culture of 
the new democracy", helped national bourgeois and in­
tellectuals like Duong Due Hien and the Thanh Ighi
»
(Excellent Opinion, the name of a high calibre 
periodical) G-roup to found "their own political party",
A ^
the Tan Dan Qhu (New Democracy), to add more political 
agitation among the people, especially the intelli­
gentsia and students.
Similar ideas and messages were sent to various 
parts of the country by means of clandestine papers 
which were of small size and had only two or four pages 
These well written papers, by emphasizing the need for 
Independence and Democracy, and appealing to the pat­
riotic sentiments of the people, proved to be highly 
effective as a means of propaganda. Their very names
were carefully chosen so as to convey some meaningful
•> /
message or explosive slogan: To Quoc (Fatherland),
Doc Lap (Independence), Nhan Dan (People), Gdu Quoc 
(National Salvation), Riai Phong (Liberation), Ghien
A^ '
Bau (Combat), TiennPhong (Vanguard), and the like
The majority of people did not know how to read or 
write, but these were not neglected by the Communist who 
made extensive use of Vietnamese popular literature, which
they rightly considered 1 the powerful tool of mass edu­
cation1*. The ordinary Vietnamese people always love
V
to hear and to learn hy heart many ca, ve (popular 
rhymes, folk songs). They also liked to spready any 
news around "by the most popular and inexpensive commun- 
ication medium, namely tieng don (humours). Accordingl 
the Communist leaders took pains to compose and to pop­
ularize some ca, ve to start some rumours in order to 
carry their messages deep down into the masses.
From this campaign of tuyen truyen mieng (oral pro­
paganda), people learned, for example, these popular
Nao ai khinh k_iep toi doi,
Mao ai mu8n, song cuoc^ ddi ti2 do,
Mau^ddng dddi ngon cb^  phan de 
Nghin tay gi6 nhili the mot, tay.
~Du8i thang Nhat^diet thang T&y ^ n 
Tham quan hao*chua ra tay tieu tru.
V
These verses, excerpted from Bai ca phan de (Anti­
imperialist song; see Appendix 12, page 456) may he 
loosely translated as follows:
Aren’t you despising the slavish life?
Aren’t you longing for a free life?
Under the anti-imperialist ‘banner quickly 
unite!
Together raise up your arms, a thousand 
as a single one.
Drive away the Japanese, destroy the French 
enemies!
Corrupted mandarins and brutal rulers, 
down with them!
Some other people imitated the bugle to sound 
out an appeal:
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V  ^  "*•
Chao^c6 ! M n g  c5 (ddng) s
Ta cung xong tran, tint diet thu!
G-iang tay cho ngon c6" bay *
06 bay, bay bay bay..,
C<f bay tren doi h&ng quan 
06'Doc lap! rang 6" (rang)
Toan"chau rang'ngdi! 6
SaluteI Raise the flag!
Let us charge! Destroy the enemy!
Open wide your arms before the flying flag.
The flag1s flying, flying, flying...
Plying over the Red Army 
The flag of independence 
Glorious over the universe! 
v
Suck Pi (whispering) method, being anonymous, was
extremely safe, especially when the ruling authorities were 
looking for proof,i to indict insurrectionary leaders. And 
yet, being popular, easy to learn, easy to ternember, those 
words proved an extremely effective form of propaganda in 
Viet Ram, a land highly fertile in rumour and whisper.
By means of rumours, folk songs, legal and illegal 
papers, pamphlets and books, the Communists succeeded in 
re-awakening that ardent nationalism which had so often been 
the driving force in the Vietnamese revolutionary movements 
of earlier times. Vietnamese people in all walks of life 
were already well conditioned by their own history to be­
come highly receptive to the call to arms to restore the 
nation’s independence and freedom. But, all Vietnamese are 
essentially pragmatic, and they had not forgotten the re­
peated failures of ill-fated patriotic movements during the 
previous hundred years, so they exercised prudence, and 
evinced a marked reluctance to embark on hazardous adventures.
Anticipating this reaction of doubt and fear, the 
Communist propagandists resorted to highly persuasive ways 
to dispose of possible disagreements, objections, opposi­
tion or reluctance.
To those who were afraid of French repression, there 
was a very convincing answer:
If we did not succeed, it was not 
because the French invaders were strong, 
but only because the situation was not 
yet ripe and our compatriots throughout 
the country were not yet of the same 
heart and mind. 7
Since France's defeat by the Germans, her 
forces have completely disintegrated....
In foreign policy, the French bow their 
heads and kneel down, shamelessly ceding 
our land to Siam; without a single word 
of protest, they heartlessly offer our 
interests to Japan. 8
By demonstrating;;with the aid of these and similar 
concrete examples of the French rulers' current weakness 
and wickedness, the appeal applied a sharp stimulus to the 
national pride of every Vietnamese calculated to arouse his 
anger against the French. But how could anybody reasonably 
be expected to dare to fight against the Japanese troops who 
had shown themselves strong enough to invade China and to 
thrust aside the French administration in Indochina? To 
the Vietnamese people, who were actually living in almost 
total isolation from the rest of the world, an authoritative 
assurance was offered in the form of a ’'Letter from abroad” 
by "Nguyen the Patriot” , who, people believed, must be well 
informed about the situation of the world outside Vietnam:
As to the Japanese, on the one hand 
they are hogged down in China, on the 
other they are hamstrung by the 
British and American forces, and cer­
tainly cannot use all their forces to 
contend with us. If our entire people 
are united and single-minded, we are 
certainly capable of smashing the 
wicked French and Japanese troops. 9
Even when their major objections had been convincingly 
answered and their emotions set ablaze by so eloquent an 
appeal and the emotive cause of Doc Ban (independence), 
the Vietnamese people were still troubled by one remaining 
difficulty. How was all this to be achieved? It was at 
that juncture that the Communist Party felt impelled to pro­
ceed from the first task facing it to the second, from the 
mobilization of the masses to the construction of the 
national united front
A national united front was believed to be "indispen- 
able” , as Truong Chinh, the then Secretary General of the 
Indochinese Communist Party, later explained:
Revolution is the work of the broad 
masses of people and not of the 
communists alone. Therefore, to make 
a revolution successful, it is necess­
ary to organize the masses and rally all 
the national and democratic forces into 
a broad front having a common political 
platform, reflecting the interests of 
all sections of the population and all 
social classes.... The platform, appell­
ation and composition of the front may 
be modified in conformity with the task 
of each revolutionary period so as to 
meet the immediate requirements of that 
period. 10
The broad front that answered the requirements of the 
Viet Nam situation in the 19401s was the Viet Nam Doc Ban 
Dong Minh Hoi (Literally: the Association of the Allied 
Parties for the Independence of Viet Nam), loosely trans­
lated as the League for Viet Nam Independence. It was 
abbreviated by contracting the first word of the long title 
with the last two, so that it became the Viet Minh Hoi 
(Viet Minh Association) or simply Viet Minh. This abbrev­
iated name was at the same time concise and harmonious, 
and its novelty appealed greatly to the Vietnamese people, 
who always attach much importance to the sound of a title 
as well as its underlying meaning. Besides their pecul- 
iar taste for what they term chdi chrt (playing with words), 
the Vietnamese, who were greatly influenced by the Con- 
fucian tradition,were-always preoccupied with the principle 
offchinh danh (rectification of names) whose meaning is 
conveyed by the precept governing it: danh chinh ngon
thuan (in order to speak effectively, one must use the 
correct term). Consequently, the term Viet Minh quickly 
became a subject for speculation and a topic of conver­
sation. Little wonder that when writing about the name 
Viet Minh, the official outline of the Indochinese Communist 
Party's History affirmed that it was "a name full of sign­
ificance which facilitated the mobilization of the masses' 
national spirit". 11
One "unofficial source" even went so far as to explain 
that the term Dong Minh (Allied Political Parties) in the 
title of Viet Nam Doc Lap Dong Minh Hoi indicated that the
Viet Minh organisation was Viet Nam's representative with 
the Dong Minh (the Vietnamese term for the Allies in World 
War II, U.S.A., Britain, Russia, France, China) in their 
struggle against the Fascists.
It was also rumoured that the Allied Countries were 
actually supporting the Viet Minh in military training, 
with arms and ammunition as well as with financial aid.
Several different origins are today ascribed to the 
Viet Minh, and these will he discussed later, hut in the 
1940!s the Viet Minh was introduced to the people hy the 
undeclared members of the Communist Party simply as a broad 
front formed to rally the different strata of people and 
the national revolutionary forces 1 to win back the Inde­
pendence of Viet Nam”.
Combined to form this Mat tran ViIt Minh (again a new 
term, meaning; Viet Minh Front), were all the mass organ­
isations of Ciiu Quoc, i.e., National Salvation or, to be 
more faithful to the Vietnamese language, Saving thet
Country”. This emotive term CtEu Quoc was a happy choice, 
conveying as it did the double connection of patriotism and 
of emergiency.
/
Indeed, the term Ctfu (help, save) is normally assoc- } / f 
iated ^ with vdt (lift from the water) to say cilu vdt i.e.,
to save or to rescue (literally; to save from drowning).
■ /  //The same term Qiiu may also be used with Cap (hurry, haste)
to form the compound word cap cilu meaning first aid,
emergency or 11 snatching from the jaws of death” . Because
of this connotation of imminent danger of death, the termt
Qdu is used in forming several succint expressions of 
emergency; ctiu ho a (fire emergency), cdu lut (flood alarm),
/ ' 
cdu doi (famine rescue) and the like. Since the term cdu
is equivalent to an urgent cry for help such as S.O.S.,
when applied to "our fatherland in danger" (to quoc lam nguy)
or to the organisations of a "national united front to save
the country", so appealing a term does not admit any pretext
for refusal or even delay in joining it.
( A/
Cdu Quoc and Viet Minh, those happily chosen terms 
were actually related to Chiu doi (famine rescue) in a 
highly persuasive appeal issued by the Viet Minh Front in 
1945 t
To prevail against the present famine, 
every one of us should seek admission 
to the Viet Minh in .order to ready him­
self for chasing out the Japanese.
Famine] Famine] Oh Famine] We must 
save our rice, capture the enemy's 
grain stocks, repel both French and 
Japanese. Our land is for us to cult­
ivate without having to pay tax* Our 
rice is to feed us without our being- 
robbed. To reach that goal, all our 
compatriots should join the Viet Minh:
Japs-French, go home]
Viet Nam be Independent] "
A direct appeal was also launched in the form of 
popular rhymes and entitled Bai ca Viet Minh (song# of the 
Viet Minh). To rekindle anger and hatred against the 
enemies of the nation, the campaign began with a litany of 
injustices that the Vietnamese had been made to suffer "at 
the hands of the French colonialists and the Japanese Fascists" 
A strong reaction against those foreign rulers was then fos­
tered by the narration of historical uprisings with famous 
battles and victories, National heroes were cited sub-
sequently to introduce "a sacred call from our fore­
fathers" ;
fV,v ’ A A /
■Bong bao hdi day ldi; tarn huyet,
D&y tieh nhan^ da; vi§t cho^ta,
Khuy&n ta giif lay mloc nha,
Khuy^n ta diing day diing co td do.
Bear compatriots,
Here's a confidential message,
A sacred call from our forefathers 
Urging us to save our fatherland,
Urging us to rise and to grasp freedom.
Anticipating that people might be tempted to think
of other patriotic and revolutionary organisations such asf
the Viet Nam Quoc Ban Bang (Nationalist Party), the Pai 
Vifet (G-reater Viet Nam) , the Phqc Quoc (National Restor-
A '  "" "'
ation), the Thanh Nien Ai Quoc (Patriotic Youth), the 
Thanh Nlen Tien Phong (Vanguard Youth) and so forth, the 
zealous propagandist globally and ruthlessly denounced all 
of these as pro-French, pro-Japanese and fake nationalist. 
After indicting other movements and parties of being 
traitorous, defeatist or duped by Frenchmen and Japanese, 
he introduced the Viet Minh Front as the best and the 
only way to save the country: using friendly but eloquent
and persuasive language, the song played on patriotic senti­
ments and self-respect to urge all men who love their 
country, including highland minorities, Cambodians, Laotians 
and Thais, quickly to join the Viet Minh Front;
Bong bao hoi Itruo’c nguy eo*
Nha tan nu’O’c: mat bay gio* hoi ai??_ 1 0 ' T *<Du’ong ctru niro’e cu’u noi duy nhat 
Co* Vi ft Minh da phat tren dau,
Cung nhau ta n&rn tay nhau
Khong phan ton giao^ ngheo giau,gai trad. 
Nao thien hg ai ngufo*i nghia khi,rf 
N^’ao iihan dan ai ke anh tai,
NLao do an ^nao hfi nhu»ng ai??
Nhtmg ai you nu*o*c;,ai ngu’oi Vi ft Nam?
NhSng ai muon danh tan gif© Phajp»
NhvSng ai mong cuu thoat giong noi,
Vi f t Minh tha tliiat^chao moi
Mau vao M&t^trfn dift load xam 1ang,
Cac do an the Vi ft Nam cu’u quoc
Dang ra tay don eu’O’g: an can.
Thq* thuyen,binh lihh,nong dan,,
Thanh nien, ph^nu*, v&n nhanjuhi dong,
Can phy lao,phu ong,d|a: chu,
B g, e ky hao , dien hf , thu'O’ng gia,
Hoi hon dab; tfg quo© gia,
Mau mau ^ tu tgp duoi cxo^P Vi ft Minh!
Muonig,Man,Tho bat binh Phap,Nhft,
Thai ,Mien,hao eung dat Dong-du’o*ng,
Nui rung to chx hien ngang,
Vi ft Minh nguyfn bu-o-c: len duo’ng dau tranh.
Bear compatriots! facing national 
disaster and personal suffering, whom 
should we turn to? Behold the Viet 
Minh the unique way to save our country. 
Let us rally together without distinc­
tion of religion, status or sex.
Where are our loyal and brave men?
Vi/here are our stouthearted groups and 
valient organisations?
You who love your country, who are truly 
Vietnamese, You who are determined to 
destroy the French enemy to save our 
own nation, the Viet Minh Front embraces 
all of you; various groups of National 
Salvation welcome you to the common 
struggle against the aggressors.
Workers, peasants, soldiers, students, 
intellectuals, young adults, seniors, 
women, children, bourgeois, notables, 
tx^adesmen, richfmen, landowners, all 
true nationalists, quickly rally under 
the Viet Minh banner!
Muong, Man, Tho, our minorities, who 
also hate the enemy, Thai, Mien, Lao, 
our neighbours on the same Indochina 
front, together with the Viet Minh, let 
us resolutely join the struggle to prove 
our heroic spirit.
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The propaganda song ends artfully on a happy note 
and a beautiful picture of an independent and free Viet Nam 
enjoying life under the Viet Minh flag:
f > *> v t
Diidi c<5 do sao ;vang nam canh,
H$i dong bao sat canh chen_ vai,
Viet Ham rieng mot goc gfcrdi 
X&y xx'en d6c l§.p mut>n dbi tii do.
Under the golden star on the red flag,
Dear compatriots! let!s rally solidly
To.build a glorious Viet Nam
For ever independent and totally free»
To such a pious profession of faith and hope, the 
Vietnamese people who had been aroused to awareness of their 
dire suffering from the loss of independence and freedom, 
could only respond with a resounding amen.
The next song many people learned from the Viet Minh
was the Hgu Tii Kinh (five '-syllable ode) which by associa­
tion of ideas, reminded them of the Tam Td Kinh (three- 
syllable ode), the popular preliminax’y lesson of ethics in 
the Gonfucian tradition. The Hgu Til Kinh, however, was
iiir~ii*Tfiniin! ■ iinn^ i~4~i niiirr iTmTm— raiiin!■ * *
solely concerned with the question nhow to organise a 
Viet Minh association?*1:
b  A  tS
Muon choo Hoi vung chac 
Tdhgntieu to lap nen 
Barden vchin hoi vien A>
Ph^ii bau ngddi trdong to ♦
Cii^hai ba tieu ;t&^
Phai cd ban chap hanh.
lu|,t phai nghi^m minh 
Moi thang hai ky hop.,,.
To have a solid foundation
Our association should start with small cells
having three to nine members
Who elect a leader for themselves,
A group of two, three cells
Should elect an executive committee*
Strict discipline must he maintained 
And bi-weekly meetings well attended.,.*
Since ’’saving the country1’ was the common duty of 
the whole nation, every Vietnamese was insistently urged 
to join some branch of ’’this great organisation” according 
to his age, sex, profession or even religious denomination: 
children, teenagers, youth, old people, women, workers, 
peasants, students, writers, Buddhists, Catholics... for 
National Salvation.
For each category, Cong, Nong, Binh, Bhu, (Workers, 
Peasants, Soldiers, Women), Ho Chi Minh himself had com­
posed some popular rhymes of sympathy and exhortation.
At the head of the list stood the workers, ’’the 
producers for the benefit of mankind”. Phey had had. to 
endure so much misery because ’’having lost their national 
independence, they had been cruelly exploited by the 
French and Japanese rulers” . Standing in the ranks of 
those poor workers, the old revolutionary Ho Challenged 
them to go forward in the van to liberate the country and 
liberate themselves;
Phd,thuyen ,ta phai dung ra, / ,
Priibc ta ciiu nu!oc sau ta ciiu minh,
Cung nhau vao hoi Viet Minh.
Ra tay jtranh dau hy s^nh mdi la.
Bao gib Kh'oi^phuc nude nlia , - 
Cua ta ta gilt, c'ong ta ta cam.
We, workers, must take the lead 
In saving the country and ourselves.
Let us join the Viet Minh
And spend ourselves in struggle and sacrifice! 
When the national restoration has been successful 
We shall keep what we own and enjoy the 
fruits of our work.
Next were the peasants, those landless peasants who 
had known nothing but hard work. Oppressed by the 
crushing taxes and corvees, and living a ”buffalo-like” 
existence, they had never enjoyed sufficient food, decent 
shelter or human dignity. Because it was their normal 
custom to invoke assistance from heaven, a 1 god-given 
opportunity1 was then offered to them:
Muon pha sach moi bat binh, ^
Bap cay phai ki^pi Vi^t Minh ma vao,
•Be. cung?toan quoc dong bao
Danh ^hap^ Nh'at, gay phong trao til do.
Bip n,ay la, dip, trcfi cho; ,
Lo cdu niLbc tide la lo cdu minh,
Mai sau thde liien^chxidng trfnh^  ^,
Nong d§n ce/ du ruong minh lain ah.
To abolish all injustice
Peasants should seek the Viet Minh and join it.
The national struggle for freedom 
Against the French and Japanese,
This is a god-given opportunity
To save the country and save themselves.
The programme will soon be realized,
Happiness is ”land for the tillers”.
The peasants allied with the workers would provide the 
main force of the revolution. But Vietnamese police and 
soldiers were ordered by their foreign officers to shoot and 
kill other Vietnamese whenever protests or insurrections 
broke out! Appealing to their sense of honour and nation­
alist sentiments, the revolutionary propaganda asked them to 
make a choice between, on the one had, the foreign oppressors
who brought so much suffering to Viet Nam, and on the other
their own compatriots who were struggling hard for the 
national salvation that is freedom and happiness for all:
Anh em binh linh ,ta ill
Chung ta cung g£ong qung noi Viet Nam,
Viec chi Idi n5d<p thi lam / ' _
Cdu dan, cuu m|£>c ha cain Item ngho’i,
Tropg tay da/ san sung hoi /
Quyet quay danh Nhat, danh Tay m'bi danh.
Tifhig thdm se, tac pil xanh: -v ^
”Quan nhaxi cdu qu6c” rang danh muon d6i.
Our compatriot soldiers!
We are brothers of the same Viet Nam race and 
nation.
Please do what you can for our country!
In saving the nation and the country, 
who can outdo you?
With guns ready in your hands 
Resolutely turn them on Japanese and French, 
History will engrave your everlasting names: 
’’Soldier Saviours” , glory of the nation!
Realizing that women constituted the majority of the 
population, exercised a great influence in Vietnamese 
families, and were less vulnerable to political revenge, 
the Communist leaders included them in their plans.
Citing the heroic examples of the Trung, Trieu ladies 
and of the young lady Minh Khai who had sacrificed her life 
after the Nam Ky (Cochinchina) Insurrection of November 
1940, Ho injected a challenge in his call:
Bay gid cd hoi da gan , t
Danh lay, danh.Nhiit, ciiu dan, cuu nha.
Cho n'en phu piT nd&c ^ta /
Phai do an fc'et lai d'e ma d'au tranh,
Bua nhau tva0^11&i-;Vi'et Minh vV -^ 5
lam cho ro matv chau ‘ Tien, con R^ng.
The moment is approaching
To fight the French and Japanese to save our 
Nation and our Families,
Women of our country,
Unite and fight!
Emulate one another in the 
Viet Minh,
Make it known, the great 
spirit of the Vietnamese 
As descendants of the Fairy 
and the Dragon,
Because of the foreign oppression, even children 
had to suffer poverty and ignorence. Being innocent 
and unsuspected, they could to© have a contribution 
to make:
Nguoi Ion cuu nuoc da danh
Tre em cung gop phan minh mot tay,
Bao gio duoi het Nhat, Tay,
Tre em ta se la bay con cung,
,”Nhi ding cdu quoc” hoi ta,
Ay la loje Idbng, By lk ciiu tinh,
A^ la Jdo ph%n Viet Minh,^ ,
Dan minh feh&c ciiu dan minh mdi xong.
True, national salvation is adults’ work 
But children have their share to con­
tribute •
When the French and the Japanese 
are defeated,
Our children will be much more 
cherished.
Our Association ©f Children for 
National Salvation is, indeed, our 
strength and our liberation.
This is a branch of the Viet Minh 
Front. Our people will do better to 
save themselves.
Bourgeois, intellectuals and landlords,persons 
who might feel uneasy in the mass organisations, were
invited to join the Viet Minh, ”lest they fall into 
the arms of the counter-revolutionaries”. The 
revolutionary movement had a message for them too:
Hoi ai con chau Hong Bang!
Chung ta phai M e t  ket doan mau raau,
Yeu nhau xin nho loi mhau
Viet Minh hoi ay mau mau tim vao,
0 descendants of Hong Bang 
(the legendary ancestors of 
the Vietnamese)!
Let us unite together quickly!
If we have mutual love for one another, 
please remember our mutual messages 
Let us join the Viet Minh soon!
What happened to those wh© did not join the 
Viet Minh? Those who consistently refused to be­
come Viet Minh members either by joining or helping
’^ ie cuu quoc organizations, were rightly labeled 
/ /v (
non-cuu quoc, but this relatively innocuous term sub 
sequently gave way to other, more derogatry terms 
such as phan dong (reactionary), or Viet gian 
(Vietnamese traitor), This newly invented term
pressure, a potent political weapon. Thus, a nev/ 
contribution to the art of political persuasion was 
added by a clever use of words.
Another interesting example of ”applied playing 
with words” was found in the case of Bao duy Anh, 
an outstanding scholar who was attacked and condemned 
as phan dong, A Viet Minh underground paper carried 
his political death sentence in popular rhymes and 
ended with the threatening verse;
developed into an instrument of dialectical
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Dao dil dao lo di thoij
(Oh Mr, Daol It’s time to
dao (dig) your gravel)
Ob. the above-mentioned forme of propaganda, 
the Viet Minh super-imposed a “higher form of 
struggle1 by adding military force to political ac­
tivities, which resulted in the creation of a Brigade 
of Armed Propaganda for National Liberation. 1his
Armed Propaganda Unit, with a name “full of signi­
ficance" , was introduced to people as a preliminary
show of forces
Because ours is a national resistance 
conducted by the whole people, we 
must mobilize and arm the whole people,,. 
Concerning tactics, we will apply 
guerilla warfare which consists in 
being secret, rapid, active, now in 
the Bast now in the West, arriving 
unexpectedly and leaving unnoticed.
The Viet Nam Armed Propaganda Unit 
for National Liberation is the first 
born unit. It is hoped that other 
units will soon come into being.
At first its size is small; its 
prospects, however, are brilliant.
It is the embryo of the Liberation 
Army and can move from North to 
South, throughout Viet Nam, 20
The effectiveness of these different forms of 
propaganda was determined by such factors as geo­
graphy and the situation obtaining in each locality. 
In the event, the Viet Minh movement reached more 
people in the North West area of the country (a 
mountainous region extending to the Chinese border 
which served as a sanctuary for the Viet Minh) and
in some of the larger cities such as Hanoi and 
Haiphong than elsewhere. In other areas, even 
in Nghe Tinh, the home province of Ho Ohi Minh and 
the traditional cradle of Vietnamese revolution, 
most people knew nothing of the Viet Minh and the 
Cuu Quoc Organisations until August 1945, after the 
defeat of Japan,
The Viet Minh, then;needed t© win the alle­
giance of those people who were still uncommitted 
because they had prudently decided to await de­
velopments before making up their minds. For the 
purpose of persuading them to "follow the crowd" and 
“side with the winner", Ho Chi Minh issued an appeal 
immediately following the Japanese surrender to the 
Allied Countries, which was perfectly designed to 
exploit the psychological shock induced by the de­
feat of this supposedly invincible forces
At present, the Japanese army is 
crushed. The Cuu Quoc Movement 
has spread to the whole country.
The Revolutionary Front of Viet 
Minhhhas millions of members from 
all social strata: intellectuals, 
peasants, workers, businessmen, 
soldiers, and from all national­
ities in the country; Kinh, Thb,
Hung, Mddng, Man, and so on. In 
the Front our compatriots march 
side by side without discrimin­
ation as to age, sex, religion 
or wealth.
The Viet Minh Front is at present 
the basis of our struggle and our 
national solidarity, Join the 
Viet Minh Front, support it, make 
it greater and stronger!
In this way, our Fatherland will 
certainly win Independence and
our people will certainly win 
Freedom soon.21
To emphasize nationalism and capitalize on the 
people1s patriotic sentiments, the Viet Minh leaders 
took pains to conceal their Communist ideology and 
such political activities as the “red organisations" 
and the conference of the Indochinese Communist Party 
in mid-August 1945. They chose, instead, to pub­
licize the news of a “National Assembly organised 
by the Viet Minh Front" at Tan Trao (16 - 17 August 
1945). This policy was thus rationalized at the 
above-said conference;
We must practice political prudence 
and firm perseverance. Prudence 
will shieid us from several disad­
vantages while perseverance will 
lead us to complete independence.
At the end of this war, any nation 
in the world that resolutely and 
single-mindedly seeks independence, 
will certainly be independent, 22
Accordingly, the Viet Iviinh Conference accepted 
a shrewdly worded programme:
1. Seize power, build a. Democratic 
Republic of Viet Nam on the basis 
of complete independence,
2. Arm the people. Develop the Viet 
Nam Liberation troops,
3. Confiscate the properties of enemies 
and traitors in order to national­
ize ox’ to distribute them to the 
poor, according to the circumstances.
4. Abolish all the taxes enforced by 
French and Japanese rulers; establish 
a just and light taxation,
5 . G-rant democratic rights to the people: 
human rights, property rights 
(private ownership), and civil rights
(universal sufforage, demo­
cratic freedom, equality of 
nationals and sexes).
6, Re-distribute communal lands; 
reduce land rent and interest rates, 
help the poor and the suffer­
ing,
7, Proclaim labour lav/s: eight- 
hour work day, minimum wage, 
social security.,..
8 , Build up national economy, de­
velop agriculture, open a 
national bank.
9, Reform national education, fight 
illiteracy, organize popular and 
obligatory education; build up 
the new culture.
10. Develop friendly relations with 
the allied countries and the 
small nations to secure their 
agreement and support. 23
Every speech in the Viet Minh "National Assem­
bly" emphasized national independence and freedom.
But such a noble cause unquestionably required 
organisation and leadership. At the suggestion of 
the Viet Minh leaders, which was at once approved by 
the Assembly, two "national committees" were officially 
established and the term Viet Minh was unobtrusively 
replaced with Dan toe (Na-tion, national).
The National Liberation Committee headed by Ho 
Chi Minh, published an exciting appeal, emphasizing 
once again the tu-do, doc-lap theme:
Now is the decisive moment of life 
or death for our nation. Our work 
for national liberation still faces 
many difficulties. To achieve our 
independence and freedom, there is 
only one way for our whole nation; 
union and struggle.,..24
In its capacity of "provisional Government",
Ho Chi Minhfs National Liberation Committee delegated 
"plenipotentiary authority" to the Insurrection 
Committee headed by Vo Nguyen G-iap, one of K o ’s lieu­
tenants and his future defense secretary.
The historian Tran Huy Lieu drafted the first 
Military order for G-iap’s Insurrection Committee, 
appealing for sacrifices on behalf of the Fatherland, 
and at the same time promising certain success:
Our dear people throughout the country*
Under the command of the Insurrection 
Committee, let our compatriots wholeheart­
edly support the Liberation Army, join 
the troops, dash to the battlefront to 
put our enemies to flight.
Our Fatherland asks for your great sacr­
ifices! 2^
Complete success will certainly be ours I
To strengthen motivation and obtain more enthus­
iastic support from all strata of the people, the Viet 
Minh publicized a very attractive platform concerning 
domestic policy. This ten-point programme written 
in a succinct, simple, and clear language, was prob­
ably the most appealing and most effective political 
handbill ever known in the history of Viet Nam. The 
brief platform answered the perennial popula]? complaint 
against heavy taxation, touched on the sensitive issues 
of religion and political restriction, considered the 
needs of all groups, professions, and walks of 
life, and promised to fulfill them.
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The ten-point domestic policy 
of the Viet Minh G-overnment.
1♦ Abolition of the poll tax which 
was required by imperialists0, 
new taxation very light and just. 
Freedom of belief and freedom of 
assembly;
2, Every peasant will have ricefields 
to cultivate and sufficient help 
to be prosperous in agriculture;
3. Eight-hour day for workers with 
sufficient salary for their 
families;
4* Obligatory schooling: State aid
for all children,
5, Free commerce for all citizens, 
abolition of miscellaneous taxes 
like sea tax, streetside tax, 
market tax and so forth;
6, Civil servants will receive worthy 
remuneration according to their 
talents;
7# Women are equal to men in every 
field, political, economic-as 
well as cultural; equal pay for 
equal work;
8, Soldiers will be highly esteemed 
for the defense of the Fatherland;
9» The old and the sick will be given 
help;
10, Infants will receive care, aid and 
protection from the State,
VIET—NAM Doc Lap Dong Minh 
(Viet Minh),
The aforementioned handbill was widely distri­
buted and posted in every prominent place after the
26defeat of the Japanese*
For the Vietnamese people who had suffered so 
long from oppression.and misery, and whose lives 
were constantly threatened by political abuse as 
well as periodic natural calamities, it was extrem­
ely difficult to resist such a tempting program.
To sophisticated Yfestern observers, the programme 
appeared politically naive or even "stupid", but it 
must be borne in mind that to the inexperienced 
Vietnamese public, subjected for many centuries to 
the system of absolute monarchy, democracy was 
completely novel and politics a rare luxury. The 
Viet Minh domestic program, on the other hand, 
promised to satisfy those aspirations for freedom 
and security that lie deep in the heart of every 
Vietnamese. little wonder that in the exciting 
atmosphere of sudden change during August 1945, 
strongly motivated, on the one hand, by the noble 
cause of national independence and freedom, and on 
the other, by self-interest, the Vietnamese masses 
excitedly welcomed the ten-point policy of the Viet* 
Minh and, explicitly or tacitly, embraxed the Guu 
Quoc organisations without weighing the issue of 
communism at all.
Towards the end of August 1945, the official 
programme of the Viet Minh with more details was 
published in the Dan Bao (People’s Newspaper) (a
copy from Dan Bao n.687, 28 August 1945, is included 
in the Appendix: B$). If this is compared with the 
ten-point program of 1930-31 (See the Appendix B2) 
some important changes are at ©nee discernible. 
Besides adjusting the slogans to the political sit­
uation of the moment (the French had already been 
ousted by the Japanese and no longer excersised 
authority), the Viet Minh decided to broaded the 
national united front for independence by incor­
porating tradesmen, intellectuals,ireligious
elements, the bourgeoisie and even some landlords
27into the Cuu Quoc organisations* To attract the
bourgeoisie and the landlords, the Viet Minh deemed 
it necessary temporarily to put aside the slogan:
"To confiscate landlords’ land", and to put forth, 
instead, the slogans: "To confiscate imperialists1 
and traitors’ land" and "to reduce land rent and 
interest rates". The right to private ownership 
and to free enterprise was also made clear in the 
longer form of the Viet Minh Program;
Policy toward the various social strata;
1, The bourgeois having the right
to free enterprise are encouraged 
and helped by the government to 
develop the necessary industries;
2. The landowners' right of private 
ownership is respected; they 
are encoux,aged to exploit uncul­
tivated land.
3* The tradesmen are free to travel and 
to carry on their business since 
commerce is guaranteed by law.
The miscellaneous taxes are elim­
inated, 28
Likewise, to obtain the support of the Buddhists,
Catholics and other religious elements, the Communist
leaders felt it more effective to drop the slogan
2911 To confiscate the land of the Churches51* They
took pains to deny any anti-religious policy and to 
emphasize, instead, the religious freedom mentioned 
in the second slogan of the ten-point policy of the 
Yiet Minh Front*
This policy ©f subordinating ”for the moment” 
all social and class questions to the national issue 
of Independence and Freedom was later acknowledged to 
have been an “extremely flexible tactic enabling the 
different classes of enemy to be identified and con­
centrating the attack against the main enemy alone” * 
Thus it became possible to x'ally the maximum force 
for the declared purpose of saving the country and 
liberating the nation*
Furthermore, the Communist policy and tactics 
were based on the economic conditions existing in 
Yiet Nam at that time* In this field, the develop™ 
ments which most profoundly affected the Vietnamese 
people during 1945 were the terrible famine brought 
on by poor harvests and the policy of rice requisi­
tion by the colonial authorities* The undeclared
communists availed themselves of the opportunity this
/  /  ,
offered to issue the slogan cddp gao cdu dol (seize 
rice to relieve hunger), led people in demonstrations 
demanding ”rice and rights” and used “honour units"
(meaning assassination squads, parts of the Armed 
Propaganda Unit) to warn notables, civil servants, and 
rich people not to exploit the rice shortage* By 
mixing economic slogans with political ones and mili­
tary force with political activities, the Viet Minh 
tried to create for themselves the image of a pat­
riotic and powerful organisation which championed the
51vital and immediate interests of the masses.
The Viet Minh had shown themselves to be skilful 
organisers astute propagandists, and adept at mobil­
izing the masses to serve their own purposes; now 
they showed they also possessed a well developed sense 
of timing. Their rare combination ©f political 
crafts was publicly demonstrated for the first time 
in Hanoi on 17 August 1945, when a meeting of the 
Civil Servants1 Association, organised in support of 
the Tran Trong Kim Government (under Bao Dai in Hue), 
was transformed into a public demonstration in favour 
of the Viet Minh. ^
The period was one of complete confusion. The 
French had been overthrown by the Japanese several 
months before but the victory of the Allied Forces 
over Japan revived their all but abandoned hope of 
somehow regaining colonial power in Indochina. The 
power of the Japanese troops in Indochina remained 
unimpaired but was immobilized by their Emperor's 
official surrender to the Allied Powers. In Viet Nam
Tran Trong Kim’s Cabinet bad just resigned and the 
Emperor Bao Dai was seeking more able men to cope 
with the difficult situation. The moment cried out 
for strong national leadership*
At the very moment, those Viet Minh members who 
had infiltrated Hanoi and the Civil Servants’ Assoc­
iation, cleverly converted the latter’s public meet­
ing into a massive and noisy welcoming party for the 
Viet Minh by employing a flood of political novelties? 
anti-fajcist, independence and democratic slogans, Viet 
Minh handbills, posters and signboards, Viet Minh 
cadres carrying guns, firing shots in the air, and 
above all, innumerable Viet Minh flags with bright red 
background and golden star* The whole operation 
provided ample evidence of a superb organisation with 
strong leadership. The whole city was stunned and 
people were deeply impressed if not altogether en­
thusiastic.
This overwhelming show of force opened the way 
for more pxxblic propaganda and “armed demonstrations” 
of which the largest one, on 19 August 1945, led a mob 
to occupy the Bac Bo Phu (North Regional Government 
Office), Toa Doc Ly )City Hall) and other public build­
ings, including the headquarters of the Security G-uard 
(similar to City Police and officially under the 
Japanese control). All was successfully organised and 
directed by the Viet Minh Front without any apparent 
opposition.
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Three days earlier, the first "Liberation 
Troops", under the command of Vo Nguyen G-iap, had 
solemnly departed from Tan Trao to liberate Thai 
Nguyen tovm. It was reported that on 19 August 1945* 
at 1:00 p.m., they had barely reached Thinh Dan vill­
age, west of Thai Nguyen, when the people of Hanoi 
rose to sei^e power in the capital! There was
general consternation at the appearance of two plat™ 
oons called "Viet Minh Liberation troops" marching 
"mot, hail mot, had!" (one, two! one, two!) through 
some of the most populous quarters of Hanoi. Though 
still poorly dressed and ill equipped these men were 
the first Vietnamese troops not commanded by foreign 
officers, to march in Hanoi since the end of the 19th 
century! In a country which sets as much store by 
symbol and myth as Viet Nam does, the effect upon the 
masses, was very great indeed and its psychological 
impact was heightened continuously by Viet Minh 
inspired rumours.
In an atmosphere of stunned admiration and ex­
citement, the Viet Minh Liberation Committee was in­
stalled by acclamation from a huge and anonymous crowd. 
Exploiting this unchallengeable demonstration of pop­
ular support, the Liberation Committee acting "in the 
name of the people", despatched a telegram to Emperor 
Bao Dai to demand his abdication in favour of the 
"People!s Revolutionery Committee" which was formed 
by the Viet Minh Front.
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'54-Following the example of Phan Ke Toai, 
the former representative of the Emperor in the North,
1 a group of (unnamed) intellectuals’’ reportedly cabled 
advice to Bao Dai to accept the demand of the Viet 
Minh, 11 a new and powerful Party having some troops 
and enjoying the support of the Allied Countries”*
On 23 August 1945? the Viet Minh committee in 
Hue issued an ultimatum to the Emperor Bao Dai de­
manding that he notify the Japanese authorities 
that the Royal Court of Hue ’’had transfered nation­
al power to the revolutionary government” and that 
he assign the Royal Guard Battalion (doi linh kho 
vang) with their arms to the revolutionary government*^ 
The deadline for Bao Dai’s reply was 13:30 on the same 
day and, as the hour approached, large crowds of de­
monstrators summoned by the Viet Minh were marched 
around the imperial citadel shouting revolutionary 
slogans.
Moreover, while the royal court was occupied
with painful deliberations over the demand on the part
of the revolutionaries, stupefying news reached the
\
royal palace: two prominent mandarins, Pham Quynh
and Ngo Dinh Khoi, who had once served Ban Dai, had 
been seized and killed by the revolutionaries] Over­
whelmed by a wave of shock and apprehension, the 
Emperor and his Council rapidly decided that he should 
’’transfer authority to the Republican Democratic 
Government” and be pleased to become a simple citizen
of an Independent country”.
Predictably all Viet Minh newspapers and other 
media endeavoured to create the impression that Bao 
Dai ”had voluntarily abdicated his throne, preferring 
national independence to his royal throne”. However, 
Hokng Trung Thilc (meaning Truthful) was probably 
more accurate in his statement concerning Bao Dai’s 
abdication, published in Hanoi twenty two years 
after the historical event:
Bao Dai’s abdication was not, 
indeed, a truly ’’voluntary11 act 
performed of his own free will; 
it was rather revolutionary 
force applied through a flexible 
tactic that forced the king to 
choose between his throne and his 
own head. 36
After Bao Dai had expressed his consent in 
order to save his own life, three Viet Minh repre- 
sentatives (Nguyen Luting Bang, Tran Huy Lieu and 
Gu Huy Gan) were sent to the I'oyal capital to witness 
the abdication ceremony on 30 August 1945, and to 
bring the An Vang, Kiem Ngpc (Gold Seal and Jade Sword), 
symbols of the royal authority, to Ho Chi Minh, the 
Viet Minh leader who had quietly taken over the reins 
of authority in Hanoi,
At the same time, the new provisional Government 
headed by Ho Chi Minh, issued a proclamation to intro­
duce an ”enlarged Cabinet” with members carefully 
selected from several different groupings so as to 
create the impression of a truly representative nation­
al united Government, Emphasizing again the twin
themes of independence and freedom, the veteran re­
volutionaries appealed persuasively for support and 
allegiance to the new government:
Dear compatriots]
The National Assembly met on 
16 and 17 August 1945 and elected 
the Viet Nam National Liberation 
Committee, which is now the People’s 
Provisional Government, to lead our 
people in the struggle for indepen-„ ^ ^  wmiwmid t . nr r
dence.-
On the historic date, 19 August 
1945, political power over the whole 
country passed into the hands of the 
Viet Nam Liberation Committee, Sol­
idly unified into a single bloc, the 
whole nation gave full support to the 
new Government. Bowing to the will 
of our people, the king agreed to 
abdicate and to transfer power to the 
People’s Provisional Government.
The National Salvation Movement swelled 
tremendously and all strata of the 
people have been exceedingly enthus™ 
iastic.,,,
...In order to make the Provisional 
Government fully representative of 
the national united front, the 
National Liberation Committee, follow­
ing the order of President Ho Chi 
Minh, has decided to reform itself by 
inviting some additional personalit­
ies to share with the Government the 
heavy responsibility entrusted by the 
people,
The Provisional Government is not a 
government of the Viet Minh front as 
it is wrongly understood by some to 
be, nor is it a government formed 
from representatives of political par­
ties. It is rather a Government of 
National Unity to lead the whole 
country.
•••Let the whole nation close 
ranks under our national flag and 
give full support to the Provis­
ional Government in ox^der to win 
freedom, independence and restor­
ation for our beloved Fatherland 
for so long shattered by the enemy. 
Our national struggle for inde­
pendence 9 freedom, and happiness 
still continues. Our cause of 
national liberation still encoun­
ters many obstacles. Let the 
whole nation ea.gerly follow the 
order of the Government and struggle 
at the cost of any sacrifice for 
the preservation of our complete
The French had submitted to the Japanese, who 
in turn surrendered to the Allied Powers; Tran 
Trong K imfs Cabinet had resigned, and Emperor Bao Dai 
abdicated. At this time of unprecedented confusion, 
only one fact emerged clearly, that a political vacuum 
existed, and people longed for strong leadership, even 
praying for some nations.! hero, some messiah. At that 
precise moment, the Yiet Minh leaders stepped forward 
officially to declare to the Vietnamese and to all 
nations of the world that they themselves, under the 
inspired leadership of Ho Chi Minh, had fought for and 
won freedom ce for Viet Ham.
Our slogans for this period
are:
Unite the whole nationI 
Fight for complete 
independence!
win. 37
.United in the fight, we shall
The Declaration of Independence
While the Allied Forces were drawing up plans 
to disarm the Japanese troops in South East Asia, 
the Viet Minh Front embarked on a campaign to seize 
local political power as soon as the news of Japans 
surrender to the Allies reached it* Viet Minh 
strategy was quickly to set up a Provisional Central 
Government in Hanoi and to proclaim the independence 
of the country so that upon their arrival in Viet 
Ham, the Allies1 representatives would be confronted 
by a fait accompli.
Moreover, the Viet Minh realized that, at the 
end of the Second World War, any government in South 
East Asia, hoping to survive, must secure the support, 
or at least the approval, of the Allied Nations head­
ed by the United States of America, For the Viet­
namese to win such approval, it was necessax'y to 
create the impression that the new state of Viet Ham 
was founded on the solid basis of that freedom so long 
cherished by Americans and the other peoples opposing 
the Fascists during the Second World War.
Ho Chi Minh, therefore, opened the Declaration 
of Independence with a quotation from the Declaration 
of the United States of America;
All men are created,equal.
They are endowed by their Creator 
with certain inalienable rights, 
among these are Life, liberty and 
the persuit of Happiness,
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Relating that American statement to the case of 
Viet Nam, Ho explained;
In a broader sense, this means;
All the peoples on the earth are 
equal from birth, all the peoples 
have the right of life, of Happi­
ness and Freedom. 39
That related quotation was intended to identify 
Viet Ham with America, Vietnamese independence with 
American independence, and thus to counter in advance 
any objection which the United States or Allied auth­
orities might raise against the new government of 
Viet Nam. It would also serve to reassure the Viet­
namese people and the Free World that Ho Ghi Minh's
Government would not prove to be Communist in nature,
since he had indirectly referred to the authority of 
God by using the term "Creator” at the very beginning 
of his proclamation.
But the French Government appeared very likely 
to insist on the restoration of its former authority 
over Viet Nam and Indochina. To weaken such claims 
and to reduce the effectiveness of any political and 
diplomatic manoeuvering on the part of France, Ho 
presented another "undeniable truth" taken from the 
Declaration of the French Revolution;
All men are born free with equal
rights, and must always remain
free and have equal rights,. 40
This noble principle, cherished by every French­
man from childhood, was here cited in stark contrast
to a long catalogue of alleged French, crimes 
against humanity and justice. If the statement of 
noble principle disarmed the French, the list of 
accusations following it certainly aroused the anger 
and hatred of the Vietnamese, including the national 
Bourgeoisie whose injustices suffered at the hands of 
the French colonial authorities, were singled out for 
special mention. And, naturally, the Vietnamese 
heartily applauded their revolutionary leader who 
posed as a brave champion of their vital rights.
Selecting his word with all the care of an emi­
nent jurist, Ho avoided indiscriminate condemnation 
of France as such, for he hoped, and indeed needed, 
to win the support of some sections of the French 
people. So, vehemently, but with much discretion 
and shrewdness, Ho indicted "the French imperialists" 
for having betrayed not only the Vietnamese people, 
but also the Allied Nations:
In the Autumn of 1940, when the 
Japanese fascists violated Indo­
china’s territory to establish 
new bases against the Allies, 
the French imperialists went down 
on their knees to offer our country 
to the Japanese. 41
This followed very closely the lines of argu­
ment advanced by the French Liberation Movement 
(headed by Be Graulle) against the policy of Marshall 
Petain and Admiral Becoux, Hence, the anti-Vichy 
elements as well as every Frenchman who did not wish 
to risk identification as an ".imperialist" or a
"coward*1, found it politic to accept the statements
a 2
of the Vietnamese Liberation leader.
Ho *s argument, indeed, went further; since the 
French colonial administrators, by their flight or 
surrender, "had twice sold Viet ham to the Japanese", 
they had de facto forfeited France1s status of 
"profector":
From the autumn of 1940, our country 
had in fact ceased to be a French 
colony and had become a Japanese 
possession.
The truth is that we have seized our 
independence from the Japanese and 
not from the French, 43
Anticipating the traditional objection on the 
basis of legitimate authority, the experienced pro­
fessional revolutionary calmly mentioned the fact 
of Emperor Bao Dai1s abdication which the Viet Minh 
Front had obtained through cleverly applied pressure 
a few days before. Ho, then, presented an entirely 
predictable conclusion concerning "a nation that has 
fought side by side with the Allies against the 
fascists", and a fait accompli;
After the Japanese had surrendered 
to the Allies, out whole people rose 
to regain our national sovereignty 
and to found the Democratic Kepublic 
of Viet Ham.
Viet Ham has the right to be a free 
and independent country - and in fact 
it is already free and independent. 44
Thus, the Democratic Republic of Viet Bam was 
born as the fruit of what the Communists proclaimed 
a "National Democratic Revolution",
To convince the Vietnamese people of itis 
"National Democratic" character, all Communist slogan 
and Marxist expressions were temporarily discarded 
from the public appeals and official notices of the 
Viet Minh. The terms Independence and Freedom, on 
the contrary, were repeated on every possible occas­
ion (seven times each in Ho Chi Mimh's appeal for 
general insurrection, and six times each, in the last 
part of his Declaration of Independence alone).
For the same purpose, on 11 November 1945, the 
Indochinese Communist Party had declared its own 
dissolution and the closure of C<3 G-iai Phong (Liber- 
ation Banner), its official organ. Likewise, 
General Elections were held and a "very democratic" 
Constitution was presented and approved in 1946 
(only to be suspended the next day without ever being 
promulgated) in order to avoid unfavourable reaction 
from the Vietnamese people and other nations who dis­
approved Communism as a totalitarian regime.
Truong Chinh's explanation of the "voluntary 
dissolution" shed a most revealing light on those 
political manoeuvres:
The voluntary dissolution of the 
Indochinese Communist Party pre­
vents the reactionaries from 
slandering us and from sowing 
division either in our National
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United Front or between the 
Democratic Republic of Viet 
Nam and the Allied Countries,
The -voluntary dissolution, 
indeed, makes the member organ­
isations in the Viet Minh Front 
believe that the Indochinese Commun­
ists are faithful to the Viet Minh 
program of National Salvation,.,.
After all, such a Voluntary disso­
lution is not a betrayal of the 
Communist ideal. On the conti’ary, 
since it serves to further the 
work of National liberation» the 
dissolution of the Party is a good 
way to serve the Communist ideal, 46
Six years later, when the Communist Party
emerged under the new name of the ,!Viet Nam Workers' 
Party" (February 1951), Ho Chi Minh candidly explain­
ed its previous withdrawal into the underground as a
"painful measure" to pave the way for the Party "to 
give discreet and more effective leadership":
The greatest concern was evinced 
about the Party's proclaimation 
of voluntary dissolution* But, 
in reality, it went underground.
And though underground, the Party 
continued to lead the adminis­
tration and the people.
We recognise that the Party’s 
declaration of dissolution 
(rather an immersion, indeed) was 
a good measure. 47
Those "good measures", Ho jubilantly hailed as 
basic elements of success;
Thanks to the clear-sighted and 
resolute leadership of our Party, 
and the solidarity and enthusiasm
of the entire people within the 
Viet Minh Front, the August 
Revolution was successful* 48
The Viet Minh revolution was not, in fact, an 
arduous military revolution like the American, French 
or Russian Revolutions, because the abrupt end of the 
Second World War in the Pacific had created a poli­
tical vacuum in Viet Nam* The French troops had 
been disarmed by the Japanese who, in their turn were 
defeated by the Allied Forces after atomic bombs had 
been dropped in Hiroshima and Nagazaki. Having no 
military force whatsoever, the Royal Cabinet of Bao 
Dai was confused, intimidated, and disorientated by 
rumour, pressure and "armed propaganda" on the part 
of the Viet .Minh* The Royal Court of Hue fell into 
despair when the Emperor's appeal to the Allied
Powers was met with ominous silence, and finally
4Q
surrendered its national authority. J Political 
power thus became "a ripe fruit dropping from its 
withered stem" - to use Truong Chinh's words and 
fell into the hands of the Viet Minh leaders who had 
been so trained as to make the right move at the right 
moment. ^
So, the Viet Minh power seizure has become a 
"successful revolution". It was a self-proclaimed 
champion of national independence just as the American 
revolution of 1775 was, and of those democratic free­
doms which the French had demanded in 1789* At the 
same time it was the instrument by which an undeclared
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proletarian party seized governmental power as had 
happened in the Soviet revolution in 1917* This 
curious combination of different revolutionary 
models was later baptized under the innocent and 
attractive name of "national democratic revolution”*
Indeed, that "first-stage revolution" was led 
to success by those skilful Communist leaders who 
knew how to turn their Yiet Minh organisation into 
a United Front for National Salvation to rally the 
whole people under a single banner, not of Commun­
ism but rather of Independence and Freedom,
As early as 1930, Ho Chi Minh had advised his
comrades to aim first at national liberation rather
than to talk about international proletarian!sm, and
prescribed, the reawakening of patriotism in each
compatriot as the necessary prerequisite of winning
51popular support* That prudent prescription was
well observed in 194-5 and the importance and effic­
iency of the Doc lap* Tu do theme was proudly acknow­
ledged in the latest official history of the Commun­
ist Party:
The Yiet Minh programme so co­
incided with our people1s yearn­
ing for independence and freedom 
that all Yietnamese who loved 
their country spared no effort to 
implement such a program* Con­
sequently, the Yiet Minh Organ­
isation was developing fast. 52
Thereupon, Ho Chi Minh himself contributed a most 
revealing comment in relating that practical and
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successful strategy to the achievement of the 
Party1s ultimate goals
The wider the Viet Minh Front 
developed, the deeper our Party 
grew... Because the Party1s 
policies were correct and were 
implemented in a timely and 
flexible wasy..., a political 
party only fifteen years of age 
has led the revolution to 
success, and seized power through­
out the country. 53
Thus, what the Viet Minh Revolution seemed to 
be, history has proved since, became incalculably 
more important than what it was in reality. Gnu 
Quoc organisations and the theme of Doc lap. Pu do 
played the key role in bringing success to the 
Communist Party.
In broader terms>the banner of National Sal™ 
vation, Independence,and Freedom is only one aspect 
of the United Front tactic. Another application of 
this far-reaching strategy is the Communist Alliance 
policy which will be the subject of the next chapter.
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Chapter IV
The Unity Theme and the Alliance Policy,
Addressing a special training session of Communist 
members in Hanoi, Ho Chi Minh asserted that in 1945 all 
over the country the Communist Party had only about five 
thousand adherents. This small minority, however, 
had rallied and led the whole nation to achieve the 
August Revolution in that year because, according to Ho, 
the correct policies of the Communist Party were carried 
out opportunely and very flexibly. One of the most im­
portant of these in ensuring Communist success was the 
alliance policy which so well combined both elements, 
opportunity and flexibility.
Section One: The formulation of the alliance policy.
The starting point of the Communist theory of
revolution is always the recognition of contradictions
between social classes. The Indo-chinese Communist
2Party, not long after its foundation, has issued in 
October 1950, a Political Programme which underlined the 
basic contradiction between the workers, peasants and 
miserable labouring people on one side, and the imper­
ialists, feudalists and bourgeois on the other.
During the Nghe Tinh Soviet Movement (1930-31) the 
Communist Committee of Central Yiet Nam pointed out
f ) "v.
Tri0 Phil, Dja.,. Hao (intellectuals, rich men, landlords, 
and notabilities) as enemies of the revolution and agents 
of French imperialism. Thus, the Communist ins^^rrection 
of 1930-31 was trying to overthrow the French colonial, 
rule and the royal administration, to set up local soviets
in the advance to the establishment of a soviet govern-f l Vment, to attack several categories (Tri, Phu, Hao)
among the Vietnamese people, to confiscate the proper- 
ties of the landlords, rich men, churches, to redist­
ribute the land, and even to suppress "superstitions’1 ^ 
(this communist pejorative term includes in fact, any 
kind of religion and belief)*
As a result, the Nghe Tinh Soviet Movement was 
doomed to failure because the revolutionary force did not 
measure up to the established power of so many enemies 
attacked at the same time*
The Comintern later criticized this whole movement 
of several heavy mistakes* There was, at first, a 
detrimental division among the workers when the "blue 
workers’1 (the technicians dressed in blue) were disc­
riminated against the "brown workers” (the nan-skilled, 
workers dressed in brown like the factory cleaners, for 
example)* Besides, the attack against the national 
bourgeoisie and. the churches, the diffidence against the 
petite bourgeoisie and the incorrect slogan "to wipe out 
Tri, Phu, B ja, Hao” only helped to create more enemies, 
whereas the "number.one principal fo'B^was not specified* 
Moreover, the overemphasis of proletarian international­
ism at the expense of nationalist sentiments, and the 
lack of a national united front constituted the main 
weakness♦
Drawing a lesson of experience from that disastrous 
failure, the Indochinese Communist Party took consider­
able pains to develops a very flexible policy with the 
purpose of having "more friends and less foes” , namely 
the alliance policy* This policy Is fundamentally
based on the principle of unity of action which consists 
In selecting a goal common to various groups and then 
focusing all the available forces on its achievement*
Throughout many yars of study, practice, revision 
and improvement, the Communist leaders fostered the pro­
gressive evolution of that policy into a sophisticated 
and highly effective "revolutionary strategy” * It was 
later defined by the outstanding Marxist theoretician 
Truong Chinh as:
the science of discerning the enemy, 
the driving force of the revolution 
and the allies of the working class 
at each strategic stage or in each 
period of strategic significance, 
in order to muster all the revolu­
tionary forces , win over allies 
and isolate the enemy to overcome 
him*
In determining the target of the struggle, the 
Communist Party singled out the principal enemy to over­
throw at each given stage of the revolution* Generally, 
the double enemy of the people’s national democratic 
revolution has been named "aggressive imperialism” and 
”its agent and support, the feudal landlord class” *
But the specific imperialist enemy was ”Prench colonial­
ism” in the 1930-36 period, the "French fascists and the 
French colonial reactionaries in Indochina” during the
1936-39 period, the "Japanese and French fascists” from
7August 1940 to March 1945* After the Japanese coup
d ’etat of the 9th of March 1945? ”the Japanese fascists 
became the main, immediate and sole enemy of the Indo-
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8C h i n e s e  peoples'1*
During the resistance war against the French troops 
(1945-54) 9 the main enemy was again the "French colonial-™ 
ists", with which were coupled their supporters, the 
"American interventionists". Since 1954, the principal 
enemy has heen the "American imperialist aggressors", 
supported by the so called "lackeys" or "puppet govern­
ment in the South".
likewise, the Vietnamese fuedal landlord class was 
itself subdivided and the special section selected to be 
eliminated in each successive phase were first the king, 
the mandarins, and local notabilities during the 1950-39 
period, the "traitorous feudalists, puppets in the 
service of the Japanese and French fascists" from 1940™
45, the "pro--Japanese reactionaries" from the 9th of 
March 1945 to the August revolution, then the "pro- 
Chiang Kai shek feudalists", the "pro-French puppets" 
and later the "pro-American puppet administration in 
South Viet-Nam". Attached to the feudal landlord class
Q
was the comprador bourgeoisie as a secondary enemy.
After discerning the enemies - general and specific, 
principal and secondary, the Communist strategist applied 
the Marxist-Leninist method to analyse the attitudes of 
the different classes in the Vietnamese society (during 
the French rule) towards the revolutionary tasks against 
imperialism and feudalism. On the basis of such analy­
sis the revolutionary forces in Viet-ham were grouped in 
four classes: the peasantry, the working class, the
petite bourgeoisie, and the national bourgeoisie. Each 
of these classes were studied and evaluated carefully.
The peasantry, first of all, represented an over­
whelming majority (90%) of the Vietnamese population 
and as valued for its revolutionary nature:
Short of land, the peasants, especially 
the poor and landless* p e a s a n t s s t r o n g l y  
opposed the imperialists and the feudal­
ists. The liberation wars in Vietnamese 
history are basically peasant wars. In 
the national people's democratic revolu­
tion, the peasants are the biggest force 
of the revolution and the most reliable 
ally of the working class. 10
But from the Marxist viewpoint, the peasantry was 
not homogeneou and lacked the adequate class conscious­
ness. Being rather inclined to individual production 
and "having the tendency to spontaneous capitalist
development", it did not have a social revolutionary ideo- 
11logy.
The working class, on the other hand, was highly- 
esteemed for its qualities of leadership:
The workers are toiling people with no 
means of production, having to sell 
their labour power to live and being 
exploited by means of the wage system.
They work in factories and live in the 
towns and industrial areas. They 
represent the most progressive produc­
tive force of the society. For these 
reasons the working class is the most 
revolutionary force whose political 
consciousness, organisational ability, 
discipline and creativeness are higher 
than those of other classes. 12
With those revolutionary virtues and other wholesome 
characteristics, the workers, though small in number, were
assigned to lead the revolution. Thus the workers and 
the peasants formed the driving forces of the revol­
ution. This basic tenet was stated in the 1930 Political 
Thesis of the Indochinese Communist Party, and philo­
sophically explained even earlier (1926) by Ho Chi Minh, 
then known as Nguyen Ai Quoc, the real father of Commun­
ism in Viet-Nam:
As oppression breeds revolution, those 
who are most heavily oppressed will have 
greater determination in their revolution.
In the past capitalism was oppressed by 
feudalism and it carried out a revolution.
Nov/ capitalism is oppressing the workers 
and the peasants; hence the workers and 
the peasants will be the main forces of 
the revolution.
These are the reasons;
1. the workers and the peasants are 
more heavily oppressed;
2. the workers and the peasants are 
united, therefore, they have the 
greatest strength;
3. they are already poor; if de­
feated they would have nothing to 
lose but their miserable lives; if 
they win, they will capture the 
entire world. 13
Turning to the other classes, the Marxist analyst 
described the petite bourgeoisie as including craftsmen, 
itinerant and small traders, owners of small industries, 
civil servants, students and Intellectuals. These 
elements suffered more or less oppression and exploitation 
from the imperialists and the feudalists. Their life 
being generally unstable and always threatened by in­
flation, bankruptcy and unemployment, those people
ordinarily participated in the revolution with great 
enthusiasm. Moreover, being more cultured than the 
other classes and more readily carried by the sentiments 
of patriotism, they very often started the struggle and 
proved to be very articulate and highly effective in the 
mobilisation of the masses. But their weakness con­
sisted in their vacillating when confronted by enormous 
difficulties or reactionary repression. Hence, the
petite bourgeoisie should not lead the revolution but it
1 4could be a reliable ally of the working class.
The final class on the list of revolutionary forces 
had an ambivalent description:
The national bourgeoisie had a two-sided 
nature: on the one hand, it was opposing
the imperialists and the feudalists, 
desiring national independence and demo­
cratic freedoms, but on the other hand, 
its attitude was unstable, wavering and 
reluctant. 15
Notwithstanding this, the national bour­
geoisie was an ally in the national people's 
democratic revolution, unlike the comprador 
bourgeoisie which had been throughout an 
anti-revolutionary force in our country. 16
Since revolution is the work of the broad masses and 
not of the Communist Party alone or the working class it­
self, the Communist strove to win more cooperation and at 
least to neutralize any opposition there might exist*
This is exactly the purpose of the communist alliance 
policy as explained by Truong Chinh;
On the basis of the worker-peasant alliance, 
we called for unity among the entire people,
85.
uniting with whomever we can unite with, 
converting whomever we can convert, neu­
tralising whomever we cannot convert; 
thus we gathered together all national 
and democratic forces and gained allies, 
however small, unstable or temporary, 
fox* the purpose of depriving the enemy 
of his supporters and winning more friends 
fox* ourselves, so as to have additional 
strength to overthrow the enemy* It is 
necessary, however, to hear in mind that 
the driving force of the Vietnamese re­
volution comes from the workers and the 
peasants, and its leader is the working 
class* 17
The alliance may he long lasting like the worker- 
peasant fusion, or temporary in a given stage and for a 
specific purpose like a league of several political 
parties before the seize-power. In any case, it must 
have a clear cut political programme and be placed under
18the close and tight control of a Marxist-Leninist party.
The programme should satisfy the purposes of various 
political parties or popular organisations and apxoeal to 
the desires and aspirations of the broadest mass possible 
where the struggle takes place. This is the minimum * 
programme of the Communist Party but accepted by its 
allies as a common programme, and all forces should be
I miPMPm1—nuiiHBUIiilii— <|M>ilHllAiwMwiwmWMWi«wi *
united to achieve it* On the other hand, it is vital 
that the Communist Party maintains its stutong and ex­
clusive leadership while preserving its own and long-term 
programme. This important detail was stressed in un­
ambiguous terms by Truong Chinh:
The ^arty has constantly to preserve its 
independent nature, possess a programme
of its own (maximum programme) so as 
to ensure its revolutionary leader­
ship based on the worker-peasant 
alliance. This leadership, the Party 
must not share with any party what­
soever, and mustabsolutely not allow 
the national bourgeoisie to lead the 
national united front, 19
Political alliance should be established with 
political parties, cultural groups, patriotic person­
alities, religious organisations, minority peoples, and 
progressive elements* And this not only at home but also 
abroad. The support of the working class and the people 
of the socialist countries, and the oppressed nations is 
always necessary for the success of revolution. Further­
more , a distinction should be made between the imperial­
ists who invaded or oppressed the Vietnamese and their 
people who loved peace and respected human rights, Such 
a delicate distinction could lead the way to other useful 
alliances so as to weaken the enemy and strengthen the 
united front in Viet-Nam. Thus, in justifying his agree­
ments with French authorities, Ho Chi Minh once quoted
Lenin as saying that "even if a compromise with bandits
20was advantageous to the revolution, he would do it."
Section Two: The Alliance Policy in Action.
Some forty years ago, the principle of united action 
was invoked, and from the alliance of the three existing 
Communist organisations (The Indochinese Communist Party 
started by a group of Forth Vietnamese Revolutionary 
Yourth delegates in 1929? the Annam Communist Party 
founded in Central Viet-Nam, and the Indochinese Communist 
League formed by members of the Tan Vj et Revolutionary
87,
21Party) was torn the Viet-Nam Communist Party*
hater, in October 1930, it was renamed Indochinese 
Communist Party by the Comintern , obviously to under­
line the alliance between Viet-Nam, Cambodia, Laos and 
possibly to facilitate the use of secret revolutionary 
bases or even to reclaim some disputed territories in 
the other parts of Indochina*
10 Alliance of social classes*
The basic alliance advocated from the very begin­
ning (1929-1930) was the long term alliance of c6ng~ 
Nong-Blnh (Workers-Peasants-Soldiers) as stated in very 
early slogans;
Cong nong binh, Unite I Follow the October 
Revolution of Russia! Establish a Cong- 
nong-binh soviet G-overnment of Indochina! 22
This alliance, first practised in Russia, was ex­
plained to the Vietnamese people in Tranh -Ban (The 
Struggle), the first lithographic paper published by the 
Viet-Nam Communist Party (the special issue of the 1 
November 1930, on the October Revolution):
On the 7 November * * * Russian proletarians 
alliad themselves with peasants and soldiers 
to overthrow the capitalist government and 
establish the proletarian dictatorship,
,,. Eor the purpose of building a communist 
society, 23
In 1930, the Communists appealed for the cooperation 
of the Vietnamese soldiers towards a successful insurr­
ection against "the imperialists, the royal government, 
the mandarins and the landlords":
These few months, workers, peasants and 
soldiers all over our country, fed up 
with so much misery, have enthusiastic­
ally mobilised our people for strikes, 
demonstrations and violent opposition* 
Unfortunately the imperialists, the 
mandarins and landlords, have ordered 
our brother soldiers to repress, even 
to shoot and kill the protesters I 
Workers and peasants, alas!, being 
killed by workers and peasants!
Most of you, brother soldiers, came from 
among the workers and peasants*** being so­
ldiers, you have been so badly mistreated 
and condemned to the miserable life of 
"horses and buffaloes11!
Brothers, Unite to struggle together!
Demand salary increase!
Support the struggle of the workers and 
peasants! Long live the 0<rmg, Binh
(worker-peasant-soldier) alliance* 24
Binh Government" slogan was later r
placed by another slogan, calling for a Democratic 
Republic* But, cooperation from soldiers was still 
urged in 1940-41 by special mention in the Yiet Minh's 
handbills and Nguyen Ai Quoc1s Letter from abroad, 
until a Liberation army was organised as an arm of the 
Yiet Minh Front, under the direction of Yo Nguyen 
Giap*
In the v/ake of the Nghe Tinh Soviet Movement (1930 
31) the coalition policy was extended to win over the 
mi ddl e-peas ants as allies in the "common struggle1', 
according to the instruction of the Communist party's 
Central Committee:
To strengthen by all means the landless 
and poor peasants because they are semi- 
proletarians in the countryside; to unite
with the middle peasants because they are
for the time being a big revolutionary 
force and a labouring force which will, 
together with the working class, build 
socialism once the state power is in the 
workers' hands* 25
Rich peasants must not be friends and should be a 
target of struggle because under the Marxist lens they 
were also members of the exploiting class* Rut to 
reduce the number of enemies so as to render united 
action more effective, they should be "neutralized1 
(neither friend nor enemy) or Isolated for the time
being* The Communist strategist was very shxewed in
suggesting to the cadres that they be careful in their 
choice of words and tactful in their methods, so as to 
persuade them voluntarily to leave the political battle 
ground for a neutral working'area:
Rich peasants should not be members of 
the Red Peasants' Association, in 
particular members of the Executive 
Committee of this Association* But 
the Permanent Bureau of the Central 
Committee disapproves of the raising 
of the question of thanh Iqc (purging) 
the Red Peasants' Association* It 
should only speak of chinh ly (re­
adjusting) the Red Peasants' Assoc­
iation according to its principles* 
Explanations should be given to rich 
peasants to convince them that they 
should withdraw of their own free will 
from the Red Peasants' Association and 
shift to the mutual aid teams* 26
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A ^This clever policy of them ban» h&t thu (more
friends, less foes) was carried out very methodically 
and made more effective the "All-oirt campaign to pro­
mote the people to struggle for the reduction of land 
rent and interest rate” in the 1950* s* It was moulded 
Into emotive and attractive slogans:
poor peasants are the basic elements;*
According to the Marxist doctrine, the landlord 
class was the people's enemy hut the Communist Party 
was too shrewd to fight too many enemies at the same 
time * It preferred to apply the tactics of "breaking 
chopsticks one by one"* I his s5^ stematic application,
Truong Chinh, Chairman of the Standing Committee of the 
National Assembly, clearly reported to the Workers' 
Party in Hanoi:
As far as tactics were concerned, it was 
necessary systematically to divide its 
"the landlord class ra.nksn into different 
groups; first, attack the ringleaders and 
powerful reactionary l a n d l o r d s • win 
over the landlords whose interests more 
or less clashed with those of the Impe?cia™ 
lists, and neutralize a number of wavering 
landlords* W e , therefore, carried out 
our agrarian programm step by step: once
we deliberately but temporarily postponed 
the slogan "Confiscate the landlords1 land,4 C  
Even during the land reform*.. we subdivided
Dap tan d.ja chu boc lot* (Crush the exploiting
landlords)* — -
Co lap phu nong» -(Isolate rich peasants)*
this class into several categories , 
and applied three different measures, 
namely confiscation, requisition and 
compulsory purchase.«„* 27
Thus the landlord class was divided into four cat­
egories according to their political attitudes. Those 
better educated landlords who had been very outstanding 
allied, were called nhan si dan chu (deocratic person­
alities), those who were converted and had contributed 
a great deal of money or material means to the res1s-
7 f ^
tance war, were named dia chu bhang chi on. (resistance 
landlords), those who, fox' one reason or another, did 
not cooperate with the revolutionaries, were labelled 
dia chu cddng hao gian ac (oppressive villainous land­
lords or local bullies), real targets of attack. For
the wavering landlords, there was reserved a relatively
*> —
mild name: dia chu fluidng (ordinary landlords).
To those different categories were applied different 
measures. In principle, " coirqpulsory purchase" was 
applicable to "democratic personalities" and "resistance 
landlords" or even to "ordinary landlords". Actually,
OQ
"compulsory purchase" as well as "voluntary offer" 
were not known in zone IT (Thanh Nghe finh) ^  during 
the first phase of land reform (1953-1954)» Some people, 
indeed, unable to pay the excessive tax imposed on them, 
offered their land to the government as a gift, only to 
find that it was not accepted. The most common measure 
was confiscation,,
Tjch thu (confiscation) and trilng dung (requisition) 
differed only semantically, the former carrying the
connotation of punishment* The Communist government, 
therefore, found it politic to requisition rather than 
to confiscate the properties of "democratic personal- 
ities" and "resistance landlords"* This was another
case of persuasive use of words to ease the pains of 
those landlords who, after serving as allies of the 
revolutionary forces, found themselves later categor­
ised as enemies of the people*
That experience of reclassification in the Communist 
list of friends and foes was also shared by the national 
bourgeoisie, the petite bourgeoisie and the intelligent­
sia., During the period of struggle for independence, 
the Communist organisation welcomed all of them because 
the Party needed their knowledge, skill and leadership* 
Hoang Quoc Viet, a member of the Central Committee, re­
lated that period of courtship quite candidly but not 
without some coyness:
We stressed that the petite bourgeoisie 
and the progressive bourgeoisie had to 
join the front* To this end, we assi sted 
in setting up the Vietnamese Democratic 
Party which we affiliated to the front.,.
After the liberation, in July 194-6, we 
helped to create the Democratic Socialist 
Party, 31
But when the resistance war had ended in 1954 and 
the state power of the whole North Viet-Nam went to 
"the workers1 hands", the Communist Party issued a new 
class line concerning the peasants:
To rely entirely on the poor peasants 
and the lower middle peasants, closley 
to unite with the middle peasants, to 
continue the restriction of the rich
93*
until the complete elimination 
of their economic exploitation, to carry 
out thought reform for rich peasants, to 
prevent the former landlords from nrais­
ing their heads11« Resolutely to take 
the peasants to socialism by way of agri­
cultural cooperation* 32
Thus the middle peasants were subdivided again and 
only the lower category was accepted as a reliable ally 
for the moment* The upper middle peasants were then 
treated as rich peasants and the latter as the landlords 
during the period of land reform* If "the landlords 
had been wiped out as a class" after the land reform,
a "7
"which shook heaven and earth" (1953-57) , the rich
peasants were also to be eliminated at the completion of 
the agricultural cooperation*
Reside agricultural reform, the other task in the 
bu Iding of socialism was the socialist transformation 
of industry and commerce* This forward step also re­
quired a new policy toward the national bourgeoisie and 
the petite bourgeoisie in those areas*
During the struggle for national democratic revol­
ution, the Communists had accepted the bourgeoisie as 
and ally for the strength of unity* But, with a new 
phase of revolution, that alliance had to be altered to 
bring the bourgeoisie to the same destiny as the land­
lord class* The official publication of the State 
Economic Department explained why the change had to be 
made;
If, in the anti-feudal and anti-imperialist 
revolution, the contradiction between the
94.
national bourgeoisie and the working 
class***was considered a secondary one, 
that contradiction has become, after 
the liberation of North Viet-Nam, a basic 
and very important one* If, in the 
people1s national democratic revolution, 
the national capitalist economy still 
had a positive and progressive effect in 
comparison with imperialist and feudal 
economic systems, in the socialist revol­
ution, that same economy has become an 
obstacle to the establishment of social­
ist economy* To solve the contradiction, 
it is, therefore, necessary to eliminate 
the sector of capitalist economy and the 
bourgeois class*
The definitive abolition of private 
capitalist ownership, the elimination of 
the bourgeoisie, the substitution of 
collective socialist ownership for capit­
alist and bourgeois systems, these result 
from a general rule used in the process of 
socialist revolution of any country; it 
Is also an immutable principle of Marxism- 
Leninism* 35
Thus the bourgeois class was clearly scheduled for 
elimination* But the partition of the country decided 
by the Geneva Conference in 1954 and the right accorded 
to the Vietnamese citizens to the territory of their 
choice, presented a thorny problem to the Communist 
Government* The great majority of the bourgeoisie lived 
in large t o m s  or cities where strict Communist control 
had not yet been established* It would be a big loss, 
both economic and political if those bourgeois left the 
North for the South* The communist regime would miss 
their skills and money for the economic reconstruction 
of North Vietnam* At the same time, any significant 
exodus from the North would create a bad image for the
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"workers government" and would alert the "bourgeoisie 
in the South to the dangers of the treacherous communist 
alliance* What a delicate situationJ one which re­
quired more 1 flexibility andAextertty" , called for an- 
other form of alliance with the bourgeois, as explained 
by Hoang Quoc Viet later:
...We had already discussed with the 
national bourgeoisie its conversion 
into mixed-ownership factories, that 
is to say, the state would develop 
them in accordance with national 
economic needs and the capital of the 
bourgeoisie would be put into the 
factories under the administration of 
the worker state and pay an annual 5$ 
to the bourgeoisie. The bourgeoisie 
agreed to this, so it did not leave 
for the South and did not make propa­
ganda against the State. That is the 
reason why the national bourgeoisie of 
the South has no fear of the National 
Liberation Front in the South.... This 
is of major importance; it is a well- 
conceived policy for strengthening the 
anti-imperialist struggle in the South 
and the unity of the National Liberat­
ion Front. 36
It was, indeed, intended to- "strengthen the unity 
of people, thus multiplying further positive elements in 
the revolutionary struggle of the whole nation for the 
purpose of "completing the national democratic revolution 
in the South and achieving the unification of the whole 
country" ^  under the communist regime.
As "a benefit from the political alliance in the 
previous revolutionary period and from the economic re­
lationship in the new period", the bourgeoisie were 
allowed to hire workers and to maintain the ownership of
materials and capitals while "the Communist State was 
ahle to use the money and the factories of the bourgeo-
■*q
isie"
Later, Lenin’s policy of "redeeming11 the means of 
production from the bourgeoisie was "creatively applied 
as a peaceful means" of eliminating private ownership 
and the communist strategist did not omit to quote Lenin 
for explanation and justification:
State capitalism in a society where the 
state power belongs to capitalists and 
state capitalism in a proletarian state 
are two different concepts. In the 
capitalist state, state capitalism is a 
means approved and controlled by the 
State to favour the bourgeoisie against 
the proletariat. In the proletarian 
state, the same means is used for the 
benefit of the working class to struggle 
against the bourgeoisie while the latter 
are still strong enough, 39
It was not too long before the communist government 
made it clear to the bourgeoisie that they were depend­
ent on the working class and that the basic contradic­
tion between the bourgeoisie and the workers should be 
solved at some opportune occasion, in a proper way;
In the history of mankind, opposing 
contradictions between different classes 
of conflicting interests ordinarily 
should be solved by non-peaceful and non- 
demo cratic (or violent) means but the 
situation in North Viet-Nam is an extra­
ordinary one0 Ihe non-peaceful and non­
demo cratic means are only applied to the 
enemies, namely to the small number of 
bourgeois individuals who have been 
separated themselves from the national 
bourgeoisie to act against the people and 
neatly oppose socialism,, For the national 
bourgeoisie in general, the Party and the 
people’s democratic State still patiently 
applied the peaceful, democratic means to 
persuade and reform them, 40
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Thus, while carrying out the "triple policy of 
use, restriction and preliminary transformation", the 
communist authority did not hesitate to "mobilize 
pati'iotic and progressive opinions" in order to repress 
any "opposition from reactionary bourgeois" like the 
Nhan V&n - Giai pham affair, This so called "simul­
taneous policy of alliance and struggle" was intended
to wipe out the "outmoded and reactionary ideas of the
41bourgeoisie" It was reported to have a very real­
istic result:
The educational results of this struggle 
upon the bourgeoisie were such, as to 
make them begin to realize that opposition 
to the management and transformation policy 
of the State or participation in reaction­
ary activities would be impossible and ^  
could lead to nowhere but a dead end.
The commynist strategists continued to assure the 
working class that "peaceful transformation" or political 
euthanasia, was simply another form of struggle and a 
very effective one:
Its success is amazing: private materials 
for production and capital for enterprise 
from the hands of the bourgeoisie already 
passed to the hands of the people in a 
relatively peaceful manner, 43
Actually the communist State plan had been scheduled 
to achieve the basic transformation of industry and 
commerce in 1960 and determined to continue other measures, 
including the Intensive re-education of the boui’geois, to 
reach the final goal of a socialist regime as promised by 
the Economic Department:
Such, a policy served to create all the 
necessary conditions for the advance, 
when the situation is favourable, to 
the final achievement of total trans­
formation of an absolute socialist 
system for the remnants of capital­
ism, and the elimination of the nation­
al bourgeoisie in North Viet-ham, 44
Similar to this gradual transformation of the 
industrial and commercial bourgeoisie, there was also 
a gradual subjugation of the intellectual bourgeois 
carried out "opportunely and very flexibly". It is 
most interesting to follow such a typical evolution of 
the Marxist alliance through the writings of the commun 
ist leaders in North Viet-Nam*
Promoting the "New Culture Movement" in 1944? 
Truong Chinh, wearing the cultural hat, made a convinc­
ing appeal to the patriotic sentiments of the Vietnames 
intelligentsia:
The Vietnamese New Culture Movement is 
an integral part of the anti-imperialist 
and anti-feudalist Revolutionary Move­
ment of the Vietnamese people during this 
period. Consequently it must not be sep­
arated. from the Vietnamese people's move­
ment of national salvation and liberation 
led by the Indochinese Communist Party, 45
The Marxist theoretician later applied his "famous 
dialectic to his promotion of Marxist alliance in 
cultural acti vi ties:
At the moment, the interests of the Vfet-Nam 
people are exactly the interests of the 
Viet-Nara workers,,. The workers, then 
volunteer to be the pioneers heading the
99;
national united front, fighting against 
french colonialism for the independence 
and unification of the fatherland* for 
the purpose of serving the national inter­
ests in the best and the most faithful way, 
the Vietnamese cultural combatants should 
be brave enough to line up under the 
banner of that pioneer brigade or at least 
to be their close friends* 46
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Our cultural combatants, therefore, should 
adopt a right attitude * consistent with the 
three general principles of the few Demo­
cratic Culture, namely:
1 * To be absolutely faithful to the father­
land and the resist an ce war * * *
2. To love science and follow the guidance 
of the Marxist science***
5. Wholeheartedly to serve the people and 
stay close to the worker-peasant-soldier 
mass * a * * 47
Ho Chi Minh added the weight of his presidential 
appeal:
Literature and a3?ts belong to the same front, 
on which you are fighters*
Like other fighters, you, in the artistic 
field, have your own responsibilities - to 
serve the Resistance, the fatherland and the 
people, first and foremost the workers, 
peasants and soldiers*
To fulfill your tasks, you must have a. 
firm clasijoSnd a sound ideology.*** 48
Anticipating the objection of those intelectuals 
who found it unsavoury to submit science and art to the 
service of partisan politics, Uncle Ho benignly disarmed 
them by a patristic statement:
Some of you may think: President Ho 
tries to turn fine arts into a polit­
ical matter*
Nothing is truer* literature and arts, 
like all other activities, cannot be 
taken apart from the economic and polit­
ical fields, but they must be included 
in them. 49
At the end of the resistance war and after the
partition of the country, Truon Chinh appealed for more
efforts in preserving unity and service:
let us unite even more closelyl 
let us strive to work for the enrich­
ment of our national fine arts under 
the banner of patriotism and social- 
i srn , 50
But a large group of writers and artists were un­
willing to accept this and demanded freedom from party
domination. Immediately Truong Chinh issued a severe
51condemnation, called for and obtained, of course, a 
merciless repression of the Nhan Van and G-iai Pham 
group. Later, at the 1962 Conference of Writers end 
Artists, the same Marxist combatant bluntly told his 
cultural allies:
1. Writers and artists must accept 
that liberal arts should be under 
the command of politics'to serve 
the policy of the Party,
Writers and artists must be faithful 
to the Communist ideal and cease­
lessly fight for the success of 
Communi sm,
2. Writers and artists.., must always 
work to strengthen the leadership
of the Party, to build up the people’s 
confidence in the Party...
3. Writers and artists must always make 
the offensive against the reactionary 
ideas of imperialism and feudalism,
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against the Ideas of the bourgeoisie 
and the petite bourgeoisie,
4o The Communist writers and artists, like 
any other Communist member, must submit 
themselves to the command of the Party,,* 
\A footnote ^
Those who are not yet Communist members 
must follow the command of their pro­
fessional organisations led by the 
Party, 52
But a much more frightening revelation was given 
later in the authoritative speech of ’’comrade" Truong 
Chinh in 1968, on the 150th anniversary of Karl Marx1 
birth:
We must oppose every manifestation of 
bourgeois nationalism, the enemy of pro­
letarian internationalism,, *»
Hence, the necessity constantly to con­
solidate the machine of repression of the 
people1s Security Force, Peoplef s 
Tribunal0„*
Therefore, after seizing power for the 
people, the communists must firmly grasp 
not only the machine of repression, but 
also the organs in charge of ideological 
work, information, propaganda and train­
ing, and never let bourgeois and oppor­
tunist elements hold sway to mislead 
public opinion and propagate anti-Party 
and anti-revolutionary, ideas. The 
communist and workers1 parties in power 
■must constantly strengthen the dictator­
ship of the proletariat, 53
20 Alliance with the Royalists 
and other Political Parties
By a decision of the Indochinese Communist Party, 
the Democratic Front of Indochina was extended during the 
period 1939-1940 to Incorporate several political parties 
and newspapers so as to prevent the French administration 
from creating a coalition with the "feudal authority" 
(i.e., the Royal court) Based on the treaties of 1884*
That political alliance for such a specific purpose under- 
standahly excluded the Royalists,  ^ The fight continued 
through the Anti-imperialist Unified Front of Indochina, 
towards the establishment of a Soviet Government of Indo­
china, This final goal, however, was to Be concealed 
under a milder slogan, according to the Resolutions of the 
Sixth Assembly of the Indochinese Communist Party's 
Central Commission (November 1939):
The Anti.-Imperi3.list Front leaves aside 
the slogan demanding a Soviet (worker- 
peasant-soldier) government, which is 
the form of government special to the 
toiling masses, and uses, instead, the 
slogan calling for a Federal Democratic 
Republican Government of Indochina, which 
is a form of Government common to all 
strata of people. 35
After many years of campaign, in August 1945, the
Communists concentrated intense pressures against the
Emperor Bao Dai and persuaded him to abdicate In favour of
56a "Democratic Republican Government." The Communists
immediately solicited his cooperation, which was given in 
the official abdication ceremony, thus cleverly implying 
the existence of an alliance between themselves and the
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Royalists* This was of the greatest importance because 
it gave Ho Ohi Minh's new government all the appearance 
of a legitimate successor government and, at the same time 
placated the large section of Vietnamese opinion which 
still believed in the traditional "mandate of heaven"*
In return for the King’s generous concession, Ho 
Chi Minh? who had campaigned some twenty years for the 
overthrow of the royal dynasty, then conferred on the 
ex-king the honour of the "first citizen of the Democratic 
Republic" and invited him to join the New Government in 
Hanoi *
At the Independence ceremony on 2 September 1945? 
the ex-king was at President H o 1s side when he solemnly 
announced that "Emperor Bao Dai has abdicated"* Then? 
citizen Vinh Thuy (personal name of the emperor) was 
listed as the "Supreme Advisor to the Government"* Ho 
also embraced and kissed the king he had overthrown as 
a public gesture of their“mutual admiration and collabo­
ration!
Thereafter? Ho Chi Minh was at pains to bow low and
to show all outward signs of respect for his supreme
advisor* Such irreverent revolutionary leaders anda A\ *
cadres as called the ex-king Ong (mister) or Dong chi
(comrade)? were reprimanded by Ho and? were instructed to 
address the advisor as Ngal (Sir)* According to a
source very close to Ho? the new president often went to 
great lengths in comforting his ex-king advisor'? explain­
ing to him that the change of national authority had been
made n e c e s s a r y  by the critical circumstances of VIet-Nam
and by the international situation, reasoning Ngai of H o 1 s
personal regard and affection, of the possibility of
NgaiT s return to power after the normalisation of the
country, of H o 1s unique desire for national independence
58and so forth.
In December 1945, Ho found it jjolitic to instruct
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his new cadre, Le Van Hien, who was sent to Hue on a 
mission, to pay a special visit to Lady Thanh Thai and 
Lady Duy Tan who had been living in obscurity since their 
respective husbands, Icing Thanh Thai and king Duy Tan, 
were forced by French authorities to resign. This 
would remind the people, especially to the Royalists, of 
the brutal depositions in the past and would minimise 
the pain caused by Bao Dai1s recent abdication. At the 
same time, it would sharply contract the new democratic 
president1s extraordinary courtesy and kindness with the 
dictatorship and cruelty of the French colonist1s. Doubt­
less the gesture should also be viewed as a Marxist- 
Leninist tactic designed to exploit the contradictions 
among the various branches of royal descendants. H o 1s 
political wishes were fulfilled, if one may believe the 
persuasive account given by Vo Nguyen Giap:
The wives of those Nguyen Dynasty1s Kings 
who were deposed by French colonialists, 
were surprised and moved by President H o 1s 
thoughtful gesture. Lady Thanh Thai 
affirmed that, since the installation of 
our Government, she had daily prayed for 
blessings on President Ho and his govern*® 
ment rather than on the Royal family.
Her daughter'-in-law, the wife of king 
Duy Tan, related that since the day her
husband was sent into exile by the
French, the royal family had simply 
ignored her. 59
To derive the maximum political advantage out of
that “thoughtful gesture” , H e ’s G-overnment “leaked11 the
news to the public through Hanoi newspapers:
-)
lady Biiu .Ian (concubine, of the part king 
Thanh Thai) and lady Vinh San (concubine 
of the late king Duy Tan) have expressed 
their support for the Democratic Govern­
ment which in turn has decided to grant 
them a. monthly pension of 500 piasters 
each,even though our country is so poor.60
Through adroit publicity and by keeping the ex-king 
at his side in Hanoi, President Ho not only dispelled 
the danger of any revolt from the royalists, but also 
succeeded in giving people in the country and all over 
the world the impression that his Democratic Government 
constantly enjoyed royal approval and support.
The Provisional Government presented by Ho Chi Minh 
in September 1945, was also designed to give the appear­
ance of incorporating all political parties and thereby 
to become a physical expression of Viet-kam’s political 
unity in order to obtain the support of the whole nation.
Two weeks before, the Viet Minh had already spons- 
ored a meeting of students and intellectuals at the 
university of Hanoi officially to ratify three resolutions
i. That the Emperor should abdicate in 
favour of a republican regime, and 
national power* should be transferred
to a Provisional Government formed 
by the Viet Minh.
i i . Tha t th e Vie t Minh Pro nt imm edi at e1v 
negotiate with other parties with a 
view to forming a Provisional Coal­
ition Government.
iii. That all political parties, all social 
strata and the broad masses of the 
entire nation should support the 
Provisional Government in order to 
consolidate our national independence,61
Actually the Viet Minh had convened their “People’s 
Congress-*1 at Tan Trao (on 16 August 1945 according to 
the Viet Minh publications), to secure the approval of 
the Viet Minh ten-point programme and to appoint a Nations 
Liberation Committee. After its closhre, Ho Chi Minh 
issued an “Appeal for General Insurrection,” transforming 
that Liberation Committee into a provisional government 
“of the people, by the people and for the people” , and. 
appealed for solidarity:
Recently, the Viet Minh Front convened 
the Viet-Kam People’s Congress and 
appointed the National Liberation Comm­
ittee to lead the entire people in the 
resolute struggle until national indep­
endence is wo.ru
At present, the National Liberation 
Committee is, so to speak, our provision­
al government. Unite around it and see 
to it that its policies and orders are 
carried out throughout the country. 62
Just before the “insurrection day" in Hanoi, an anti 
colonialist demonstration was transformed into a “show of
unity” in favour of the Viet Minh. Ironically;, the
whole dramatic operation was staged I n  front of the Hanoi
Municipal Theatre, It was a masterly performance on the
evening of 1? Agust 1945 and was widely publicised the
very next day by all Hanoi newspapers, thanks to a
judicious ear3.y press i* el ease on the part of the Viet 
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Minh! " At that meeting in the name of the ”Viet~-Nam 
Democratic Party” which had been created the year before 
a militant called on all compatriots to join the Viet 
Minh and to “unite into a single bloc,”
Japan has surrendered... The French are
endeavouring , , . to reimpose their rule
on our country... The Tran Trong Kira 
government is completely powerless.
Those compatriots who are still confused 
should quickly wake up.
The ranks of the Viet Minh are ready to
welcome you,.. Let us unite together 
into a single bloc, 65
Finally, the "Democratic” orator asked his compat­
riots to voice with him only two parallel slogans (a 
rare departure from customary verbosity) which were
carefully contrived to suggest the equaling of two ideas,
Viet-Nam and Viet Minh:
VIET-NAM DOC LAP MUON NAM! (Long live Independent
Viet-Kam)
MAT TRAN VIET MINH MUON NAM! (Long live the Viet
Minh Front)
On 19 August 1945, a Viet Minh representative who 
spoke to a large meeting, in Hanoi, also suggested the
t
the creation of a united democratic government:
...the essential thing for the time being 
is to set up immediately a Democratic 
Republic of Viet-Nam, with the partici­
pation of the broad masses of the popu­
lation, thus enabling the people to 
determine their fate for themselves, 66
The following week, the Viet Minh Liberation 
Committee, joined by some "allied Democrats," converted 
itself into a. provisional government and sent its intro­
ductory "address to the whole nation" unambiguously to 
assert that it was "the broad and complete expression of 
the National United Front:"
„0.The Provisional Government is not a 
Government formed only of representatives 
of the Viet Minh Front as some people have 
wrongly understood. Neither is It com­
posed only of representatives of various 
political parties. It Is truly a govern­
ment of national unity, having the noble 
mission of leading the country until the 
convening of the National Assembly which 
will elect the official Democratic 
Republican. Government.
.Under the National banner, our compat­
riots should close their ranks and support 
the Provisional government in order to 
defend our freedom and independence... 67
The Provisional Government presented by Ho Chi Minh 
on ? September 194-5? retained eight of the ten members of 
the Viet Minh Liberation Committee and added seven new 
members. Among these new members, Pham Ngoc Thach was 
a convert to communism, Duon^Duc Hien, a Democrat 
"allied" to the Viet Minh, Nguyen Manh Ha, a. Catholic and 
son-in-law of George Marrane, a communist deputy in the
French Parliament, Nguyen Van To, a “non-partisan hut
68very co-operative scholar", and so forth.
A few communist names like Nguyen Liiong Bang, nick- 
named Anh Ga (Oldest Brother) or Sao Bo (Red Star), did 
not appear on the official list hut worked behind the 
scenes. They were later publicly praised as excellent 
examples for the whole people to imitate:
...Some comrades, members of the Viet-Nam 
National Liberation Committee who, having 
been elected by the National People*s 
Congress, should have taken part in the 
Provisional Government, but of their own 
accord withdrew to give the place to 
patriotic personalities outside the Viet 
Minh Front. This was a selfless, mag­
nanimous gesture of men who did not care 
for position and put the interests of the 
nation and people*s unity, above individual 
interests. This is a praisworthy, honour­
able gesture that we must imitate. 69
The key political posts, however, were firmly held 
by members of the Viet Minh: Ho Chi Minh was President
and Foreign Minister; Tran Huy Lieu, Propaganda Minister 
Chu Van Tan, a representative of ethnic minorities, 
defence Minister.
On the same day, the T&ng Bo Viet Minh (General 
Directorate of the Viet Minh) made public a nation-wide 
appeal;
Let all strata of the population, all 
patriotic organisations unite closely 
together!
...All of us must support the Provisional 
Government and carry out its orders.
...Unity, struggle consolidation of inde-
pendence, such are our watchwords for 
the^present time* 70
The ordinary people inspired by patriotism were con­
ditioned to accept that kind of appeal and ready to 
sacrifice everything for independence, hut the difficult 
problem that the Viet Minh had to face was the strong 
opposition from other political parties like Viet-Nam 
Qu&c Nan Bang (Nationalist Party) or briefly Yiet Quoc, 
Viet-Nam Cach Mang Dong Minh (The Revolutionary League) 
or Viet Cach. Bai Viet (Great Viet Nam), Phuc Quoc 
(National Restoration) and several other groups like 
Thanh Nien Ai Quoc (the Patriotic Touth),
The Communists first made every effort to absorb
various groups into their Yiet Minh ,!united front”. When
the Thanh Nien Ai Quoc (Patriotic Youth), the Phuc Quoc
(Restoration) and the Dai Yiet (G-reater Viet-Nam) refused
to submit to the Yiet Minh leadex^ship, they were elimin-
71ated by force. 1
The situation in South Viet-Nam was different: the
noncommunist organisations were very popular and the Yiet
72Minh did not play the dominant role* The Thanh Nien'""ji
Tien Phong (Vanguard Youth), the Phuc Quoc (Restoration), 
the Viet-Nam D&c hau (Independence), the Cap Dai* the Hoa 
Hao, the Trotskyites, the Civil Servants1 Association and 
the intellectuals* group had formed a Nationalist Uni- 
fied Pront, the Mat tran Quoc G-ia Thbng nhat. headed by 
Tran Van An, an outstanding nationalist (16 August 1945}* 
It had been planned that the imperial delegate, Nguyen
Van Sam, and his deputy Ho Van Nga, would join the 
Executive Council of the above Unified Front to accept 
the administrative power transferred from the Japanese 
authorities in Saigon after their official surrender to 
the Allied Countries.
Suddenley, on 2.1 August 1945, leaflets and handbills 
appeared in many quarters of Saigon to publicise the Viet 
Minh as a powerful organisation that had been fighting 
both the French and the Japanese for national independence, 
and an official body recognised and supported by the Dong 
Minh (Allied Powers) as well as by China and Russia.
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Tran Van G-iau, the Moscow trained leader of the Viet Minh, 
then approached the Council of the United National Front 
and shrewdly persuaded the nationalist leaders to rally 
behind the Viet Minh and let the Viet Minh negotiate with 
the representatives of the Allied Powers who were due to 
arrive soon in Saigon. To do so, would be much more 
beneficial for the nation and the common cause of all 
patriotic organisations, according to the Viet Minh argu­
ment, because other organisations and the Unified National 
Front had been more or less connected with the Japanese, 
whereas, the Viet Minh had been on the side of the Allied 
Powers that had just defeated the Japanese forces.
That convincing reasoning led to the official emer­
gence of the Viet Minh and a new coalition headed by a 
Provisional Executive Committee of which the majority of 
members were Communist leaders or converts: Tran Van
G-iau, Pham Ngoe Thach, Nguyen Van Tao, Dddng Bach Mai,
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Huynh Yan Tieng, and so forth. In other provinces in
the South, the Communists likewise sent their cadres into
the Thanh M e n  lien Phong Movement and "orientated the
74-whole movement towards the Yiet Minh goal". '
In the North, by September 1945, there was some 
competition between four main political parties, namely 
the Phuc Quoc (Restoration), the Yiet Minh. the Yiet-Nam 
Cach Mang Dong Minh (or Yiet Cach) and the Yiet-Nam Quoc 
Ban Dang (or Yiet Quoc). ^
These two major parties Yiet Cach and Yiet Quoc were 
able to withstand the Yiet Minh several months, thanks to 
support from the Chinese Nationalist Government forces 
which had arrived to disarm the Japanese in Yiet-Nam 
(North of the 16th parallel). For those political com­
petitors, the Communists had nothing but hatred and 
condemnation. Realising, however, that to fight them 
while the Nationalist Chinese troops were still present in 
Hanoi, would result in political suicide for their Yiet 
Minh Front, the Communists decided in favour of a policy 
of great flexibility. They offered to reorganise a new 
Provisional Government on coalition basis, postpone the 
General Election from Becember 1945 to 6 January 1946, 
and to reserve 70 seats in the National Assembly for the 
two nationalist parties. This conciliatory gesture was 
given publicity in many newspapers and the Provisional 
Coalition -Government was announced by Ho Chi Minh in his 
official declaration of 1 January 1946;
With a view to winning complete Independence 
and bringing about close co-operation between 
the various political parties to further
strengthen the Government, it is now named 
the Provisional Coalition Government. At 
this moment, if the parties unite, the 
Government can overcome difficulties. All 
the Vietnamese people want the Provisional 
Government to hold office until the election 
of the National Assembly which will change 
it into a definitive government. 76
But Ho Chi Minh ingenuously inserted the "practical 
point" that the military policy of the Provisional 
Government under his own leadership was:
to unify the various armed forces under the 
command of the Government. Parties are 
not allowed to have armies of their own. 77
After peacefully disarming the other political partie 
by the enunciation of an apparently fair political 
principle, Ho appealed for popular support of his Govern­
ment’s policy:
Such is the policy of the Provisional 
Coalition Government of the Democratic 
Republic of Yiet-Nam, I hope that the 
entire people will support it to en­
able the Government to succeed.
78long live Independent Viet-Naml.'
In the meantime, the Communists methodically pre­
pared a general election which resulted in a National 
Assembly "representing all social strata and various 
groups" but dominated, in fact, by the undeclared Commun­
ists. The Assembly, in turn, was to approve later the 
National Anthem, national flag, national constitution, 
proposed by the Yiet Minh, to elect Ho Chi Minh to be 
President of the Democratic Republic of Yiet-Nam, and to 
entrust Ho with "the mission of forming a national united 
government". This coalition government presented by Ho 
Chi Minh included four members from the Yiet Quoc and Yiet
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Cach parties, four members from the Yiet Minh (undeclared 
Communists) and Dan Chu (Democrats whose party had been 
created with the help of the Communists in June 1944) ^
V  i f
and two "non-partisan" members, namely Huynh Phuc Khang, 
a very old man who died shortly afterwards, and Phan Anh
QA
who had been absorbed by the Yiet Minh, A member of
this "United Government" later reported that as Nguyen 
Hai Than was a powerless vice-president, Huynh Phuc Khang 
had only enough energy to sign those ready made "decrees" 
and Phan Anh, the nominal Minister of Defense was given 
the duty of kien quan (inspection), diidng quan (supply) 
an(3- buan quan (training) whereas the right of du&g quan 
(use of the army) was entirely in the hands of Yo Nguyen
81Giap, the head of the newly created Military Commissariat.
Phat coalition government came to existence after the 
signing at Chungking (28 February 1946) of the Franco- 
Chinese Agreements which allowed the Drench to replace 
Chinese Nationalist troops in Yiet Nam. Yo Nguyen G-iap 
then signed the Preliminary Agreement of 6 March 1946 
on behalf of the G-overnment, with Sainteny and General 
Salan signing for the Drench side. However, as the Yiet 
Minh1s attack against the Yiet quoc and Yiet Cach became 
more violent and open, tactical alliance between the Yiet 
Minh and other political parties was fast coming to an end. 
Since August 1 9 4 5 indeed, many outstanding leaders, nation-
■> / A 1
alists like PriicSng PR Anh, religious like Huynh Phu So and 
Trotskyites like Pa thu Phau had been eliminated by the
Yiet Minh. following the Resolution of the Revolutionary
99
Forces Conference of April 1945.
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Po minimize the public shock of so many murders, the 
Communists were always careful to incriminate their politi­
cal enemies and to incite the people’s hatred against them 
before ordering their execution. Black lists of those 
alleged to be traitors were commonly to be found in 
Communist books and papers. Sometimes, the victims were 
secretly executed and the news was published, together with 
their alleged 1 crimes11, much later to as to avoid un­
favourable reactions from the ordinary citizens. Pham
^  A  ^  /V / v ' v A
Quynh, Ngo Binh Khoi and Ngo Dinh Huan, for example, were 
executed (buried alive, according to some sources) in 
August 1945, but the news was printed in Hanoi papers only 
some four months later. v
One consequence of this policy of calculated murder 
of actual or potential political opponents, was that most 
of the non-Viet Minh members in the Hanoi National Assembly 
and in the Ho Chi Minh National United Government (March 
1946) disappeared one after another, some being assassinated 
by the Doi Danh Bil (The ’’Honour Squad”) while others 
fled to China,
fo fill the vacuum left behind by the Viet Quoc and 
ike Viet Cach, the Communists M p e d  in the creation of 
another political ally, the Viet Nam Socialist Party (July 
1946) ’’which was intended to win over the patriotic intell­
ectuals” . ^
At the second Session of the National Assembly (51 
October 1946), Ho Chi Minh announced the resignation of the 
’’National United Government” only to be entrusted by the
then almost exclusively Viet Minh National Assembly with
the task of forming another cabinet. On 3 November 1946, 
Ho Chi Minh submitted his new coalition Cabinet ^  to the 
Assembly, once again adding a well prepared address which 
emphasised the therne of national unity:
It was the express wish of the National 
Assembly1 s that the new Government 
should clearly reflect broad solidarity 
without any discrimination of political 
party. After being entrusted by the 
National Assembly with the formation of 
the Government, I consulted with many 
senior personalities, representatives 
of various organisations, and personal­
ities representative of the various 
sections of society.
I am thus able to declare before the 
National Assembly that this Government 
clearly expresses the people1s spirit 
of coalition, that it is a Government 
wholly in accord with the actual sit­
uation and that it will endeavour to 
win independence and national unity, and 
build a new Viet Nam.
This is a national Government in which 
personalities from the North,,the Centre 
and the South participate; especially 
our southern compatriots, who are not 
only fighting at the front to protect 
the country, but are also enthusiasti­
cally taking part in the construction 
of the Patherland. 88
Because of the critical situation obtaining in the 
country, the National Assembly was adjourned and the 
Constitution suspended, leaving all powers in the hands 
of the !,United Government” of President Ho Chi Minh and a
small sub-committee of the Assembly itself, which would 
remain in permanent session. An absolut majority of this 
sub-committee1s members were Communists and "allied” members.
Only a short time afterwards, Ho Chi Minh and^his 
comrades withdrew to the jungle to wage a war of resist­
ance against the French, and, at the same time, to carry 
out the first stage of the "Socialist Revolution", Bao Dai 
and the surviving nationalist leaders on the other hand 
had, by then escaped from the Viet Minh Front and were 
undertaking the formation of a new nationalist government.
So ended the short-lived alliance, between Communists and 
Nationalists.
In 1947, when Bao Dai entered into negotiations with 
France to work out terms under which a nationalist govern­
ment might function in Viet Nam, the Viet Minh undertook 
a vigorous campaign of sabotage, The Communist journals 
published whole series of attacks, mostly with the help of
/ go
Tu Mb's satires, against Bao Dai. J
At first, some relatively mild verses served as a 
warning to put the Vietnamese on their guard against the 
activities of the former Emperor.:
Bay gid bon thde dan kia
D&i liia loi fce'o ngai ra  ^.
Chu trddng tan Rich giang hoalbung xung. 90
The colonialists are now
Deceiving the ex-king and persuading
him to stage a puppet show of peace
negotiation
Sarcasm and attacks of a relatively anodyne nature 
later gave place to a t!funeral oration11 whose purpose was 
to pronounce a political 11 death sentence” on the supreme 
counsellor who had deserted the ”United Government” of Ho 
Chi Minh, Yet, the true circumstances of the emperor1s 
enforced abdication and the purpose of the Communists' 
“gentlemanly alliance” may be perceived in the following 
passage of the poem:
D&u con muSn gid con dau 
, B'e ha feu planh^ha be , •-
H&p an ngpc, Riem vang cho (Chinh quyen Cach 
mang, nguyen vlam dan mot ndbc td - do^
Quang mang'rSng, mu mien, theo lche" do cong 
ho a, th^f thoai jri jhtfdng 4vua no l e v '
Ai m5m ldi ma an noi bi&'t difeu?
 ^ Ai bao l'di ma thoai lui^hdp l‘e?
Hhan dfen ci| tddn^ cdu hoang Bao ‘ £>ai da hy 
sinh. ng'oi^bau, de xa^f mo^ig c^ng hoa. ^
Chinfe phu voi lam co v&j tdi^cao, cung 
hdp t^tc^tfem thanh, lo dap n'en thinh tri.
Hao aiM hac dai cho / cam I 
Sao nd Sen long qua tel 91
Fortunate to survive and anxious to remain alive, 
His majesty had to give up his august throne. 
Offering his golden seal and sword to the 
Revolutionary Government, choosing to be citi­
zen of a free country, Rejecting the royal 
emblems to embrace the Republican system, he 
abdicated from the slavery imposed by his crown. 
Who was it who framed those noble words for 
him?
Who was it who counselled that attitude of 
reason?
Our people believed the ex-emperor Bao Dai had 
given up his throne in all sincerity to lay the 
foundation of the Republic.
Our Government invited him to be supreme 
counsellor, to play his part in the nation1s 
prosperity.
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Why then did he undergo so base a change 
of heart?
When, in 1953, Bao Dai sent in his official capacity 
as Chief of State a formal communication to the government 
of Ho Chi Minh;suggesting a national reconciliation for 
peace, the latter chose to treat him as though he had never 
relinquished the post of counsellor and to rebuke him in a 
personal letter of reply:
Dear brother Vinh Thuy,
I  am very much surprised to see you sending 
to the Viet Nam Democratic Republic Govern­
ment an official letter suggesting peace 
negotiation. You convey such a message as 
if this aggression war were started by me 
or by you and not by French colonialists 
and American interventionists. Half a 
million of the French foreign legion with 
so many airplanes, tanks, bombs and canons, 
are savaging our fatherland and killing our 
compatriots. What do you think about that?
As for you, the former supreme counsellor of 
the Viet Nam Democratic Republic, if you had 
been faithful to your pledge 11 to be a free 
citizen rather than an enslaved king” you 
would have been with me, here, to lead the 
Viet Nam people and army in fighting French 
colonialism and American interventionism.
(Together we would have been looking forward 
to the glorious day when you and I, on the 
same side, would pass sentence on our 
adversariesf (i.e. the French colonialists 
and international reactionaries) and then, 
chase them outI That day, my dear brother, 
is not too far away. 32
Apparently, Ho Ghi Minh wan hoping to derive further 
advantage political as well as psychological, from that 
”royal alliance” of 1945.
Concerning the political alliance with the two major 
parties, the semi-official history of the Communist Party, 
published twenty years later, explained its meaning and 
purpose quite candidly:
Our Party contracted an alliance with the 
Viet Qach Party of Nguyen Hai Than and the 
Viet Quoc Party of Nguyen Tuong Tam, in 
order to attract the truly patriotic Viet­
namese out of those organisations and away 
from the influence of those leaders. 93
And yet, addressing the official assembly commemor­
ating the thirtieth anniversary of the founding of the 
Inodchinese Communist Party, Truong Chinh still took pains 
to praise the Communist*s "noble theory" of political 
alliance in flowery terms:
It is our Party1s policy to realise lasting 
solidarity and co-operation with other 
friendly political parties within the front 
in order to struggle against the common 
enemy of the nation and build a peaceful 
unified, independent, democi'atic, pros­
perous and strong Viet Nam. 94
3° Alliance with social and professional grou-ps.
In order to transform the wide variety of groups and 
organisations which existed in Vietnam at that time into 
auxiliary forces serving their own revolutionary aims, the 
Communists designed and executed an ingenious and effective 
"social policy".
Essentially, this policy depends upon finding common 
ground which serves to identify the aims of the Communist 
Party with those of others. In practice, the Communists,
while concealing their own identity and their political 
aspirations, became active members of every accessible 
social and professional organisation, and gave proof of 
their professional competence, their concern and zeal in 
working for the interests of those groups. When their 
strenuous and unflagging efforts won them entry into the 
leading echelons, they used their positions to manoeuvre 
these groups into supporting some "good cause” , carefully 
selected to appeal to the sentiments of the membership - 
usually struggles against foreign oppression, campaigns 
for national independence, social justice or the like.
They would then manipulate the activities of the groups 
until these conformed, in a greater or lesser degree, 
with the undeclared aims already determined by the Commun­
ist Party. Such tactics constituted an important part of 
many Communist programs, resolutions, instructions and 
training courses, as shown in these examples:
The mission of the party is to use the 
daily needs of the proletarians and peasants 
as initial steps gradually to lead them to 
the battlefield of revolution. The Party 
should immediately establish its leadership 
over the masses as soon as the high tide of 
revolutionary forces wells up.
In normal times, Communist leaders should 
put forward, according to the circumstances, 
some slogans for a "minimum program” (in 
favour of the masses1 interestsT. which 
accord with the masses interests, like wage 
increases, tax reductions, lower living 
costs and so forth, in order gradually to 
widen the revolutionary struggle. Those 
"minimum slogans", should then be related
to the principal slogans of the Party 
like abolition of imperialism, fudalism 
and landlords, the complete independence 
of Indochina, a worker-peasant government..,,
It is a serious mistake not to pay attent­
ion to the daily needs and struggle of the 
masses; and likewise, it would be a great 
mistake if one pays attention to their 
daily needs but is not concerned with the 
main goals of the Party, 95
The Eighth Plenum of the Indochinese Communist Party*s 
Central Committee (May 1941) was at pains to outline some 
concrete campaign tactics:
Any slogan which cannot be carried out 
under present conditions, should not be 
advanced, because the impractical is 
useless and empty. So, the current 
tactic of our Party is to use a method 
of wide popular appeals capable of 
awakening nationalist sentiments among 
the people, 36
Thus, in the 1940*s, the Communists did their best to
infiltrate the associations of friendship (ai huu), of
mutual assistance (tiJdng te), the kinship societies (hoi / * 
hieu), the sports clubs, and the rural co-operatives (hoi
cay, hoi l8p nha).
To exercise a greater influence among students and 
intellectuals, the Communist cadres joined the staff of 
"Evening Courses", the Society for Literacy (Hoi Truyen 
ba Quoc ngu) , promoted a movement of cultural revolution 
and created the Cultural Association for National Salvation.
In February 1943, the Central Committee issued an 
Instruction emphasizing the necessity for the Cultural
Movement and outlining its various activities:
Out Party should send out some cadres 
specializing in cultural activities to 
promote a movement of progressive culture 
for national salvation, to oppose the 
retrogressive fascist culture. In the 
cultural centres like Hanoi, Saigon, Hue... 
cultural organisations for national 
salvation should he established to rally 
the intellectuals and the men of culture.
A "vanguard culture groLip" , a "Marxist 
study group!t:-or a "Viet Nam history study 
group" are examples of what might be done".99
To help so important a project, a Cultural thesis 
was carefully drafted and approved by the Communist Party* 
Central Committee as a study document and guideline:
The cultural front is one of three 
areas (economic, political, cultural) 
where a Communist must be active. To 
influence public opinion and to have 
fruitful propaganda, our Party must 
work not only for a political revolu­
tion but also for a cultural one. 100
The Party 8,1 so pointed out the duty of the Marxist 
cultural leaders in Viet Nfim:
What must be done is to struggle in 
education and publication for the 
victory of dialectical and historical 
materialism against those erroneous 
philosophies of both European and 
Asian origins, with more or less harm­
ful effects in our country, like those 
of Confucius, Descartes, Bergson, Kant, 
Nietzsche...., for the victory of 
socialist realism over classicism, 
romanticism, naturalism,symbolism etc.... 101
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These secret instructions were given to Communist 
members whereas the constitution of the Cultural Assoc­
iation for national salvation suggested that its only 
philosophy was one of nationalism, Thus, the purpose 
of the Association was supposedly;
to rally those patriotic cultural 
men who earnestly take part in 
fighting against the French and 
the Japanese andiin building up a 
new national, democratic and pro­
gressive culture. 102
Following the pattern adopted for all Viet Minh 
organisations, the existence of this association was kept 
secret. Under the guidance of the Party officials TrdSng 
Chinh, Hoang Quoc Viet, and the local leadership of Vu
,v<
Quoc Uy, Nhu Phong, Le Quang -Bao, it attracted a number 
of outstandling university students, men such as Nguyen 
P)inh Thi, young writers such as To Hoai, Nguyen Huy Tdong, 
Nam Oao, Nguyen Hong, Thep Moi, and Professor Bang Thai 
Mai. 105
This Association was small, but, since it incor­
porated writers and artists, it was considered "a precious 
capital of the Party", a nucleus around which a much wider 
cultural front might be constructed before and after the 
success of the August Revolution.
It was this nucleus that attracted the "General
Association of Students and Intellectuals", helped Diicjng 
/ ,vv
-Biic Ilien and his "progressive" group to form the "New 
Democracy Group" which was later renamed the "Viet Nam 
Democratic Party" and was incorporated* in the Viet Minh 
Front.
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Other intellectuals and artists who remained non- 
Viet',Minh, were later urged to join the "Viet Nam Socialist
Party" (28 July 1946), an ally of the Viet Minh, Students
and teachers were submitted to a process of transformation 
through consecutive intensive courses: Ren can chinh c6
(forming the Cadres and shaping the organisations), Hoc 
tap dan chu (Democratic study), Gai tap td tddng (Thought 
reform), The content and direction of educational re­
form can be read from they typical message of President Ho 
to the national congress of education, convened in July 
1951 :
,..At this congress you must review 
in detail the "reform" of the educat­
ional programme and its method of 
application in order to correct your
errors and cultivate your good qual­
ities.
You should make sure that education 
is related to our people*s life, to 
our resistance war and the construct­
ion of our country. Make every effort 
to harmonize classroom education with 
the common work of political propa­
ganda and mass education,...
On 10 December 1951, Ho gave the artists a basic 
instruction on their political duty:
Literature and arts belong to the same 
front, on which you are fighters.,..
To fulfil your tasks, you must have a 
firm class stand and a sound ideology....
Literature and arts, like all other 
activities, cannot be taken apart from 
the economic and political fields, but 
they must be included in them.
To inculcate in the intellectuals and professionals
a revolutionary ideology and to consolidate their polit­
ical stand, the Communist Government organised for them a 
special ideological remoulding course that lasted ten weeks 
(from 15 July to 26 September 1953). Ho Ohi Minh made a 
personal appearance at the closing ceremony to congratu­
late the participants for "all of you have made progress, 
more or less".
Ho assured them that "our Party, Government and 
people love and esteem the intellectuals". He, then, 
spoke frankly of their weaknesses while sympathising with 
their having been exploited by colonialists and feudalists. 
This ingenious approach succeeded in arousing a guilt 
complex in those "bourgeois intellectuals" and in urging 
them to do penance or redemption work by actively cooper­
ating with the resistance government which was anti­
colonialist and anti-feudalist. This was also shrewdly 
suggested by Ho when he presented to them the shining 
example of "strong Nationalism and indomitable spirit" on 
the part of the workers and peasants.
All of you have clearly realised that 
formerly the colonialists and feudal­
ists unashamedly oppressed and exploit­
ed the workers and peasants materially.
But the workers and peasants kept a 
firm class stand, a strong nationalism 
and an indomitable spirit. When it 
was propitious to carry out the revolu­
tion and the resistance,,the workers 
and peasants bravely rose up and, 
placing the common interest above their 
private interests, fought heroically 
and selflessly. As for the intellec­
tuals, though they were also materially 
exploited by the colonialists and feud­
alists in a direct manner, yet they
received a tiny part of the latter*s 
huge profits as a bribe. But the 
colonialists and feudalists ruthlessly 
oppressed and exploited the intellect­
uals from a spiritual viewpoint. As 
a result the intellectuals then became 
divorced from reality and from the 
people. Some of them indulged in day­
dreams and forgot that their country 
was enslaved and that they themselves 
were kept in bondage; they could not 
distinguish friend from foe nor right 
from wrong. This is a most cruel 
manoeuvre of the colonialists and feud­
alists.
It would be unrealistic and utterly imprudent for 
those intellectuals to express even the slightest dissent 
after such a thorough exercise of brainwashing. But 
what was to be done? To this anticipated question, the 
old revolutionary leader obligingly offered a very 
dialectical answer:
All of you have clearly understood that, 
in order to free yourselves from slavery, 
to regain independence and power, you 
must carry out revolution and resistance.
The resistance war is a continuation of 
the revolution to fulfil our revolution­
ary task. dur revolution is a revolut­
ion for national liberation, democratic, 
anti-colonial and anti-feudal revolution 
of the people. It is basically a 
peasant revolution or an agrarian revol­
ution.
Promising a victorious outcome, Ho called upon the 
intellectuals, not only to cooperate with the people but 
also to set them a good example by being "the first to 
endure hardship and the last to enjoy comfort". After
citing Marxism-Leninism as “m a n ’s greatest discovery and 
the swiftest road to development", exemplified in the 
"new and immense world camp of democracy and peace headed 
by the Soviet Union", he spoke of the "unexpected progress" 
of Viet Nam with outstanding heroes and heroines (Tran 
Dai Nghia had been made an intellectual hero because of 
his contributions to the manufacturing of weapons and 
ammunitions). President Ho then bid the intellectuals to 
embark on his glorious revolutionary path:
In a word, nine years ago, our people 
were enslaved, today they are masters 
of the land* This is because our 
revolutionary path has been enlight­
ened by Marxism-Leninism,
To struggle in a glorious epoch and 
to serve as cadres for an heroic 
people are honours and at the same 
time heavy tasks for the intellect­
uals. To fulfil these tasks you 
must keep pace with the movement and
the progress of our people; you
must reform your ideology and adopt 
a firm political stand.
Among those gathered for the ideological remoulding, 
were some elder Gonfucian scholars. Other Vietnamese 
intellectuals must also be familiar with the elementary 
concepts of Gonfucian ethics which they had learned at 
home and in schools. In order to make his Marxist- 
Leninist lesson more familiar and more effective to his
special audience, Ho Chi Minh judiciously chose to expound
it in terras of Gonfucian ethics:
We must constantly rememberAthe precept 
that one must first Ghinh tam, tu than
(right one's mind and improve o^efs 
virtues) in order to tri quftc hinh 
thi&n ha (rule the country and 
govern the people). "To right one's 
mind and improve one's virtues" is a 
work of self-transformation.
Returning to his Marxist terminology, Ho strongly 
suggested the use of "two sharp weapons" as very helpful 
to that "internal revolution":
There are two sharp weapons to help 
us transform ourselves, namely, to 
co-ordinate study with practice and 
to frankly make self-criticism while 
welcoming criticism from others with­
out fear nor concealment.
Finally, Ho challenged the graduates of the thought- 
reform course with a dutiful recommendation that may 
reveal great expectation as well as close surveillance on 
the part of the regime:
I hope that upon returning to your 
offices and your localities, you will 
continue to study and to transform 
yourselves into an intelligentsia of 
our time and of our people; the Party, 
the Government and the people are 
looking forward to your endeavours.
Thus in marked contrast with the Nghe Tinh soviet 
movement (1930-31) which had the intellectuals high on the 
list of principal enemies to be completely eliminated 
(Tri, Phu, ©ia, Hao, ©ao tan goc, Troc tan re), Hanoi 
Government succeeded in enlisting intellectuals and profes 
sionals to their "cultural army". To make this rapproche 
ment between "boui*geois intellectuals" and "proletarian 
toilers" less shocking and more acceptable to both sides,
130.
at least in speech and writing, the communist adminis-
/ /
tration has replaced the traditional term tri thdc 
(intellectual) with the new one, lao dfrn^tri oc (brain 
worker), which seemingly denoted a close relationship to 
lao dSng chan tay (manual worker). This small change 
fitted in very well with the new name Dang Lao d&ng of 
the Indochinese Communist Party.
4° Alliance with religious groups.
After the failure of the Nam Ky Insurrection 
(November 1940), the Communist Party in South Viet Nam 
was rendered ineffective as a political force by the 
thoroughness and ferocity of French repressive measures. 
Communications with the Central Committee of the Indo­
chinese Communist Party were severed while most of the 
leaders in the South were arrested and executed or im­
prisoned, consequently the Southern Segment of the 
Communist Party remained incapable of conducting any act­
ivities until 1943 and the Viet Minh Movement scarcely 
became known in South Viet Nam before August 1945*
This situation of relative weakness explained why the Viet 
Minh4sought to establish an alliance with the Cao Dai and 
the Hoa Hao in the South.
a) The Cao Dai and the Hoa Hao.
During the early 1940*s, the two politico-religious
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groups, the Cao ©ai  ^ and the Hoa Hao, were attract­
ing increasing numbers of adherents in the populous Mekong 
delta and both became corporate members of the Nationalist 
Unified Front, a coalition of South Vietnamese political 
groups, which planned to assume administrative powers in 
Saigon as soon as the Japanese had surrendered to the 
Allies.
The Viet Minh, which arrived only belatedly on the
South Vietnamese political scene, shrewdly allied itself
with the Cao Dai and Hoa Hao, infiltrated the Thanh nien
Tien phong (Vanguard Youth) and gradually took over the
leadership of the Nationalist Unified Front to seize
power in the provinces of the Mekong delta and also in
the Sai G-on-Chd Ldn,
%
Tran Huy.Lieu, the director of the History Depart­
ment of the State Science Committee in North Viet Nam 
reported in the following terms, on the "peaceful policy1' 
adopted by the Viet Minh because of the weakness of its 
position:
In Long Xuyen...the organisations for 
national salvation Viet Minh were 
unable to develop satisfactorily be­
cause of the enthusiastic Vanguard 
Youth BAovement and the reactionary 
propagation of Hoa Hao religion.
Faced with such a situation, the Viet 
Minh provisional committee of the 
province immediately changed its tactics, 
infiltrating its own Youth for National 
Salvation into the Vanguard Youth Move­
ment in which it formed a nucleus which 
would eventually take over the leader­
ship.
In the matter of the Hoa Hao, we 
approached their leaders and proposed 
an Alliance for National Salvation 
which would persue a policy of fighting 
the Japanese... 107
The astute Viet Minh manoeuvres on the day of in­
surrection were also vividly and proudly related by the 
same author (p.195)'
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The greatest difficulty in seizing 
power in Long Xuyen arose, not from the 
Japanese nor the puppet administration, 
but rather from the Hoa, Hao religion.
Its followers, so numerous and deeply 
rooted in this area, were our competi­
tors in the struggle to seize power.♦.
On 25 August, in front of a huge 
meeting attended by hundreds of thousands 
of people of all social strata and re™ 
ligous denominations, the Insurrection 
Committee indicted colonialism and 
feudalism, proclaimed the Viet Minh 
program, and declared national independ­
ence. In the beginning, we were still 
not masters of the situation because 
mingled with the red banners with hammer 
and sickle or golden star of the Commun­
ist Party and of the Viet Minh Front, 
were also the yellow flags with red star 
or triple stripes, of the Vanguard Youth 
and the old regime. Later on, under 
pressure from the masses sic , the non 
Communist and non-Viet Minh flags gradua­
lly disappeared. The meeting was then 
transformed into a parade to demonstrate 
the massive force we now controlled.
The same document candidly revealed (p.196) the final 
result of that alliance policy,, an outcome which was pre­
dictable and typical;
The following day, we put under arrest 
a few reactionary Hoa Hao leaders.
But, three days later, there was estab­
lished in LongXuyen a People's United 
Revolutionary Committee embracing re­
presentatives of various political 
parties and religious denominations 
under the leadership of the provincial 
committee of the Indochinese Communist 
Party,
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The Communist treatment of the Hoa Hao in Long 
Xuyen, was also applied to the Cao Dai in Tay Ninh and 
other areas.
V  •> v
When the Hoa Hao and the Cao Dai refused to submit 
their forces to the Viet Minh leadership, their religious 
leaders were condemned, and many of them, including the 
founder of the Hoa Hao religious sect, Huynh 3?hu S&', 
were kidnaped and murdered by Communist forces.
b) The Buddhists,
In the North, the Communists also approached Buddhist 
monks in the name of the sacred cause of national inde­
pendence, hoping to benefit from their support and pro-
w  A*
tection. The Communist general Van Tien Dung, for example, 
had chosen in December 194-2, to disguise himself as a
A A ^
Buddhist monk in the pagoda of Bot Xuyen village (My Ddc,
Ha Dong), so as to continue his revolutionary activi- 
110ties.
Van Tien Dung himself provides an account of his 
motives and of his preparation for becoming a Buddhist monk;
It was necessary for us to have a 
secure place as a base for our 
activities. After consultation 
with Ly B., we decided to apply for 
the use of the pagoda in Bot Xuyen 
village.... This pagoda did not have 
any resident monk and its location 
was "good"; only one of its sides 
faced the village while the remain­
ing three overlooked ricefields.
Thus our comings and goings were 
less conspicuous.
To prepare myself for this "monastic" 
performance, I went to the Quan Su 
pagoda in Hanoi tp buy a few Buddhist 
books in qudc ngti (romanized Vietnamese)
...., from which I learned the pagoda 
ceremonial.
On 13 December 1942, after all pre­
parations had been completed, it was time 
for me to live "in the shadow of Buddha".
I left the house of ly B., crossed the 
paddyfields, and went into thick bush to 
change into the brown habit of the 
Buddhist monk and to put on a brown head 
covering to conceal my hair. Then, 
accompanied by Ly B , , I walked devoutly 
through the main entrance to the pagoda 
with the pious invocation1’Ham-m6 a - di - 
da Phat" on my lips. 111
Since Buddhist pagodas were usually situated in remote 
areas and Buddhist monks did not maintain regular contact 
with the people, the Communist cadres sometimes sought 
shelter and food in the shadow of Buddha, and found the 
pagodas such secxire refuges that they even dared to hold 
meetings and to conduct training courses there. In May 
1945, for example, a meeting of Viet Minh cadres was held 
in the pagoda of An Xa (Quang Binh) at which mass organ­
isations, general insurrection and Party business were,
, 112 discussed. f
A Communist writer, Vu Qufic Uy, still remembers his 
first meeting in 1943 with "comrade Iloang Quoc Viet"
(whoSe. real name was Ha Ba. Gang, but who was then using 
the aliases Hufong or Lien) in a pagoda;
Upon our arrival, the Buddhist prior 
came out, recognised the guests, and 
with special regard for comrade Viet,
warmly welcomed us in to the rear 
hall. Those deserted pagoda in the 
countryside were so very convenient 
for our rendez-vous and meetings.
The reason why we conducted extensive 
propaganda among the Buddhist monks 
was so that we might use many differ­
ent centres for our activities. 113
It was also in a pagoda close to T&ng and Bai 
villages (between C&ng Nhat Tdu and $)Sng Van area) that
tv f\ ^
Vu Quoc Uy and other comrades received their training in 
Leninism, guerilla warfare and revolution,under Hoang 
Quoc Viet, The Communist writer Uy could not help but 
reflect ironically;
Sometimes I wondered if the prior 
would ever realize that the guests, 
to whom he extended such king 
hospitality, were the ones who 
tried to persuade the toiling people 
not to believe in Spirit or Buddha but 
rather in themselves as sources of 
salvation? 114
To rally the Buddhists into their United Front after 
the August Revolution, the Communists took pains to create 
the Buddhist Association for National Salvation and also 
the Buddhist Monks and Buddhist Nuns Associations for 
National Salvation.
Nor did the Communist cadres neglect to help those 
Buddhist Associations, periodically, to draft and present 
some letters of support to President Ho Chi Minh. Those 
letters, of course, were accorded publicity in Hanoi news­
papers. An outstanding example was to be found in Cdu 
Quoc newspaper,No*129 (29 December 1945), just one week
before the G-eneral Elections;
A Resolution of the Buddhist G-eneral 
Association for National Salvation,
Hanoi Section.
On the occasion of the solemn feast 
of AMIDA, considering that Ho Chi Minh 
has sacrificed himself to regain 
national independence, and has guided 
the nation through such stormy times, 
the Buddhist G-eneral Association for 
National Salvation resolved:
1, That all the Buddhist followers 
and disciples in the metropolitain 
area of Hanoi would unanimously 
vote Ho Chi Minh into the National 
Assembly;
2. That all should acclaim and support 
Ho Chi Minh to be elected President 
of the Democratic Republic of Viet­
nam.
Only a few years later, disillusion overtook the 
Buddhists when they found themselves living under a 
totalitarian and anti-religious regime. They were 
heartbroken to see some of the most courageous monks, 
Venerable Tu*e Quang and Venerable Tue Chi£u, for example, 
publicly condemned as "traitors” , and to learn about 
their later execution.
On one occasion in Nghe An, during the massive exodus
of refugees from North Viet Nam, (1954*1955), 96 out of
115 Buddhists who had attempted to flee to the South, were
115reportedly eliminated.
Refugees who had escaped from the North and defectors 
from North Vietnamese troops in the 1960's, testified that 
in the North, apart from some pagodas in Hanoi and some 
celebrated shrines left elsewhere as showcases for the
enjoyment of Western diplomats and privileged visitors, all 
other genuine Buddhist organisations and centres of worship 
had Been effectively abolished by the communists. [They 
were replaced by a "progressive” organisation created by 
the Communist authorities, namely the "Patriotic Buddhists1 
Association".
At the same time, communist writers, like Nguyfen Hong 
Phong, openly criticized Buddhism and reviled the Buddhist 
monks:
Buddhist monastic life has long been 
an object of derision for our people.
Buddhist monks have been ridiculed in 
popular sayings, folk songs and comedies.
To the people, Buddhist monks are no­
thing but iazy men who batten on society.
We can cite dozens of comic stories and 
hundreds of popular sayings or folk 
songs directed against Buddhist monaster­
ies, monks, and Buddhism itself. 116
Obviously, all those anti-Buddhist activities were, 
of course, postponed until communist power had been con­
solidated* As early as 1947, Hoang Quoc Viet declared at 
a high level conference of the Viet Minh:
During this stage, let us leave them 
alone, those shaved heads i.e., Buddhist 
monks and religious leaders in general 
and their flocks. The next stage, when 
communism is established, will be the 
proper time for us to dispose of them 
all. 117
It was also the same communist leader Viet who, twenty 
years later, told a communist visitor from South America:
There is no problem with the Buddhists.
There are, however, problems with the 
Catholics,... 118
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c) With the Catholics,
The Catholics, on the other hand, though a 
minority in Viet Ham, formed an integral part of an 
international Church with ramifications in most countries 
of the world and co-ordinated by an experienced and com­
plex administration whose headquarters were in Rome.
They were the closest knit, best organized, and therefore, 
the most influential group in the country at that time.
Very active in the educational and social fields, the 
Catholic organisations had built up great prestige among 
the Vietnamese espectially the educated people. Addit­
ionally, they were the recipients of very considerable 
support, both material and moral, from the Vatican and 
from Catholics all over the world. However, the royal 
edicts against Christianity, the unhappy coincidence of 
evangelisation and colonization in the nineteenth century, 
the hatred and suspicion of Catholicism which resulted 
from the "Scholars1 Movement", and the mistakes or scandals 
of some Frenchmen and Vietnamese converts had given rise 
to deeply rooted prejudice. Catholics were then, among 
other things, accused of being "traitors” or "fifth colum­
nists" .
The Viet Minh showed themselves past masters in the 
art of converting both assets and liabilities into pro­
ductive capital for their own political undertakings. 
Immediately after Ho Chi Minh's seizure of power in August, 
1945, anti-catholic rumours gained a wide currency in Viet 
Ham, French missionaries were alleged to have poisoned 
village wells, native Catholics to have served as spies,
and any connection with foreign missionaries became 
evidence of treachery or a ground for suspicion. A 
report reaching North Viet Ham from Saigon alleged that 
"French gunners had opened fire from the balcony of the 
bishop*s house" (sic) killing Vietnamese demonstrators 
in Saigon. All this brought psychological pressure to 
bear upon the Vietnamese Catholics to prove themselves no 
less patriotic than their non-Catholic compatriots, which 
predisposed them to serve the struggle for national 
independence to the best of their ability.
In the Vinh diocese (embracing the three provinces 
Nghe An, Ha Tinh, Quang Binh) for example, several priests 
and many laymen had been sent to labour camps by the French 
authorities in 1944, and released only after the Japanese 
coup d !Htat of 9 March 1945* The Viet Minh took pains to 
honour them as heroes and set them up as patriotic examples 
for the whole people to follow.
Anticipating the apprehension felt by the Catholics
about the possibility of an anti-religious government, at
the first Cabinet meeting on 3 March 1945, Ho Chi Minh
decided that one of the most necessary and urgent tasks
was to proclaim freedom of conscience and to emphasize the
119necessity of union between Catholics and non-Catholics. ^
Hoping to create a favourable impression on non- 
Catholic Vietnamese, all the four Vietnamese bishops at 
that time (Nguyen Ba Tong, Ho Ngoc Can, Ngo Binh Thuc and 
Le Hdu Til) addressed a collective letter to Pope Pius XII 
to plead for Viet Nam*s independence and to appeal for more 
support from Vatican and Catholics everywhere especially in 
France:
....Our people have asked its four 
bishops to present to your Holiness 
the expression of their profound 
respect, and to request your blessing 
upon our national independence. Our 
people have struggled so hard to regain 
it and are now determined to preserve 
it at all costs. 120
A few weeks later, on 4 November 1945, the four 
bishops wrote another letter to Christians of the whole 
world, especially in Britain and America, to request their 
support for the just cause of Viet Ham:
....We sincerely ask our brother 
Christians effectively to intervene 
in order to save us from the horrors 
of war.., Our country is being in­
vaded now and must defend its inde­
pendence together with justice and 
freedom... 121
The ex-queen Nam Phddng, whose name had become Mme
Vinh Thuy, after the abdication of Bao Dai, being a Catholic
also wrote an open letter of appeal in favour of national
independence and of the new Democratic Republican Govern-
ment. All three letters were later published by Hanoi
Information Service in pamphlet form, together with a
message from President Ho Chi Minh to the French resi-
1 22dents in Indochina.
The Viet Minh, in their turn, used the appeals 
written by Vietnamese Catholics of such great authority 
to persuade the Catholics to join their organisation of 
Women, Youth, Children, Peasants... for National Salvation. 
Answering the Government1s appeal for unity and support,
the Catholic people joined the National Salvation Pront 
en masse, organised a huge demonstration in Hanoi on 
23 September 1945, and the largest public meeting ever to 
be held in Yinh (Hofs home province) in October 1945.
As a result of some prompting by the Yiet Minh leaders, a 
letter of support was sent to President Iio, promising him 
that Catholic people were ready to sacrifice everything, 
even their lives if necessary, for national freedom and 
happiness♦
That message was naturally most welcome in Hanoi*
Ho Chi Minh earnestly acknowledged it in a very friendly 
and ”devout” letter, dated 14 October 1945:
Your enthusiastic promise, dear friends, 
makes it clear that you are real patriots 
and true followers of Jesus* The Lord 
Jesus has sacrificed himself to win free­
dom and happiness for mankind. . It is 
also for the freedom and happiness of our 
whole nation that our compatriots, both 
Catholic and non-Catholic, have to 
sacrifice and struggle* We hope that
Catholics all over the world will eager­
ly respond to the dramatic appeal of our 
Catholic compatriots. 123
Little wonder that the Provisional Government of Ho 
Chi Minh "thoughtfully” included a Catholic, Mguyen Manh 
Ha, who was entrusted with the ministry of national 
economy* This government post was later given to Chu Ba
Phuong for the sake of political alliance with the Nation­
alist Parties, and Ha was instructed by Ho to contact the 
Apostolic Delegate, Msgr* Drapier, to hint to the latter 
that a visit to Hanoi might be opportune, and to probe the
attitude of tlie Vatican representative towards H o 1 s 
G-overnment*
Moreover, the Viet Minh cadres and local adminis­
trative committees were urged to show special concern for 
the Catholic communities and more respect to the clergy, 
to invite Catholic leaders to give speeches, to offer 
help in organising Catholic celebrations and so forth*
Ho Chi Minh himself took the lead in showing "good will" 
to the Catholic Church by sending Nguyen Manh Ha and his 
supreme counsellor Vinh Thuy to represent the G-overnment 
at the consecration of bishop he Hdu Tu, who was sub­
sequently named a G-overnment Advisor*
Before Christmas, Ho found the time to honour his 
Catholic compatriots with a special letter, praising 
Jesus as the sublime liberator, and encouraging Catholic 
people to be active in the national liberation movement* 
This courteous>reassuring, and persuasive gesture became 
a regular practice during the resistance war and gave Ho 
the opportunity to appeal for more support and efforts on 
the part of Catholic people "with a view to holding a much 
more joyful Christmas celebration when the resistance war 
should end in victory"*
Tran Van G-iau, the Communist leader who had out­
manoeuvred the politico-religious groups in the South, 
also found the time to come to the Christmas celebration 
of the Catholic League in Hai Phong, and "incidentally" 
to deliver a "highly motivating" speech partially based 
on his own biblical exegesis;
In the South, the idea of religious 
conflict does not exist. 1 myself 
was struggling side "by side with 
Father Luat. The Youth delegation 
from the South numbers a Catholic 
representative among its members.
In future, Southern Viet Mam will 
send Catholic representatives to 
the national parliament.
....Whoever is without any belief is 
not a real man. I myself have my 
own belief, the belief in Marxism- 
Leninism. Marx and Lenin were per­
suing their work of salvation, sal­
vation from misery, in similar 
fashion to their predecessor, Jesus.
The Lord Jesus and his first twelve 
disciples were poor and oppressed, 
indeed. His words "my kingdom is 
not of this world" means that Jbsus 
was disgusted with the world of opp­
ression and exploitation of the 
Roman Empire. Hence, the Lord was 
determined to sacrifice himself to 
liberate men from misery. We all 
should follow the example of self- 
sacrifice, 18*1 set to us by the Lord. 1^ *
The Viet Minh newspaper, Dan Chu, which published 
Giau's visit and ideas, commented that "his ten-minute 
speech completely captivated the whole audience"!
A few years later that same persuasive speaker 
again made an allusion to the Infant Jesus, while prepar-
m  A
ing a political speech^training course for lawyers. On 
that occasion his remarks were loaded with contempt and 
insult. Immediately Comrade Ho, who rated the importance 
of political persuasion very highly, reprimanded his
arrogant cadre and advised him "to be more realistic and
delicate" so as to avoid political complications and
1 2*5undesir$able effects,
But Giau!s earlier promise of Catholic representatives 
in Parliament was scrupulously fulfilled in accordance 
with the Viet Minh plan* During preparations for the 
general election of January 1946, the Viet Minh Front 
inserted a few Catholic names into its list of recommended 
candidates with entirely predictable results: among the
333 elected representatives there were approximately twenty 
Catholics, including several priests. One Catholic priest,
t
the Rev. Pham Ba True was later named a member of the 
Standing Committee of the Rational Assembly, and also a 
vice-president of the Mat Tran Dan Toe Thong Rhat (Unified 
Rational Front) which combined the Viet Minh and the Lien 
Viet Fronts.
In December 1948, the Bishop of Bui Chu, Msgr* Ho
A*
Rgoc Can, died. Though the relationship between the Viet 
Minh and the Catholics was, at that time, becoming far less 
cordial, President Ho nevertheless wrote a letter of 
sympathy to Bishop H o 1s flock;
It was with dismay that I received the 
sad news that the Most Reverend Ho Rgoc 
Can had passed away.
I very much regret that the war sit­
uation does not allow me to attend the 
bishop!s funeral. The Committee of 
Administration and Resistance of the 
Third Zone has been requested to re­
present me at the funeral and to 
express ray sincere condolence. 126
By that time, H o 1s supreme advisor, the ex-king Bao 
Dai, had formed his nationalist government, whose rule
extended over South Viet Nam and most cities and towns 
throughout the rest of the country.
^  ^  jfc
People resident in the area of Bui Chu and Phat Diem 
had constituted themselves an autonomous zone under the 
leadership of Bishop Hdu Td*, another former counsellor 
of H o 1s Government. The Viet Minh Front, believing that 
its alliance with the Catholics was already in ruins, was 
prepared to bring them back under its control by force. 
Consequently, Bao Dai *s Government, supported by the 
French, despatched a detachment of paratroops to help 
Phat Diem and Bui Chu.
Following several months of careful planning and pre­
paration, the Viet Minh troops were at last ready to launch 
an attack on that area, whose inhabitants were predominantly 
Catholic. On 9 December 1949, Ho Chi Minh sent a very 
shrewd letter to justify his action and, at the same time, 
to make a final attempt to win back the cooperation of the 
Catholic people. This letter which is a typical illus­
tration of the political guile employed by the Viet Minh, 
merits quotation at length;
Dear Compatriots,
The French invaders and their puppet 
paratroops have dropped into Phat Diem,
They have violated Vietnamese territory, and 
this hurts me deeply.
Moreover, the French invaders falsely de­
clared that they had come at the invita­
tion of the Catholics. Such an assertion 
has a doubly malicious purpose:
First, to smear our Catholic compatriots 
and to suggest that our Catholic compat­
riots are betraying their Fatherland in
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favour of the colonialists;
Secondly, to foment a fratricidal war 
in which we would kill one another for 
the benefit of the French, But, the 
French invaders will he defeated 
because, during the last few years, 
our Catholic compatriots have nobly 
contributed to the Resistance for 
national salvation, The reason they 
have done so is that during these past 
few years, the French invaders have 
destroyed churches, abused priests 
raped nuns, and plundered and mstsacred 
our Catholic compatriots no less than 
the non-Catholics. In the beginning, 
they pretended to be friendly and kind 
so as to deceive our Catholic com­
patriots and win them over to their side, 
but these compatriots of ours have re­
mained steadfast in face of every 
inducement,
The G-overnment has sent its troops to 
Phat Diem to repulse the colonialist 
invaders in order to liberate our 
Catholic compatriots in this area from 
the fetters of those satanic enemies.
I wish you to maintain your patriotic 
spirit and to be strong enough to re­
sist the French invaders, thus ful­
filling your sacred duty of serving 
both G-od and the Fatherland, 127
The attack on Phat Diem signalled the beginning of a 
new phase, that of preparing to increase the scale of the 
war against the French and to apply sterner measures in 
domestic affairs. Once the Workers1 Party had been form­
ally and officially constituted> a campaign of violence and 
repression followed which ended the freedom and even the 
lives of many Catholics. During the years 1952 and 1953
147 *
1 28three uprisings " mn predominantly Catholic areas of 
Nghe Tinh, were brutally suppressed, after which, a savage 
campa'gin of land reform stripped Catholic communities of 
their traditional resources and properties. Early in 
1954, most of the Roman Catholic bishops and priests liv­
ing under the Communist regime were restricted to their 
residences and, in one diocese, Vinh, nearly 50$ of the 
priests were placed under arrest. Many of these suffered 
terribly in labour camps.
It is scarcely surprising, therefore, that, after the 
1954 G-eneva agreements had been concluded, nearly one 
million refugees, the majority of whom were Catholics, 
left North Viet Nam (the zone allocated to the Communist 
side by these agreements) for the South in a historic ex­
odus of biblical proportions.
Priests and Catholic leaders were accused by the
Communists of "forcing people to go South, to join the
enemy camp11: Communist cadres, newspapers and handbills
publicised endless accusations and insults, reviling them
with names like "reactionaries", "traitors", "hunting dogs"
129and so forth. ^
Thereafter the Communist government, now in undis­
puted control of North Viet Nam, embarked on an "advance 
towards socialism", but it had to send its troops once more 
to suppress an uprising of peasants and fishermen, most of 
them Catholics, at Quynh Ldu (Nghe-an) in 1956.
Late in 1959, Truong Chinh still found it necessary 
publicly to condemn Catholic leaders in his report to the
National Assembly of Hanoi:
There are also reactionaries in the 
Catholic Church who take advantage of 
their spiritual power and dogmas to 
distort the truth about the co-opera­
tion movement, to deceive or coerce 
Catholic followers in an attempt to
draw the religious elements away from
the Party and Government.,.. We must maintain 
our vigilance against them and exert our­
selves to frustrate their acts of sabotage. 130
about the same time, the North Viet Nam Writers' 
Association organised a series of seminars and contests to 
encourage young writers to produce poems, plays, songs, or 
short stories designed to draw attention to campaigns, 
slogans, revolutionary tasks and so on. The best works 
submitted, being favourable to the Party and helpful to the 
implementation of its policies were subsequently published. 
Subtle attacks on the Church embodying hidden persuasions 
to induce the Catholics to support the Communist regime 
were published in pamphlets such as: Jung Dot (Conflict),
iJm Bao (a Catholic Village), Sd Bao Thbi Xa^hoi chu-
nghia (Religion in the Socialist Era), Ben Dong Kd6c Ung 
(The Flooded Ricefields), Ba Ng am (Hidden Rocks)...,
In 1958, at the national conference of cadres convened 
to commemorate the 150th aniversary of Karl Marx's birth, 
Truong Chinh again denounced religion as a force opposed to 
socialism:
In the socialist revolution in the 
North, the enemies to be overthrown.... 
are all the forces that oppose social­
ist transformation and socialist con­
struction: exploiting elements...,
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spies, bandits, reactionaries dis­
guised as the followers of religion,.. H 1 31
5° Inter-national Alliances
Besides the alliance with different social classes, 
political parties, religious groups, and various sections 
of theVietnamese population, the Communists always strived 
to achieve solidarity with the people of different nation­
alities both at home and abroad,
a) With the minorities on the highlands.
Since the Northwest of Viet Nam was geographically 
and strategically important as an area in which clan­
destine organisations might operate without fear of dis­
covery, for communication lines with Southern China and 
other parts of Indochina, as well as being ideally suited 
to guerilla bases and military activities, the Communist 
leaders were determined to win over the minorities, Tho, 
Man, Thai, Meo, Nung and Chinese, who inhabited the high­
lands, For this purpose, Ho Chi Minh and the Communist 
cadres undertook the study of the local languages and 
customs, concerned themselves with building a lasting 
friendship with the highlanders, and recruited and train­
ed some of their ablest men to be representatives and 
leaders of the minority people. Outstanding examples in 
the 1940's were Hoang Van Thu and Chu Van Tan in the Bac 
Sdn, Vu Nhai area.
To carry out more effective propaganda, they pub­
lished some lithograph newsletters written in Vietnamese,
J
Chinese and minority languages. The Bac Son paper, for
1 5 0 .
a' 132example, carried articles written in the Tho language.
The "Ten-Point Regulations" of the guerillas, the
133"Ten Honour Pledges" of the Armed Propaganda Brigade, 
and the "Twelve Recommendations" were all carefully framed 
so as to accommodate to the beliefs and customs of those 
minorities in mountainous areas. Ho wisely advised his 
cadres:
To study the customs of each region 
so as to be acquainted with the local 
people to create a friendly atmosphere, 
and gradually to explain and persuade 
them to mitigate their superstitions, 134
But he also cautioned them:
Not to offend against the people's 
beliefs and customs; not to sleep 
before the family altar, not to raise
their feet over the hearth, not to
play music in the house.,., 135
After the seizure of power in 1945? a Department in
charge of Minorities was created and in December 1945, a
Conference of Minorities was created and in December 1945,
a Conference of Minorities1 delegates was organized in
Hanoi. Ho Chi Minh took pains to reassure them again of
their equality with all other citizens of the Independent
Viet Nam and those delegates responded by giving their
pledge of support and loyalty to the Hanoi G-overnment,
following the examples of their own heroes Hoang Van Thu,
1 36Ndng Van Cun and so on.
To strengthen that loyal friendship, many memoirs, 
novels and short stories were published, giving accounts of 
the community life in various cun and lan (villages and
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hamlets in mountainous areas), of cooperation and support 
of the minorities people and the heroic deeds of their 
leaders. Nguyen Tu&n in Tuy But Khang Chi eh (resistance 
Ghronicales), Nam Cao in P&i Mat (The Two Eyes), and To 
Hoai in Iruyen T§.y Bac (Stories of the North West) did 
indeed, contribute their effective literary persuasion to 
winning more support from the national minorities.
This campaign also reached the minorities in the 
SoLith and, in 1946, the Yiet Minh organized a Minorities 
Fair in Ban me thuot and a Congress in Pleiku. Ho Chi 
'Minh, unable to attend the tfvery happy family*gathering" 
sent to his "Compatriots of national minorities" a special 
letter which proved again that Ho had mastered the art of 
persuasion:
I am far from you, yet my heart and 
that of the government is always by. 
your side.
Compatriots of the Kinh majority people 
or of the Tho, Muong or Man, Djarai or Ede,
Sedan or Bana, and other minorities, 
are all Yiet N a m fs children and there™ 
fore blood brothers and sisters to one 
another. Close to one another we 
always remain, in happiness and in; 
trials, during life as well as at the 
hour of death. In affluence or in 
want, we must help each other.
In the past, we were kept apart because 
first, of our lack of communications, 
and secondly, of the discord and divi­
sion someone had set between us.
Today, Yiet Nam is our common country.,..
Then, all nationalities must closely unite 
to safeguard our Fatherland and support 
our government.
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We must love, respect and help one 
another to secure our common happiness 
and that of our offspring.
Rivers may dry up, or mountains wear 
away, hut our solidarity will never dec­
rease* 137
b) With the Laotians and the Cambodians.
From the beginning of the Indochinese Communist 
Party, the Comintern had advised the Vietnamese Communists 
to form a single bloc with the Laotian and Cambodian peoples. 
The underground newsletter C&ng Nong Binh (Worker, Peasant, 
Soldier) has explained this policy in an authoritative way:
Though Yiet Nam, Cambodia, and Laos are 
different in race, language, customs, 
and way of life, they form indeed a 
single bloc.
Economic relations between the three 
countries are inportant: natural prod­
ucts must be exchanged to answer the 
needs of the people; communication 
lines and sea ports should be shared to 
make possible the life and activities of 
each country, which would be unfeasible 
if they were completely separated from 
one another.
In the political sphere, those three 
countries were all occupied by the 
French and suffered the same rule and 
the same oppressive, exploiting system 
of the same empire....
Hence, the proletariat and the oppressed 
people in the three countries, Yiet Nam,
Cao Mien, Lao, must absolutely unite to 
achieve their aspirations for freedom....
Since the enemy of revolution has a
unified central power which administers 
the whole of Indochina, the Communist 
Party, likewise, must concentrate the 
forces of Indochina1s proletariat in a 
unified front, under the leadership of 
the Indochinse.proletariat in order to 
he on the same ground with its enemy. 
Therefore, the name Vietnamese Communist 
Party, should he changed into Indochinese 
Communist Party. 138
The eighth Plenum of the I.C.P. in May 1941? also 
reaffirmed the necessity of all Indochina’s unity:
To achieve the liberation of all Indo­
china' s people, all revolutionary forces 
of Indochina... must be united together.
The alliance of all the forces of all 
classes and parties, of revolutionary 
groups and all anti-Japanese peoples, is 
essential to our Party. 139
During the resistance war, the Communist Party made 
continuous efforts to create a common front of Viet-Mien 
Lao, by retaining a small faction of Laotians and Cambod 
ians in the anti-French struggle:
We are waging our Resistance war; the 
brother Cambodian and Laotian nations 
are also waging theirs. The French 
colonialists and the American inter­
ventionists are the common enemy of 
our three nations. Consequently we 
must strive to help our Cambodian and 
Laotian brothers and their resistance 
wars, and arrive at the establishment 
of a Viet-Mien-Lao Front. 140
Of that Viet-Mien-Lao Front, Ho Chi Minh spoke 
proudly to the Congress at which the Viet Minh and the 
Lien Viet Fronts merged together:
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What makes me happier is that not only 
the entire Vietnamese people are united, 
hut the Cambodian and Laotian peoples 
are also united. The news of the unity 
of these two brother nations is brought 
personally by the Cambodian and Laotian 
delegates.
Thus the Vietnamese people are united, 
the Cambodian people are united and the 
Laotian people are united. Let us 
strive for a Vietnamese-Cambodian- 
Laotian unity. 141
This Viet-Mien-Lao unity has made it possible for 
Ta Quang Buu, vice-minister of Defence of Ho's government, 
to sign the Geneva "Agreements of the Cessation of Hostil­
ities" in July 1954, not only in the name of the Democratic 
Republic of Viet Nam, but also in the names of the joint- 
command of the Cambodian Resistance Front and of the Pathet 
Lao.
Also, in the name of that unity, Hanoi has established 
the Ho Chi Minh trail, sent her troops to fight in Laos, 
Cambodia, and used- those two countries as sanctuaries to 
mount attacks on South Viet Nam. It was this strategic 
need that gave rise to the new "Alliance of Indochinese 
people against American imperialism", after the coup d'etat 
in Cambodia that deposed Prince Sihanouk.
c) With Russia and the Socialist camp.
Since Communism came to Viet Nam from Moscow and Ho 
Chi Minh, the founder and leader of the Indochinese Comm­
unist Party was trained in Moscow, North Viet Nam has
maintained a long lasting and loyal alliance with the 
Soviet and other Socialist Governments as well as the 
revolutionary movement in various countries.
This was expressed in one of the ten major slogans 
of the Communist Party:
Support for the USSR, unity with the 
world proletariat and the revolution­
ary movement in colonial and semi­
colonial countries. 14-2
This slogan was repeated every year on the commem­
oration day of the October Revolution, and developed in 
newspaper articles and letter of support sent to Moscow.
Relating the successes of the August 1945 Revolution 
and of the resistance war victory of the Soviet Red Army 
and the friendly assistance of other Socialist countries, 
Ho Chi Minh gave an authoratitive report at the second 
national congress of the Viet Nam Workers1 Party (February 
1951):
The democratic camp headed by the 
Soviet Union includes the socialist 
countries, and the new democracies in 
Europe and in Asia. It also embraces 
the oppressed nations which are strugg­
ling against aggressive imperialism, 
and the democratic organisations and 
personalities in the capitalist count­
ries.
The democratic camp is a powerful camp 
which is growing in strength.
....From Eastern Europe to Eastern Asia 
the USSR and the new democracies form an
immense bloc of 800 million people.
In this bloc the nationas are united, 
having the same goal and without any 
antagonisms. It is the symbol of 
progress and of the bright future of 
mankind. This is an extremely 
powerful force.
...This is the United Front of the 
peaceful and democratic world. This 
is a very powerful force whose in­
tensity is growing every day. 143
This purely optimistic picture of a "democratic, 
peaceful and powerful world" was relentlessly repeated, 
reproduced, translated into paintings, songs, movies, 
playes, posters, banners, carticles, books, and slogans, 
and exclusively funneled into the minds of people through 
eyes and ears, day after day and year after yea.
Of course, the powerful state censorship produced 
only one-way information and the ordinary people in North 
Viet Ham could not hear about the tragic events of "Budapest, 
1956", "Prague, 1968", the sad cases of Pasternak, Solzh­
enitsyn, Alleluiva Stalin, nor about the protesters who 
vanished (Vadim Delone, Konstantinr-Babitsky, Larissa Daniel, 
Pavel Litvinov, Natalya Gorbanevshaya and so forth).
hau
Moreover, the magnificent Viet-Trung-XopNghi (Vietnamese- 
Chinese-Soviet Friendship) Frontrmight strengthen the 
people's conviction that "in this bloc the nations are 
united,... withmit any antagonisms".
In more practical terms, Truong Chinh in a speech 
delivered on the occasion of the thirtieth anniversary of 
the Party, explained one of the immediate tasks of Viet Nam:
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The Vietnamese people should strengthen 
solidarity with the people of the 
socialist camp, with the Soviet Union 
as the centre, because the peoples of 
these countries are their closest 
brothers in the international arena, 
hot only did they actively support us 
in our revolution and resistance War 
but since the restoration of peace, 
they have also been wholeheartedly 
h e w i n g  us in building socialism in 
North Viet Nam and warmly supporting 
our struggle for peaceful reunifica­
tion of our country,.,. Bach Vietnamese 
must clearly realize that solidarity 
and cooperation with the brother coun­
tries in the great socialist family is 
a firm guarantee for the success of 
the building of socialism in North Viet 
Nam and the struggle for the reunific­
ation of the country. 145
That celebrated Marxist theoretician also explained 
the f,hown and "why" of the mutual support between Viet Nam 
and the colonial or semi-colonial countries:
The Vietnamese people must strengthen 
solidarity with the colonial and semi­
colonial countries. By conducting 
the revolution to overthrow the 
imperialists and liverate themselves 
the Vietnamese people weaken the 
enemies of other colonial peoples.
That is why we must call upon other 
colonial peoples to rise up and to­
gether oppose the common enemy. The 
people of other colonies support our 
revolutionary cause, therefore it is 
our duty to support theirs, 146
After the Soviet Union, China has been the closest 
ally of North Viet Nam. This becomes obvious if geograph-
ical, historical, cultural and economic conditions are 
taken into consideration.
Since 1923, when Ho Ohi Minh, under different names, 
came to China with the Borodin delegation as a member of 
the Third International, a strong tie has been developed 
between the two revolutionary movements, Chinese and Viet­
namese, It was in China that the Indochinese Communist 
Party was born and its early activities took place. It 
was China that gave Ho shelter, a platform, experience in 
the application of Marxism-Leninism, together with several 
powerful comrades who, after their successful revolution in 
1949? were the first ones officially to recognize H o ’s 
government and wholeheartedly to help the Democratic Re­
public of Viet Nam to win the anti-French war at Dien Bien 
Phu*
Little wonder that after the foundation of the People’s 
Republic of China, Ho in his message of congratulation to 
Mao, solemnly reaffirmed:
Brotherly relations have existed 
between the Vietnamese and Chinese 
nations during thousands of years of 
history. Henceforth these relations 
will be even closer for the develop­
ment of the freedom and happiness of
our two nations, as well as for the
safeguard of world democracy and 
lasting peace, 147
No doubt, the Chinese victory confirmed the Vietnamese 
Communists* full confidence in their final victory and great­
ly favoured their decision of letting the Indochinese Comm­
unist Party emerge (under the name of Viet Nam Workers*
Party) at its second National Congress in February 1951 
At the Congress Ho happily related the Vietnamese Revol 
ution to that of China and Russia as well:
The October Revolution was victorious. 
The building of Socialism in the Soviet 
Union has been successful. The Chinese 
Revolution has been successful. These 
great successes have opened the way to 
success for our revolution and that of 
many other countries in the world. 148
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Chapter Y
Conflicts, Resistance, Ne
and the Theme of Hoa de tien 
Ooncilliation for future a
In August 1945, the Yiet Minh exerted every 
effort to seize power and to establish a Government 
before the arrival of the Allied Forces. They 
achieved great success in North and Central Yiet Nam, 
as is shovrn by the transfer of power in Hue (30 Aug­
ust 1945) and the Proclamation of Independence 
(2 September 1945) in Hanoi,
In the South, however, they encountered an en­
tirely different situation. Since the failure of 
the Nam Ky Insurrection (November 1940) and the sub­
sequent French repression which shattered all the 
Communist organisations then existing in Cochinchina, 
the Communists had still not fully recovered by the 
time of the Japanese troops1 surrender. By dint of 
astute political manoeuvres, Tran Yan Giau succeeded 
In assuming the chairmanship of the National United 
Front, in which capacity he organised in Saigon a 
huge demonstration to greet the National Independence 
proclaimed by Ho Chi Minh in Hanoi on the samec-day 
(2 September 1945). Some shots were fired, which 
Induced panic among the densCLy packed crowds, after 
which disorders broke out with widespread shooting, 
looting, and robbery: it was reported that most
victims of the incident were Frenchmen, including 
Father Tricoire, who was killed on the steps of the 
Cathedral, While Yiet Minh and French representatives
blamed one another, the French and foreign residents 
of Saigon were seized by fear and awaited the arrival
■i
of French troops with growing anxiety.
Four days after the incident, a British mission 
under the command of General Douglas D, Gracey, rea­
ched Saigon. The British commander at once requested 
the Japanese troops to help restore order in Saigon, 
imposed military curfew from 9;30 p.m., to 5;30 a.m., 
so as to avoid.any more violent encounters, and out­
lawed further public meetings, demonstrations, and 
the carrying of arms,
later the British mission opened the prison doors 
to free all political prisoners within, most of these 
being French troops incarcerated by the Japanese, 
with a few others, French and Vietnamese, placed there 
by the Viet Minh,
The simmering antagonism between Vietnamese and • 
French flared up unexpectedly on 23 September 1945? 
when French troops suddenly occupied all public build­
ings throughout the city and assumed control of Saigon.
A statement by the British mission deplored "the manner 
in which this 1 coup d'etat1 was executed", the "counter- 
measures taken by the Vietnamese" and the "reprisals"
and "violent treatment" enacted by the "more emotional
2
of the French citizens".
This incident clearly indicated France's intention 
to re-establish her control in Viet Nam and, at the 
same time, marked the beginning of the resistance war
173
in Nam Bo (South. Yiet Nam or Cochinchina) , and of an 
abundant literature of political persuasion which can 
he grouped under the emotive theme of anti-colonialism.
Resistance in the South.
When the French occupied Saigon, the Provisional 
Executive Committee left the city and shortly after­
wards, at the insistance of its Communist leader Pran 
Van G-iau, was transformed into the Uy Ban Nhan Dan 
Nam Bo (Peoplef s Committee of the South), Later on•> f
the body again changed its title to Uy Ban Khang
A i
Chien Ham Bo (Resistance Committee in the South), and
\  ^ rv .Jy
appointed Nguyen Binh (alias Nguyen Phxidng Phao) as 
its military commander.
On 26 September 194-5, when the people of Saigon 
were faced with a tragic situation and disturbed by
fj f
numbers of conflicting rumours, Pi eng Noi Yiet Nam 
(Yoice of Yiet Nam) a programme broadcast by Hanoi 
Radio Station, brought to them a clear and moving 
message from President Ho Chi Minh. Phis masterly 
and well timed speech merits close analysis.
At the beginning, the attention of listeners was 
immediately seized by a note of great urgency.
Lear southern compatriots!
Our newly-won national inde­
pendence is threatened by 
foreign i n v a s i o n . . T h e  
French colonialists,... are com­
ing back...,Phey still want to 
dominate our people once more. 5
Instead of directly calling on his listeners to
fight, Ho expressed his and. the entire nation.1 s con 
fidence in the noble patriotism of "the southern 
compatriots1* who will certainly know how to react. 
However, to counter a possible objection from the 
French side, Ho spoke in praise of a French hero;
southern compatriots, le all 
should bear in mind the inspir­
ing words of a heroic French 
revolutionary; f,I !d rather die 
free than live in bonds". 4
fhereupon, Ho promised his fighting compatriots 
the thing they most needed, namely support; support 
from the G-overnment, the Nation and the1 whole world;
I am certain, and our southern 
compatriots should also be 
certain, that the G-overnment 
as well as compatriots through™ 
out the country will totally 
support the combatants and the 
people who are making sacrifices 
in their struggle to defend 
national independence. I am 
certain, and all our compatriots 
are certain, that in the whole 
world, individuals and nations 
who cherish equality and free­
dom, will all take our side. 5
Like a general addressing his soldiers on the 
field of battle, the veteran revolutionary leader, 
who had once borne the name T'at Thanh (Who Must 
Succeed), signalled victory and cheered his compatriots 
with two stirring promises;
I trust, as do my compatriots 
throughout the country, in the
Victory shall he ours because 
our entire people are solidly 
united behind us. Victory is 
certain because we struggle 
for a Just cause. 6
The speech might appropriately have ended on
that high note, for that would have enhanced its
popular appeal, but Ho was anxious to inject an
element of psychological warfare as well. The Viet
7Minh had been blamed f for the atrocities and murders 
of 2 September and for the hideous massacre in the 
European quarter (Tan Linh, Saigon) of 24 - 25 Sept­
ember 1945. Ho now found it expedient to make an 
indirect disavowal of x'esponsibility for such conduct
I want to recommend to our 
southern compatriots just one 
thing: Any Frenchmen captured
in the course of the war must 
be carefully guarded, but we 
must also treat them generously.
We must show to the world, and 
to the French people in par­
ticular, that we want only inde­
pendence and freedom, that we 
are not struggling out of per­
sonal enmities or rancour. We 
must show to the world that we 
are an intelligent people, more 
civilized than the homicidal 
invaders,
That diplomatic postscript also served both to 
allay apprehensions in the Allied missions to Viet 
Nam, and to cause mental xinease to people in France 
and elsewhere over the behaviour of French troops in 
Indochina,
17 6.
To heighten the morale of their southern com­
patriots and to prolong the euphoric effect of H o 1s 
eloquent appeal - to say nothing of increasing his 
personal prestige, the Communist cadres im the South 
issued a fresh slogan containing a mewly-coimed name 
for Saigon; "Struggle to defend the Ho Chi Minh 
City". 8
With the twin objectives of fomenting Viet­
namese hostility towards the French and soliciting 
forces now fighting im the South, the newspaper 05
7 f
Oriai Phong (Liberation Banner), organ of the Indo­
chinese Communist Party, published the following 
accounts of the incidents;
On 2 September 1945, at about 
noon, French residents and 
British prisoners of war caused 
provocation by opening fire on 
500,000 Vietnamese who were 
enthusiastically participating 
in an "Independence Day" cele­
bration. The Vietnamese guards 
to whose care the lives of more 
than half a million empty handed 
citizens including women, children 
and old persons had been committed, 
were obliged to react. As a re­
sult, our people suffered 47 cas­
ualties (wounded and killed) while 
those who provoked the violence 
suffered only 7# However,.more 
than 20 French murderers were 
arrested on the spot and imprisoned. 9
Three weeks later, after negotiations had failed, 
the same newspaper prepared people for what it termed
177,
"The mew staged
The shooting has started again 
in the South. It was caused 
by the determination of the 
returning French colonialists 
to reimpose their domination on 
the Indochinese people, and to 
contrive to exploit them.
Blood is once more being shed, 
and the People's Committee of 
the South absolutely denies 
any responsibility for the con­
flict ... .After the failure of 
negotiations from 2 to 8 October 
1945, between the French and the 
Committee of the South with the 
mediation of General Gracey, 
commander of the British mission, 
war may well rage with greater 
intensity. Our Saigon compat­
riots have been ordered to leave 
the city, our troops have 
entered the city to cause des­
truction, and a general strike 
still continues. A double 
blockade, economic and military, 
has tightened the ring around 
Saigon city. The French in­
vaders are suffering from lack 
of food, electricity and water. 
....The Committee of the South 
has issued the order to shoot 
and kill any French soldier who 
ventures to follow the British 
forces out of Saigon.
....The resistance of our southern 
compatriots has entered a new 
stage which will be more tense and 
critical. Our people in the 
South are wholeheartedly united in 
their support for the national 
resistance. All over the country, 
an anti-French tide Is running high 
••••We should always be willing to
brave every difficulty and 
danger, to sustain a protracted 
resistance until the end, which 
will come with the complete lib­
eration of our country and the 
total independence of our 
nation, 10
On 25 October 1945, a very important conference 
of the Southern Section of the Indochinese Communist
Party was held in My-Tho province in the presence of
A A? f S  -
le Du an (known as Anh Ba) , Ton Biic Thang, and Hoang
A ( k
Quoc Yiet who had arrived from Hanoi in mid-Axigust, 
as representative of the T6ng Bo (Headquarter) Yiet 
Minh, This Regional Conference passed several fund- 
ememtal resolutions concerning the resistance war and 
the establishment of the Party's leadership over the 
armed forces.
On 5 November 1945, the Communist organ Cd Giai
No.31, printed a detailed report from "a com
batant who had participated in the resistance of the 
South", The article began by analysing the trouble­
some events that had caused much damage-and taken the 
lives of five Frenchmen,, including that of Father 
Tricoire, on the 2 September:
Three points should be noted: 
a) French colonialists opened fire 
from the church and the French 
priests' house so as to provoke us 
into killing priests and destroying 
the church. That would provide 
them with the evidence they needed 
to request the Allied Power to in­
tervene,
h) When shots rang out from French 
houses, our men went in to Investi­
gate and found drunk British soldiers 
inside. In this way, the French 
colonialists deliberately enticed us 
to kill British men so that that 
might bring about a British intervention.
1 7 9 .
c) In the evening, French colonialists 
hired some gangsters to commit house- 
breaking, burglary, and looting against 
French homes so that they might falsely 
accuse the Yiet Minh of plunder. 11
Similarly, the Yiet Minh 11 combatant" accused the 
British mission of triggering off troubles and conniving 
at the French re-conquest of Saigon. This allegation was 
obviously intended to justify the "task of self-defence":
The mission indirectly incited some 
journalists to criticize the British 
army and the British Government, and 
tricked the Trotskyts into dissemin­
ating leaflets and marching in an armed 
demonstration, fomenting violence 
against Frenchment, They did that to 
prove our government’s incapacity to 
administer the city.
In the evening of 22 September and 
early the next morning, British troops 
set out to occupy police posts, the 
city hall, the Republican Guard’s 
barracks and other public buildings.
The British went ahead and the French 
followed them. That was the beginn­
ing of the battle. The task of self- 
defence was imposed upon u s . 12
The report went on to explain the loss of Saigon and 
the suburbs, the application of "scorched earth" tactics 
and guerilla warfare, and the system of resistance organ­
ized by the Communist Party. The Communists then vowed 
to fight a protracted war of attrition in which the out­
come could only be a victory for Yiet Nam, In this 
struggle, they were willing to accept casualties in the 
ratio of ten to one:
The South is ready to sacrifice ten 
thousand men to kill one thousand 
Frenchmen, or even one million to 
kill a hundred thousand.
We could hear the loss of a hundred 
thousand or a million men, but the 
French can never stand the loss of 
fifty or thirty thousand troops in 
South Yiet Nam.
This is a war of attrition, a pro­
tracted war, the only winner will 
be the Yietnamese people* 13
In evaluating the work of preparation, the Yiet Minh 
report listed the following weaknesses:
Before the fighting started, we had 
failed to sabotage electric and water 
supplies, to take away money from the 
national treasury, and we left a 
number of Yiet Gian (traitors) in the 
Saigon prisons. Our Government was 
too lenient with the traitors, thus 
tolerating many who would later become 
agents for the French. We also 
failed to demolish many public build­
ings, palaces, and bases. 14
That high level "combatant" placed on the credit side, 
the "careful and reserved attitude" of the Resistance 
Committee of the South. That remark proved to be correct 
in its application to the resistance war (1945-1954).
It is illuminating to compare the conclusions of the 
Yietnamese Communist leaders in 1945 with those reached in 
19^8 (the Tet offensive) or 1972 (the Easter offensive):
While the para-military and the shock 
troops were eager for a general offensive 
and an all-out attack on the city, the
Resistance Committee of the South did 
not blindly follow the mass’s opinion, 
but weighing one strategy against the 
other, it chose to adopt a protracted 
resistance. This was the right de­
cision. To reoccupy Saigon city, 
would have required a force three 
times larger than that of the defenders.
A policy of staking all on the hope 
of immediate victory would have resul­
ted only in defeat. 15
Thus, according to Yo Nguyen Giap, the Party decided 
to rely totally upon guerilla tactics, quickly to send 
several units of the Liberation Army with outstanding 
"comrade commanders," and also several teams of cadres, to 
the South.
Simultaneously, a strong movement was promoted all over
the country to master support for the resistance In the
South. "The whole nation turned to Saigon," Giap asserted
in his memoirs, "grimly determined to fight aggression and
16to defend the fatherland".
Newspapers and loudspeakers in Hanoi gave the news of 
success and victory in the South, of the growing enthusias­
tic support among people in the North and Centre, of the 
increasing number of volunteers to help the Southern com­
patriots, and also described the departure ceremonies of 
Liberation units in many areas. Good examples, courageous 
deeds and heroic gestures were very well publicised for the 
purpose of national motivation.
General Giap still savoured the memory of those 
exciting days, when he recorded in his recently published 
memoirs:
During the last days of Sept­
ember, in Hanoi, a large crowd 
was always present in front of 
loudspeakers, waiting for news 
from Ham Bo*
The youth were eager to join 
the army, longing for the oppor­
tunity to join the struggle in 
the South to eliminate enemies.
In some families, both father 
and son applied together for 
military service* Even Buddhist 
monks cast off their religious 
robes and volunteered to kill the 
enerny. Thus, the Liberation 
forces were growing very fast.
..♦.Prom the North, many Liber­
ation units started their South­
ward journey at the same time.
....The new G-overnment and the 
people took pains to lavish on 
their rlsonstf leaving for the 
battle-front the best weapons 
available brand-new uniforms, 
warm pullovers, leather shoes, 
and bonnets shining with golden 
stars. Huge crowds poured into 
railroad stations to bid fare­
well to the combatants. Com™ 
patriots in the Northern and 
Central zones offered to those 
in the South, their own children 
as an expression of their affec­
tion and heartfelt support. 17
Internal Unity for Resistance.
Affection and support, however, did not come uni
formly from all elements of the population. The
Yiet Nam, Thiet Thule (Realist) and B&ng Tam (United
Hearts) newspapers of the Yiet Quoc and Yiet Oach
(Nationalist and Revolutionary) Political Parties, 
published some unflattering news about the Southern 
battles and vehemently criticized the Communist Yiet 
Minh for numerous mistakes as well as for implement­
ing a partisan policy of eliminating other nation­
alist leaders*
The first issue of Su That (Truth), the Yiet­
namese !Pravdaf, that succeeded the Co Giai Phong 
(liberation Banner) after the "dissolution”©! the 
Indochinese Communist Party, carried, on 5 ."December 
1945? a. bitter retort from the "Indochinese Marxists1’ 
(the new name for the Communist Party after its 
dissolution'). The line of argument in this "Open 
Letter to the Nationalist Party” was predictably 
based on the war situation. Thus, the reply began 
with a statement of the unchallengeable principle of 
national unity:
While waging the offensive in the 
South and the Lower Part of Cent­
ral Yiet Nam, the French colonial­
ists are poised to bring their 
troops into the North. The 
Fatherland is endangered. The 
whole nation must be closely un­
ited to oppose the aggressors.
Divided, you will fall, but united, 
you will survive. 18
From that indisputable statement, which called to 
mind the famous declaration of the ex-Emperor Bao Dai, 
the Marxist group went on to utter veiled threats con­
tained in a justification of their policy of violently 
eliminating those nationalist leaders who did not agree
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with theix* policies:
You call for union and co-operation. 
Well, the entire people and our­
selves, we want it. But the people 
and ourselves, we can practice 
"union and co-operation" only with 
those who are loyal to the national 
interests, and not with those trai­
tors who have been hiding themselves 
among your ranks...National inter­
ests and national honour require us 
to reserve a severe punishment for 
them,..Regretfully, the seven prin­
ciples that the Viet Quoc, Viet Minh 
and Viet Cach agreed upon on 19 Nov­
ember 1945? did not include the not 
unimportant point that the "patriotic 
organizations must co-operate with 
one another, to eliminate traitors". 
You maintain that "no one should 
ever open fire on his Vietnamese 
compatriots" (Viet Nam newspaper 
No.10). D on’t you realize that to 
grasp our independence, it is neces­
sary to shoot down not only the 
foreign enemies,^bht; also the enem­
ies within, i.e. traitors? As you 
well know, that painful necessity 
has been confirmed by the history of 
any national revolution. We do not 
say that all the members of the Dal 
Viet Quoc Xa. (Socio-Nationalist 
Party for Greater Viet Nam) the Cao 
Dai religious sect, aijLd the Bhat 
Thay’s congregation, y are traitors,
* i. in ■ .ii jii i ,| rrniT < - /
Many among them, being honest but 
lacking political clear-sightedness, 
were deceived by their traiterous 
leaders. There are, at present, 
some real traitors who disguise them­
selves under the labels of Viet Quoc
and Viet Cach. to evade the 
punishment from our people 
and the G-overnment. 20
Following this minatory apologia for their con­
duct towards the nationalist, the Communists, went 
on to invoke their leadership of the national govern­
ment and the state of emergency that government had 
proclaimed as their authorities for silencing all 
critics and opponents, for suspending the exercise of 
civil and human rights, and for introducing their 
policy of single-party rule, which they intended to 
establish as a permanent institution:
Under-the leadership of the Viet 
Minh, our people have regained 
national power....The most impor­
tant tasks of our people at the 
present time are to remain united 
and to mobilize all the available 
forces for national resistance....
So long as the country is waging 
a resistance war, anyone who is 
"anti-resistance” , must be con­
demned by a military court. Are 
you ignorant of the name of that 
crime?,...As far as freedom of 
speech is concerned, we all know 
that in wartime, every government 
in the world, even the most demo­
cratic, has to impose censorship, 
or even direct control, on the press 
.. . .Regretably, your newspaper lacks 
judgment and is undisciplined...»
Our people will never approve of the 
way you exercise freedom, because it 
is not really freedom of speech that 
you practice, but rather freedom of 
suicide. Who is directing the re­
sistance war? The G-overnment is....
Yet you insult the Resistance 
Government....You shout:
"Down with the Government 11 
....You are self-professed re­
volutionaries, so how can you 
serve the cause of French colo­
nialism in this deplorable fash­
ion? 21
For the sake of independence, therefore, the 
Vietnamese people were to be persuaded to sweep aside 
all political differences, to overlook the mistake or 
shortcomings of the Government and of the cadres, and 
to make every sacrifice for the success of the resis- 
tance war in the South. To this end, Bac (Uncle) Ho, 
appealed to the whole country in his by now familiar 
avun cular s tyle.
Firstly, Ho concentrated his attack on the 
enemy,namely the French colonialists, whom he por­
trayed in villainous colours, underlining their wick­
edness and the "contradictions" which existed between 
them and the Allied Powers:
During the Second World War, the 
French colonialists twice sold out 
our country to the Japanese. By 
so doing, they betrayed the Allied 
Powers, and enabled the Japanese 
to inflict greater damage on the 
Allies. But they also betrayed 
our people, exposing us to des­
truction by bombs and bullets.
Their own conduct placed the French 
colonialists outside the ranks of 
the Allies, and it also invalidated 
the treaties they had formerly com­
pelled us to sign with them. 22
Thus, those French colonialists appeared on 
Ho * a bill of indictmnht as cowardly, dishonest and 
cruel. Not only were they depicted as inherently 
perfidious and warlike, but they were said to have 
repeated their violent and perverse acts, in contra­
vention of every principle of democracy, freedom and 
peace:
So, it is clear that in the past, 
the colonialists betrayed their 
own Allies and our country, and 
surrendered to the Japanese. At 
the present time, in the shadow of 
the British and Indian troops, and 
sheltering behind the Japanese sol­
diers, the colonialists are attack­
ing the Southern part of our country.
They have sabotaged the peace that 
China, America, Britain and Russia 
had won at the high price of many 
millions of lives. They have be­
lied the promises of democracy and 
freedom proclaimed by the Allied 
Powers. 23
Having "proved” to his nation that guilt for 
the war lay wholly on the "colonialists", President 
Ho then advanced his own just cause, independence for 
Viet Ham, peace and justice for the world. In 
struggling for their cause, the Vietnamese were act­
ing in complete harmony with their historical trad­
itions of loyalty and courage, with the noble and 
laudable aspirations of many nations, including the 
French, and also with the honourable declarations and 
actual policy, of the Allied Powers:
Despite the treachery of the 
French "colonialists", our whole 
people were determined to side 
with the Allies and to oppose 
the invaders. When the Japanese 
surrendered, our entire people 
acting as one, transformed our 
country into a democratic repub­
lic and elected a provisional 
government, which is charged with 
the preparation of a national 
congress and the drafting of a 
national Constitution.
Not only are our actions in 
accord with the Atlantic and San 
Francisco Charters, and other 
similar documents, solemnly pro­
mulgated by the Allies, but they 
entirely conform with the glor­
ious principles upheld by the 
French .people: ; f
Liberte. Bgalite, and Fraternite....
for a just cause, for justice in
the world, and in the land of
Viet Nam and for its people that 
our compatriots throughout the 
land have risen to struggle, and 
they are absolutely determined to 
defend their independence. 24
Ho also took care to avoid offence to the French 
people as a whole by pinning the blame on those 
"ruthless invaders" and colonialists, who were be­
having "lawlessly" in South Viet Nam, Further­
more, world opinion, as always, sided with the opp­
ressed people who did "not want bloodshed, but loved
peace". In claiming support from the "great count-
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ries" and the countries which "love peace and demo­
cracy", Ho slyly disarmed the French people, whose 
national pride he readily acknowledged:
We do not hate the French people 
and France. We are energetically 
fighting slavery, and the ruthless 
policy of the French colonialists.
We are not invading another’s 
country. We defend only our own 
against the French invaders.
Hence we are not alone. Those 
countries which love peace and 
democracy, and the weaker nations 
all over the world, all sympathize 
with us....Public opinion in the 
great countries - China, the United 
States, Russia and Britain - has 
supported our just cause.
Ho next appealed for unity, co-operation and 
determination in carrying out this patriotic resist­
ance in the South for the deeply desired aim of 
"independence and freedom":
Compatriots throughout the country!
Those in the South will do their 
utmost to resist the enemy. Those 
in the centre and in the North, will 
endeavour to help their Southern 
compatriots and will remain on guard 
♦...We are determined even at the 
sacrifice of millions of combatants 
and the waging of a protracted war 
of resistance, to defend the inde­
pendence of Viet Nam and to free 
our children and grandchildren.
This struggle would demand great sacrifice, but 
victory was assured by the fatherly Bac Ho, who offered as
his credentials nearly thirty years of struggle which had 
culminated in the glorious Proclamation of Independence:
With the unity of the whole people 
within the country and the support 
of so many friends abroad, we are 
sure of victory. 25
"Unity within the country" and "support of friends 
abroad11, those two conditions of victory were the main goals 
towards the achievement of which the Communists were dir­
ecting all their activities from December 1945 to December 
1946.
The plan of that political campaign was first intro- 
duced in the directive; "Khang Chien Kien Quoc" (Resistance 
war and national construction), issued on 25 November 1945 
by the Central Committee of the Communist Party:
....The easier the seizure of power, 
the more difficult its preservation.
The newly born Democratic Republican 
Government has to face up to an extrem­
ely complex situation, 26
Besieged by "enemies within and without", the Communist 
Party analyzed the situation, singled out French colonialists 
as the principal enemy, and defined its own duty as:
To mobilize the whole nation’s forces 
to struggle with perseverance, to 
organize and to lead the protracted 
resistance war, and to combine guer­
illa warfare with the tactic of total 
non-co-operation, 27
But, if all the forces were to be deployed against the 
external enemy, then the unity of the whole people within
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the country had first to be achieved. The Communist 
directive named some of the first tasks to be accom­
plished by the cadres and members of the party:
We must consolidate national 
power....eliminate the enemy 
within, improve the living con­
ditions of the people....Our 
slogan should be: "The Nation 
above all!t or 11 the Fatherland 
above all”. 28
With those objectives in mind, Ho Ohi Minh was 
at pains to plan and to implement campaigns against 
famine and illiteracy, at the same time as the cam­
paign against foreign invaders. Hence, the triple 
slogan:
Diet giac doi (Eliminate famine I)
Di|t gi&c d'dt (Eliminate illiteracy!)
33iJet giac ngoai xara (Eliminate invaders])
To win the support of the minorities in the West­
ern highlands of the Southern part of Central Viet Nam, 
several Agitprop teams were sent to Ban-me-thuot, Pleiku, 
Kontum and other areas of the Highlands. The Marxist 
paper, Su That (Truth), delightedly reported their 
success:
Why are the Highlanders now fighting 
bravely at our side against the French?
Because our revolution has been extend­
ed to the Western highlands. Our com­
batants have extended their work of 
agitation over the whole area.
The Highlands well understand, nowadays, 
that their enemies are the French colon­
ialists who have cruelly exploited the 
minority people.,..29
The report also hinted how the highlanders might be 
persuaded to join the anti-French campaign and to accept the
elimination of those of their leaders who had co-operated 
with the French:
The highlanders are awakened, nowadays, 
and are resolutely determined to elim­
inate the French* They often tell 
one another: 11 If the French come, they 
will chase us out. If we do not resist, 
our descendants will have to suffer and 
will place the blame on us* They will 
think that we were cowardly, not manly 
enough to dare to fight the French]
And what a misfortune if they should re­
fuse to offer any sacrifices in memory 
of our spirits]”
The elimination of those who had served 
the enemy also pleases the highlanders.
Everybody seems to be well pleased by 
the assassination of Phan Lac, a pro- 
French agent and an oppressor of the 
highlanders. 30
Thereafter, the Communist agents organized some guer­
illa units among the highlanders and helped an assembly of 
various tribal representatives to express "the closing of 
their ranks" behind the Ho Government, Agitprop was 
carried out simultaneously amorg Cambodians and Laotians, in 
order to win their co-operation in the protracted war against 
the French.
The motives behind those efforts of agitation and 
alliance were summarized by Quan Hong (Red Troops):
Those enlightened highlanders are 
sincere, heroic, simple, self- 
sacrificing and enduring combatants.
The Western plateau Is an area of 
high altitude; its thick jungles,
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mountains, brooks and obstructions, 
rendered it highly favourable to 
our guerilla fighters. Hence, 
the Western plateau is a solid 
rampart which will thwart a 
French invasion. The minorities 
living there will march forward, 
hand in hand, with other* nationals 
of Indo-Ohina, on the road towards 
freedom and progress, 31
While the successful campaign of "agitprop" 
among the Communist leaders, the Government of Ho Chi 
Minh in Hanoi was encountering great difficulties 
from the opposition of the Fiet Quoc and Fiet Cach 
political parties, both of which enjoyed the support 
of the Nationalist Chinese occupation troops.
To appease the Chinese authorities, as well as 
the Flet Quoc and Fiet Cach, Ho was making every effort 
to show himself humble, flexible and accommodating.
To avoid provocation, the name Quan G-iai Phong 
(Liberation Army) was changed to Fe Quoc Loan (National 
Guard Group), and several units of the National Guard 
were moved from the city centre to the outer suburbs 
where they would be less conspicuous. President Ho 
himself went out of his way to pay friendly visits on 
the Chinese military leaders, Lu Han, Hsiao Wen and 
even some low-ranking officers. By H o 1 s order, Hsiao 
Wen was presented with a beautiful home, but was later 
requested to help H o 1s groups in subsequent conflicts 
between the Viet Minh and Chinese troops. At the 
same time, Ho effectively exploited every contradition
between the various groups of Chinese troops, and
criticised the Viet Quoc and Viet Cach, to G-eneral
Lu Han, thus defusing the explosive situation with
a view to maintaining the newly gained power of the
32Viet Minh G-oveminent in Hanoi* Moreover, so as
to avoid conflict with the Viet Quoc and Viet Oach, 
the Communists declared the dissolution of their 
party, closing their official newspaper 66 Giai 
Phong (liberation Banner), signed the G-iao tfdc Doan 
Ket (Unity Agreement) with the Viet Quoc and Viet
3 A
Cach leaders (24 November and 24 December 1945), 
postponed the G-eneral Election from 19 December 1945 
to 6 January 1946, established a provisional Coal­
ition Government and offered seventy seats in the 
National Assembly to the two opposition parties*
While making those conciliatory gestures and 
political compromise however, the Communist Party 
shrewdly "mobilised their mass organizations to fight, 
denounce and isolate those reactionary enemies.”
An editorial in Su That newspaper explained the 
party!s policy for the period:
Our revolution is still a revol­
ution for national liberation,..„
We must direct our forces against 
the principal enemy (French invaders) 
and, at the same t^.me, isolate the 
secondary enemy (Vietnamese reac­
tionaries and traitors).
Defeat the aggressors, eliminate 
the traitors; these are the twin 
tasks tor every Indo-Chinese citizen.
Our basic policy during this 
period is to reconcile the con­
tradictions between the differ­
ent social strata in the country, 
to allay the enmities that exist 
between the different races of 
Indochina., and to unite the var­
ious strata and groupings with a 
view to forming a national united 
front to oppose the French colon­
ialist Invaders. 36
To promote an effective fightingforce against
the "French colonialist invaders", the military means
should be combined with the economic and the political
ones. Tims, an editorial in the Su That newspaper,* ^
issued on the occasion of Binh Tuat Lunar New Tear 
(1946), set out the three principal tasks for the per­
iod: Defeating the French colonialists, increasing
production, and summoning the first session of the 
National Assembly,
On that occasion, to heighten the morale of the 
fighters who were far away from home, "eating and 
sleeping in the wind and rain, enduring cold on the 
battlefield", President Ho wrote a letter to convey 
the whole nation1s gratitude to them:
Beloved fighters,
While our compatriots are burning 
incense to honour their ancestors, 
you burn gunpowder to defend the 
Fatherland, While our compatriots 
fire crackers to welcome Spring, 
you fire your guns to eliminate the 
enemy. You resolutely fight the 
enemy so that our compatriots may 
safely welcome Spring, Consequently, 
our compatriots will never forget 
your great service.... 37
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.Following old tradition, Ho included some pop­
ular verses to wish the combatants final success in 
“comradely1* fashion:
When the Resistance War ends in 
victory, together we shall drink 
a lot of brandy*.. ..
In a special message addressed to his compatriots 
throughout the whole country, Ho thoughtfully sent 
special wishes to "the fighters at the front and their 
families in the rear". To mark the first Tet (Lunar 
Hew Year Festival) of the Democratic Republic of Viet 
Nam, the revolutionary leader made a political appeal:
In the course of this New Year, 
our compatriots will struggle for 
a new life, will all contribute 
to the long Resistance War in 
order to complete our country’s 
independence and freedom. With 
the coming of the New Year, our 
compatriots will all unite more 
closely, struggle more fiercely 
and produce more abundantly. 38
To correlate the duty of raising production with 
the fight against invasion, Ho went on to coin a slogan 
for peasants;
Thuc tuc binh cddng or An no lanh thang.
(With sufficient food, the Army will 
be strong and victorious),
But the policy of the period was well summarized 
in another concise and clear slogan:
N f * v
Hoa hoan ben trong. quyet thang giacn.Qo&i »
(Dome stic conciiiation, crushing exCer- 
nal enemies).
General Election and a Coalition Government for Resistance
Of equal importance with the military and pro­
duction duties, the Marxist newspaper affirmed, was 
the convocation of a National Assembly, So far, the
Government of Ho Chi Minh was no more than a provisional
one and even the Democratic Republic, established by 
the Viet Minh, had not yet been officially ratified by 
the people, nor recognized by other governments in the 
world.
Early in 1946, this was hinted at in a Su That 
editorial which emphasized the importance and the 
meaning of the General Election:
All citizens should cast their
votes so as to give the lie to
propaganda emanating from the 
French enemy, and to indicate 
to the world that the Vietnamese 
people, who seized political 
power from the Japanese fascists, 
are now building a Democratic 
Republic, and are resisting the 
cruel invasion of their country 
by French colonialists..,. All 
citizens should cast their votes 
to demonstrate to the United 
Nations that the Vietnamese people 
desire to be completely independent 
and have the qualifications neces­
sary for the maintenance of com­
plete independence..,.
All citizens should cast their 
votes to increase the whole nation's 
confidence in the great plan of 
"resistance war ant nation-building," 
and to demolish the sceptical and 
reactionary contentions of the Viet­
namese defeatists and traitors. 39
Thus, the general election was seen as a means 
of political persuasion: it could give Vietnamese
people a sample of "new democracy" with freedom and 
power returned to the citizens; it lifted a little 
window to give the outside world a glimpse of "a 
free and democratic republic"; it also served as a 
source of prestige and authority for the government 
of Ho Chi Minh.
The difficulty was that Viet Nam never had a 
general democratic election and there was no such 
thing as an electoral roll. Besides which, most 
people did not know how to read or write. Moreover, 
the great majority of peasants did not know any pol­
iticians nor understand anything about politics 
beyond their own villages. In that situation, the 
General Election became no more than a political 
ritual. But the Communist leaders knew how to draw 
political benefit for their organisations.
Since the Indochinese Communist Party had de­
clared itself dissolved in November 1945? most Comm­
unist leaders presented themselves as candidates under 
the patronage of the Revolutionary Viet Minh Front, 
Predictably, the undeclared Communists and their 
fellow travellers who were aided by the detailed plan­
ning and effective propaganda of the Viet Minh, secured 
election. Here and there, a "Democrat", an| "Inde­
pendent", a "Patriotic Personality", even a "Buddhist" 
or "Catholic Candidate", was added, but Communist 
strategy depended upon having a Viet Minh majority
in the National Assembly.
The General Election was subsequently hailed as 
a complete success and a Su That editorial revealed 
how the election and the resistance movement were two 
related elements of the same overall Communist plan:
The protracted, but firm per­
severing resistance of the 
Indochinese nationals, together 
with the successful General 
Election of the Vietnamese 
people, have compelled the 
French colonialists to recog™ 
nise the right of internal ad­
ministration of Viet Nam. 40
Just one week before the opening of the National
Assembly, Ho Chi Minh obtained the assent of General
Hsiao Wen, of the Viet Quoc and the Viet Cach, to the
41formation of a Coalition Government of Resistance. 
This conciliatory gesture on the part of the Chinese 
cleared the way for Ho to convene the National Assem­
bly, which in turn, requested Ho Chi Minh to form a 
new Government.
Since his main purpose was to secure the rati­
fication of the National Assembly, Ho showed himself 
willing to compromise with the opposition parties and 
to accommodate the various groupings. But the Party 
had a detailed plan to cope with any emergency, as is 
confirmed in the account of Vo Nguyen Giap:
The first National Assembly of 
the Democratic Republic of Viet 
Nam was convened on 2 March.
This was one day earlier than 
had been scheduled.
It was an emergency situation.
The organizing committee had 
prepared for the Assembly an 
alternative meeting place at 
Dinh Bang in Bac N'inh province.
At the last moment, the Perm­
anent Committee of the Party 
decided to convene the Assembly 
in Hanoi itself. Uncle Ho
told the comrade members of the
Organizing Committee to be pre­
cise and businesslike, so that 
the planned programme might be 
completed in a single session.
In the course of this session which lasted only
one day, Ho proclaimed the opening of the National
Assembly, gave a report of his Provisional Government's 
achievements, offered its resignation, was requested 
to form a new Coalition Government, and introduced his 
new Coalition Government together with an Advisory 
Council and a Resistance Committee, for ratification 
by the National Assembly!
Conciliation and Preliminary agreements with Prance.
On 20 February 1946, Reuter News Agency announced 
the conclusion of Sino-French agreements under whose 
terms the French were to replace the Chinese.occupa­
tion forces in North Viet Nam. It was rumoured that 
South Viet Nam had been lost to the French, and that 
the return of the French to North Viet Nam was immin­
ent. Such speculation, and the resulting discontent 
further confused an already panicstricken people in 
the Northern cities. To sustain national morale and
maintain the confidence of the people in his Govern­
ment, Ho Chi Minh countered these damaging rumours 
with a psychological appeal:
At the present time, in addition 
to. the military war, the French 
colonialists are engineering a 
psychological war against us by 
means of leaflets, posters, and 
false rumours, they are trying 
to sow confusion and anxiety among 
our people so as to demoralize 
them. Remember the ancient say­
ing; "It is more important to 
win men's hearts than to occupy 
forts". Henceforth, a struggling 
nation, as ours is at this moment, 
must always be well-prepared and 
must remain calm, firm, and always 
ready to meet any new situation 
which may arise. Whenever the 
enemy comes to occupy an area, the 
residents should apply the tactics 
of "scorched earth", forcing the 
enemy to suffer and to become weak 
from lack of food, shelter and 
transportation. Always be ready 
and never become confused or re­
luctant to fight to the last inch 
of land and the last man in the 
country.... 43
After all, the Franco-Chinese agreements were 
signed on 28 February 1946.
The French claimed that they were simply replac­
ing the Chinese troops in completing a mission en­
trusted to them by the Allies, whereas the Vietnamese 
viewed the French move as a "legal manoeuvre" whose
purpose was to establish a new form of "French
Protectorate" over Indochina. So ingenious a 
"political and diplomatic solution" on the part of 
the French placed Ho Chi Minh's Government in a 
very difficult dilemma.
To oppose so powerful a military mission while 
the "Viet Nam liberation Army" existed in little more 
than name would seem to be tantamount to suicide, 
political as well as military. To accept the French 
troop's arrival, on the other hand, would appear to 
the Vietnamese people as a surrender of national in­
dependence, and therefore, an abandonment of all re­
volutionary achievements to date and an unforgivable
44- , , ,crime,  ^ Moreover, were the French to succeed m
re-establishing their authority in Viet Nam, they 
would certainly, by one means or another, try to elim­
inate the Viet Minh. Thus, "to fight the French or 
not to fight", posed a painful dilema that exercised 
Ho Chi Minh and the Communist leaders in Viet Nam,
If Vo Nguyen Giap's version may be believed, Ho 
and the Central Committee of the Communist Party re­
sponded to this dilemma on 3 March 1946, by issuing 
the "Situation and Policy" directive;
The answer can be briefly summarized 
as follows:
If the French maintain their policy 
of an "autonomous Indochina" as out­
lined by the declaration of 24 Btfarch 
1945, we shall certainly fight and a 
protracted guerilla war may possibly 
develop; if the French recognize
the "self-government" (txi chu) 
of Indochina, there may be a 
reconciliation. Such a recon­
ciliation with the French would
help eliminate the intrigues of
the Chiang Kai-shek clique, the 
Vietnamese x’eactionaries, and 
the remnants of French fascists, 
who colluded to isolate us and 
force us to fight several enemies 
at the sarnie time,,.. 45
Reconciliation and negotiation with the French, 
according to Giap's account, would provide a reloca­
tion of tension during which the pi'eparation for a new
struggle might be carried out. The Party's Central 
Committee therefore, emphasized the overriding import­
ance of being well prepared:
It is essential that, during our 
negotiation with the French, we 
should not only prepare cease­
lessly for resistance anywhere 
and at any time, but should also 
intensify our preparedness. We 
must absolutely not allow negot­
iations with the French to dimin­
ish the fighting spirit of our 
people. 46
Su That (Truth) newspaper (No,22, 1 March 1946) 
carried an editorial entitled; "The Position of the 
Vietnamese Nation", to induce the public to accept 
the policy of negotiation. The article cited 
Sainteny as saying:
The French Government is willing
to recognize that Viet Nam has
the right to form its own Government,
National Assembly, Array and to 
manage its Finances, while re­
maining a member of the French 
Union.
The position of Hanoi was summarized in the 
slogan coined by Ho: "Doc hap va Hdp Tac" (Inde­
pendence and Cooperation),
The Su That editorial, then' hinted at possible 
aggreements:
Agreements on commercial, econ­
omic and military matters bet­
ween a completely independent 
Viet Nam and the French Govern­
ment, may be signed on the prin­
ciple of equality and mutual 
cooperation,,..Moreover, Viet 
Nam may consider France as, a A 
"most favoured nation" (tbi hue'A \ Nquo c).
The two nations, Vietnamese and 
French, may work together, hand 
in hand, not in a, narrow "French 
Union" but rather in a broad 
front of peace and democracy, 
for the common welfare of the 
two nations and the whole world.
Even while preparing for negotiations, Ho Chi
Minh and the Party made ready to fight a war of resis 
tance should the need arise. Besides the Coalition 
Government of Resistance, a National Committee of Re­
sistance was created, with Vo Nguyen Giap and Vu Hong 
Khanh as president and vice-president, respectively. 
On 5 March, at a time when Ho Chi Minh had already ex
pressed his readiness to sign an agreement with the
French, the Resistance Committee issued the following 
appeal:
Compatriots] Rise up to oppose 
the enemy. The critical hour has 
struck for our Fatherland* The 
National Committee of Resistance, 
formed of the Representatives of 
various political parties, has 
the dxity of unifying the Army and 
leading civilians and soldiers on 
the battle-ground, for the defence 
of our Fatherland, Compatriots! 
Wholeheartedly support the Committee, 
and be ready to follow its direct­
ives, in order to gain success for 
our army and people, and to grasp the 
independence of our Fatherland. 48
That was an official appeal, obviously intended 
to allay the resentment of those who objected to any 
conciliatory gesture towards the French, On the other 
hand, at the same date, the Central Committee of the 
Party, gathered at Huong Canh, a rural area near Hanoi, 
and after deliberation, agreed to the following con­
clusion;
At this juncture, the best tactic 
for the salvation of the country, 
is not to cut the bridges, but to 
preserve peace. It is to resist 
both erroneous tendencies;
a) to fight at any cost;
b) to suffer the illusion that, once 
the agreements are reached with the 
French, all difficulties will be at 
an end. Vigilance should be main­
tained concerning the threat of 
provocative activities on the part 
of the Chlang Kai-shek troops and of 
the Vietnamese reactionaries. 49
Tlius far the obstacle to an agreement between 
France and Hanoi had been the difference between Viet 
Nam's doc lap (independence), as requested by Hanoi, 
and til tri (autonomy), as offered by France. On the 
evening of 5 March 1946, in his discussion with 
Sainteny and L. Pignon, Ho Chi Minh expressed his 
readiness to reach a compromise agreement with the 
French and suggested that the Vietnamese expression
French word "llbre" (free).
The French delegates, however, still refused the 
automatic integration of Cochinchina into the "free 
state of Viet Ham", even though Ho Chi Minh insisted 
on this. Consequently the negotiations had reached 
a state of deadlock when the French delegates left 
Ho Chi Minh that evening. Meanwhile, the French 
Navy continued to approach Hai Phong where, on the 
following day, it clashed with the Chinese troops who 
were still responsible for control of the port.
Early in the morning of 6 March 1946, a messenger 
awakened Sainteny to tell him that "President Ho was 
ready to accept the agreement". In the afternoon, 
at 4 p.m., the Preliminary Agreements ■.•between Hanoi 
and France were signed by Ho Chi Minh and Saint eny at 
38 Ly Thai To Street, the residence of the French 
General Treasurer and later, of President Ho Chi Minh. 
Since the Viet Quoc and Viet Cach had constituted the
political opposition to Ho Chi Minh's Government, Ho 
contrived to have Vu Hong Khanh, the leader of the
be translated by the somewhat imprecise
Viet Cach Party, append his signature to the agree­
ments as well. Some years afterwards Vo Nguyen 
Giap wrote a very brief, but nonetheless revealing, 
account of the incident:
As the President of the Democratic 
Republic of Viet Nam, President Ho 
signed first. He then passed the 
text of the agreements to Vu Hong 
Khanh who was standing nearby.
Under pressure from his political 
patrons, Chiang Kai-shek's repre­
sentatives, Vu Hong Khanh had to 
s^wallow his pride and affixed his 
signature as 1 the special delegate 
of the Government Council". 51
Nghiem Ke To, another nationalist leader, later 
commented;
Prom their position of protest, the 
opposition parties suddenly found 
themselves having to share the re­
sponsibility for the agreements with 
the French* The Machiavellism of 
the Viet Minh, by a quick stroke, 
transformed their opponents into 
supporters. The simple people, 
always incapable of comprehending 
such complicated political machin­
ations, needed only a few persua­
sive explanations from men such as 
Tran Iiuy lieu, to voice their en- j-p 
thusiastic support once again*...
Persuasive explanations, indeed, were offered 
to the public meeting on 7 March 1946, by Vo Nguyen 
Giap:
France recognised the Democratic 
Republic of Viet Nam to be a "free
state"* A "Free State" is not 
equivalent to, but rather higher 
than, an "autonomous government".
A "Free State" iq not exactly an 
"Independent State", but if free­
dom can be preserved, our nation 
will get its Independence; comp­
lete Independence* 53
After disarming the crowd by assuring it of his 
goal of Independence, the militant Marxist gave evi­
dence of his skill in historical dialectic;
We have chosen the way of neg­
otiation so as to create favour­
able conditions for our struggle 
to gain complete Independence..*.
Russia, in 1918 signed the Brest- 
Litovsk agreements in order to 
stop the German invasion, to re­
inforce her array and consolidate 
her political power during the 
c e a s e - f i r e I s n ' t  it true that 
Russia has become very strong, 
thanks to that treaty? 54
Vu Hong Khanh was invited to contribute his ex­
planation too! But the Ho Ohi Minh magic was much
more successful, even before he spoke! The rheto­
rical ground being already cleared by Giap; when 
Uncle Ho appeared, somebody started to cheer and then 
the whole crowd gave him a tremendous ovation. The 
benign leader voiced his fatherly approval for the 
arguments of Giap:
It is a mark of intelligence to 
choose negotiation rather than 
wax*. Why should you sacrifice
50,000 or 100,000 men when by
way of negotiation,.you can 
achieve Independence in say five 
years?
After exhorting his compatriots to remain calm 
and disciplined, to he ready and brave, Ho Chi Minh 
exploited the full weight of his revolutionary pres­
tige to stir the emotions and win the sympathy of the 
jjeople;
I, Ho Ohi Minh, have always led 
you along the road to freedom.
Throughout the whole of my life,
I have fought for the Independence 
of our Fatherland. Hence you 
know that I would prefer death 
rather than betrayal. I swear to 
you that I have never betrayed you.
On 18 March 1946, General Leclere led his troops 
into the capital of Viet Ham, to be enthusiastically 
welcomed by French residents in Hanoi. Understand­
ably, there was resentment among Chinese residents, 
apprehension among Vietnamese, and renewed criticism 
from several political segments.
To allay those adverse feelings Ho Chi Minh 
found it expedient to sign with General L e d  ere a 
joint communique, promising to French, Chinese and 
Vietnamese population a "definitive peace", "the 
end of your sufferings and the beginning of a period 
of loyal and fruitful collaboration between our peoples" 
The proclamation also asserted the "peaceful return of 
French troops in complete agreement with the Governm­
ent of the Republic of Viet Ham" as a "symbol of union" 
between France and the Viet Ham associated with the
French Union*
In order to reassure the public that the Govern-
ment did not surrender Viet Nam's sovereignty by 
"welcoming the French army in a friendly manner", Ho 
Chi Minh proposed to the French Commissioner, Jean 
Saintany, to issue a carefully worded communique as 
follows s
Whereas the French Government re­
cognises Viet Nam's right of form­
ing her own Government and freely 
administering the country, the 
Provisional Government of Viet Nam 
does not object to the peaceful 
arrival of the French units which 
will replace the Chinese troops 
occupying the area of In dochina 
above the 16th parallel.
As first consequence of this pre­
liminary convention, the cessation 
of hostilities throughout Indo­
china will be effective 24 hours 
after the broadcast of this pro­
clamation on the Hanoi-Radio and 
the Saigon-Radio, 55
Ho Chi Minh
President of the Provisonal Government
T -p + of Viet Nam,J.R, iDaxnteny
French Commissioner in-iUorth Indochina, 
representative of the Provisional Government 
of the French Republic.
But Ho realized that the news of his agreement 
with the French had jolted the entire nation, especi­
ally those who were fighting in the South* It came, 
indeed as a severe shock to the great majority, who 
had been constantly encouraged to "fight the French 
Colonialist to the last man". President Ho was at
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pains to write a special letter to "compatriots, 
fighters at the front and the Administrative Committee 
in SouthViet Ham", informing them of the Praneo-Viet 
preliminary agreement and describing it as "a great 
success1 for Viet Nam, This success, which Ho att­
ributed to the "heroic struggle" in the South, resided 
in the following two points, according to H o 1s ex­
planation;
1. This is the first step in the 
negotiation to arrive at vic­
tory,
2, These negotiations will create 
political connditions of which 
we must know how to take advan­
tage, in’order to achieve Viet 
H a m ’s complete independence. 56
After appealing for support in favour of the 
Government, for "preparedness", "discipline" and for 
"consolidation of our forces" during the truce, Ho 
spoke of the future, employing a warm humanitarian tone
We must save each drop of our com­
patriots’ blood to build the future 
of our country. In our national 
struggle and construction, your en­
thusiastic spirit will have many 
more opportunities for development.
ions for Negotiation
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The Viet-Prench Convention of 6 March 1946 (see 
the complete text in Appendix 01) had stipulated that 
both sides will take measures "to create the favour­
able atmosphere necessary to the immediate opening of 
friendly and frank negotiations". The place was not 
definite yet; "either Hanoi, Saigon or Paris can be
chosen"* This was nonetheless a very important issue 
in the minds of Hanoi leaders.
On 13 March 1946, exactly one week after the 
signing of the Preliminary Pranco-Vietnaraese Agree­
ments, Ho wrote an open letter "to his compatriots 
throughout Yiet Nam" and "to various Governments and 
nations all over the world". The letter vehemently 
denounced the Prench side for its failures correctly 
to implement the Agreements of 6 March 1946. But 
H o Ts real intention became apparent only in the last 
paragraph, where he opened a campaign to win over 
public opinion in all parts of the world;
I earnestly call on the peoples and 
Governments all over the world, 
especially the Prench people, to 
support our just cause and to ensure 
that the Prench side correctly im­
plements the Preliminary Agreements 
in order to maintain the friendly 
relationship between the two nat- ro 
ions, and to safeguard world peace, ^
The appeals and denunciations were also published 
in Hanoi newspapers, especially in the Su That» the 
organ of the "Indochinese Marxist Society". While 
Su That No.25 (10 March 1946) expounded "the correct 
and successful policy of Preliminary Agreement", 
later iss\ies, Ho. 26 (14 March 1946) and No, 28 (21 March 
1946), listed provocations and violations of the Agree­
ments on the part of the Prench, making specific men­
tion of "their lack of concern about the official neg­
otiation to be held in Paris" .
Until that date. Ho Ghi Minh and his government 
had been virtually unknown to the outside world and 
had not obtained any official recognition. The 
Communist leaders were naturally anxious to arrange 
for Ho and his Government to make a formal appearance 
in Paris, "the capital of light". That drive for 
international publicity was made clear in H o 1s open 
letter of 13 March 1946, when he complained that "a 
week has passed and the Prench side has still not 
fixed a definite date for the official negotiation 
in Paris" , That complaint, together with the direc­
tion of the political campaign outlined by the 
Communist leaders, was unfolded in an editorial of 
Su That No,29 (30 March 1946):
On the road leading to complete in­
dependence, the "Preliminary Agree­
ments" are a milestone. This mile­
stone must serve as a starting point 
for another jjourney: must demand
immediate official negotiations in 
Paris....
....Our immediate slogans at the pres­
ent are: "Correct implementation of
the Preliminary Agreements" and 
"Official negotiation in Paris".
The basic slogan for our actual re­
volutionary period must be: "Estab­
lish a national front to oppose the 
Prench reactionaries and to regain 
complete independence".
Thereafter, the Communist Party instructed its 
members to emphasise those slogans and to organise 
11 spontaneous demonstrations" in various areas to de­
mand immediate opening of official negotiations in Pari
After a Paris Radio Broadcast announced the 
appointment of Admiral Thierry D ’Argenlieu as head of 
the Prench delegation to negotiate with Viet Nam, the 
Su That newspaper No.30 (6 April 1946) ran a revealing 
headline: "Official Negotiation: Nowhere but Paris".
Being afraid that the Prench Government would conduct 
negotiations only in Viet Nam, thus depriving the 
Hanoi Government of its "international exposure", the 
Su That editorial insisted on the three points which 
Hanoi was arranging with the representatives of 
Prance toward the end of March 1946;
1). The Viet Nam National Assembly 
will send a delegation to visit 
Prance;
2). At the same time, a Prench dele­
gation will come to Viet Nam to 
make preparations for an official 
treaty;
3). Subsequently, a Vietnamese dele­
gation will come to Prance for 
official negotiations and for
the signing of the official treaty 
in Paris. 59
In fact, several days after the meeting between 
High Commissioner B'Argenlieu and President Ho Chi Minh, 
on .24 March 1946, in Ha Long Bay, both sides agreed on 
the above three points and decided to have preparatory 
talks at Dalat before opening the official negotiations 
in Paris.
The Dalat Conference.
Some two weeks after the signing of the 6 March 
Preliminary Agreements, the Poreign Ministry of Hanoi
formed an ad hoc committee thoroughly to study the 
text of the Agreements, to define the important terms 
such as Free State. Indochinese Federation. Prench 
Union, and to propose a maximum list of demands, leav­
ing the minimum one to the Government and the dele­
gation to the Paris Conference*
Three days before the departure of the delegation 
to Dalat, Truong Qhinh, then secretary general of the 
"Indochina Association for Marxist Studies", offered 
a Su That editorial (No.31, 13 April 1946) a guide­
line for issues and demands at the Dalat Conference,
Oxi 13 April the eve of the departure, at 4 p.m., 
the delegates were convened to a meeting with the 
Government. President Ho Chi Minh farefully summar­
ized the positions to be maintained;
1, The status of a Pree State;
the extent of its freedom must
be clarified; its sovereign 
territory and integral unific- 
ation must be acknowledged.
2. The Indochinese Federation is of 
an economic nature only. There 
must be no Federation Government.
3« Concerning the Prench Union:
Viet Nam accepts to be freely 
associated with it, provided the 
rights and duties of Viet Nam 
will be clearly defined, Viet 
nam must have the rights of dis­
cussion and decision in the pro­
cess of deliberation on the 
affairs of the Union.
4, Viet Nam must have independent
diplomatic relations with England 
America, China, Russia and her
neighbouring countries,
Thailand, India, Philippines* 
Moreover, Prance must intro™ 
duce Viet Bam to the United 
Hations *
5* Viet Bam must have her national 
bank and currency*
6, The State of Viet Bam must have 
independent economic rights*
7* There must be no military power 
on Federation level. The 
number, duties, place and time 
of station for French troops 
must be defined.
8. Generally speaking, we should 
base on the Preliminary Agree­
ments to build up a sincere 
cooperation,with France.
Careful readers can see that the seven previous 
points formed the substantial content of the negotiat­
ion package whereas the last point served as wrapping 
paper and label.
According to the veteran revolutionary leader, 
this "preparatory conference” will have great effects 
on the subsequent negotiations, caution was the key­
word of his eight principal recommendations to the 
delegation:
1. Maximum unity in ideas as well 
as in actions;
2. Maximum caution;
3. Strict secrecy;
4. Mot a single declaration without 
previous discussion.
5. Self-study after each meeting to 
account for strong or weak points 
of your arguments;
6. Various roles at the meeting: 
leading team, supporting team,
and reserve team; someone 
to strike and someone to soothe;
7. Proposing only vital issues for
discussion, leaving specific topics 
to he proposed by the French dele­
gation;
8 0 Leaving aside any question which 
will not he agreed upon, without 
mentioning "consultation with the 
Governement", Such a mention 
would engage the Government in 
this pourparler, (This conference 
is simply a preparatory one which 
we attend only to appease the 
French High Commissioner L*Argenlieu, 
whereas the Government will offic­
ially participate only in the Paris 
conference), 60
This last point really reflected the sagacity
\
and the shrewdness of Gia Ho (i.e, the old politician 
Ho or, literally, the old fox). It also made certain 
that the Lalat conference would lead to nowhere.
Another highly significant point was revealed 
' / /
when Huynh Thuc IQiang, Home Minister, raised a quest­
ion concerning the Ham Bo issue; "We should not 
bring out", replied Ho Chi Minh, "the question of cease­
fire". The reason for this decision according to 
Professor Hoang Xuan Han, a member of the Hanoi dele­
gation to Lalat, was very likely the idea that the 
continuation of war in Ham Bo would be favourable to 
Hanoi at the negotiation table. This interpretation 
was later confirmed by a captured document bearing the 
words of General Nguyen Binh, the commander of Viet 
Minh forces in Nam Bo; "To support the Lalat Conference, 
an order has been given for a general offensive".
However, during the Dalat Confereace,realising that 
the resistance forces had been hurt by French mili­
tary activities, Yo Hguyen G-iap, after consultation 
with Hanoi by private radio-phone, proposed the dis­
cussion of a cease-fire. But the French delegate, 
Torel, retorted that the cease-fire was an issue for 
the two Governments to decide....
It was obvious that at Dalat, the two delegations/
from Hanoi and Paris were using the same terms Eiio'c 
td-do (Etat libre), Ljen-bang Dong-dd5ng (Federation 
indochinoise), Lifen-hlfep Phan (Union francaise),
Ham-bo (Cochinchine), and so forth, with entirely dif­
ferent meanings. Since the positions of the two 
sides, beginning from the understanding of the nature 
and purpose of the "preparatory conference at Dalatn , 
were far and wide apart, even irreconcilable, there 
was small wonder that the Dalat conference failed 
miserably, and both sides were very much disappointed.
In May, giving a report of the Dalat meeting,
Su That paper related that 11 the exchanges of ideas at
Dalat normally ended with the cliche expression:
61"let’s take note of that disagreement!" Another
editorial of the same Party paper confirmed that the 
principal goal of the Communists was to drive toward 
the official negotiations in Paris:
We may say that, despite very little 
agreement between our side and the 
French at Dalat, this preparatory 
meeting has achieved its objective.
namely to help both sides to under­
stand one another*s position, thus 
further mutual understanding and 
favouring the negotiations in 
Paris. 62
" G r o d d  will”. Propaganda, and Fontainebleau,
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When the Government delegation headed by Nguyen 
Tuong Tam and Yo Nguyen Giap was making the final 
preparations for the meeting at Da Lat, the National 
Assembly’s delegation headed by Pham Yan Dong, was 
ready for a "good will visit" to Prance.
On 16 April 1946, bidding farewell to the dele­
gation, Ho Chi Minh advised the whole group of their 
duties:
You delegate© have three things 
to do; be united, be careful, 
and make the French understand us 
for the purpose of strengthening 
the friendship between the two 
nations. 63
Always a faithful spokesman for the Party, Su 
That newspaper No,32 (20 April 1946), later expalined 
"the duties of the Yietnamese delegation to France" 
in the terms of the above directive of President Ho*; 
and added its own authoritative suggestions about the 
work of political persuasion:
It has to be admitted that our work 
of international propaganda still 
leaves much to be desired. Our 
purpose is just. Our nation is 
politically mature £si<3 * Yet,
French colonialists are still active 
in their counter-propaganda against
us, asserting that we are usurpers, 
that our nationalist movement has 
pro-Japanese tendencies and that 
our nation is still immature....
To make the French people under­
stand us in order to increase mutual 
friendship and mutual help between 
the two nations, Viet and French, is 
an important duty of our National 
Assembly’s Delegation to France...,
...We are looking forward to the 
happy return of our delegation with 
the tinder standing and friendship of 
the new France, and also with the 
good news about some twenty-thousand 
of our compatriots in France .
Indeed, the main purpose of Dong’s delegation was 
to proclaim irthe good cause" of the Hanoi Government 
and to obtain support from the French people through 
the French Left. To create a more pleasant atmos­
phere for diplomatic activities, the Marxist paper,
Su That (No.31, 13 April 1946), in an editorial, pro­
posed a further differentiation of enemies. This 
periodic process required, as usual, a new slogan and 
a few explanations, under the heading, ’’The physiog­
nomy of a French reactionary":
Who are French reactionaries? - 
They are the most selfish,,cruel 
and stubborn imperialists. In 
France, they form the stumbling 
block against the forward advance 
of the new democracy movement 
and oppose friendly diplomacy to­
wards the Soviet Union, Con­
cerning Indochina, they protest 
against the Franc o-Vi e tnam e s e 
Preliminary Agreements and would
maintain a policy of repression 
against our movement for national 
liberation, hoping again to impose 
the French Imperialist yoke on our 
people o
The "classical imperialist policy of divide- 
and-rule" was examined and condemned. To counter 
that policy with a similar tactic, namely the exploi 
tation of the various conflicts arising from the 
Second World War and the contradictions between the 
Vichy Group and the "Free France F r o n t " F i r s t l y  
the Su That editor endeavoured to attach uncomplimen 
tary labels to those reactionaries;
Among the ranks of French reaction­
aries, are concealed French trait­
ors, French fascists*... former agents 
of Hitler and of the Japanese fascist 
militarists, loyal disciples of the 
traitors, Detain and Decoux.
The "reactionaries" being identified and "pro­
secuted", the Marxist editorial then proposed a new 
slogan and a temporary alliance;
We do not approve French colonialism, 
because our revolutionary goal for 
this period is to advance toward com­
plete independence. But for a limi­
ted period, we set aside the general 
slogan, "Down with the French colon­
ialists", for among the French colon­
ialists, there are also relatively 
progressive members who accept the 
Preliminary Agreements, sincerely 
recogniseing the self-government of 
Viet Nam.
Since the concrete and immediate 
enemy of our nation at the present is 
the French reactionary, we use only the 
slogan "Down with the French reaction­
aries" ....
Indeed, French reactionaries are enemies 
not only of our 13601316 but also of the 
French people.
In our struggle against French reaction­
aries, therefore, our people should make 
an alliance with the French people, with 
the truly democratic and progressive 
Frenchmen. 64
That delicate "distinction of friend from enemy" was 
designed specifically to inci'iminate a "reactionary group 
of selfish, cruel and stubborn colonialists" in Indochina, 
and at the same time, to win the sympathetic support of 
"the French people", and particularly, "the progressive 
elements of the New France", This was expounded again by 
the Marxist Su That-- No.36 (18 May 1946) in a leading 
article of which the captivating title well reflected its 
content: "T&i ac va thu pham" (Grime and the Culprit),
A long catalogue of crimes were predictable: arrest,
torture, killing, rape, plunder, ransacking, house-burning, 
bribery, deceit, false calumny, sowing division, and what 
not? The two characteristics of the "white terror" were 
made obvious: "repression and deceit". The sensitive
nerves of French protesters were jarred by the mention of 
"heavy bombs dropped by French soldiers on suspected 
villages", and the sensational description of some crimes 
so hideous as to surpass belief:
French "elite soldiers" thrust children 
into bags and threw them into the
rivers! They set fire to petrol in a
2 2 3  o
large basin and forced into it the 
head of any Vietnamese citizen who 
protested the partition of his 
countryI 65
While allegations of such infernal atrocities 
were obvioiisly calculated to identify colonialism with 
satanisms the author took pains to acquit the 1 French 
people*1 ;
No, we do not believe that the heaven- 
shaking crimes committed in South Viet 
Nam and in Laos could be ascribed to 
the french people, who, indeed, have 
carried out several revolutions, pro™ 
fessed the doctrine of "Liberte,
Egalite, Fraternite", fought hard dur­
ing four long years against the Hitler 
regime, and have survied terrible 
sufferings. Such a people, we are 
sure, would not like to inflict re- 
presive tortures on us as Hitler has 
inflicted on them. Would it be poss­
ible for the French people who enjoyed 
the high distinction of having cham­
pioned the just cause, to forget the 
advice of their wise man; "Dont do to 
other people what you would not like 
others to do to you"?
We do not hold the new France respons­
ible for what the Indochinese people 
are presently suffering. Born of, and 
growing from, a struggle for liberation, 
the new France has declared itself to 
the. world, through Constitutional 
Assembly;
"Faithful to her traditions and Inter­
national laws, France will not start any 
aggresive war, and will never violate 
by force the freedom of another nation"
(rfhe New Constitution).
While proclaiming such a humanitarian
principle, how could France, in deeds, 
strangle to death, the Democratic 
Republic of Viet Bam?
Bo, being a heroic nation, a champion of the princ­
iples of liberty, equality and fraternity, the French 
people would not accept the indictment for those base 
crimes. They would welcome the indentification of the 
specific criminals on whom they might pour blame and hate. 
The author, therefore, singled out the culprits;
We well understand. Those that out­
raged the French people and merited 
their strong disapproval.... were per­
petrated by a group of French reaction­
aries i.e., a handful of French imperial 
ists and colonialists who were most 
brutal, rapacious, and stubborn. Those 
are the French capitalists and their 
agents, including French traitors who 
were pro-German and pro-Japanese....
They do not have the right to claim to 
be representative of the French people, 
or of the new France simply because they 
are rather enemies of the French people 
and of the New France, Their Machia­
vellian scheme is to complete the liquid­
ation of Bam Bo liberation movement be­
fore the official negotiations in Paris....
Their repressive and terrorist tactics in 
Viet Nam and Laos are not only intended to 
preserve the selfish interests of French 
colonialists, but also to turn Indochina 
into a base, where they would co-operate 
with other international reactionaries 
against the movement of new democracy in 
France and the anti-colonial revolution in 
South East Asia,
Finally, after hinting at the hardship of an adventur­
ous war against experienced Vietnamese guerillas,. and the 
gloomy picture of a bloody defeat at their hands, the 
article ends with a suggestion which well reflects the real
purpose of the "good will visit" and of the whole 
negotiation period;
Some time in the future, the French 
people would feel forced publicly to 
disavow their barbarian activities, 
and together with the Indochinese 
nationals adequately to punish those 
crimes. 66
The "good will" delegation left Paris for Viet 
Bam on 16 May 1946, but Pham Van Dong remained in 
France to be the leader of the Hanoi delegation to 
the negotiation conference at Fontainebleau.
In the meantime, the French Government was trying 
to set up the Bam k.y td trl (Autonomous Cochinchina) 
and "to liberate" the Minorities Area, while the Viet 
Minh sustained the "anti-colonialist struggle" by means 
of guerilla and sabotage. Thus the hostilities con­
tinued in Nam Bo (Gochinchina), in Nam Trung Bo 
(Southern Part of Central Viet Nam), then spread out 
to North and Northwest. Both sides exchanged denun­
ciations and accusations, while the negotiations at 
Fontainebleau made no progress.
On 27 June 1946, a general strike was organised 
to protest against the French*,, and Su That, No.42,
30 June 1946, published an editorial to expalin "the 
day of united struggle";
The will of the Vietnamese nation 
is made clear....
The Vietnamese people and their 
patriotic political parties, 
always united and increasingly
united feic3 , have trampled under 
foot all schemes of division on 
the part of the French reaction­
ary colonialists.
The Vietnamese people will always 
support and cooperate with the 
Government in domestic as well as 
in foreign affairs.
The Vietnamese people are ever 
loyal to their just cause and ever 
ready to struggle for just cause.
...The Vietnamese people deeply 
admire the sublime ideals of the 
French people, sincerely cooperate 
with the new France, and therefore, 
must be united with the French 
people.,..
That high "admiration", "cooperation" and "union"
with the French people did not prevent the Viet Minh
from making ready for resistance. This was an early
sign of a future military opposition already in the
course of preparation;
On 27 June 1946, the Vietnamese 
people opposed the hostile ad­
vance of the French reactionary 
colonialists by negative means.
The people are more than willing 
to use positive means of opiDOS- 
ition as the combatants have been
doing on the Southern front if
necessary.
To make people "united and more united" in order 
to give undivided support to the Government in Hanoi 
and to the delegation in Paris, the Viet Minh created 
the National United Front (Hbi Lien Hiep Quoc Dan Viet 
Nanjor Lien Viet) 9 just two days before the departure
of Ho Chi Minh and the Government delegation for France
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During the negotitation in Paris, division and oppo­
sition arose increasingly in Hanoi. By July 1946, 
the Viet Minh felt it necessary to use force; the 
headquarters of the Viet Ham Quoc Dan Dang was sear­
ched, "traitors" were arrested, "reactionary documents" 
and "evidence of crimes" were confiscated. The Su 
That paper (No.45, 19 July 1946) published a bill of 
indictment and invoked the authority of the President 
of the Lien Viet Front, a "non-partisan personality", 
Huynh Thuc Khang, who represented President Ho during 
his absence, to appeal for "more unity" and "more 
support":
The situation is critical, everybody 
realizes that. For, in our country,
French reactionaries are using mili­
tary forces to destroy our forces in 
the South and to occupy strategic 
positions in the North. In France, 
the position of the French Government 
is exactly the same as in Dalat. It 
is necessary for us to be united and 
to unify our actions in order to main­
tain power and effectively to support 
our delegation at the negotiating 
table....
.,.Our nation welcomes and agrees with 
the declaration of cu Huynh; "We must
unite to build the country and to
support the diplomatic mission".
From the French side, Fontainebleau had been in­
tended to solemnize the official signing of the agree­
ments which would have been spelled in details at 
Dalat. But, in fact, Fontainebleau was simply a re­
petition of Dalat. Just as Vo Nguyen G-iap had slammed
the door abruptly to end the Dalat conference on
11 May, Pham Van Dong angrily left Fontainebleau in 
the same manner on 12 September 1946, to embark on his 
return trip the following day.
After receiving news of the failure of the 
Fontainebleau Conference, Hanoi’s Government with the 
old "non-partisan" Home Minister, Huynh Thue Khang, 
as the official representative of Cu Ho, urgently 
appealed for "a closing of the ranks" while making pre­
parations for a "welcome home" ceremony. On the other 
hand, Truong-Ohinh, the spokesman of the "Indochinese 
Marxist Association" and the real lieutenant of Ho 
Chi Minh for the period, issued an instruction on "The 
failure of Fontainebleau*.1 This instruction, dated
12 September 1946, was made public in Su That paper 
No,545 20 September 1946.
To the first question "why failure?", Truong- 
Chinh after citing a series of "facts", stated an 
unambiguous answer which was printed in bold type;
The ultimate and fundamental cause 
of the failure of Fontainebleau 
Conference was on the French side 
and not on ours, 67
The second question was concerning the future of 
the Viet-French relations. Here, the Marxist dialec­
tician offered a subtle distinction between the Viet- 
French diplomatic relations in general and the partic­
ular case of the Fontainebleau negotiation. He also 
raised the hope of new negotiations to appeal for 
greater unity and "Perseverant struggle;
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...The termination of the Fontainebleau 
Conference does not mean complete 
failure of the Viet-French diplomatic 
relation or the Viet-French negot­
iation as a whole. It is very poss­
ible that our country and France would 
open new negotiations (as the French 
delegation has suggested for next 
January) and will sign an official 
Viet-French treaty, f This hope will 
materialize if, from one hand, our 
people are united and persevere in our 
struggle, and, on the other hand, the 
French people and the democratic 
forces could succeed in enforcing a 
more reasonable attitude among colon­
ialists. It also depends upon the 
growth of the world movement of peace 
and democracy, and upon the inter­
national detente in favour of the 
Viet-French relation. Otherwise... 
it would give rise to a military 
conflict.
Facing the factual failure in diplomacy and the 
mounting criticism of the other Vietnamese politi­
cians, the Marxist leader Truong-Ohinh, then, out­
lined the agenda for the members of the "Marxist 
association";
What should be done?
Firstly, we must clearly explain 
the cause of the Fontainebleau 
failure in order to publicly 
denounce the wicked scheme of the 
French reactionary colonialist, 
and to promote the people’s oppos­
ition against them* Secondly we 
must oppose the attitude of doubt 
and consolidate the people’s con­
fidence in President Ho and the 
Government delegation. We must
also oppose those who are wavering, 
pessimist, opportunist or provoc­
ative, thinking that the diplomatic 
policy of President Ho and the 
Government is not right, that the 
preliminary accords of 6 March 1946 
are wrong, etc.*..
...We must appeal to the people to 
form a wide alliance and a solid 
union in the Vietnamese National 
United Front, to close the ranks 
around the Government and President 
Ho, and finally to be well pre­
pared for any unforseen contingency.
This "unforeseen contingency" was also hinted at 
in the same instruction;
If the French colonialists do 
not change their attitude, willingly 
accept a cease fire and observe the 
preliminary accords of 6 March 1946, 
the partial war between Viet-Nam and 
France will continue in a seesaw.
But if our people are not very well 
united and if the situation in. France 
and in the world suffers unfavourable 
complications, then the partial war 
could be transformed into a nation­
wide war.
The instruction, however, ended on an optimistic 
note, appealing for more confidence and recealing the 
far-reaching political objectives at which the shrewd 
internationalists had aimed from the very beginning 
of the negotiations;
Though the visit of President Ho 
and the Government delegation to 
France this time, was not conducive 
to the signing of an official and
total treaty with France,,it 
has scored, indeed, a great succ­
ess; it raade French people cog- 
nicent with us and to strongly 
support us; it also attracted 
world opinion in favour of Viet 
Nam and deepened the sympathy 
of the whole world for Viet N a m ’s 
hard struggle and profound aspir­
ations. From economic and legal 
viewpoints, the Democratic Republic 
of Viet Nam does not have any posi­
tion on the international stage yet, 
but in spirit it has become an ob­
vious reality* 68
H o 1s visit to Paris and the Modus Vivendi *
When the "good will" delegation first arrived 
(26 April 1946) and was courteously received in Paris, 
Pham Van Dong cabled a favourable report to President 
Ho, and President Ho, who was seeking international 
recognition, did not neglect to send a telegram to 
D'Argenlieu, (14 May 1946) requesting the High Commiss­
ioner to convey his gratitude to the French Government 
and the French people. This was an appropriate pre­
paration for his official visit to Paris, which Hanoi’s 
diplomatic activities had won him from the French Govoer.: 
mento Determined to acquire the support of the French 
people, the Communist leaders from Hanoi chose to set 
aside any kind of hostility towards the French and 
adopted an attitude of kindness and friendship* Before 
leaving for France, President Ho sent a special letter 
to his Southern compatriots to express his concern ab­
out the future of NTam Bo (Cochinchina) and to dis­
avow any betrayal ascribed to him* Ho, in another 
letter to all his compatriots (both letters were dated
31 May 1946), also took pains to forestall any ob
jeetion and to get the entire nation to close the ranks 
behind him. Firstly, the hardships he had borne for 
his revolutionary ideal, constituted a moving public 
appeal:
My life has only one purpose which 
is to struggle for the Fatherland’s  ^
interests and our people’s happi­
ness* When I hid in the mountains, 
was imprisoned, and braved dangers, 
it was all for this purpose.
Now, through their solidarity, the 
people have grasped the national 
power from the invaders and entrust­
ed me with the National Government,
I am deeply concerned, day and night, 
for this purpose, but I try to be 
patient.
Today, following the Government’s 
order and the people’s will, I say 
goodby to you fox the long trip to 
France with our delegation; this is 
also for the same purpose.
Whenever 1 can, and wherever I am,
1 unswervingly pursue only one purpose, 
namely, to be of use to our nation and 
our people. Hence, at this time, I 
pledge to you that all members of our 
Delegation and I, will endeavour to be 
worthy of the people’s trust. 69
Since "state government v/as a common duty to all! 
like a family-father, Ho invited every citizen to 
"share that responsibility" in helping the Government’s 
negotiations to achieve success;
How can you help?
1), By uniting closely and avoiding 
any divisive action,
2). By trying to practise industry 
and economy, in order to avoid 
famine.
3). By keeping order and strictly 
complying with the Government's 
directives*
4)• By practising moderation and 
kindness toward foreigh resi­
dents.
Your correct implementation of those 
points will contribute to our diplom­
atic work. If you have affection 
for me, I trust that you will ful­
fill my wishes*
Since diplomacy, like charity, should begin at 
home, Ho availed himself of the opportunity to win the 
hearts of foreign residents in Viet Nam, and French 
residents in particular;
living among the Vietnamese people, 
you and the Vietnamese meet one 
another every day, and you exper­
ience plenty, or want, together.
Hence, the Vietnamese are your 
friends and Viet Nam is your second 
Fatherland, The Vietnamese people 
and you should respect and love one 
another; sincerely practice mutual 
cooperation and mutual friendship, 
put into practice the saying,
"People the world over are brothers"
(Tu Hai giai huynh de). If Viet Nam 
is prosperous, youx^selves will share 
plenty of happiness, 70
To answer any objection about the violent language 
and the hostile attitude of the Viet Minh during the 
previous months, the Hanoi diplomats would call atten­
tion to the delicate distinction between reactionary 
fascist Frenchmen and the truly democratic ones, as 
stated In the "Open Letter to the true democratic 
Frenchmen ":
Those Frenchmen supporting the 
reconquest of Indochina are 
reactionary fascists,... The 
common interests for both French 
people and the Vietnamese people 
resides in the elimination of all 
reactionaries and the building of 
a common peace. The colonialists 
cannot forever divide the demo­
cratic forces. Nothing can break 
the united bloc of ^regressive 
elements,
Our true French democratic friends, 
you are actually showing that spirit 
of unity. Please make the people 
of Indochina and of the progressive 
world understand the New France; 
please positively oppose the reac­
tionaries,.., , and do your best to 
intervene in favour of VIer Nam's 
struggle for freedom. 71
Truong Chinh also acquitted the French people o 
the colonialist t4ndency of those selfish individual 
who happened to represent the French Grovernment in 
Indochina at that time;
The attitude of those representatives 
of the French Government has aroused 
suspicion among the Indochinese people.
But we believe that such an attitude 
is not consistent with the desire for 
freedom and justice of the French 
people. It is rather an expression 
of the unbecoming and selfish interests 
of French colonialism,
The Vietnamese jjeople have great con™ 
fidence in the consensus of the French 
people which is to support them...*
But the Vietnamese people have no 
right naively to trust in the sin­
cerity of the ractionary French colon­
ialists, 72
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Indeed, in 1946, Hanoi was conducting a consis­
tent diplomatic campaign to acquire de facto recog­
nition from the French Government, and at the same 
time, to gain the support of the French people. Ho 
Ohi Minh was seemingly proud to acknowledge his diplo­
matic achievement, when he delivered a very kindly 
but nonetheless shrewd speech at the luncheon given 
by the French Government:
The reception given me by the French 
people and Government has moved me 
to the innermost depths of my heart.
Please convey to the French Govern™ 
ment and people the sincere thanks 
of the Vietnamese people for the sym­
pathy and friendliness the French 
people and Government have expressed 
to me. 73
While insisting on Vietnamese self-government,
Ho made a clever allusion to the case of the Basque 
provinces, TTa very beautiful region of Prance", and 
praising the noble political principles upheld by 
the French people since the Great Revolution of 1789* 
Ho declared his willingness to adhere to the French 
Union as suggested before by French negotiators:
The French Union that we will est­
ablish on a democratic basis can be 
set up only under a good omen. It 
is here in Paris, a heroic and gen­
erous city, which proclaimed the 
principles of liberte, egalite, and 
fraternite, a city which, tradition­
ally, champions the equality of other 
peoples, it is in this very city that 
I  solemnly declare that Viet Mam will 
;l o in this human, i t ar i an o r gan is at ion.
That declaration might sound to he a political
compromise or a naive statement, innocent enough to
assure the French people of a new friend in the French 
74Pederation* Actually it is evidence of H o 1s con-
summate skill in applying ,fcorrect terms’* in diplom­
acy and politics. Two months before, the Franco- 
Vietnamese Preparatory Meeting at Pal at had 11 taken 
note of a disagreement” on that question; the 
French negotiators maintained the intrinsic legal nat­
ure of the French Union to deny the right of diplo­
matic representation to Viet ham and its members,
whereas the Vietnamese Government vehemently opposed
7 Bit)demanding all the rights of a free state. In 
the diplomatic atmosphere of a state luncheon in 
Paris, President Ho proved himself a. very shrewd neg­
otiator in reiterating his firm position by a pleasant 
11 verbal detour” , when he ”solemnly declared” his will­
ingness to join the French Union as a "humanitarian 
organisation”.
To convince his august audience at Champs Elysee 
and the good people of France, Ho Chi Minh continued 
to offer his listeners the happy remembprance of their
noble political ideals and to draw a parallel between
new France and new Viet Ham. He finally ended his 
diplomatic argument with the citation of a universal 
ethic principle that would bring together East and 
West, as well as Christians and Confucians;
Paris is the city which discovered
the external ideas for the 1789
Revolution; it has remained loyal
to its ideals in the bloodshed 
between the democratic and 
fascist blocs.
Paris has made no small contri­
bution to the concord of Viet 
Nam and Prance within the French 
Union including free and equal 
nations which cherish the same 
democratic ideals and are all for 
freedom. It is here in Paris that 
Viet Mam will step forward to the 
path of independence. I am con­
vinced that it will not be long 
before independent Viet Nam plays 
its worthy role in the Pacific.
No doubt many difficulties are 
awaiting the Fontainebleau Con­
ference which has the responsibility 
of laying the foundations for re- 
lations between a new France and a 
new Viet N a m . But sincerity and 
mutual confidence will level all 
obstacles. Have we not done away 
with aggressive imperialism and 
narrow chauvinism which are no 
longer fit for the present world?
We are all stimulated by the same 
Spirit, The Oonfucian philosophy 
and the Western philosophy alike 
uphold an ethical principle which 
is; "Don’t do to other people 
what you would not like others to 
do to you". 76
During the period of negotiation, Ho was under­
standably concerned to maintain a "friendly atmosphere" 
to favour his diplomatic enterprise. Learning that 
several political groups had shown their opposition 
and accused the Viet Minh of betrayal, Ho ordered 
Hanoi to postpone the 19 August commemoration of the
general insurrection. For the National Day of 
Independence (2 September), Ho sent a telegram to 
advise his government;
I wish all celebrations to be free 
of any hostility towards France, 
thus allowing her representatives 
eventually to attend. 77
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All that endurance, kindness, speech, writing, 
diplomatic manoeuvre, all were aimed at achieving 
the recognition of Viet N a m ’s independence on the part 
of France. As Ho Chi Minh told the reporter of the 
Franc Tireur (15 August 1946), Hanoi was ready "to 
collaborate" with France, "to guarantee her moral, 
cultural and material interests" in Viet Nam in ex­
change for a guarantee, an affirmative word for the 
future of Viet Nam.
In fact, his long trip (30 May - 20 October 1946) 
undertaken as a "mission of good will" and of "psy­
chological action" was carefully calculated for "maxi­
mum exposure" to world opinion through the press, and 
for a de facto recognition of a chief of state and an 
official guest in Ho. It was this political persuit 
that made Ho lay a wreath at the unknown soldier’s 
tomb on 13 July and insist on having his seat next to
the French President at the reviewing of troops on
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14 July 1946. So It is understandable that Ho felt
his personal prestige being challenged and his politi­
cal leadership seriously threatened, if the negotia­
tions in Paris and his personal visit to France did 
not result in any official agreement to bring home as
a token of "concrete success", whatever it be in 
reality. The significance of symbol and "face" 
became more apparent than ever in H o 1s conciliatory 
declaration:
I came to make peace. I am not 
content to return to Hanoi with 
empty hands. 1 would like to go 
home with France, in other words, 
to bring back to the Vietnamese 
people some concrete results 
meaning the certitude of cooper­
ation between France and Viet Nam 
as we all wish. 79
That line of thought clearly explains the 
perplexity, the anguish and the last compromise of 
Ho Chi Minh, after the sudden termination of Fontaine­
bleau and the departure of the Hanoi delegation 
(13 September 1946).
The following day, Ho still discussed with Marius 
Moutet and paid a visit to President Georges Bidault 
but the press did not have any Important news to re­
port. It was not until midnight that Ho walked into 
M.Moutet’s bedroom to sign what has been called the 
temporary modus vivendi of 14 September 1946, very 
much compromising to the French demands. (See the text 
in Appendix Cp) Apparently thining of the prediction 
of failure and of the accusations of appeasement, oppor­
tunism and betrayal tossed against himself on the part 
of the opposition parties in Hanoi, Ho Chi Minh report­
edly confided to a companion; UI just signed my o^ Fn 
death sentence ],T
The Modus Vivendi and its aftermath.
In Hanoi, Su That newspaper (No.54, 20 September 
1946) presented a long editorial to rationalize H o 1s 
signing of the Modus vlvendi which was rejected by 
Pham Van Dong four days earlier. Pointing to the 
temporary character of the agreements which covered 
only some small but urgent questions, the Marxist 
editor assured the people of a more favoiirable solu­
tion in the future, concerning fundamental problems 
of permanent character such as the independence and 
the unification of Viet Nam. Then, the rationale of 
the Modus vivendi was summarized in a concise passage 
with a highly persuasive tone:
President Ho as well as President 
Bidault and Minister Moutet were 
able to distinguish the achievable 
from the unachievable at certain 
times and in certain conditions.
The signing of the "modus vivendi” 
was motivated by President H o 1s 
determination to make the Viet- 
French relations progress better 
than on 6 March 1946, and to 
deepen the friendship between the 
two democratic nations in view 
of achieving a higher unity. Our 
President knew that the agreement 
on modus vlvendi could placate the 
Viet-French hostilities, buy more 
time to consolidate our strength in 
preparation for a more favourable 
situation. It also served to mani­
fest the desire of our people to be 
on amicable terras with the French 
people, thus Increasing the friendly 
support of the French people and of 
other free nations in favour of our 
country.
Though it is not completely 
satisfactory3 it is, nevertheless, 
a good opportunity to plant an­
other milestone on the Yiet-French 
diplomatic road, and to demolish 
some stumbling blocks laid by certain 
French reactionaries. So why should 
we miss it?
The editorial praised the signatories as skill­
ful diplomats and interpreted the agreement as sign­
ifying the agony of colonialism. The Marxist writer 
also found it opportune to deduce a dialectical con­
clusion against both “leftist" and "rightist” tenden­
cies :
Anyhow, we should not be over- 
optimistic about the "modus 
vivendi" of 14 September 1946,
NTor should we consider it totally 
unfavourable to us. Both those 
attitudes are not corrects the 
former will cause imprudence, un­
awareness and lack of preparedness 
in confronting unexpected contin­
gencies, whereas the latter will 
give rise to a pessimistic and 
negative attitude, vulnerable to 
the provocation on the part of 
French reactionaries, or leading 
to defeatism and surrender.
The editor, however, took great care to wai’n 
people of the risk that French authorities might 
grasp the "real meat of the Yiet-French question i,e,, 
French economic and financial rights" in Indochina, 
and let go the g a p p i n g  skin i.e., the independence 
and thejunification of Yiet Nam in the French Union". 
Consequently, the editorial ended with an appeal for 
"union and struggle", in order to oblige the French
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to implement the "Modus vivendi? and called for 
"preparedness", since "this temporary agreement might 
very well embolden French colonialists to attempt 
more oppressive measures".
The Viet-Minh information services made every 
effort to convince Vietnamese people that the "modus 
vlvendi" signed in Paris as a proof of the "policy of 
moderation" of Hanoi Government, would, eventually, 
lead to the complete independence and unification of 
the country under the same Vietnamese Democratic 
Government, For this purpose, Hanoi vehemently con­
demned the Provisional Government of Dr, Thinh in 
Saigon, and staunchly reasserted the authority of the 
Nam-Bo Provisional Executive Committee created and 
headed by the Viet Minh since September 1945. To 
hamonize that political concert, on 22 September 1946, 
the shadow Nam-Bo Provisional Executive Committee 
issued a declai’ation claiming itself to be "the only 
legal authority in Nam-Bo".
In order to obtain political benefit from the 
agreements signed by Ho Chi Minh, Hanoi announced on 
13 October 1946, the reorganisation of the Nam Bo 
Provisional Executive Committee for the implementation 
of both the "6 March Preliminary Agreements" and the 
"14 September Modus Vivendi". Already, since 13 
September, did the Hanoi Government, by Decree No.182, 
confer more power on the military arm of that same 
Provisional Committee by entrusting the "Direction of
Resistance in the Southern part of Central Viet 
Ham" to the "Resistance Committee in Nam Bo". Thus, 
Oochinchina (Nam Bo) was de facto unified with Central 
Viet Nam (Trung Bo), under the authority of the 
central Viet Minh Government in Hanoi. To increase 
embarrassment to French authorities, the Provisional 
Executive Committee and the Resistance Committee in 
Ham Bo both of which were created by the Viet Minh 
and not recognised by any Government in the world, 
were, then, deliberately related to the "Modus Vivendi" 
signed by representatives of Hanoi and Paris Govern­
ments.
The implementation of the Modus Vivendi, as 
planned in Hanoi, would give the resistance forces in 
the southern area time for regrouping while the appeal 
for "awareness and preparedness" among the Vietnamese 
population helped to deepen patriotic sentiments, to 
increase "defense forces", and, at the same time, to 
demolish the "separatist movement" as well as the 
Government of Dr. Thinh in Saigon. Besides, the 
circulation of the accusation term Viet giap (Viet 
traitor) scared everybody, especially when it was 
accompanied by terrorist activities.
"Awareness and preparedness" was also a slogan 
that guided all the activities of Hanoi Government 
during the absence of Ho Chi Minh, under the influence 
of Vo Nguyen Giap and his collaborators who were affirm­
ing the impossibility of lasting agreement with French 
authorities. Phillippe Devillers, writing the History
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of Viet Nam (1940-1952), seemed correctly to under­
stand the mind of H o 1s real lieutenant, when he 
characterized the period of Viet-Drench negotiation 
in Paris with a chapter entitled: f*Griap forged his 
arms11 *
Early in October 1946, while Ho Ohi Minh was 
still on the Dumont d ’Urville, Hanoi started a cam­
paign of denunciation against the Drench* This 
campaign found full expression in an article published 
Su That newspaper* Ho*57 (11 October 1946)* A 
catalogue of alleged violations served to revile the 
enemies and to incite a ’’patriotic1' anger against them:
In Ham-Bo (Oochinchina) and Ham 
Trung-bo (Southern part of Central 
Viet Ham), since 14 September, the 
policy of terror has been practiced 
more rigorously than ever before*...
Vietnamese civilians have been 
slaughtered as never before* Drench 
troops tortured Vietnamese combat­
ants with barbarous means which were 
never applied before* Drench react­
ionaries dared to pass criminal 
sentence on patriotic Catholics 
(Father Luat and Dr* Sang) and arres­
ted some members of the Executive 
Committee for Ham Bo (Mai-van-Bo).
Recently, they executed three southern 
patriotic personalities, among whom, 
the late M.P* Hoang-minh-Chau*
The sympathy and warm support that Hanoi wished 
to obtain from theVietnamese population and other people 
in the world, were adroitly suggested, then, as un­
avoidable effects of those alleged crimes:
s
Those immoral and inhuman actions 
will only succeed in widening and 
deepening the struggle movement 
of the Southern people, in uniting 
more closely various religions and 
political parties of the Vietnamese, 
and in strengthening against them, 
the opposition of the progressive 
democratic elements throughout the 
world, especially in France* They 
do not understand that, in so acting, 
they themselves cause damage to the 
interests and the honour of France*
The article also suggested that the policy of 
"preparedness" advocated by Viet Minh leaders was 
correct, and "full responsibility" for war would 
devolve on the French:
The Vietnamese army never ceased 
to prepare for resistance against 
any offensive from the FrenchI *.*
Combatants in the rear area, mem­
bers of the Executive Committee in 
the South, no one was so optimistic 
as to suspend his activities or to 
be unaware of reactionary schemes 
of the FrenchJ *.*
**.French reactionary colonialists 
must certainly bear full respons­
ibility for their actions in Indo­
china before the French people and 
before world opinion*
Obviously, Hanoi leaders appreciated the import­
ance of world opinion and the influence of the French 
public upon French G-overnment policy in Indochina, 
especially in an election year. Already in France, 
the Leftists with their organs, Le Populaire and 
L ’Humanite„ used the question of Indochina as a cam­
paign issue* The election of 10 November 1946, in
fact, marked a new progress for the French Communist 
Party: together the Socialist Party and the Communist
Party obtained more than 46% of the votes* Thus the 
Bidault Government was facing a deep political crisis 
while the situation in Viet Nam became more somber 
with every passing day* It was at this moment that 
Ho Chi Minh sent a letter, dated 11 November 1946, to 
G. Bidault, Presi.dent of the Provisional Government 
of the French Republic, to protest against "the uni­
lateral establishment of a tax bureau at Haiphong 
harbour", which measure Hanoi Government found to be 
in conflict with the "Modus Vivendi"* Again, Ho
used a policy of moderation and friendly language to
confuse his enemy:
I am confident that through youv 
good offices, all instructions
necessary for the rectification
of those measures which are at
variance with your agreements 
and susceptible of prejudicing 
the Viet-French entente to which 
our two Governments are bound, 
will be issued. 80
On 23 November 1946, President Ho made an appeal 
to the nation urging both "moderation" and "prepared­
ness". It is, in fact, a veiled cri de guerre:
The situation in Lang-son has 
not yet been settled when the 
situation in Hai-phong becomes 
serious again. Not only did 
the French violate the agreements 
signed in the afternoon of 20 
November....but this morning, they 
have made further demands which
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we found unacceptable. Consequently, 
another clash has taken place.,..
...I appeal to all my compatriots to 
exercise moderation and I call on 
the regular army and the Tu-ve 
(national guards) to be ready to de­
fend our national sovereignty and 
the lives and property of foreign 
residents.
The Government is always close by 
your side to protect our land.
The attack on Hanoi,
Soon after the return of President Ho Chi Minh, 
the Communist Party leaders seemed to have reached 
a firm decision which agreed with the conviction of 
those hard liners such as To Nguyen Giap. This de­
termination was made public in Su That (No*64,
29 November 1946) under the form of an appeal of the 
"Marxist Studies Association":
De ar c ompatri o t sI 
French troops have started their 
offensive against us at Hai phong 
and lang-son.
Their activities in violation of Viet 
N a m ’s sovereignty are likely to spread 
to other areas. The situation is 
extremely critical. Be ready to 
fight in self-defense at any time and 
anywhere I Every Vietnamese citizen
must earnestly fulfill his sacred duty 
of defending the sovereignty of the 
Fatherland,
United to fight, we will win.
That appeal became an order in the following issue 
Gu That (No.65, 4 December 1946) and the words of
the Marxist secretary general Truong Ohinh sounded no 
less authoritarian than the order of an army general:
Determined to fight and ready to 
fight! French troops have vio­
lated our national territory in 
the South, the Centre and the 
Forth, They have violated the 
Preliminary Agreements of 6 March 
1946 and the Modus Vivendi of 
14 September 1946. Resistance 
has already been offered in all 
three regions. At any time, 
the resistance could become total 
and nationwide.
....Any advice to surrender, coming 
from enemy or self proclaimed "friend", 
should be firmly rejected. Any pol­
icy of appeasement, temporising, or 
cowardice, must be eliminated. Any 
agent for the enemy should be severly 
punished.... Before making the assault 
against the enemy, we must free our- 
selves from all such impediments.
Once the order had been given, Vo Nguyen Giap 
and his military collaborators feverishly prepared a
A a' v
coup de force: the ve quoc doan (national guards)
helped the enthusiastic youth to form til ve (self- 
defense) platoons, to build barricades, to make ready 
weapons and ammunition while a partial, selective and 
methodical evacuation of the capital took place. ^
The whole enterprise was shroiided in secrecy and wan 
termed "a contingency plan" 011 the occasion of the 
French toops entering Hanoi after the alleged massacre 
of Hai-phong.
On the diplomatic front, Ho Chi Minh was still
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receiving numbers of French visitors including the 
French negotiator Jean Sainteny who had developed 
much sympathy for the Viet Minh and had seemingly won 
Ho Chi Minh’s confidence. Although warned by various 
sources that a sudden attack was scheduled to begin 
at 8 p.m.s on 19 December 1946, the French negotiator 
was reluctant to believe it. As late as noon on 
19 December, Sainteny received a letter from Ho Chi 
Minh complaining about "the tense atmosphere which 
he regretted", and urging the French representative 
"to find some means of ameliorating the climate" 
between France andViet Nam* Only a few hours after 
receiving the warmest expressions of friendship from 
President Ho, Sainteny was taken by surprise that 
same evening, and seriously wounded in the attack the 
Hanoi leaders had meticulously prepared (See the in­
serted Official Order)*
The explosion that blew up the electric power 
plant and plunged the whole city of Hanoi into dark­
ness (19 December 1946), officially signaled the end 
of a period of Viet-Prench negotiations and marked the 
beginning of the nation-wide resistance war.
The first public document implicitly declaring 
war against the French, was an official order (see 
the following inserted page) issued by the Resistance 
Committee of Region II (which included Hanoi).
The official order began with the allegation that 
French tropps had commenced hostilities in Hanoi, 
imposed martial law, and appealed for "Calm and Order".
It stipulated five points covering military, moral, 
psychological, political and diplomatic aspects of 
the wars
OFFICIAL ORDER 
Compatriots in the CapitalI
The French troops have opened fire 
at Hanoi
The Resistance Committee of Region II 
issues the following orders:
1)* All acts liable to prejudice the 
national resistance in any way 
(supplying the enemy with food and 
munitions, spying on the enemy1s 
behalf, giving him conventional 
signs, etc,) are strictly forbidden,
2). All acts of looting and rape are 
strictly forbidden,
3), The propagation of unfounded rumours 
to disturb the public is strictly 
forbidden,
4) o I'he sheltering of traitors and pirate
is strictly forbidden. Anyone who 
knows of the movements of traitors 
and felons must immediately report to 
the Resistance Committee of the 
locality*
5). All acts liable to harm the life and 
property of unoffending alien resi­
dents are strictly forbidden,
CALM - ORDER
There will be absolute obedience to the 
orders of the Resistance Committee* Any 
transgressor of the above orders will be 
executed according to Martial Law,
This Official Order will take effect from 
20:00 hours on 19 December 1946 until 
further notice*
Hanoi 19 December 1946
The Resistance Committee of Region II
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This poster had been printed in advance but for 
the sake of military security, the space for the time 
and date of the attack had been left blank, to be 
filled at the last moment. Later, the date 19 Decem­
ber became the commemorative day of Rational Resistance
For so important an event, Ho must have prepared 
an appeal, as usual, to "show cause'1 and to win the 
X^eople's hearts and minds and their full support of 
the Government's decision. But only at noon on 19 
December, was a diplomatic letter sent to the French 
commissioner Sainteny, The president's appeal to 
the entire people to wage resistance war was tactfully 
dated 20 December 1946, The letter was necessarily 
brief and vigorous in style to convey the determina­
tion of the revolutionary leader, A word of self­
justification and the warning that the French ■ had 
invaded would suffice to alarm the entire people and 
to incite them to rise in arms:
Compatriots in all parts of the 
country! Since we desired peace, 
we made concessions. But the 
more compromising we are the more 
aggressive the French colonialists 
become. The reason is that they 
are resolved to invade our country 
once again,
Ho! We prefer to sacrifice everything 
rather than lose our country and be 
enslaved.
Compatriots! Rise up!
Men and women, old and young, regard­
less of creed, political party, or
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nationality, whoever is Vietnamese 
must rise and fight the French 
colonialists to save our Fatherland,
Those who have rifles will use their 
rifles; those who have swords will 
use their swords; if you have neither 
use hoes or sticks, ho one can be 
excused from this endeavour to beat 
the colonialists and save our country.
Soldiers and militiamen!
This is the time for national salv­
ation, We must sacrifice ourselves 
to the last drop of blodd for the 
defence of our country.
Long live the independence and unity 
of Viet NamI
Long live our victorious resistance!
"Fight to the end", Ho repeated this phrase to 
his compatriots in the next appeal included in an open 
letter "to the French people and the peoples of the 
Allied Nations1', wheu^Ln he elaborated his accusation 
against the French:
....The French reactionary colonial­
ists lack sincerity....In the South 
they.., provoke the Vietnamese 
patriots. They oppress honest 
Frenchmen who advocate sincerity....
In the North, they provoke clashes..,.
They blockade the port of Hai phong, 
thus making it impossible for the 
Chinese, Vietnamese, other foreigners, 
and also the French residents to carry 
out their business,
...They have massacred old people, 
women, and children even in Hanoi, 
our capital.
On 19 December 1946, at 8 p.m., Hanoi 
was attacked.
The responsibility for "provoking a war" and 
"invading our country" had been ascribed to the French 
colonialists, Ho found it politic to give the order 
of "counterattack" while "respecting the lives and 
properties of foreign residents". Martial law was 
confirmed, not in military terms, but in inspiring 
terms of ethics, right and wrong, reward and punish­
ment :
On behalf of the Government of the 
Democratic Republic of Viet Ham, I 
give the following orders to the 
soldiers, national guards, militia- 
men, and compatriots in the three 
regions of Viet Nam:
1. If the French troops attack us, 
we must fiercely counterattack them 
with all the weapons available.
Every Vietnamese must rise up to 
protect the Fatherland,
2. We must protect the lives and 
properties of foreign residents and 
treat prisoners of war well,
3. Those v/ho collaborate with the 
enemy will be punished. Those who 
help and defend their country will 
be rewarded.
CompatriotsI
The Fathex'!and is in danger. All 
of us must stand up!
In the immediate aftermath of the hurried Indep­
endence Ceremony on 2 September 1945, conflicts were set
in motion between the many forces, movements and 
groupings destined to play their parts on the stage 
of the Indochina drama: Vietnamese, French and
Chinese, Communist and Nationalist, Unionist and 
Separatist, Viet Minh, Viet Quoc and Viet Cach. to 
name only the principal participants. The Viet Minh 
Front, though it had succeeded in seizing power and 
establishing a "united central government", had no 
army: in the threatening atmosphere of dissension
and conflict, in whatever direction it turned, the 
newly born Government, headed by Ho Chi Minh came 
face to face with the agonising question: "Hoa hayp ——
chien?" (Peace or war?).
Unlike the historic Dien H&ng Congress which, 
when facing the same question, in the thirteenth cen­
tury, had answered unambiguously: "Quyet chien!"v ^  u  ■ -y...,. ■ — - r r —   ............. '----------------
(Fight to the end!) the Viet Minh leaders, in the 
period of 1945-46, chose rather to answer cryptically:
v A°> A/ .
"Hoa de tien" (conciliation for future advance). 
Indeed, under the umbrella- of a national united front, 
those undeclared Communists had to follow dangerous 
and tortuous political paths trying to make peace with 
each of their opponent groups by negotiation and com­
promise, for the sole purpose of gaining more time and 
strength to defeat their political enemies such as the 
Viet Quoc and Viet Cach after the departure of the 
Nationalist Chinese forces.
In dealing with the French who were immensely 
stronger in military forces and diplomatic relations,
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the Viet Minh Front organised local resistance in 
Nam Bo while the central Government of Ho Chi Minh 
which was at pains to obtain diplomatic recognition 
(in re if not de .jure) , offered to negotiate with the 
French Government "nowhere but in Paris".
The whole year of 1946 was characterized by a 
consistent policy of apparent "conciliation with 
France", witness the Ho - Sainteny preliminary agree­
ments, the Ha Long Bay meeting, the "good will" dele­
gation to France, the Dalat Conference, H o ’s presi­
dential visit tqFrance, the Fontainebleau negotiations, 
the Ho - Moutet modus vivendi. and other diplomatic 
niceties. It was, indeed, a period of preparation 
prescribed by the Central Committee of the undeclared 
Communist Party. But the violent incidents of 
Lang-son, Hai phong and Hanoi, precipitated armed 
conflict on a- nation-wide scale. "Hanoi was attacked!", 
this ambiguous cri de guerre marked the end, to use 
a famous Chinese expression, of the tan tan (talk, 
talk) and the beginning of the ta ta (fight, fight) 
period which was tragically to last some eight years.
Political persuasion during the period of hos­
tilities, which forms the subject of the next chapter, 
naturally concentrated on the aim of winning the war.
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Most survivors of the signatories of this 
proclamation were on the list of the National 
liberation Front for South Yiet Nam in the 
1 9 6 0 !s , and recently on the list of the 
tt pro visional Government of South Yiet Nam11. 
Phis shadow government refused to be called 
Yiet Cong and also claimed to be "the only 
representative authority of South Yiet Nam11.
Chapter VI
The nation-wide war 
and the Theme of TAT THANG- (we will win).
The "tour de force" on the night of 19 December 
1946 marked the end of BSgotiations and the beginning 
of a nation-wide war. With the general appeals of 
President Ho (dated 20 and 21 December 1946, according 
to Hanoi publications), a total and permanent mobil- 
ization started.
Instead of the beautiful democratic Constitution 
which had been presented at the National Assembly but 
never promulgated, martial law was imposed. The war 
provided an excellent excuse for the restirction of 
all democratic freedoms and the requirement of many 
sacrifices. But the evils of war tended to exhaust 
the forbearance of people and to give rise to many 
complaints. The Communist G-overnment found it nec­
essary to start a campaign of "winning hearts and 
minds".
Various forms of agit-prop.
Since the Resistance Government, hidden in the 
jungle or remote countryside, did not possess elabor­
ate news dissemination media such as television, radio, 
or publishing houses, it was not easy to organise a 
political campaign or to send a message to any partic­
ular segment of the population. But in the areas con­
trolled by the Viet Minh (mainly in the countryside
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and the highlands), the undeclared Communist leaders 
went all lengths to make the best of whatsoever was 
available.
At first the Viet Minh spared no efforts in build­
ing a fascinating image of Ho Chi Minh as a. rrnational 
hero” , a ”father of the nation” , an ”enlightened lead­
er11, a “veteran fighter against colonialists” , a “liv­
ing saint11, and ”a brother, a friend to everybody11 *
Since the words of such a paragon would necess­
arily command both respect and appreciation, it was 
little wonder that Ho became a. most prolific letter 
writer* A careful reader could discern in H o !s 
writings much evidence of his great skill as a per­
suader* The effects of his oratory were clearly dis- 
cernable among those people living under the Ho Chi 
Minh G-overnment, especially in Zone IV (Thanh, Rghe, 
Tinh), a stronghold of the Resistance Movement from 
1945 to 1954o But most of H o 1s writings did not 
become available to his people until late in 1956, 
when HhEtng 16i keu goi cua Ho Ghu ilch (President H o 1 s 
Addresses and Messages) were published in a collection 
of six volumes in Vietnamese* The Tuyen Tap (Selected 
Worlcs) appeared in 1960 and its foreign languages ver­
sion one year later* Throughout the period of rests- 
tanee, one booklet, Siia doi loi lam viec (Let us change 
our method of work), which was compiled by Ho Chi Minh 
and published in 1947 under the pseudonym© X.Y.Z., 
provided the “cadres of the Association’* (i . e. the 
Communist party and other leaders) with a basic study 
document*
To compensate the lack of printed hooks and 
the peasants1 opportunity to read, there were plenty 
of slogans on posters, streamers fand signboards along 
the roads* A splendid way of combining the power of 
slogans with traditional respect for authority was 
the distribution of Uncle Ho 1 s pictures with a brief 
quotation of his revolutionary wisdom*
In addition to H o 1s writings, an important source 
concerning the Viet Minh Front and its power seizure 
in 1943? was Truong Chinh's series of articles in Su 
That revised and published towards the end of 1946 
under the title O^.ch Kang Thang Tam (The August Revo­
lution) * Another series from Su That (Nos, 70-81), 
was very well publicized later in book form and entit- 
led Khang chien nhat dinh thang 15i (The Resistance 
will win).
In the army, political persuasion was empha­
sised from the very beginning of the Guu Quoc Move­
ment* A training course had been meticulously pre­
pared and published in 1945 as a. booklet entitled
* \ ft N.
Chinh tri vien trong quan doi (Manual for Political
—an Hi II i> II ill* JLIMiHUHUHHWmUWJHi^lMIIHiininnilii I «i l|i,*n» W,U»HJ.IJ ■ iV m il M*lin ^ •111............... '
Commissar in the Army* Hanoi: Trung Bac Tan Van 
Printing House)* Moreover, every unit made all its 
efforts to issue bulletins or newsletters (very often 
written by hand) to “further political education for 
all soldiers11 *
Likewise, the Association ofWriters and Artists 
had their periodical Van Hghe (Literature and Arts)s
***' i n H'H1* HTTui III II II 1.1 i "uni, f f
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the Teachers their Giao Due (Education) the studentsi f  / f,
their bich hao (wall poster) , bao bubm ("butterfly 
paper"), bao tay (hand written journal) in order to 
develop their political study according to the three 
principles "Dan t'oc „ Khoa hoc * Dai chung" (National , 
Scientific, Popular)*
For the ordinary people, a vigorous "anti™ 
illiteracy campaign" was launched to enable peasants 
to read communiques, slogans and papers* But the 
most popular vehicle for furmeling political inst­
ruction to village inhabitants was study meetings 
which later were held almost daily in those hamlets 
completely under the Viet Minh control*
Periodically, a gToup of Van-cong (mission of 
literature and arts) caimjto "entertain" villagers with 
exhibitions* plays0 songs» poems and motion pictures 
(later), all of which were politically orientated*
From the early 1950*s peasants were taught to sing 
new revolutionary songs and the young to dance to pol- 
itical tunes*
Traditionally, Vietnamese peasants have always 
loved chanting spontaneous folk songs, while baby­
sitting, working at home, on the river or in the rice 
fields* The Viet Minh cadres did not lose any time 
in exploiting those ca, ve (ballads, odes) or bn 
(sung rhymes) fox1 their work of political agitation* 
Because the overwhelming majority of Vietnamese people 
were peasants (most of them could not read too well), 
this form of propaganda reached virtually the whole 
population and proved to be highly effective in
mobilizing the masses
The art of agit-prop which had been taught by 
Lenin and Mao Tse-tung, was adroitly applied in 'Viet 
Nam by the use of trinternationalist content under 
nationalist form11 or "revolutionary message under 
traditional cover". Furthermore, a. great amount of 
Mao * s teachings could be discerned as direct3.y trans­
lated into the content of Communist political per­
suasion in Viet Nam.
The content of agit-prop.
i jiL-ii^mnMiMH w iw m w im w tfrT w n iiu jn w i.  m i i ^  n mum a - nmm ■rwifflm  .......... .
The principal purpose of revolutionary propa-
* A
ganda as summarized in the So tay nghien vu tuyen
^  i mu mumii mi iiii iiTAiimm mi.■■■■nr'Tii h i.iiin jp>mJhnnnTirn»inwiftnn im n w i i l  iiMiim imiiii
truyen (Notebook for propaganda agents) was "to make 
the people understand, believe and follow our way". 
Concerning the anti-French war, the Communist Govern­
ment took pains thoroughly to explain the duty and 
capability of the people, the full competence and 
strong leadership of the Government, to inspire the 
entire nation with total confidence in the final 
victory as the necessary outcome of the war,
A multi-aspect campaign continued relentlessly 
throughout the country for many years, using all dev­
ices to exploit every possible opportunity and to 
influence every person anywhere and at any time. One 
category of propaganda activity during the nation-wide 
war, was seen to be centred around these five general 
principles or axioms:
267.
I, Our resistance war is a 
just cause,
II. The resistance must he waged 
hy the whole nation,
III, The resistance must be total,
IV. The resistance is long lasting*
V. The resistance will win.
1. The first Axiom of Resistance:
Our Resistance War is a Just Cause 
(Chien-tranh Chinh-nghia)
wa.ng<qm m m 4i|,unu jm m i im»'ilMrTWVnpii.>iiiiHi,iw n'»'i*ii '■ m II»I«|'IU til Iiu»n.urn"  J " p m '
Since the main purpose of political propaganda 
was to strengthen the people*s motivation which could 
only spring from moral conviction, the first task was 
to give people a just cause for which they were supp­
osed to dedicate their whole lives to fight.
National independence and democratic freedoms 
were recognised as the deepest aspirations of the 
people. Time and again, the Viet Minh leaders en­
deavoured to emphasise Doc-lap, Tu-do as presented in
— 1 ■WBi.nMiMW.iimimmjimwWM * niimiiiini«i»nmif ni p «
Chapter III. Then they created a sort of sacred 
triple motto to be used as a universal letter-head and 
a permanent theme for any writing: Doc-lap. Tu-do0
Hanh-phuc (Independence, Liberty, Happiness) were in­
scribed everywhere, Once, people had appreciated 
those sacred rights and precious possessions, a cry 
against aggression or invasion would easily arouse the 
people*s holy anger and thrust them to the battlefield
From the beginning of Viet-French hostilities 
in Saigon (September 1945), Ho Chi Minh had solemnly 
declared Viet Nam's struggle as a sacred duty "for a 
just cause and for justice of the world". In Decem­
ber 1946, President Ho urged the whole nation to 
fight invasion. But, in February 1947, that sublime 
cause and noble motivation was explained in simple 
and concrete terms of the peasants1 ordinary language
Compatriots who love our country,
Why must we wage the Resistance war?
Because if we do not resist, the 
French will occupy our Country once 
more. They will enslave our people 
once more. They will force our 
people to be their coolies and sol­
diers, and to pay them every kind of 
taxes. They will suppress all our 
democratic freedoms. They will 
plunder all our land and property.
They will terrorize and massacre 
our brothers, sisters and relatives.
They will burn down or destroy our 
houses, pagodas and temples. You 
will realize this by seeing what 
they have done in Hanoi and Haiphong.
Because we do not want to be buffaloes 
and horses to the French, because we 
must protect our country, we must 
fight the French colonialists. 1
Since most Vietnamese had experienced so much 
poverty and misery under the social injustice and 
oppression of the old regime, who among them would no 
be reeply moved by such clear and stirring words?
The appeal of the "Association of Marxist 
Studies" in Su That newspaper, before the incident 
19 December 1946 had clearly distinguished the just 
from the unjust party:
French colonialists are extremely 
rapacious. Their actions are 
unjust since they serve only the 
selfish interests of a group of 
professional exploiters and op­
pressors.
On the contrary, our resistance war 
is totally just, because we fight 
in order to protect the just interests 
of a whole nation that wants to live 
a worthy life and refuses to be en­
slaved once again; because we struggle 
to defend the Preliminary Agreements, 
to consolidate the union, the friend­
ship, and the equality between the two 
nations, Vietnamese and French. 2
Truong Chinh's booklet which served as a cate­
chism of the resistance war, presented the aims of 
the war to justify it and to deduce its noble chara 
ter just as Mao Tse-tung did in December 1936:
To oppose the faithless, unjust, 
insolent behaviour of the reaction­
ary French Colonialists, the Viet­
namese people must fight!...
To annihilate the French reaction­
aries, to defend themselves, to 
defend civilization and the cause 
of justice, the Vietnamese jjeople 
must fight.
The Vietnamese people must fight 
to regain freedom and independence,
to defend and liverate themselves; 
therefore our resistance war is a 
revolutionary war, a people's war 
of self-defence, a just and pro­
gressive war .A.. 3
Later, Vo Nguyen C-iap, also following the 
teaching of Mao Tse-tung, offered more explanations 
to justify the war on the basis of a people's war:
The armed struggle of our people, 
the long and heroic resistance of 
our people..0 is a people's war.
It is so because it is an armed 
form of struggle to fulfill the 
basic duties of the national de­
mocratic revolution, to fulfill 
the basic aspirations of our 
people and our nation, and to solve 
the basic contradictions in Viet­
namese Society. 4
For theCommunists, the term nhan dan (people) 
may have a different meaning from the term dan toe 
(nation), since the latter comprises all Vietnamese 
whereas the former, understood on the basis of class 
struggle is restricted to the masses of cong-nong-binh 
(workers, peasant, soldier). That delicate shade of 
meaning was coyly hinted by Truong Chinh in 1947 while 
using the term nhan dan in its ambiguous sense to av­
oid any direct revelation of Communism:
This resistance is a people's 
war. The great majority of 
our people are peasants. Al­
most all the combatants of the 
regular army and of the guerillas 
are also peasants. Consequently, 
this resistance is in reality a
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peasants1 war 
class„ 5
Time and again, the Communist leaders repeated 
to the whole nation to inculcate into every Vietnamese 
mind that basic canon of dogma: !tA people *s war is a 
just war1 o later it was also corroborated by the 
assertion that resistance war was a necessary and 
realistic measure to destroy the root of all imperial­
ist wars and to establish lasting peace in the world* 1
For that purpose, the first requirement was to 
mobilize the whole people for the Resistance,
II. The second Axiom of Resistance:
The Resistance War must be waged 
by the entire nation 
(ifeng chi In to an dan ) .
Combining Mencious tradition of respect for people 
(dan) with the Leninist ~ Mao's concept of people's 
power, Ho Chi Minh did not let any opportunity pass 
him without emphasizing the necessity of total support 
and earnest collaboration from every Vietnamese. The 
basic principle was concisely formulated by Ho when 
he handed the Twelve Commandments to the troops:
People is the root of the country.
In the resistance war and the 
national construction, the main 
force is in the people...
A tree can last only with deep roots; 
likewise, the tower of success will 
stand proud only on the solid base of 
a united people, 7
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As early as November 1945, Chien Thang (Victory) 
the organ of the Vietnamese National Guards had pre­
pared the people with a series of articles concerning 
"Our resistance war",' "Methods of resistance", "Mili­
tary training course", "How did Chinese children con­
tribute to their resistance war"?, "Examples of re­
sistance in Mam Bo", and various slanted news sheets,
Nam Bo (Southern part of Viet Nam) had been 
names "the Bronze Wall of Viet Mam", and the resis­
tance was described inhighly emotive terras and lavi­
shed with beautiful praises that easily elated nation­
al pride in every Vietnamese readers
The bloody flag of Independence 
had been barely raised when the 
hoard of inva ing d.evils attemp­
ted to lower it in order to 
strangle our people once a.gain0
..♦Eacing the.threat of genocide, 
our compatriots did not hesitate 
to throw themselves into the 
"death field" In order to secure 
life for the present and future 
generations,, Our compatriots 
have braved all perils to main­
tain the Independence flag and 
the honour of our nation, to be 
worthy of our forefathers, to wash 
away with their blood the dis­
honourable stain of foreign dom­
ination, and to add new pages to 
our glorious national history.
Vietnamese blood has been shed*
The whole Vietnamese people lay 
down together forming an unshake- 
able fortress to break all waves 
of invasion. 8
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On the "commemoration of six months of resistance" 
(19 June 1947)9 Ho, the veteran revolutionary and skil­
ful persuader, chose to express the same ideas in 
slogan form for stronger impacts
For the whole nation of Viet Ham:
A single aspiration ; To he free 
A single will : To save the country
A single aim : To fight for Unity
and Independence
Our compatriots1 union of hearts forms 
a bronze wall round our Fatherland: 
crashing into such a wall, however 
wild and cunning our enemy may be, he 
will be smashed. 9 t
Another approach in Ohien fhang was to alert 
Vietnamese people against the danger of 11 a total 
massacre by the invading force", and to urge all 
citizens to organise such a general resistance that 
"wherever he goes, whomever he meets, the enemy will 
encounter nobody but a formidable soldier resisting 
against invasion".
Again, the slogan expert Ho preferred another
way of expressing the same idea when he sent a mess™
s *
age to the guerillas per their newsletter Quan du kiclx 
in 1949:
Let us so organise that every 
citizen becomes a fighter and 
every village a fortress,
Let us so organise that where- 
ever the enemy troops go, they 
will be harrassed, opposed and 
eliminated whereas our troops 
will meet everywhere kindness ^
and help, both material and moral.
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Since resistance was the duty of all Vietnamese,
particular works were suggested to every grouping,
11every age and every walk of life, Chinese exemplars
such as the seventy-year-old lady Trieu Thai, who by 
her courageous co-operation had earned the title 
WMother of Guerillas1* , were cited to encourage max­
imum enthusiasm in resistance, Vietnamese women 
whose activities had been traditionally restricted in­
to housework, were urged to involve themselves in pol­
itics and in resistance, following the glorious exam­
ples of the Irung Sisters, Lady Trieu, Nguyen thi 
Minh Khai, and the like,
A >
An extract from the booklet Kinh nghiem Tau 
(Chinese experience) presented the “Association of 
Chinese children for National Salvation” with their 
legendary feats during the war against the Japanese, 
Their efficient roles in different fields were explain­
ed; “Little teachers group” in the anti-illiteracy 
campaign; “Nood group";* !TG-rass clearing group” ,
“Manure Group” in the “production increase campaign” ; 
“Collection group” in raising funds for the Government; 
“Liaison group” , “Security group” , “Intelligence group” 
in helping guerillas and militiamen for national de­
fence, ,, Some precocious heroes were especially men-
A
tioned to enhance heroism. Thus one Vu-Thong, 15
year-old, was praised for “having grabbed a machine
gun from behind the Japanese lines” , and one Long-Bang, *
a 14 year-old, was given credit for “the destruction
of a Japanese airfield together with eleven airplanes 
1 ?
in i t V
Those stories were the precursors of a long 
series of publications concerning “outstanding 
individuals” , “emulation winners” and “national 
heroes” throughout the resistance war, This method 
of dien - hinh (typical exemplar) was widely applied
and proved to be highly effective in promoting active
participation in the resistance war.
When the people were sufficiently prepared to 
accept the hardships of the resistance war, Truong 
Ghinh outlined various duties for them and sternly 
warned “those who should neglect their duties” of the 
firmness of the Government:
The whole people must properly 
aim at the defeat of our enemy.
Everyone, then, must take part 
in the patriotic emulation and 
obey the decree of total mobiliz­
ation, issued by the PeopleTs
Government. At the present time,
no one is allowed to wander idly 
outside the resistance campaign.
He who has money should contribute 
his money,he who has strength 
should contribute his strength, 
and he who is endowed with mental 
power should contribute his men­
tal power.
Except some special cases, any 
citizen who reaches the legal age 
must join the army or the military 
organization in order to fulfil 
his civil duties. This is the 
moment to implement the motto 
“general resistance from the total 
population” . This is the moment 
that the rich should contribute 
rice while soldiers sacrifice their 
life, and the poor their work.
This is the moment seveifly to punish 
traffickers and profiteers or those
who evade their duties. The People * s 
Government is humane hut also very 
determined, indeed. 13
To those who were still perplexed by the quest' 
ion “peace or war?” , such a directive and style of 
the Indochinese Communist Party1s general secretary 
would suffice to provide a practical advice.
III. The third Axiom of Resistance:
The Resistance must be total
f  ^ 'V.
(Khang chifen toan diyen) ♦
All the Vietnamese people were required to take 
an active part in the resistance and to carry out the 
struggle In every field so that the enemy would be 
swamped in a hostile ocean that would make him deaf 
and blind, hungry and paralyzed, and finally choke 
him to death, as explained in Su That paper:
Our whole people must fight, 
and fight in every field: 
military, political, economic 
and cultural. No matter where 
theeenemy goes, he will encounter 
a strong resistance that will 
surround him and strangle him, 
making it impossible for him to 
survive unharmed on our land. 14-
Directing his appeals to the masses, Ho Chi Minh 
explained this multi-aspect resistance in the popular 
language of slogans:
Diet Giac Pol 
STft "GiSc" D?t
Di-gt Mgoai Xam
Let us destroy our triple enemy,
Hunger, Ignorance and Invasion.
Every Vietnamese citizen, 
without distinction of age, sex,
or status, must become a fighter 
on a front : military, economic, 
political or cultural* let us 
implement the double slogan : 
loan Ban Khang chien (Nation-wide
Resistance). ,^
Toan Dien Khang chien(All-out Resistance).
Subsequently, the Communist leaders went all 
lengths to mobilize, educate, organise, and inspire 
every citizen to contribute his best in any field of 
activity.
1) In the military field.
Because the war was essentially a competition 
between two armed forces, military struggle should be 
given primary consideration. Now, the Democratic 
Republic of Viet Nam was little more than one year old 
and its army scarcely exceeded outline on Vo Nguyen 
G-iapfs papers, whereas France was a major world power 
with a military tradition reaching bade over many 
centuries. Moreover, such outstanding generals as 
Valluy and Leclerc had organised in the capital of 
Viet Nam a military xoarade that noticeably impressed 
the inhabitants of Hanoi. Actually, most Vietnamese 
remained apprehensive of a military disaster which 
might result from the armed conflict between Hanoi and 
Paris, Ho Ghi Minh was facing the same situation Mao 
had confronted in 1937-38 when the powerful forces of 
Japan invaded China. Ho, having learned the lesson 
from M a o T s experience, began to refute 11 defeatism” and 
cited the Viet Minh experience of 1944-45 to inspire 
self-confidence to his junior comrades and his resis-
tance followers. To the military superiority of the 
French forces, Ho opposed the determination of the 
people and the skilful planning of the Vietnamese 
leaders, since the beginning the Viet Minh Liberation 
forces;
To liberate ourselves, we must 
fight the Japanese fascists and 
the French. To fight them we 
must have military forces which 
cannot be created without organ­
isation. But very necessary to 
any successful organisation, are 
planning and determination.
Formerly, in the struggle 
against both enemies, Japanese and 
French, we started from nothing, 
and yet, we succeeded in mustering 
a great force, the Liberation Army, 
to overthrow them. Today, we have 
to fight only one enemy i.e., French 
reactionary colonialists and yet we 
now have the National Assembly, the 
Government, the (Viet Minh) Front, 
the great forces of National Guards 
and militiamen, the support of 
twenty million compatriots, and 
the favourable public opinion of 
the whole world. Our resistance, 
therefore, will win, 16
The details of the military plan are beyond the 
scope of this thesis but it is useful, from the view­
point of political persuasion, to see how the plan 
was gradually presented to the people by means of 
general guide-lines which, will form the content of 
part C of this chapter.
2) In the economic field.
Following Mao's advice that "military activi­
ties without an economy will result in suicide", 
the Vietnamese Communist leaders earnestly appealed 
to the people to spare no efforts in building up a 
self-sufficient economy in order to continue a pro­
tracted war.
To stimulate the people1s eagerness in imple­
menting the Government's decision despite all the 
hardships involved, the shrewd communist persua­
ders chose to make j>eople victims of an economic 
aggression and exhorted them to counter-attack by 
building a stronger economy or to increa.se production 
by all means.
Thus, the Su That editor' sounded an alarm against 
the enemy's economic attack:
The enemy attacked us not only 
in the military and political 
field, but also in the economic 
field, for example, by blockade, 
plunder or sabotage of our supply 
lines. We, therefore, must also 
counter-attack in the economic 
field....
Our resistance against the French 
in the economic field has two 
aspects: one negative and one
positive. The former consists 
in destroying the enemy's econ­
omy while the latter is building 
ours.♦..
The upgrading of our economy should 
follow these two principles:
1. To achieve National Construc­
tion while continuing the re­
sistance war.
2. To accomplish Self-supply in 
every field. 17
3) In the cultural field.
According to the Marxist dialectic, culture is 
a reflection of economy and politics. If resistance 
is to he carried on in economic and political fields, 
naturally it should he reflected in the new culture.
Applying the usual dualistic reasoning into this 
field, Truong Chinh authoritatively advised all 
M cul tural worker s11:
Culture is also a hattle front 
of our people. Our resistance 
in this field consists in a 
double task.
Firstly, we must get rid of the 
obsurantist culture, introduced 
by French Colonialists to foster 
their invasion.
Secondly, we have to build a new 
democratic culture for our country.
Early in 1946 in his letter to the Southern Com­
patriots, President Ho had warned his countrymen of 
the "cultural invasion11 and the "psychological war" 
on the part of the French. Appealing for calm and 
prepardness, Ho reminded his people of the famous 
advice of Nguyen Trail, a highly respected scholar- 
general who successfully conducted resistance against 
Chinese invasion in the fifteenth century;
Military attack only comes 
second whereas psychological 
offensive is of primary im­
portance .
This was the reason why, in the early stages of 
the resistance war, President Ho addressed a special 
letter to the intellectuals and cultural workers in 
Nam Bo, urging them to use their pens as weapons of 
resistance;
Your pens are also effective 
weapons to fight for the right 
against the evil. Intellectuals 
and cultural workers, therefore, 
should fight as heroically as the 
combatants on the battlefield for 
the unification and independence 
of the country. 19
The following year, a national cultural confer­
ence was organised with a view to fostering the resis­
tance. A message of Ho Chi Minh suggested some con­
crete duties £>r cultural workers:
Cultural activities are destined 
not only to mobilise the spirit 
and the forces of resistance and 
national construction but also to 
inform the whole world of our 
great successes in resistance and 
national construction. Our cul­
tural men should produce worthy 
works, not only to glorify the 
achievements of our resistance and 
national construction in our time, 
but also to preserve the heroic 
examples of resistance and national 
construction for future generations. 20
But in the first period of resistance, Truong 
Ghinh, the official theoretician of the Communist 
Party, still deplored "the remnants of colonialist 
culture among the cadres and people", the "insuffi­
cient mobilization" of cultural forces, their indif­
ference or even "doubts of our final victory" and 
the lack of guidance and planning.
To correct those shortcomings, Truong Chinh 
called for "further efforts" and outlined some prin­
cipal duties in the cultural field:
All cultural workers should seek 
to glorify and regenerate the 
peoplefs collective heroism, and 
to incite maximum hatred among 
our soldiers and people against 
the enemy, thus fostering their 
eagerness to fight the enemy 
and their preference for death 
over surrender. Their work must 
aim at welding .our people into a 
single bloc in support of the 
Government, with a firm confidence 
in national salvation and persever­
ance in trials and hardships.
Their work must aim at doing what­
ever possible to dishearten the 
enemy troops making them depressed, 
and causing them to desert the 
enemy and to pass over to our 
ranks i.e., to the right path.
To achieve those aims, the editor of Su That 
suggested several means such as pictures, drawings, 
handbills, posters, fly papers, songs, dances, talks 
.,,, These measures were familiar to most Western 
Countries, but they were novelties to most people in
Viet Nam's countryside where an anti-illiteracy cam­
paign had barely started. Those people had, on the 
other hand, their traditional forms of culture which 
the Communist leaders refused to leave unexploited;
We are not afraid to use the forms 
of propaganda of the old culture 
which are very familiar to the 
broad masses and most effective 
in influencing them. The various 
styles of folk song such^as "Trong 
quan", "Quan ho-"., "H^t dam" and 
"H&t boi", for*instance,* should be 
widely'used with a new context and 
a new spirit of art. 22
That "cultural renewal", as explained by the 
Party leaders after 1956, ultimately consisted in 
"permeating the whole population with socialist 
ideas", "developing the Communist concept of man", and 
"establishing Marxism-Leninism as the ideology of the
0 *7.
whole people".
However, in waging the resistance war, the Comm­
unist Party did not wish to alienate intellectuals 
and cultural workers by such a blunt revelation. The 
Secretary General of the Party,therefore, chose to 
formulate the guiding principle for "resistance in the 
cultural field" in a very mild and attractive way:
The enemy is trampling on our 
fatherland. The whole nation 
is struggling heroically, At 
present, every cultural activity 
should be in accord with the 
slogan: "Love for the country 
and hatred against the enemy".
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4) In the -political field.
The importance of political activities in the 
resistance war was embodied in President Ho's advice 
to his military cadres:
Military science deprived of 
political training is compar­
able to a tree without roots 
which becomes useless and even 
harmful. 2 5
This is the reason why early in 1946, after the 
hostilities took place in Nam Bo, Ho Chi Minh issued 
a warning to the people:
At the present time, in addition to 
the military war, the French colon­
ialists are waging a war of nerves 
against us. Their psychological 
offensive appears in a series of fly 
papers, slogan posters, disturbing 
rumours, a whole campaign waged for 
the purpose of drowning our people 
in confusion and worry. 26
That accusation leveled against the enemy also 
reflected the plan of reaction on the part of the 
resistance government. Actually, President Ho missed 
no opportunity of giving a speech ox* sending a message 
to further the cause of political persuasion. This 
was, indeed, an aspect of his ideological conviction 
as confirmed by his own words;
Someone may say : Hmcle Ho is 
pushing arts into politics.
True, Culture and art, like any 
other activities, cannot remain 
outside but must form an integral
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27part of economics and politics. 1
The same "basic idea was given full expression 
by the Marxist theoretician when he listed the various 
political measures as required for the success of 
resistance:
The tasks demanded from the re­
sistance in the political field 
are very heavy, To fulfill them 
we must, on the one hand, consoli­
date the democratic republican 
State, invigorate the machinery 
of resistance, unify all military 
administrative, and popular organ­
isations throughout the country, 
foster the growth of all patriotic 
organisations, consolidate the 
leading organ of the peoplefs long 
resistance, and subordinate mili­
tary questions to political lead­
ership, On the other hand, it is 
our political duty to purge the 
machinery of resistance of all 
traitors, wreckers, opportunists, 
cowards, bureaucrats, militarist 
and factionalist elements, to su- 
press counter-revolutionaries, to 
kill the germs of division and dis­
ruption among the people, and to 
strive for the strengthening of 
our political rear. 28
Those political tasks were incorporated into the
ten-point guidelines, These will be presented later^
VIM
in thSa chapter together with the persuasive recomm­
endations from the Communist leaders, to secure im­
plementation of those lines. But those same tasks 
were publicised by the editor of Su That in the form 
of a Hegelian formula:
P)oan ket to an dan 
Ob lap ke thu
* Af ^Khang chien thang 151
Union of the whole people!
Isolation of the enemy!
'Victory of the resistance!
5) In other fields.
Furthermore, any activity planned by the Resis­
tance Government should be welcomed as a contribution 
to the resistance. Thus, in June 1948 President Ho 
advised people in several provinces that ,rthe main­
tenance of dikes against flodd was also a part of
29the resistance war”, J In the same vein Prime Mini­
ster Pham Van Dong four years later, alerted people 
of nthe enemy’s plan to destroy crops, bridges, dikes, 
dams and irrigation systems*’, and appealed for greater 
efforts in resistance works.
On another occasion, Ho Chi Minh endeavoured to 
relate the cultural enemy of illiteracy or ignorance 
with the invading enemy, in order to promote deeper 
aversion towards illiteracy and higher enthusiasm in 
fighting illiteracy:
Ignorance is also an enemy.
Ignorance serves as an ally to 
our invading enemy. The latter 
attacks us with brute force 
whereas the former wages an 
offensive against our spirit.
The colonialist enemy relies 
on his ally, ignorance, to
implement M s  strategy of ob­
scurantism w M l e  ignorance en­
lists our colonialist enemy to 
mistiead us into darkness.
In eliminating ignorance, our 
troops are destroying a supp­
orting force of the colonial­
ists. 30
Specialists and technicians were certainly very 
necessary to the resistance but too often they resent­
ed their loss of status to the cong-nong-binh (worker,, 
peasant*, soldier) bloc. Ho Chi Minh, however, did 
not neglect them but he even emphasized their import­
ance and assured them of the sioecial regard of the 
whole nation. Medical professionals, for instance, 
were invited"to a Conference of the Medical Corps 
(March 1948) to see for themselves the examplary in­
dustry and enthusiasm of many medical cadres or heroes 
such as Dr. Hguyen Van Thuyet, Dr. Dang Van BgU and
f v 1
Dr. Ton That Tung, and to hear the reassuring words of 
the benign Uncle:
We have two simultaneous duties: 
resitance war and national con­
struction. Consequently, special­
ists, especially in the medical 
field, will be in great demand and 
will not be superfluous. There­
fore specialities, particularly 
medicine, will be highly recognised, 
and certainly those who are practic­
ing medicine will do their best to 
satisfy the needs of our compat­
riots. 31
But the highest need which the resistance Govern­
ment was aspiring for, was doubtless a final victory
over the French. To achieve this national purpose, 
every person in every field of activity must earnestly 
co-operate with the Government and totally contribute 
to the war of resistance. Such a message v/as repeat- 
ed time and again, under every form and by every means 
to each one and all of the Vietnamese, both inside 
and outside the country. But it took the fatherly 
and persuasive President Ho, to summarize the toan dan, 
toan dien (all-people, all fields) requirements and 
various duties in his May Day message of 1949. It 
is remarkable that such an intransigeant revolutionary 
leader, on such an emotive occasion, was flexible en­
ough to address the nation in the traditional terms
-"V  .  ^
of social classification SjL, Nong, Cong. Thunng 
(Intellectuals, Peasants, Workers, Traders) with the 
addition of Binh (Soldiers):
In our country, May Day has a 
special significance....
May Day is a festival for all 
our Compatriots..,.
On this occasion, I would like 
to remind the various strata of 
our people of their main tasks 
to be fulfilled:
Binh: Soldiers should stive to 
kill many enemies, seize many 
military bases, persuade many 
enemy soldiers to desert, grasp 
their weapons, and^earnestly 
participate in the training of 
cadres and the refining of 
troops. They should make fur­
ther efforts to widen guerilla- 
war fare in the rear of our enemy
2 8 9 *
and inside their area, with a 
view to weakening the enemy and 
strengthening our forces*
2* Si: Students should he studious
and receive military training 
while specialists continue their 
research for discoveries andi 
inventions to help our army against 
the enemy, and to better the liv­
ing of our people.
Artists and writers should produce 
creative works for the mobiliz­
ation of our national spirit and 
the propaganda of our resistance 
war to other nations.
Civil servants should practice to 
the best of their abilities the 
four basip virtues cdht kiem. 
liem. chinh (industry, thrift, 
probity and righteousness).
Their work should reflect a 
fighting spirit, a scientific method 
and a democratic manner to make 
known the (Government1 s policy to every 
citizen.
5* Nong; Peasants are expected to grow
rice, grains,and"cotton sufficiently 
to provide our army and our peox>le
with food, clothing and commodities;
to protect the crops, safely to hide 
the rice and readily to supply the 
army and G-overnment Offices with 
foodstuffs; to organise fortified 
villages for resistance....
4- Cong; Workers have to manufacture
many tools and weapons to supply 
the people and to fight the enemy... 
They should safeguard the factor­
ies and sabotage the enemy1s 
economy by every possible means.
5* Thudng: Traders should contribute
to the growth of Commerce, the 
betterment of supply services, 
the sale of local products, the 
purge of black markets, and the 
stability of Vietnamese currency.
The resourceful war leader furthered the list 
with four more general duties for people of every walk 
of life in order "to push forward the struggle and to 
prepare for the general counter-offensive to win final 
victory":
For the entire people:
6. To close ranks in the broad 
united front against the enemy1s 
scheme of division. To avoid 
subjectiveness and under-estima- 
tion of the enemy. To oppose 
the tendency to compromise and 
appease.
7. To assist the army, militia and 
guerilla fighters, to protect 
secrecy for the army and govern­
ment offices; to participate in 
the detection and repression of 
spies, and the blockades of the 
enemy1s economy.
Willingly to pay taxes and actively 
to take part in the Resistance War.
9. Compatriots in the enemy-occupied 
area should organise themselves 
closely and secretly to sabotage the 
enemy in favour of our resistance, 
an^ be ready to rise up on receiving 
the order for a general counter­
offensive ,
10. Every citizen is expected to strive for 
patriotic emulation in every field. 32
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Thus, the list of ten promises of happiness 
given in August 1945 was replaced four years later, 
by a list of ten categories of duties which are over­
whelmingly heavy indeed* Both lists were highly 
persua,sive in language and people were conditioned to 
put the blame for such an onerous substitution on the 
”enemies of the x>eople” , namely "French colonialists’1 
and ’’Viet counter-revolutionaries"* Freedom, Happi­
ness” was constantly recalled to everybody by all 
audio-visual means as a necessary goal to aim for* 
That "promised land” , however, was said to lie beyond 
the indispensable triple bridge of:
Toan dan (Nation-wide)
Toan^die'n (All-out) and 
Trhdn^fTy (Long-term) Resistance,
IV, The fourth Axiom of Resistance:
The Resistance must be enduring 
(Khang chien trudng ky).
•f si.
The Chien Tliang (Victory) paper of the Viet Ham 
National Guards, No** (4 November 1945), had drawn 
experience from the Chinese resistance to explain the 
method of long-term resistance:
Long resistance consists in 
protracting the war in order 
to win the final victory. It 
does not consist in submitting 
all our forces to a decisive 
test on the battlefield in the 
early phase of the war, but
rather in fighting a war of 
attrition gradually to deci­
mate the enemy forces while 
developing and consolidating 
our main forces. The victory 
of China (over Japan) is, indeed, 
a concrete proof of the import­
ance of long-term resistance.
Plagiarising a speech of Mao Tse-Tung ("On 
Protracted War", May 1938), Truong Chinh expounded the 
strategy of protracted war in Su That paper and later 
published the revised series in form of a pamphlet:
Protracted ws,r is the secret of 
success. Why? - Because when 
we make a comparison, we see 
clearly that the enemies are 
strong but we are weak as yet; 
their country is industrial while 
ours is agricultural; they have 
airplanes, tanks, battle ships, 
whereas we have only rudimentary 
weapons. Their troops have 
been well trained and ours are 
beginners..,
In a protracted war, with our 
efforts, our forces Increase 
while theirs decrease, Their 
spirit will go lower and their 
finances will run short. As 
the war is prolonged, our people 
become more unified at home while 
abroad we win more support from’ • 
the world movement of democracy.
On the contrary, as our enemies 
continue the war, the anti-war and 
the democratic movements in Prance • 
are rising to withhold their hands.
Moreover, the revolutionary move­
ments In different French col&nies 
will require the enemies to scatter 
their forces, and on the international
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stage, our enemies will be more 
isolated, To achieve those 
favourable results, we must have 
time, Time is on our side; 
time is our master strategist if 
our people are determined to wage 
a persevering resistance, 34
After two years of war, people living under the 
Viet Minh control were accustomed to the way of life 
in a small closed world with only irone.^way information11, 
Guu Quoc, the only paper available to ordinary people, 
at the local government office, continued to publish 
news of success and victories of the guerillas through­
out the country while Zone IV (Thanh-Hghe-Tinh), a 
stronghold of the Viet Minh, was generally safe from 
any French attack (See the map of victories in Appendix 
D 2 , page 476), People were, then, conditioned to 
see a realization of the Viet Minhfs prediction.
In this favourable political climate, a message from 
President Ho, on the occasion of the second anni­
versary of the nation-wide resistance (19 December 
1946), came to many peasants as a reliable confirm- 
ation, especially when accompanied with clear figures 
and impressive statistics;
The French government has been 
overthrown more than ten times...
Each month, from 800 to 1,000 
enemy soldiers were eliminated 
by u s ...
...Their economy in our country 
went bankrupt, and decreased by 
96,97 per cent.
...The enemy forces are decreasing 
and being weakened. Their sit­
uation is comparable to the setting 
sun.
Our Resistance which did not know 
anything hut hardship in the first 
year, has made some progress in 
the second year. The third year, 
none-the-less, will bring it nearer 
to success. 35
On the sixth anniversary of the Democratic 
Republic, the hardship of war was compared to a pain­
ful operation for the cure of "colonialism disease”, 
and the long-term resistance to a recuperation period*
This "plain-folk” approach was ad.so used with a 
realistic tone in president H o Ts political report to 
the second Rational Assembly of the Viet Nam Workers1 
Party in February 1951;
The resistance war must be long 
enduring; since our territory 
is narrow, our population small, 
and our country poor, we need a 
long period of preparation and a 
preparation which involves the 
entire nation and covers all 
fields. Also should we always 
bear in mind that compared to us, 
the French enemies are quire strong 
and they benefit from American and 
British assistance*
Since they are a "thick peel- 
mandarine” weeneed time to "shar­
pen our finger nails” before 
tearing them to pieces. 37
H o !s way of using ordinary language and popular 
sayings to drive home some unfamiliar idea or strategy 
proved to be highly effective among the Vietnamese of 
whom the majority were peasants. But his personal 
ingenuity coupled with his early Chinese literary stud 
ies, was also apparent in his "politics of language” .
An example can be cited also from his 1951 political 
report;
The enemy nurtured the strategy of 
a lightning war. To their wish of 
a quick solution by swift attacks 
and sweeping victories, our Party 
and Government opposed the strategic 
slogan "Long-term Resistance".
When the enemy schemed the sowing 
of dissension among our people, we 
confronted them with the slogan 
"Unity of the whole nation".
Thus, from the very beginning, 
our strategy has prevailed over 
the enemy's. 38
Such a "witty argument" was known among Vietnamese 
as the tactic of "smoke bomb" in argumentation.
The favotirite approach of the Communist leaders 
however, remained the historical one, being convinced 
as they were, of the necessary historical development 
in favour of the proletariat. Faithful, therefore, 
to the Marxist-Leninist tradition, Ho Chi Minh skil­
fully explained the long-term resistance war to mili­
tary cadres at a political training session in 
October 1951, drawing arguments from Vietnamese history 
and the revolutionary experiences of Russia and China,
In the past, our forefathers had 
to sustain long-term resistance 
before successfully repelling the 
invaders.
Under the Tran Dynasty, resistance 
had to be endured three times in 
order to defeat the Yuen, The Le
dynasty suffered only one period 
of resistance but it took ten 
years to repulse the Ming.
ISfot too long ago, friendly for­
eign countries had also to resort 
to long-term resisrance to win 
over the invaders. Russia had 
to wage a. resistance war from 
1917  to 1922  f03? the expulsion of 
the imperialists. And then a 
struggle against the Trotskyites 
followed. Subsequently it took 
successive five-year-plans to re­
build the country.
In the second World War, Russia 
won over the German Fascists only 
after five years of war.. Like­
wise, Chins, had to endure thirty 
years of resistance war in order 
to eliminate the reactionaries in 
the country and to banish the 
imperialist invaders from outside.
Our resistance war is a contin­
uation of the August Revolution.
Just like the resistance wars of 
Russia and China, our resistance 
to be successful must be a long 
term war. 39
Fired by patriotism and hatred against the enemy, 
swept by political persuasion and the exciting atmos­
phere of new independence, new deraoca?acy and new 
leadership, Vietnamese people took part in the resis­
tance war, In fact, those who were living under the 
Viet Minh1s control, did not have any feasible altern­
ative. But human endurance always has a limit.
After a few years of war and hardship, people grew 
more and more impatient and began to raise thorny ques­
tions; How long would the long-term resitance be?
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When and how would the war end? The Resistance 
Government refused to he caught by surprise and had 
prepared some canny answer in various study documents;
Long-term Resistance may last 
five years, two years, or 
fifteen years ..♦ The most im­
portant factor lies in our unity 
and our determination. If 8.11 
the people try their best and 
enthusiastically participate in 
the emulation campaign, the war 
may be shortened and final vic­
tory will come^sooner, 40
As President Ho said; "The 
nearer.the victory, the harder 
the resistance", our people may 
have to endure more trials ...
However, if in the past few years 
we have overcome many obstacles 
and hardships. We are confident 
that we shall overcome whatsoever 
difficulty in the future. After 
all, our resistance will win, 41
V, The fifth Axiom of Resistance;
The Resistance will win 
(Khan,a; chien nhat dinh thang loi),
During the period of war, obviously victory was 
the goal set up for the resistance, the motive force 
for all activities, the 3cey note for political per­
suasion, and the core of all publications.
The topic of "confidence in final victory", was 
presented in various forms, by all media of communi­
cation, and strongly emphasised in Ho Chi Minh's
presidential message, Su That (Truth) paper, study 
meetings and especially in Truong Chinh's pamphlet;
' a' ^  <1
Klaang chien nhat dinh thang Ihi (The Resistance will 
win). Every possible means was used to inculcate 
into the mind of every Vietnamese subject the five 
axioms of resistance, of which "final victory" was the 
essential point.
That message was considered vital for the contin­
uation of the resistance war and the consolidation of 
the Government, This was the reason why some time 
after the public appearance of the Viet Nam Workers1 
Party the Communist leaders issued a highly interestin 
pamphlet, to be used as a study document for the Army 
and all the people. It's title summarizes the whole 
theme, the conclusion, and the purpose of the study
/ r ^ ^ n f
campaign; Khang chien triidng ky gian kho nhat dinh
thang lfli (The long and hard resistance will certainly
win). It could be considered a completely revised
/ ^  /
summary of Truong Chinh's booklet, Khang chien nhat 
dinh thang Idi (1947). Intended for popular use 
(many people had barely learned to read and to write), 
and written in a very simple and concise style, the 
pamphlet presented only eleven lessons in forty four 
pocket-size pages. Each lesson was clearly divided 
into two or three parts covering on average only four 
small pages, including the brief "purpose of the 
lesson" (about three lines) and the "questions foi^  
discussion".
This booklet which was a typical study document 
having all the qualities necessary to be highly effe 
tive in political persuasion, served very well the 
purpose of popularizing the five axioms of resistanc 
with a view to "mobilizing the whole population to 
push forward the resistance war until final victory" 
The outline of the document, therefore, deserves to 
be reproduced here as a sample of the literature of 
political persuasion in North Viet Nam,
The long and hard Resistance will certainly win.
Edited by the Committee of Propaganda and Education, 
part of the Political Department,
Lesson 1. Why Resistance?
1). Eighty years of oppression and exploitation 
by French colonialists.
2). French colonialists and American intervention­
ists intend to enslave our people once again.
3). Our determination in fighting the enemies to 
save our country.
Lesson 2 . Whom do we fight?
Questions for discussion:
1), Who are the enemies of our people?
2), At the present time, who is our principal 
enemy?
Lesson 3. What are the purposes of 
our resistance war?
1). To regain independence, freedom, and 
happiness for our people.
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2). To make a positive contribution to the 
defense of world peace.
Lesson 4 « Who are members of the 
Resistance?
1). All our people are fighting.
2). Working people are the main forces
(under the leadership of the "La/bour Party1').
3)* The workers1 class is the one to lead the 
Resistance.
Lesson 3. Our progress throughout 7 years 
of resistance.
1). In the military field.
2). In the political field.
3)* In the economic field.
4)• In the cultural field.
Lesson 6. The principal conditions
which guarantee the success 
of our Resistance.
1). Our resistance is a just cause, shared by 
our entire people and supported by the 
whole world,
2). Our Resistance is guided by the clear­
sighted leadership of President Ho and the 
Viet Ram Workers' Party,
3). We have a broad National United Pront.
4)* Our people's government has become better 
consolidated every day,
3). Our people's army grows stronger every day,
6), We benefit from the supx)ort of our international 
friends.
Lesson 7 « Some of our principal 
difficulties;?
Our military forces do not yet measure up 
to their combat duties.
Our production does not adequately answer 
the needs of the frontline.
Lesson 8 . The unsurmountable weaknesses 
of the French side.
Bankruptcy of French economy and politics.
Low morale among French tx'oops.
Inadequate effective force.
French lackeys are ostacized by oux* people 
and their traitorous troops have no fighting 
spirit.
Lesson 9 * Long duration and hardships of 
the re sistance war.
The resistance should be long.
The resistance should be hard.
Lesson 10. Our Resistance must be based, 
on self-sufficiency.
Self-sufficiency is essential.
a). Liberation depends upon us,
b), Help from friendly countries 
has certain limits.
Requirements for self-sufficiency'
S). Courageous fighting to eliminate 
the enemies.
b). Extensive propaganda to educate 
and to help the people.
c), G-enerous efforts in raising pro­
duction and practising thrift.
Lesson 11. The Resistance will certainly 
win.
1). Our Resistance will win because:
a). We have many basic conditions 
favourable for victory.
b). The enemies suffer unsxir mount able 
weaknesses,
2), Wrong ideas to be purged:
a). Over-optimism;
b), Pessimism and inconstancy;
c). Excessive reliance on brotherly 
countries.
Expressing the aim of the study campaign, the 
pamphlet, in its conclusion (p.41), emphasizes self- 
confidence and firm belief in the final success:
Our struggle with the enemy 
continues to be bitter and wild.
We still have to fight a long 
war and to endure many hard­
ships. But it will necessarily 
result in "victory for us and 
defeat for the enemy11, This is 
the unshakeable belief of all of us.
"Victory for us and defeat for the enemy", that 
dictum was consecrated to be an ubiquitous slogan dur
ing the whole period of war. The usual formulae of 
letter-ending such as "Chao than ai!l (Greetings of
friendship), "Chao:B&c-l£rp" (Greetings of Independence),
(Greetings of determination to win). Later, on
lay Bay 1952, President Ho offered a more explicit
slogan, culled from the revolutionary writings of
4-2 a B f
Mao Tse-tung : Ta nhat dinh thang, Dich nhat dinh
thua (We are certain of victory, the enemy of defeat),
This slogan was often repeated in various presidential
messages, in officials' and cadres' speeches; it also
appeared in newspapers, posters, streamers, signboards,
and so forth, as a constant reminder to everybody,
everywhere, that there was a just war to fight and to
win at all cost.
But fighting the war was not the onljr preoccu­
pation of the Communist leaders. While the brutal 
war and the scorched earth tactic demolished innumer­
able buildings and human lives, the Marxist promoters 
found favourable conditions to urge the abolition of 
traditional ideas and practices, then to suggest and 
foster "a new way of life suitable to the new sit­
uation". This was the programme of "new democracy" 
listed under the-head title of Kien Quoc (nation 
building), an urgent duty which required, for its 
implementation, the "ten-point guidelines" as pre­
sented in the following chapter.
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National Resistance, Nation Building, The Party, 
and the Theme of HOA-BINH. D M - O H U  
(Peace and Democracy).
In general terms, the Resistance War was declared 
a just cause which would lead to victory but required 
great sacrifice and active participation of every 
citizen in every field and for a long period.
Once those general principles were explained to 
and explicitly or tacitly accepted by the general pub­
lic, the following question was raiseds "What is 
to be done?" Any attempt to give a, comprehensive 
answer to this question would necessarily result in 
failure: a list of all the requirements of a total
and long-term war would discourage the people complet-
iy*
Communist leaders were shrewd enough to avoid such 
a psychological disaster. They emphasized instead the 
national cause of Doc lap, lu do (Independence and 
Freedom), the threat of another era of French domina­
tion with its untold cruelty and a total loss by the 
Vietnamese people of all they had achieved thus far. 
Then, were denounced the colonialist schemes of "divide 
and rule11, of "using the Vietnamese to fight the Viet­
namese", of "feeding the war v/Ith war", of "enslaving 
small nations to widen their ‘.empire", and of ^exploiting 
our people to enrich a handful of reactionary capital­
ists". .. Only when people had been moved by patriotic 
explanations and excited, by those emotive slogans,
did the persuaders suggest counter-measures to reptilse 
"those barbarous invaders", to retain national Doc lap, 
Tu do, to "close ranks behind o.ur Democratic Government 
against the Viet gian (traitors)", to "raise our living 
standard and our culture,! level", to build a new nation 
on self-reliance, to strengthen solidarity with "demo­
cratic and peace-loving peoples" in the world, and "to 
build new democracy in Viet Nam and peace in the world".
To achieve those fine and desirable goals, a vast
programme of action was consistently advocated. But
the plans, instructions, and admonitions given in so
many fidderent places, times and forms, may be fairly
summarized in or related to the following "ten-point
/ f f * 
programme" of Khang Chien, Kien Quoc (reistance and
nation-building):
I Maintaining the United Front.
II Cementing various patriotic
organisations.
III Consolidating the People's
Government#
IV Self-sufficiency.v Improving production.
VI Bettering the i^eople's living
conditions.
VII Raising the people's cultural level.
VIII Patriotic Emulation,
IX Political mobilization of the entire
people.
X Mustering international support.
This comprehensive programme provides us with a 
I1'proper context and a convenient framework in which to 
study the way Communist leaders have exhorted the 
Vietnamese people to implement their ideas and plans.
A few quotations suffice to illustrate each point of the
programme, but some complicated guidelines, deemed 
more important and emphasized by more activities and 
exhortations from the Communist leaders, are cited and 
explained more fully,
x
x x
I , Maintaining the United Front.
Following the same tactic as the Chinese Commun­
ist Party in 1935, Vietnamese Communist leaders 
decided that in the fight against "French reactionary 
colonialism" and the "domestic counter-revolutionary 
forces", the basic tactical task; was to maintain a 
broad national united front.
Applying historical dialectic to the National 
resistance of Viet Nam, Ho Chi Minh solemnly declared 
to some hournalists who came to interview him at the 
beginning of the nation-wide war:
World history and the history 
of Viet Nam have taught us:
Whenever a whole nation rises
up resolutely to struggle for
its Fatherland, no one and no 
force whatsover can defeat it.
The Vietnamese only want peace 
but, for the sake of their 
Fatherland and their nation, 
they will fight to the end, 
pushing the resistance war to­
ward final victory. 1
Time and again, H o 1s presidential messages urged 
the whole nation "to close ranks in the broad united
front" and "not to succumb to divisive schemes of
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the enemy11. “ His argument became much more con­
vincing when he cited various historic successes of 
the Yiet nation in the past, including the power 
seizure of 1945 and several victories scored against 
the French, using only rudimentary weapons:
The patriotism coupled with the 
unity of the nation is an immense 
force which no one can overcome.
Thanks to that force, our fore­
fathers have defeated the Yuan and 
the Ming to safeguard our national 
sovereignty and freedom. Thanks 
to that force, our revolution has 
succeeded in regaining national 
independence. It is that force 
which supports our army and our 
people in their resolute endur­
ance of all kinds of difficulties, 
hardships, and miseries, and in 
their determination, completely to 
eliminate the invaders. It is 
also that invincible force which 
helped us to inflict defeat after 
defeat on our enemy even from the 
beginning when we were armed only 
with sticks and rudimentary fire­
arms. 3
To drive home the idea of a powerful united front, 
Truong Chinh used the " chops tick comparison" which was 
already familiar to the people and which Vietnamese 
schoolchildren learned very early from their school 
reading books:
To continue waging this long re­
sistance war, the whole nation 
must be united and single-minded, 
our people can be compared to a 
bundle of chopsticks. If the
chopsticks are hound together, 
it is difficult for anybody to 
break them. But if they are 
separated, it is easy to break 
them all, one by one, Likewise 
our unity is so necessary to our 
resistance war, 4
The Marxist editor of Su That also hinted at the 
structure of that united front:
At home, national unity must be 
maintained; the national uniter] 
front against the French colonial­
ists and their lackeys must be con­
solidated and widened. This front 
must be built on the cornerstone of 
the worker-peasant alliance and ~ 
must be led by the working class.
That "cong - nong (worker-peasant) cornerstone1 
certainly reminded many a Vietnamese of the Nghe-An 
(Soviet) in 1930-31 and of the terror which ensued 
from it. So painful a memory filled the people with 
anxiety and fear, and gave rise to suspicions of 
Marxist atheism and objections to co-operating with a 
possible anti-religious regime, especially among 
Catholic circles.
An editorial in Su That (ho,74, 4 March 1947)? 
the official organ of the Indochinese Association for 
Marxist Studies, offered a very subtle argument in 
defence of the Marxists;
On 31 January 1947, D*Argenlieu 
(the High Commissioner of France 
In Indochina) declared opposition 
to the Marxists in Viet Kam, The 
French reactionaries are fighting
against Viet ham and yet they 
have declared war only against 
the Marxists I This confirms 
the fact that the enemies of 
our nation have a great fear of 
the Marxists who do not fall 
prey to their deception or their 
conquest, hut are wholly dedic­
ated to the interests of the 
3iatIon and the fatherland.
This defence was later reiterated by Truong Chinh, 
with the substitution of "the Viet Minh" for "the 
Marxists";
The French invaders even declare 
that they are "fighting the Viet 
Minh and not Viet Ham", But in 
reality, they are inflicting dam­
age on the lives and properties 
of the Vietnamese people without 
distinction of Viet Minh or non- 
Vi et Minh. They intend to divide 
the Viet Minh from the people, be­
cause to their knowledge, the Viet 
Minh consists of the most patriotic 
and determined elements in the 
country. They are the most faith­
ful to the people's interests ...
The French enemies know that they 
can conquer our people only if they 
succeed in isolating the Viet Minh 
and inciting the people to oppose 
the Viet Minh, 6
The question of "Catholics versus Atheistic 
Communists" constituted a real stumbling block to the 
maintenance of the national united front which was a 
vital tactic of resistance against French forces.
The issue was deemed too important to be dismissed 
easily. So, Truong Chinh reserved more than one page
in his pamphlet on the Resistance War, rhetorically 
to remove the objection and by insinuation to turn 
the tables against Catholics:
At present, the French invaders 
are striving to deceive and 
divide our people. To sow dis­
cord between our Catholic and non- 
Catholic compatriots, they order 
their agents to make propaganda 
among the Catholic patriots that 
the Viet Minh are Communists, 
that the Ho Chi Minh Government is 
a Viet Minh Government and that to 
follow the Ho Chi Minh Government 
is to follow the Communists ...
Such misleading propaganda must be 
torn to pieces. Communism is a 
doctrine that hides neither its 
ends nor its means Sic . But it 
is not our intention here to ex­
plain what Communism is. However, 
our Catholic compatriots should 
realise that the Ho Chi Minh Govern­
ment is a Government of the entire 
people, already approved by the 
Rational Assembly. Likewise, this 
resistance war is revolutionary war 
of the entire people led by our 
Government, It is not a private war 
concerning only the Communists or the 
Viet Minh Front. Moreover, the 
Communists or the Viet Minh Front are 
persuing the sole aim of gaining free- ■ 
dora and independence for Viet H a m .
This resistance will win democratic 
freedoms for our people, including 
freedom of belief and freedom of 
religion. 7
Not content to defend "the Viet Minh Front ox* the 
Communists", the ruthless Communist leader Truong Chinh
opposed the imagined objection ’’Rather lose one’s 
country than one’s G-odff with his doctrinal sermon:
’’To love one’s country is to serve 
God” * If we love our country and
serve Cod, how can we refrain from
fighting the French invaders?
Truong Chinh, then, disposed of other ”perfidious 
schemes” of division between Southerners and Northern­
ers, between minorities and the majority people, be­
tween rich and poor **•, by reassuring people of unity
and equality throughout the country, by guaranteeing 
freedom of belief, and by repeating the litany of 
promised belssings: independence, unification, freedom, 
happiness, respect for lives and property and improved 
living standards*
If "art consits of concealing art” , the tactic 
of ’’national united front for resistance” became a 
rare piece of Communist art* In 1953, Ho Chi Minh 
put a higher price on it by jubilantly declaring to 
his underground ’’National Assembly” that the mainten­
ance and widening of the National United Front made an 
essential contribution to the success of the Resistance
x
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11 * Cementing various patriotic organisations.
This plan involved two elements:patriotism and 
mass organisation* The Communist leaders took 
the initiative in arousing patriotism, emphasizing
and publicizing patriotic deeds, then seting up mass 
organisations under patriotic names to perform pat­
riotic duties. The philosophy and the methodology 
of patriotic organisations were officially explained 
by the revolutionary master, Ho Chi Minh, to the 
second national congress of the Viet Mam Workers*
Party in 1951:
Our people are imbued with a burn­
ing patriotism. This is our price­
less heritage. Today, as in the
past, whenever the Fatherland is 
invaded, their boiling patriotism 
overflows into a surging wave that 
sweeps away all dangers and diffi­
culties, and drowns all traitors 
and aggressors.
Our history has many great resis­
tance wars which give testimony 
to our people’s patriotism...
Our compatriots of today are worthy 
of their forefathers...
Patriotism is like jewels or other 
valuables. Sometimes it is 
clearly vivSible to the naked eye, 
being exhibited in a shop window 
or crystal vases. But there are 
times when it is discreetly hidden 
in a trunk or suitcase. Our duty 
is to try to bring all these hidden 
precious stones into public display, 
i mean that every effort must be 
made to give explanations, publicity, 
organisation and leadership, so that 
the patriotism of all of us can find 
expression in the works benefitting c 
the country and the Resistance War.
In addition to the various Cuu quoc (National 
salvation) associations related to the Viet Minh Front,
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new clubs or guilds, plans or campaigns were organised 
to attract more contributions to the' Resistance War:
a!  ^/Hoi Me Chien si (Association of sponsoring mothers 
for combatants), Hoi Bao tro thiidng binh (Aid for 
wounded soldiers), Hoi Bao ve Hoa binh (League for 
the Defence of Peace), Mua dong binh si (Winter 
Help for Soldiers) , Hu gao midi quan (Rice jar for 
Soldiers), and so forth. -Dang Dan Ghu (Democratic
*7 ,0  /v
Party) and Dang Xa hoi (Socialist Party), the two 
political parties formed at the instigation of the 
Viet Minh Fi*ont to be its allies and proteges, were 
also regarded as "patriotic organisations of the 
people" since they wholeheartedly co-operated math 
the Government of Resistance.
Since 1942 Ho Chi Minh had appealed for more 
adherents to the Viet Minh associations, and in his 
message throughr<the Moon Goddess” emphasized people’s 
organisations as the indispensable means to gain free­
dom and to lead revolution to success:
i *
Yda nhau xin nil6 16i nhaus  ^ _
Viet Minh hbi ay mau mau tim vao,
Muon biet^td do chay hoac chong
Phi xem to chiic khap hay khong.
Teg chuc, tuy^n truyen cang rong rai,^Q
M e  la ca'ch mang chong thanh'cong.
If you love me, please, remeber my word:
Join the Viet Minh as soon as yo\i can.
To know when Liberation will come,
See how widespread are people’s organisations.
The better organisation and propaganda,
The sooner the revoltuion will succeed.
but in 1946, when its Communist leanings were detected, 
people hesitated to join the activities of the Viet 
Minh Front, The Viet Minh Government then proposed 
a broader organisation, Hoi Lien hiep Quoc dan Viet Nam 
(the Viet ham United Association) or Lien Viet, in its 
abreviated form, to comprise all associations, groups 
and political parties in Viet Nam. As well as the 
Viet Minh or Communist officers (Ho Chi Minh: hon­
orary president; T&n Luc Thang: Vice president; Cu
Huy Can: secretary general; Tran Huy Lieu: Pham
Ngpc Thach), other men, known not to be Communists, 
were appointed to office to convey an impression of 
broad nationalism: Huynh Thuc Khang, officially a
non-party patriot, Hom^Minister in the Ho Chi Minh 
Government; Ngfe Til Ha, a pro-Viet-Minh Catholic; and 
Nguyen Tiidng Long, a "cooperative” Nationalist, This 
Lien Viet was officially declared a "non-partisan un­
ited front", formed to push forward the national re­
sistance to gain "independence and democra.cy".
However, the real aim and nature of the Lien Viet 
wererrevealed by President Ho 011 20 April 1948, in his 
letter to the Congress of the national Committee of 
the Viet Minh League:
In the period when it became 
necessary to further-develop the 
unity of the whole people, the 
Viet Minh proposed the timely 
formation of the Viet Nam United 
As?o~ciat7oii (Lien T ieT) and
assisted its rapid and extensive
growth.' By so doing, the Viet
Minh was itself further developed 
and consolidated. 11
When the Indochinese Communist Party decided to 
re-emerge under the new name of Viet Nam Workers1
A
Party (Dang Lao Long), at "the public appearance cere­
mony" on 3 March 1951, Ho Chi Minh officially intro­
duced the Party as follows:
The goal of the Viet Bara Workers1 
Party may be summarized as follows:
To unite the entire people and
serve the Fatherland.
The task of the Viet Ham Workers’
Party is resolutely to lead the 
entire people: ■ To bring the 
resistance war to victory and the 
national rehabilitation to success.
The policy of the Viet Nam Workers’
Party ... can be expressed in a few 
words: To make our Viet Ham in­
dependent, unified, democratic, 
prosperous and strong, 12
This is an attractive and persuasive summary of a 
typical official manifesto written by the Communists, 
But the true face of the "new party" was described more 
accurately only to the members of the Party in February 
1951, by the same old revolutionary leader:
As regards its composition, the 
Viet Ham Wir leers’ Party will 
admit the most enthusiastic and 
most enlightened workers, peasants 
and Intellectuals.
As regards theory, it adheres to 
Marxism-Leninism .... As regards 
its immediate goal, the Viet Ham 
Workers' Party unites and leads 
the entire people to wage the 
Resistance war to complete vic­
tory, to win back national unity 
and complete independence, it 
leads the entire people to im­
plement new democracy, and to 
create conditions for the advance 
to socialism.
...At the present stage, the in­
terests of the working class and 
other working people, and of the 
nation, are one. It is precisely 
because it is the Party of the 
working class and working people 
that the Viet Ham Workers' Party 
must be the Party of the Vietnamese
We have a great and powerful Party.
It is great and powerful thanks to 
Marxism - Leninism....
We have the most clear-sighted 
and worthy elder brothers and 
friends of mankind - comrade
Stalin and comrade Mao Tse-tung. J
It is most interesting to observe those "patriotic
organisations" being used as stepping stones leading
to the "great and powerful Party" based on Marx, Lenin,
Stalin and Mao. Prom the writings of Ho Chi Minh it
is learned that "the more the Viet Minh Front developed
1 4the more the (Communist) Party grew", and that "the
Viet Minh was further developed and consolidated" by
1 5the rapid growth of the Lien Viet, When the Lao
'.Dong Party made its public appearance in the Unification
Congress Viet Minh - Lien Viet, Ho Chi Minh apprec­
iatively told those "non-party" representatives at the
You have welcomed the report by 
comrade Truong Chinh on the 
founding of the Viet Nam Workers'
Party, You are the representatives 
of the National United Front, that 
is of the entire people. Your 
opinion is that of the entire people, 
therefore, as you have welcomed and 
esteemed the Viet Ham Workers* Party, 
we are confident that the entire 
people will also favour it. 16
This explains the importance attached to "pat­
riotic organisations of the people", the Immense in­
terests, and the tireless efforts on the part of the 
Communist leaders, in creating and activating those 
popular fronts and people's committees.
Yet, officially those patriotic associations were 
said to help the Vietnamese nation in fighting colon­
ialist invaders and defending "independence and de­
mocracy", Truong Chinh, for instance, asserted in the 
beginning of the Resistance War, that patriotic organ­
isations were Indispensable for the success of the 
total war:
The mobilization of the whole 
nation is not a special task 
reserved for the Government, 
but rather a common task for 
the £>olitical parties and the 
people's organisations. There 
fore, to have a systematic, 
strong, deep and wide mobiliz­
ation from the top to the 
bottom and from the bottom to 
the top, efforts should be 
made to organise the people 
into patriotic associations
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and democratic political parties. 
The growth of the people’s organ­
isations is a guarantee for the 
great success of the total mobil­
ization. . .
On the contrary, if the organiz­
ation of the people is neglected, 
it is impossible to mobilize the 
whole people to support the Gov- 
ernment and the army, and imposs­
ible to make the whole people par 
ticipate in the war of total re­
sistance, 17
x
x x
V/hen various patriotic organisations were well 
co-ordinated and the National United Pront emerged as 
a monolithic bloc, the Communist leaders endeavoured 
to further the consolidation of the People's Government, 
The term Peoiule (Nhan dan) became increasingly restric­
ted to the nation’s core which was "the alliance of the 
workers and peasants under the leadership of the working 
class".
Since the country was at war and national power 
was already in the hands of the Communist leaders, it 
was expedient to appeal to the nation to intensify the 
resistance war while the Communist leaders strove to 
strengthen "the machinery of resistance" i.e., the 
People’s Government, This blending of "Party tasks" 
with "nation-tasks" had been announced by Truong Chinh 
Su That and in his pamphlet "The Resitance will win":
The task of the resistance in the 
political field is very heavy.
Its fulfilment requires the con­
solidating of the democratic re­
publican State, the strength­
ening of the machinery of resis­
tance, and the unifying of all 
military, administrative, and 
popular organisations in the whole 
c o u n t r y . . 18
Another way of unifying all organisations, activ­
ities and powers, under the same "leading machinery of 
the people’s resistance" was also prescribed by the 
same spokesman of the Indochinese Communist Party:
On the other hand, all traitors, 
wreckers, opportunists, cowards, 
bureaucrats, as well as militar­
ists and factional!st elements 
must be purged from the machinery 
of resistance, counter revolution­
aries must be suppressed, the seeds 
of division and disruption among teh 
the people should be destroyed, and 
the political rear consolidated by 
all means. 19
Thus, all opponents and those who did not enthus­
iastically embrace the policies of the Government were 
crushed on the grounds that they were "national trai­
tors" , and this was "a task to be undertaken simul-
PO
taneously" with the resistance war against the enemy. "
That double task was to be carried out in a shrewd 
manner as Ho Chi Minh had advised his delegation to the 
Dal at Conference (April 1946): "there is a need for 
someone to strike and someone else to carress". Leav­
ing the unpleasant duty of striking "national traitors"
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to his lieutenants and the Gong-an (security office), 
President Ho continued his persuasive appeals con­
sistently with the respectable and benign figure of 
the "Elderly Uncle". Until December 1950, Ho f s 
presidential messages were still carefully worded so 
as to avoid any mention of the Communist Party, Marx­
ism or of any cruel, ruthless policy on the part of 
the Government. His kindliness in manner and mild­
ness in words were surpassed only by the extreme 
caution in depicting his attitude toward the enemy 
and the persuasiveness of his appeals for unity and 
co-operation with "a determined Government which Lip- 
held a just cause";
...After four years of nation-wide 
Resistance we have moved from a 
passive to an active position, from 
a weak to a progressively stronger 
status, from the defensive to the 
offensive.
fhese successes resulted from the 
heroism of our army, the enthus­
iasm of our people, the determina­
tion of oLir Government, and from 
the just cause of our struggle.
...But do not be conceited over your 
successes nor underestimate your 
enemy...
...Members of the army of mass organ­
isations, and of the administration 
must emulate in practising indust­
riousness, thriftiness, integrity and 
justice...
Our army, people, and government offi­
cials must unite and be of one mind, ^
and closely co-operate with one another.
But after the Communist victory in China and the 
establishment of its official relations with Peking 
and Moscow, the Government of IldChi Minh took a new 
turn in policy. A triumphal note pervaded H o ’s 
presidential message:
At the beginning of last year, we 
won a great political victory, the 
recognition of our Government by 
the Soviet Union, China and other 
people1s democracies, which led to 
the great victory at the Border 
and in the Midland.
At the beginning of this year, 
we won a new great political victory, 
the founding of the Viet Barn Workers1 
Party and the Viet Minh - Lien Viet 
unification: with this trend, we will
score greater military victories. 22
It was Mao Ise-tung’s victory in establishing the 
People’s Republic of China that encouraged Ho *s Govern­
ment in its expectation of victory over the French and 
served as a decisive element in the re-emergence of the 
Indochinese Communist Party even though the resis­
tance war was not yet over. In fact, the tactical re- 
emergence of the Communist Party under the ambiguous 
name of the Viet Mam Workers1 Party, and its identi­
fication with "the leading machinery of national resis­
tance" were planned to gain credit and prestige for 
the Party in the national victory over the French, thus 
placing beyond dispute the political power which was 
already in Communist hands. Phis subtle plan of op­
erations was presented by Ho Chi Minh to the Second 
Congress of the Viet Mam Workers’ Party in a very
delicate manner:
...We must have a legal party- 
appropriate to the situation in 
the world and at home in order 
to lead our people’s struggle to 
victory. Phis party is the Viet 
Bam Workers’ Party.
Ihe Viet Nam Workers’ Party must 
he a great, powerful, steady, pure 
and thoroughly revolutionary Party.
The Viet Nam Workers’ Party must 
he the clear-sighted, determined, 
and loyal leader of the labouring
class and other workers of the
Vietnamese people, to unite and 
lead the people in carrying the 
armed resistance to complete 
victory so as to achieve new demo­
cracy. 23
Once the "new party" was given the leading role 
in the "national patriotic war", the consolidation of 
the national government became the consolidation of 
the Workers* Party. Phis process required the skil­
ful combination of the two previous policies, namely 
the maintenance of the United Front, and the cement­
ing together of various patriotic organisations, A 
typical sample of H o 's art of persuasion in his polit­
ical manoeuvres to consolidate his "Government of new 
democracy" can be culled from his letter to the Second
national congress of peasants for national salvation:
Most of our people are peasants,
All enterprises must rely on 
peasants. Should the peasants 
be awakened and actively parti­
cipate, the resistance will win 
and the rehabilitation be com-
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pieted, all the sooner and only 
then can the peasants he liber­
ated* The Peasants1 Association 
for Hational Salvation must be a 
broad and well organised one, 
enrolling youth of both sexes in 
the countryside to make the 
Association larger, stronger, and 
more active. At the same time, 
we must educate its members by 
everyday practice to turn the 
Peasants' Association into a 
powerful force to implement all 
the policies of the Government p. 
and the National United Front.
x
x x
IV. Self-sufficiency.
Learning from the Ghinese experience of economic 
problems in the late 1920's and Mao Tse-tung's speech 
on the importance of economic work during the revolu­
tionary war (the speech was delivered in southern 
Kiangsi in August 1933), Ho Ghi Minh ceaselessly ad­
vised his followers always to strive for economic 
self-sufficiency throughout the resistance war. At 
the conference of military supply in 1951, Ho applying 
the "logic of resistance war", listed self-sufficiency 
as a condition of victory for the long resistance:
You well understand that the resis­
tance will certainly win, but victory 
will only come after a long enduring 
resistance. How, a necessary require­
ment of our long resistance war is 
self-sufficiency. 25
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At the conference on guerilla warfare in July 
1952, President Ho emphasized again the principle of 
self-sufficiency against excessive reliance on for­
eign aid;
The help from our brotherly countries 
is certainly important. But we must 
not remain inactive to wait for help 
nor excessively rely on other peoples.
A nation which relies on other nations' 
help, without practising self-supply, 
does not deserve its independence.
In the same vein, General Hguyen Ghi Thanh took 
pains to remove the apparent incompatibility between 
self-sufficiency and foreign aid, when he addressed 
the Army Conference on Propaganda and Training in 
August 1951:
We benefit from the aid of our brotherly 
countries but we must always keep 
in mind that our revolution is our 
own work and it consists of practis­
ing self-sufficiency while braving 
all difficulties to grasp victory■with 
our own hands. Some of us may have 
said that "self-sufficiency will ex­
clude foreign aid and foreign aid 
would dispense with the need for 
self-sufficiency". Both are cases 
of extremist thinking; the first 
assertion is an expression of stub­
born isolationism and the second one, 
of incredible laziness. Those 
muddled heads do not understand that 
self-sufficiency and international 
aid are complementary. 27
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V. Improving production.
In order to practice self-sufficiency, every 
citizen must not spare any effort in trying to raise 
production rates, This was an often repeated message 
from the Resistance Government.
On May Day 1948, President Ho urged the labouring 
people to increase production and, at the same time, 
to disrupt the economy of those areas occupied by the 
enemy;
Our labouring compatriots throughout 
the country must strive to be exemp­
lars in improving production in every 
field.
Our fellow workers in the enemy 
occupied areas must strive to 
paralyze the enemy’s economy.
Compatriots on this side should vie 
with one another in economic con­
struction whereas compatriots on the 
other side do in economic destruction, 
and both sides should compete with 
one another in setting high records.
In this way, workers in both the 
free and the occupied areas, are 
participating in the resistance war 
and in the patriotic emulation, and 
are rendering service, therefore, to 
out fatherland.. This constitutes a 
step forward for the victory of our 
resistance war, the unification and 
independence of our country, and the 
liberation of all our working com­
patriots. 28
Since Viet Ham was mostly an agricultural country, 
production during the resistance war consisted almost 
exclusively in the cultivation of land. The Govern­
ment, therefore, decided to exploit all the capabilit­
ies of the peasants by an emulation program in agri­
culture. Naturally, the resistance war was appealed 
to so as to endow this campaign with a sense of pat­
riotism and urgency. In February 1951, President 
Ho also applied his "logic of chain reaction" to 
promote this campaign among peasants;
Since the inauguration of the "all 
people cultivate" movement,,every­
body has been making great efforts 
to compete with others in the culti­
vation of land. Thanks to the 
movement, last year even though our 
country had to suffer natural cala­
mities (flood and drought) and much 
destruction from the enemy, there 
was sufficient food for our people 
and our army which scored great 
success.
This year since the resistance war 
is achieving far greater progress, 
we have to strive for more abundant 
food.
To win moi'e victories, our soldiers 
and our people must eat their fill, 
which requires an abundance of food.
Hut to produce more food, we must 
cultivate more and work hard in man­
uring and weeding,
"Abundant food produces a strong 
army", As the fighters at the 
front emulate in killing enemies and 
scoring exploits, our compatriots in 
the rear must emulate in improving 
production.
The ricefields are battlefields 
Ploughs and hoes are weapons 
The peasants are fighters,
'The rear competes with the front* 29
To set a good example to the people, Uncle Ho 
joined the peasants in pushing the plough through 
muddy ricefields and planting young trees in some re­
mote villages* The propaganda service did not miss
the opportunities to take and piiblish pic turves of "the
zn
Uncle cultivating land"*
Prom the early days of the Viet Minh Front, the 
betterment of people's living conditions, was promised. 
The ten-point domestic program of the Viet Minh Govern­
ment publicized in August 1945 presented more detailed 
promises, instilling high hopes into every Vietnamese 
and every grouping.
In October 1945? not long after the power seizure, 
the revolutionary leader Ho Ohi Minh gave evidence of 
his enterprise in issuing to the people’s executive 
committees at all levels a special message emphasizing 
their duty of "serving the people’s interest" in order 
to "win the people's confidence"!
Our Government has promised the 
people that it will do its best 
so that every citizen may enjoy 
his share of happiness. In the 
building of our country, the 
things to be restored will have
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to be restored slowly,., But from 
the very beginning, we must correctly 
follow our guiding principles,
, . , We must exert ourselves to do 
whatever is of benefit to the 
people,
We must love them so that they 
may love and respect us* 31
This particular concern about the welfare of the 
people was apparent in H o 1s appeals to fight famine 
in 1945? to fight flood in June 1947? to increase pro- 
duction from 1947 onwards, and so forth* It was
officially stated as a Government policy on 1 January 
1946, and compassionately expressed in H o 1s letter to 
evacuated compatriots in February 1947*.
The Government and I worry for the 
welfare of our compatriots every 
minute. We live amid hardships 
now? but we willingly endure them 
together, When oux* resistance is
victorious? our independence achie­
ved? we will enjoy happiness to­
gether, 33
On 2 September 1947? however, while the Vietnamese 
people were enduring the hardships of the war? President 
Ho already reported in glossy terms the Government’s 
achievements in the economic field:
Together with the people? the 
Government has repaired the 
dikes? increased production? 
abolished poll-tax? decreased 
other taxes, saved people from 
starvation? and improved the 
people's living standard, 34
Some three months later (19 December 1947) Ho 
made a revealing statement about the spirit of "shar­
ing" and "belonging" of the Resistance Government:
Our Government has gained more 
prestige and support because it 
is a Government determined to wage 
the Resistance war, a Government 
of broad national unity which 
shares its subjects’ misfortunes? 
a Government belonging to the 
people* 35
This subtle blending of national government with 
the Communist Party which remained partially hidden 
behind the facade of a national united front, was also 
to be found in a cleverly contrived land reform.
Even though a radical, agrarian revolution had 
always been a crucially important item of the Comm­
unist agenda, the Central Committee of the Party deci­
ded, in 1945 to replace the slogan of agrarian revolu­
tion with the slogan of "reduction of land rents and 
interest rates", so as to maintain intact a broad 
united front for the democratic bourgeois revolution 
and the power-seisure.
likewise, during the resistance war, the Communist 
leaders preferred to carry out partial land reforms, 
step by step, in order not to alienate some potentially 
troublesome segments of the population, such as the 
landowners, the bourgeois, and the religious groups. 
They also found it politic not to proclaim land re­
form as a major policy of the Government from the 
beginning. It was touched upon as a humanitarian mea­
sure to alleviate the suffering of the poor peasants,
under the unchallengeable policy of nimproving the 
people’s living conditions” *
Subsequently, the Party Central Committee method™ 
ically reaffirmed, in January 1948, the ”anti-feudal 
task” alongside the uanti-imperialist task” of the 
revolution* It prescribed, however a gradual, caut­
ious, and flexible implementation of land reform, as 
stipulated in the Central Committee's instructions:
”Gradually to limit, by reforms, 
the exploitation by feudal land™ 
owners (for instance, by reducing 
land rents), at the same time, to 
bring about changes in the system 
of land ownership (as far as this 
measure does not harm the anti- 
colonialist National United Front).
The concrete measures for implementing the agrar­
ian policy decided by the Party in 1948, the Governm­
ent decrees in July 1949, February 1950, March 1952, 
concerning the red^^ction of land rents, the temporary 
confiscation and distribution of land., the rise of 
Communal lands, the system of agricultural taxes, pro­
mulgated in 1951, and the five drives of laiid reform 
from 1953 to 1956 were all put forward as contributions 
to the improvement of the peasants' standard of living, 
to the national increase of production, and also to the 
success of the national Resistance.
This tactic was embodied in the new foimiulation 
of the Communist Party’s ’’thesis on the agrarian ques­
tion” issued in November 1953:
In order to improve the living condi­
tions of the peasants and to mobilize
all the material and human resources 
so as to carry on the long-term 
Resistance, defeat the French Imper­
ialists and American Interventionists 
overthrow the puppet administration 
and completely liberate the country, 
and in order to liberate the produc­
tive forces in the countryside, in­
tensify agricultural production and 
pave the way for developments of 
industry and trade, which is necess­
ary for carrying on the Resistance 
and rebuilding the country in the 
future, it is necessary to abolish 
the systems of colonial land owner­
ship in Yiet Nam, abolish the system 
of feudal land, ownership, and bring 
into being the system of land owner­
ship by the peasants* the land being 
given to those who work on it. 37
It was understood (and confirmed by later pub­
lications) that a radical land reform had "no other 
aim than the total overthrow of the oldest ruling class” 
and that there existedc*no way to break the feudalists' 
reaction other than the use of violence” . Persuasion 
was deemed ineffective, partial and gradual reforms in­
sufficient. To reinforce the "revolutionary violence” 
which had been applied through the administrative 
measures decreed by the "people’s revolutionary power", 
i ee., the Resistance Government, theCommunist Party 
decided to use "the force of the revolutionary masses" 
by an "all-out mobilisation of the peasant masses" for 
carrying out land reform.
However, theYietnamese peasants were deeply rooted 
in their traditions, including the Confucian traditions 
of Kindness„ Faithfulness» Courtesy. Reasonab1eness
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(Khan, Nghis^, I/e, Tri), and the Taoist traditions of 
Respect for and Harmony with Nature. It was small
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wonder that generally they were easily satisfied with 
the basic necessities of life and normally shrank from 
the px’ospect of violent struggle. Even though land 
reforms were officially declared, time and again,
"a means of improving the people1s living conditions'1, 
peasants were reluctant to join class struggle and’ to 
overthrow social order. The Communist authorities 
decided, then to sweep away those traditons of "obscur­
antism", -to awaken the peasants to their own interests, 
to organise, and to lead them to the struggle accord­
ing to the Partyfs policy of agrarian revolution. This 
rationale of the all-out mobilisation was formulated 
by Tran Phuong in a Hanoi publication:
The Vietnamese peasants are ardent 
revolutionaries £sic]. However, 
as the national struggle was always 
on the foreground and the peasant 
struggles did not have the appear­
ance of a class struggle, their 
class consciousness was obscured.,.
The peasants were often under the 
influence of landowners, especially 
of those with whom they had ties of 
kinship or religion; others were 
prisoners of the feudal ideology, 
of superstitious or defeatist ideas, 
and believed that "people are born 
rich or poor",.♦. To engage them in 
the anti-feudal struggle, it was 
therefore necessary to free them 
from all those chains, to instill 
class consciousness into them, to 
awaken them to their class interests, 
to the necessity of opposing the 
feudalists, to make them aware of 
the matchless strength of their
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class and the worker-peasant 
alliance5 in a word, it was 
necessary to awaken their con­
sciousness and then to organize 
and lead them to the struggle 
in a systematic way and accord­
ing to the working class political 
line.... 38
Such an operation was euphemistically termed 
"liberation of the peasants” or 1 democracy for the 
peasants” and was essentially related to "national 
liberation” and "democracy for the people” . 'Thus, 
the peasant question was prompted as a national ques­
tion, class struggle cunningly combined with national 
struggle, and the Party’s interests with the people’s 
interests. It is no longer a secret that this kind 
of clever combination was 1 the key to success” in land
*5q
reform, ”a success of strategic significance”.
It was President Ho who outlined the plan of oper­
ation to the Labor Party in Pebruary 1951:
Concerning land policy, in the free 
zones we must strictly carry out 
reduction of land rent and interest 
rates, confiscation of lands... to 
temporarily distribute them to the 
poor peasants and the families of a 
soldiers, with a view to improving 
the living conditions of the peasants,
ing their force for the Resistance War. ^
After nearly three years of implementation of 
land reform under the watchful eyes of the Government, 
it was also Ho Chi Minh, the founder and supreme leader 
of the Indochinese Communist Party, who expounded the 
significance of land reform in more revealing terms.
The key to the victory of the 
Resistance lies in the consoli 
dation and broadening of the 
National United front, in the
peasant alliance and the people's 
power; in the strengthening and 
development of the Army, in the 
consolidation of the Party and 
the intensification of its leader- 
fields Only a mob­
ilization of the masses for the 
purpose of land reform enables us 
to fulfill those tasks with success* 41
VII, Rai
In the political field, the politi­
cal and economic power in the 
countryside will be in the hands of 
the peasants, the people1s demo­
cratic dictatorship will be carried 
out genuinely... 42”
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level,
This programme was applied in three main fields 
popular education, general education and cultural 
activities.
1. Ihe first field :ation (Binh dan hoc
vu), consisted of helping the illiterates to learn 
reading and writing, then to receive complementary 
education (Rfo tuc binh dan)* Ibis kind of activity 
was declared as going justice "to the poor peasants who 
were for a long time victims of colonialist-feudal 
oppression and exploitation. Predictably, it was met 
with a great enthusiasm and produced concrete results 
which were found as attractive as the declared purposes
of the program itself: thousands of Vietnamese
peasants being able to read and to write for the first
S . '
time, proudly shed the ignominious label of mu clrd 
(literally letter-blind,^or illiterate).
The anti-illiteracy campaign had far greater effects 
by virtue of the fact that it opened new horizons and 
conditioned the peasants to adopt new attitudes, new 
practices contrary to their old traditions of ethics 
and socio-politics. At this conjunction, compliment­
ary education was introduced to whet their appetite for 
learning and accepting new ideas and new roles, as they 
had been thrilled by their ability to read slogans and 
public notices in their villages. Moreover in the 
prospect of other potential abilities, they were pro­
mised of a prominent role in the continuing revolution, 
with more economic and political powers.
From the very beginning of the campaign against 
illiteracy, the peasants were given strong motivation 
by an inspiring appeal of President Ho (8 September 
1945) wherein national struggle and future happiness 
were emphasized:
Formerly, during the period of their 
domination, the French colonialists 
applied a policy of obcurantism.
They limited the number of schools, 
wishing to keep our people illiterate 
the more easily to deceive and to 
exploit us.
...Now as we have won our independence, 
one of the most urgent tasks to be 
accomplished at present is to raise the 
people's cultural level.
...If you want to maintain inde­
pendence , if you want to make our 
people strong and our nation 
prosperous<, ever Vietnamese must 
know his rights and duties, enrich 
himSelf with new knowledge in order 
to he in a position to participate 
in the building of our country, but 
first of all he must know how to 
read and write the national script. 43
A sequal written by Nguyen Khanh loan, the party 
member who really directed the Ministry of Education 
(though the non-party Nguyen Van Huy&n bore the off­
icial title of Minister) proved to be more explanatory8
The anti-illiteracy movement is of 
great importance in a country like 
ours, But it auras higher than the 
eradication of illiteracy itself.
By wiping out illiteracy, it helps 
improve the cultural level of our 
people, without which national re-^, , 
construction would be impossible.
First of all, this mass of illiterate 
people had to know how to write and 
read. Once that power was in their 
hands, they would become the ma.sters 
of their lives. For them, educa­
tion was a necessary means to raise 
the level of political consciousness 
enhance their ardent patriotism and 
increase their revolutionary activi­
ties, help them take a real part in 
the management of public affairs, 
consolidate Independence and accom­
plish national renovation. 45
Throughout the period of resistance war, "each 
anti-illiteracy class11, said President Ho, nmust become
a centre of p r o p a g a n d a  for the patriotic war11, However
it did not stop there* Since nthe fight against 
illiteracy was first of all a political work'1, it was 
strictly designed to serve the revolution according 
to its successive stages, ^
General education: Early in 1947* after leav­
ing Hanoi for the jungle to wage the resistance war, 
the Ministry of Education received precise instructions 
from the resourceful revolutionary leader, Ho Chi Minh, 
concerning the reform of education.
The first stage of reform (1947-49), termed Ren 
can Chinh c5 (Training cadres and readjusting organ­
isations) , consisted of laying’ foundations for strict 
organisation and control in schools.
The second stage, Iipc tap dan chu (Democratic £> tudy), 
(1950-51)? trained teachers in the educational methods 
of "new democracy" and recast the curricula of educat­
ion with a "national and democratic content", emphasi­
zing patriotism, spirit of independence, national 
solidarity, hatred against feudal oppression and colon­
ialist agression, love for collective labour and labour­
ing people,., The third stage (1952-54) was a radical 
transformation, called Cai tao til tu\3ng (thought reform) , 
whereby "educational workers" were expected to be 
completely remoulded in "the ideology of the working 
class". Such a new educational system, "popular and 
democratic", was given three clearly-defined duties:
To mould the young renerations according to the new, 
progressive ideology ofthe "democratic camp headed by
the Great TJ.S.S.E."; To improve the cultural stand­
ard of the working people and to achieve a gradual 
cultural revolution; To train cadres !tto serve the 
Revolution and revolutionary people” .
Since education was considered a battle-front 
during the Resistance War, various slogans in schools 
pointed to the close relationship between school and 
life, study and resistance, education and revolution:
To study is to wage resistance 
against aggression.
To combine theory with practice,
To study well, is to serve the 
people.
To relate knowledge to real life.
Every class should be a propaganda 
centre for the resistance.
The road on which education had embarked was 
praised as the "right path" and described, in flowery 
terms:
Born amidst the fire of decisive 
struggles, Vietnamese education 
has taken the right -path--: it is 
truly national""and genuinely demo­
cratic, An offspring of the 
Revolution, it must serve first of 
all the Revolution and the revolu­
tionary people. 47
Obviously, during the Resistance War, the political 
revolution continued in every single field, inclusing 
the field of education which was called "a powerful 
tool of revolution". The report on fifteen years of 
education in North Viet Ram, published under the name 
of Eguyen Van Huyen, described that constant and firm
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revolution under the leadership of the Party, as having 
two principal aspects:
That educational revolution was 
achieved under the guiding prin­
ciple that education must serve
politics or, to he more specificwm niu inw um m n II * JL
the resistance war and production. 
In order to purge the schools of 
all remnants of imperialism, a 
timely implemented resolution was 
the reform of old teachers and 
the formation of new teachers, 
constituting a corps of engineers 
of mind, armed with the ideas of 
nation and people1s democracy.., 
Such revolutionary education came 
to terms with the interests of 
the masses, and hence was whole­
heartedly supported by the masses 
who in turn contributed materials, 
work and experience to foster the 
constant growth of education. 48
The important role of the teachers was readily 
acknowledged by the Party and the Government:
Teachers are brain workers, 
entrusted with the duty of edu­
cating and forming young men 
and children to become socialist 
workers, ready to defend the 
Fatherland, eager to co-operate 
in the building of a peaceful, 
unified, independent, democratic 
and prosperous Viet ham. Teachers 
are constantly fortified in poli­
tics, professional training, and 
culture, with a view to fulfilling 
the above mentioned duty improv­
ing the quality of their work, and 
making continuous progress in their 
profession. 49
In order to arouse the enthusiasm of teachers and 
to encourage them to participate, together with stud­
ents and parents, in the politica.l and social activi­
ties in their localities, the cadres of the Party and 
the State endeavoured to implement the "policy towards 
teachers" which consisted of "respecting teachers, im­
proving their system of work, raising their living 
standard", and so forth. But at the same time teachers 
were required to take part in study sessions, local 
meetings, and national congresses, for the purpose of 
purifying and transforming .themselves into "new men", 
"new workers'1. A mild reminder for teachers came 
from President Ho Ohi Minh, in his message to the 1951 
National Educational Congress:
At this Congress you must review 
in detail the reform of our educ­
ational programme and its method 
of application In order to correct 
your mistakes and develop your 
good points.
See to it that education is related 
to our people*s life, to our Re­
sistance War and nation-building.
Endavour, therefore, to co-ordinate 
schooling with the common work of 
political propaganda and education 
of the people. 50
Realizing the difficulty of transforming old 
teachers with bourgeois backgrounds, the Government 
and the Party officials concentrated their efforts on 
forming a new generation of students according to the 
party line.
To serve the Resistance War and the revolutionary 
people, students had to divide their day into two halves
half a day was devoted to study and the other half to
production and defence work.
In 1951? students in secondary schools were
trained and encouraged to give periodic evaluation of
their teachers based on the criteria of rtteaching 
contents teaching method, and political standpoint11.
In the following years, strictly organised and 
entrusted with a measure of political power, students 
formed people1s courts to pass sentence on "reaction­
ary elements", either teachers or students. The 
tumultuous trial of Einh Thitc, a sixth former at £>au
w t
Quang linh Secondary School, was an outstanding exampl 
of what was happening everywhere.
Only much later (1965) was a comprehensive ex­
planation given in an official publication entitled 
Education in the Democratic Republic of Viet Nam (pp,1 
1 1 ):
Events of the national liberation 
war had s. profound impact on school 
education. In 1953? when the 
peasant masses were mobilized for 
land reform, education received a 
new impetus. The national anti- 
imperialist struggle combined with 
the anti-feudal fight gave teachers 
and -pupils the opportunity to steel 
themselves in a fiece and complex 
class struggle. The years of
imm i ri ii.Mi 11 iii 11 ■■ «TrnTw 111 h . i  nimiiiiii n w iiViifi iii "in in nmriiiiMiii *-*
Resistance regenerated the content 
and methods of education. Marxism- 
Leninism became the official doctrine 
which breathed dynamism into the whole 
of our education system while ensuring 
for it a scientific character, War 
had by no means paralyzed our efforts 
in the field of education; when peace
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returned, we were ready for new 
progress i.e. Socialism ,
Since the final purpose and duty of education is
"to form fully developed men, those workers who are to
51build Socialism", the efforts in the educational 
field had been aiming at:
An education which will material­
ize the teaching of President Ho,
- namely that "intellectuals should 
be transformed into peasant-workers,■ 
and peasant-workers into intellec­
tual s" thus creating a large troop 
of new intellectuals, new workers 
who will be ardently patriotic and 
faithful to socialism, 52
3, The third part in the programme of "raising the 
people's cultural level" consists of cultural activi­
ties and cultural workers.
The first important document promoting the 
"Hew Culture of Vietnam" was the proclamation of the 
Cultural Thesis, signed by Truong Chinh in 1943. It 
pointed to various weaknesses of the contemporary cul­
ture in Viet Nam (feudal influence from France, fascist 
influence from-Japan, separation between theory and 
practice, "superstition, hope in God or Buddha", "wrong 
tendencies of art for art's sake, of super-realism", 
divorce from the masses criticized the then
famous cultural groups of Tri Tan, Thanh Nghi. merci­
lessly attacked the Han Thuyen group (of Trotskyte 
tendency), and raised three attractive guiding princ­
iples in slogan form: Ban toc, Khoa hoc, -Dal chung 
(National, Scientific, Popular), This whole document 
was a close adaptation of Mao Tse-tung's "The culture
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of New Democracy^ which was completely unto own in 
Viet Kam. It made a deep impression on some profess­
ors , students, and writers, such as Dang Thai Mai,
Hoang Minh Hiam, Nguyen Dinh Ihi, Nguyen Hong, lam Gao..., 
and thus succeeded in propagating revolutionary and 
Marxist ideas through 11 culture11 and "democracy" as 
Truong Ckinh has written in the conclusion:
The movement of a new culture 
for the Vietnamese nation is an 
integral part of the general 
movement promoting the anti* 
imperialist and anti-feudal 
revolution of the Vietnamese 
people in this period. It is 
inseparable from the movement 
of national salvation and lib­
eration of the Vietnamese 
people under the leadership of the 
Indochinese Communist Party. 54
Those ideas were later developed in a paper delivered 
by Truong Chinh at the second national congress of cul­
ture (July 1948) and published as a pamphlet the follow- 
55ing year. This paper asserted that the working
class was the most revolutionary class and that its 
interests coincided with the interests of the Vietnamese 
nation, andit invited all "Vietnamese cultural combat­
ants" to join the "national united front for independ­
ence and unification" headed by the workers who had
been the voluntary pioneers.
Anticipating the excuse of those intellectuals who
were enthusiastic about fighting colonialism as nation­
alists but not as Marxists (men such as Tran Trong Kim, 
Nguyen Van Sam, Nguyen Van Luyen, Hoang Xuan Ilan,.,), 
Truong Chinh resorted to sophistry, which is known 
among Vietnamese as "a smoke bomb in argumentation":
3 4 7 #
Cpi we struggle for our nation 
simply on a nationalist stand­
point? No* pur country is ;a 
country of democracy, and fur­
thermore, of new democracy.
It is not a false democracy in 
which a small minority practices 
oppression and exploitation 
against the great majority* It 
is rather a people’s democracy 
wherein the people (i*e., the 
majority) get the upper hand oyer 
a number of foreign invaders and 
Viet traitors (i*e*, the minority)*
We cannot struggle only for the 
country and nation, while standing 
against democracy...
The cultural combatants of our 
country, just as the progressive 
cultural combatants throughout 
the world, being faithful to the 
Fatherland, will naturally join, 
and must join, the ranks of the 
new democracy’s forces in the 
world, to fight against all im- 
perialist and colonialist forces.
Later, after introducing the materialist and the 
historical dialetics of Marx as the most effective way 
to serve the people, the nation and mankind, Truong 
Chinh proposed ’’the most revolutionary cultural stand” 
as based:
Socially on the working class 
and the labouring people)
Politically on new democracy and 
scientific socialistic*
Idealogically on dialectical 
materialism and historical 
materialism;
and on socialist realism for c7 
literary and artistic creation* 01
I3 4 8
In the last analysis, the three principal 
characters of the "National* Scientific* and Mass 
culture" were interpreted as positively to acquiesce 
in accepting the new democratic leaders of the "national 
United Front", to accept " scientificaMarxisia" as the 
compass of life, wholeheartedly to love and to serve 
"the people" i.e., the worker-peasant-soldier "bloc*
"This was", asserted Truong Chinh, "the tfight 
attitude and the secret of success for us, cultural
Pj8
combatants"*
Answering those who would like to specialize in 
cultural activities without embroiling themselves in 
partisan politics, Truong Chinh vehemently argued with 
the authoritarian tone of a political dialecticians
Propaganda is also a kind of 
art. The art of propaganda is 
an integral part of art in gen­
eral* Conversely, every work 
of art has more or less propa­
gandist effect*.. Propaganda, 
when it reaches a certain level, 
becomes art. On the other hand, 
when art is realist to a certain 
degree, it becomes clearly propa­
gandist. It is possible there­
fore, that certain propagandists are 
not, or not yet, artists; however, 
it is impossible to have artists cq 
who are entirely non-propagandists.
To those who maintained that art must be concerned 
with truth whereas propaganda would not be always 
truthful, Truong Chinh opposed a dialetic retort:
3 4 9 .
The art which serves a just 
cause is truthful* The art 
serving an unjust cause is 
untrue or not really art at 
all. So likewise there are 
two kings of propaganda: 
the propaganda of the invading 
or reactionary side is untruth­
ful whereas the propaganda of 
the party which upholds a just 
cause is clearly truthful. 60
In the same vein, President Ho’s letter to the 
cultural workers and intellectuals of Naa Bo on 25 May 
1947f reminded them that "their pens could serve as 
sharp weapons in their struggle to uphold the good 
against the evil".
To sharpen their weapons and to tighten the assoc­
iation of artists and eJlltoirai workers, the Government 
organised the second national conference for culture 
in July 1948, an exhibition of paintings in December 
1951. and so forth. On no occasion did President Ho 
neglect to send them a message urging upon them stronger 
links with the broad masses, and advocating a "solid 
political stand" and a "correct ideology".
After a few years of resistance war under the 
leadership of the "vanguard class", and of submission 
to the art of propaganda which constituted a part of 
the Culture of New Democracy", it was practical for 
every Vietnamese in the "liberated zones" to accept the 
official teaching that "culture must serve politics". 
There was practically no possible distinction between 
culture and ideology* new education and thought-reform* 
democratic study and Party training. It was, then,
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perfectly expedient to organise discussion groups, 
study weeks, training sessions, and ideological re­
moulding courses for the purpose of "raising the people's 
cultural level" or "further advancing towards final vic­
tory" .
Most outstanding and typical for specific group­
ings were the three ideological remoulding courses 
organised:
a). For Party members and cadres in May 1952;
b). For office workers in June 1952;
c). For brain workers in July-September 1952.
a). To the Party cadres, Ho Chi Minh, the father and 
the supreme leader of the Party, confided in an atmos­
phere of secrecy the real purpose of the whole"cultural 
programme and the full significance of the "training 
course":
The aim of the ideological remould­
ing of the Party is to raise the 
ideological and political level of 
the Party cadres and members to 
enable them to act in accordance 
with the proletarian viewpoint and 
standpoint.
If the Party ideological remould­
ing campaign is successfully carried 
out, it will develop our success in 
the military, political and economic 
fields.
It is through this campaign that the 
Party tempers, readjusts and strength­
ens its ranks to keep up the long 
Resistance War until victory...
When this course is ended, you must 
compete with one another to help
the Central Committee carry 
out the ideological remoulding 
of the whole Party and the 
whole army, and improve your ,* 
work among the broad masses.
b). To the office workers, i.e., administrative 
officials who were not necessarily Party members, ' 
was at pains to explain in non-communist terms the 
"Why" and the "How" of the remoulding courses:
Why must we remould our ideology?
It is because many cadres do not 
have a firm political stand nor 
a clear ideology. This is the 
cause of their many shortcomings:
- They have not yet implemented the 
national democratic revolutionary 
line, not firmly grasped the pol­
icy of long-term resistance, self- 
sufficiency and self-supply;
- They have caught many diseases: 
individualism, concern for per­
sonal and. family interests,... 
waste, corruption, bureaucracy, 
commandism, and so forth.
How must ideological..remoulding be 
conducted?
Ideological remoulding aims at 
raising the cadres1 revolutionary 
ideology, strengthening their 
political stand, cleansing them 
of their mistakes, and developing 
their good points. To achieve this, 
we must:
- Broaden democracy, apply sincere 
self-criticism and frank critic­
ism;
- Repress the reserved and. sub­
servient attitude of lower levels 
towards higher levels, of the 
workers and peasants towards the
352.
intellectuals, and between the 
cadres within and without the 
Party.
After asking the cadres in charge (high,Party 
officials) frankly to guide the' courses, and the 
participants resolutely 1 to study and transform them­
selves", Ho voiced his. wish for more efficiency in 
their future "glorious" missions:
You are the cadres who have taken 
part in the Resistance and in the 
Revolution, you have many oppor­
tunities to„make progress and to 
enjoy a glorious,.future. I hope 
that you will do your utmost to 
study in order to advance steadily, 
to serve the, resistance and the 
•people with all your hearts and 
souls, and to. fulfil your task, 
especially the task.of promoting 
the masses to carry out land re- 
.form so as to become exemplary 
cadres. 62
Some examplary cadres were there already through­
out the remoulding course, to help create a serious 
atmosphere, to exercise some psychological pressure, to 
remind the participants of their mistakes, and to set 
an example in "frank criticism and sincere self-critic­
ism". Christian participants who had undergone 
thought-reform, later described it as Marxist "inten­
sive retreat", "brain-washing.cursillo", or likened it 
to the Catholic practice of confession with its five 
procedures; examination confession (public in the 
Marxist case), contrition, resolution, and penance.
An outstanding example of theft contrite penitent"
after such an effective process of "washing away 
mistakes" was Phan Ke Pqai who had served as royal 
delegate for Bao Dai in Hanoi until the Viet Minh 
§ei^ed *khe power* Because of his complete submiss­
ion to the new rulers, Poai was allowed to survive and 
to assist at the Home Office. dBater, Toai in a 
session of thought-reform, made a public confession 
in which he stated he had advised the Prench Commiss­
ioner at Vinh Phuc Yen to imprison the local herb-
/V a  ** 6  ^physician -Do Prong Nham alias Xuan Phuy. J
Phis kind of concrete result of criticism and 
self-criticism was further obtained at the ideological 
remoulding course organised for brain workers from 15 
July to 26 September 1953*
c). Phe Communist leaders considered intellectuals 
as Jlprecious capital". Phe remoulding course for 
intellectuals was, then,* carefully prepared and carried 
out with caution.
Ho Chi Minh, himself, the veteran revolutionary 
leader graduated from the Lenin University for the Par 
last, personally assisted the guidance of the course 
and delivered at its closing ceremony a highly persuas­
ive speech ^  which deserves to be cited and analysed 
at length.
After nine long weeks of learning historical 
materialism, dialectical materialism, criticism, self- 
criticism, and the like, in a tense and threatening, 
atmosphere the intellectuals at the remoulding course
were understandably nervous and fearful. At the
closing ceremony of the course, President Ho undoubt­
edly provided most welcome relief with his opening 
words: "Poday we are ending this course in a joyful
mood". Ho proceeded, then, to ease their tension
and fear with a reassuring word, skillfully injecting 
at the same time a discreet pre-condition:
Everyone has clearly realised that 
our Party, Government and,people 
love and esteem the intellectuals 
... who have formed a monolithic 
bloc with the people, who belong 
to the people.
Ho, now resorted to the art of frank yet bland
criticism by giving a brief diagnosis of the bourgeoi
intellectuals* diseases while ascribing total respons 
ibility to the "colonialists and feudalists":
As for the intellectuals, although 
they too were materially exploited 
by the colonialists and feudalists
in a direct manner, they received
a tiny part of the fruits of colon­
ial exploitation, which was used to 
buy them. But the colonialists 
and feudalists ruthlessly oppressed 
and exploited the intellectuals in 
matters of the spirit. Phe intel­
lectuals then became divorced from 
reality, from the people. A 
number of them indulged in day dreams 
and forgot that their country was 
enslaved and that they themselves 
were kept in bondage; they did not 
know who was their,friend and who 
was their foe and could not dis­
tinguish right from wrong. Phis is 
a most cruel manoeuvre of the colon­
ialists and feudalists.
Po redeem the lives which they had lost - if not
sold - to the colonialists and feudalists, the revol­
utionary leader asserted, the intellectuals must fulfil 
their patriotic duty towards the "national revolution", 
and consequently must "side with the peasants":
Everyone has.clearly understood 
that, in order to free himself 
from slavery, to become indepen­
dent and powerful, he must wage 
revolution and. Resistance. Phe 
Resistance War is the continua­
tion of the revolution to fulfil 
the revolutionary task. Ours is 
a revolution for national liber­
ation, a peopled democratic, anti­
colonial and anti-feudal revolu­
tion; it is basically a peasant 
revolution, an agrarian revolution. 
...Pherefore those who love their 
Fatherland, especially the cadres, 
must take a definite stand;.they 
must resolutely side with the 
peasants, the basic force, to 
bring the resistance to victory 
and achieve independence.
So far, it was only the question of first stage 
revolution, the bourgeois democratic revolution that 
many intellectuals had been supporting with great en­
thusiasm. Po introduce them to the second stage of 
revolution, the resourceful leader was remarkably at 
ease with an intellectual approach based on scientific 
progress. In terms of the history of science, Ho Chi 
Minh briefly described a "changing and developing 
world" with so much development and so many scientific 
inventions. From among them, Ho singled out the
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greatest one, which had been the soul of the second 
phase of revolution:
But the greatest invention and 
most rapid development is Marx­
ism-Leninism.
.In a few decades, this theory 
has spread throughout the world; 
it has demolished the old society 
and built up a new one on one 
third of the globe.
Making no mention of.either communism or social­
ism, the shrewd speaker painted an attractive picture 
of. the new, mighty, and beautiful world of democracy 
and peace in sharp contrast to the old.. decaying, and 
miserable world of capitalism, imperialism, and feud­
alism:
Thirty six years ago, the whole world, 
the old one, belonged to capitalism, 
imperialism and feudalism. Today 
there exists a new and immense world, 
spreading from East Germany to Korea, 
passing through the Soviet Union and 
China. Eight hundred million people 
are sealed in a monolithic bloc in 
the ideological, political, economic 
and military field* Around this bloc 
of people, there are hundreds of 
millions of woi'king people who, opp­
ressed by imperialism and feudalism, 
are rising up to free themselves.
This is the world camp of democracy 
and peace headed by the Soviet Union,
Such oratorical skill produces the natural effect 
of pre-conditioning the audience and making their choice 
inevitable. In fact, the choice had been made for them
"Viet Ham had been honoured with the membership of this 
glorious camp of democracy and peace", had made un­
expected progress in every single field, and achieved 
a respectable status throughout the world:
What progress has Viet Nam made, 
as a. member of this, camp?
Nine years ago, .the jhame of our 
country was overshadowed and 
unknown. Today, thanks to the 
revolution and the resistance, 
it is widely known in the world, 
feared by our enemies, and loved 
by our friends...
... In a word, nine years ago, our 
people were enslaved, today they 
are masters of the land. This is 
because our revolutionary. path 
has been enlightened by Marxism- 
Leninism.
Also enlightened by the adroit Marxist-Leninist 
persuader was the path of those intellectual trainees.
A clear conclusion was forcefully suggested, a definite 
political stand consistently argued, and "an honour 
and a heavy task" were so "courteously offered", that 
no realistic intellectuals who loved life could con­
ceive of any alternative other than radically to trans­
form themselves to keep pace with the revolutionary 
movement and the revolutionary leaders who had-might 
and right:
To struggle in a glorious epoch 
and to serve as cadres for an 
heroic people are both an honour 
and a heavy task for the intellec­
tuals. To fulfil this task you 
must keep pace with the movement 
and the progress of the people;
you must remould your ideology 
and adopt a firm political stand.
As Marxism-Leninism was introduced on every 
possible occasion, the process of thought-reform was 
found necessary for all intellectuals especially those 
who "had been progressing too slowly". Some of them 
were Buddhists, Christians or Confucian scholars (such 
as Phan Khoi), but all of them had to undergo this 
traumatic "transformation", "despite their old age". 
This was the reason why, in the opening part of the 
speech, the old Ho had expressed his "appreciation for 
their good examples". In its closing part, to allay 
their s0hoeking experience and to quieten their con­
sciences when traditional thoughts had to give way to 
Marxist dialectics, the atheist politician shrewdly 
chose the familiar terms of Confucian ethics and a 
language similar to Saint Paul!s ascetic exhortations 
to explain the requirements'of the Marxist remoulding 
course:
We must constantly remember the 
words "right our mind and improve 
our virtues" in order to "rule 
the country and govern the people". 
ffTo right our mind and improve our 
virtues" is a work of transformation.
It is a long and hard task, because it 
is an internal revolution for each of 
us. To arm ourselves with a new 
ideology in order to triumph over the 
old one, and to divorce ourselves 
from our old personality so as to 
become, new men, are no easy matters 
and cannot be successfully completed 
in a single training course completed 
within a few months. We must intensify
our efforts to overcome great rr 
difficulties and hardships.
To make sure that the ideological transformation 
will continue even after leaving the "remoulding center", 
President Ho advised the intellectuals to be firm in 
their determination to avail themselves of the effective 
help from the Party, the Government and the masses of 
people, and "to use the two sharp weapons of self- 
criticism and criticism without anxiety and concealment". 
Finally, his wish for continual progress was coupled 
with the threatening reminder of a continuous sur­
veillance;
1 hope that upon returning to 
your office and your localities, 
you will continue to study to 
transform yourselves into an 
intelligentsia of our time and 
of our people; the Party the
Government and the people are
looking forward to your endea­
vours.
Thanks to the insistent care of the "Party-Govern- 
ment-People" embodied in "the cadres in charge", thanks
to the "sharp weapons of criticism and self-criticism",
those intellectuals who had joined the resistance move­
ment to fight French colonialism, to serve the country 
and the people, suddenly found themselves bathed in the 
blinding light of Marxism-Leninism and enveloped in the 
powerful net of the "people1s democracy". Not with­
out concealment", several writers and artists surrendered 
themselves and agreed to submit their written public 
confessions. The predictable form which such can-
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fessions always took voiced a renunciation to their 
sinful past riddled with imperialism, colonialism, 
the "bourgeoisie, and a resolution promising total 
service to the revolutionary cause, 1 the people” (in 
the proletarian meaning of the word) and "The Party", 
as seen in the following examples.
Nguyen Tuan, author of the well known Tang hong: 
mot th<3i (The once glorious way of life) submitted 
the following statement after being ideologically re­
moulded:
Under the light of Marxism-Leninism 
focused on me by the Party, I see 
clearly now the meaning and the 
direction of true art and recognize 
that ray past literary work is no­
thing but a series of mistakes and 
shameful actions. My self-claimed 
achievement consists only of my 
wrong doing which our generous 
people have forgiven me so that I 
might redeem it with my new work 
for the service of the revolution..•
I am enthusiastic to side with the 
poor peasants... under the leader­
ship of the Party. 67
j
Likewise, the famous poet The Id, publicly con­
fessed:
After completing the thought- 
reform session in the programme of 
Party reform, I have seen and re­
cognised the truth... Being comp­
letely liberated^ I am living an 
enlightened and purified life, ded­
icating all my abilities to the 
service of the revolutionary cause, 
the Party}and the people. 68
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In the same vein, the artists To Ngoc Van,
Nguyen Van Ty, the musicians Nguyen Xuan Khoat, Le Yen, 
the architects Nguyen Gao Luy§n, Hoang Nhu Ti§p, and 
many others, were assisted by the "cadres in charge" to 
see "the light of Marxism-Leninism", to publish their 
disavowal of evil and their new "profession of faith".
Those confessions and resolutions were widely 
publicized for the purpose of converting all other in­
tellectuals. To popularize the persuading effect of 
the ideological remoulding campaign, Xu&n Lieu, a young 
poet who was at one time secretary to President Ho,
formulated his act of contrition in popular verses:
r
Honj nay het hoc ky Chinh Dang^,
Thay bon phiidng anh sang ua vao.
Long Dang tha nui xanh hung vi^
Toi xin theo churig thuy d‘en cung.
Dao s'au suy aig^ dT, cam thfeng^
Mdi hay Dang o trong long ma ra.
Dangle on tranh d'au khjSng ^ thoi, t ^
Ta con theo Dang,*suot d6i tiih len. ^
Today, at the completion of the Party 
reform session,
The salvific light is poured into my 
mind.
The PartyI Oh! how great and generous! 
I vow my faithfulness to her until the 
end.
Only after deep reflections and sincere 
c ommun ications,
Have I become aware of the presence of 
the Party in my own heart.
As the Party continues her ceaseless 
struggle,
I promise faithfully to follow her all 
my life.
"Faithfully to follow the Party1', this resolution 
represented the climax of all "new cultural activities", 
and adequately summarized the real purpose ofthe whole 
programme of Wraising the people's cultural level"*
x
x x
VIII. Patriotic Emulation*
When all organisations had been consolidated, all 
political, economic, and cultural operations co-ordin­
ated, the Ho Ohi Minh G-overnment endeavoured further to 
activate those mechanisms and progressively to intensify 
their activities.
Having a keen sense of politics, Ho made his appeal 
to both the national and personal interests of the 
people, raised the triple slogan Independence - freedom 
“ Happiness * and urged "venerable old::men" , "young 
pioneers", workers and peasants, .intellectuals and 
specialists, public servants and soldiers, all Viet­
namese without exception, to join 1m  "patriotic emul­
ation". Employing his favourite language of the slogan, 
Ho eloquently explained in June 1948:
What is the aim of our patriotic
emulation?
- To fight famine and poverty,
To fight ignorance;
To fight the foreign‘invaders.
The way to do it is to rely upon 
The people's force 
The people's spirit
in order to achieve
The people's happiness, '
Linking the emulation movement with the nation-
wide war of total resistance, Ho reassured his people 
of their final victory, provided that everybody took 
pains "to work quickly, to work well, and to produce 
more:
Briefly, everyone competes, 
everyone rakes part in the 
Resistance war and the nation- 
building programme. The 
movement is rising and the 
patriotic emulation is deeply 
rooted and continues to spread 
over every field, pervading 
all strata of the people, It 
helps us to overcome all diff­
iculties and to thwart the 
enemy*s schemes in order to 
secure final victory. 71
The following year, on 1 August 1949, President 
Ho began a "new drive of patriotic emulation" firstly 
by reporting the glorious achievements in the economy, 
the popular education and the resistance.w a r , secondly 
by correcting some shortcomings in connection with 
the emulation movement. Being an astute campaign 
leader, Ho rightly .emphasized the heart of the matter, 
namely "motivation by conviction":
The essential point is clearly to 
explain to everybody how patriotic 
emulation is beneficial to him, to 
his family, to his village, and to 
his country. Once everybody has 
thoroughly understood this, all 
difficulties can be solved and all 
shortcomings overcome, 72
Thereupon, the revolutionary leader raised the 
emulation campaign to a higher tempo:
We must compete in every task which 
Is beneficial to the national 
interests and the people*s welfare, 
and relevant to the Resistance war 
and nation-building. Emulation 
must be undertaken by the whole 
people and in all fields.
The old politician Ho did not neglect to recall 
the four traditional virtues from Confucian ethics to 
be harmonized with some revolutionary slogans, so as 
to make the campaign drive easier for both the olds 
and the youngs:
In patriotic emulation, virtues 
such as Industriousness, Thrift,
Probity and Justice must be high­
lighted.
The. slogan for patriotic emulation 
at present is: All for victory.
Victory over the colonialists.
Victory over ignorance. Victory 
over famine. Victory over our 
defects,
Prom December 1948 to August 1949, two stages of 
competition were organised (the first one from 19 
December 1948 to 19 May 1949, the second one from 19 
May 1949 to 1 August 1949) under the inspiration of the 
triple slogan: "Cdm no, sung tot, danh than&" (Suffi­
cient food, good weapons, military victories).
Patriotic emulation reached into every field and 
required of everybody much harder work.
Soldiers competed in the movement of "Luyen quan
lap cong" (Arduous training to achieve feats of arms) ;
v / v ^
teachers, public servants, cadres in "Ren can chinh co”
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(Training cadres, readjusting organisations), workers
v j  /
in t!0i6 lam cuu 1\i£dcH (let us work overtime to save
■WM N H K f  ,T'----'-■■■ ........ %y
tie country) and "G-fcy cd sd ;oha kv luc?1 (Hew bases, 
new records); peasants in ntang gia san xuatM (in­
creasing production), in nbinh dan hoc vuu (progress 
in mass education) and 1 dong thue nong nghien” 
(emulation in paying agricultural tax), and other com­
petition campaigns such as killing flies, killing rat®, 
autumn harvest for victory, harvest for the army, and 
so forth.
Recognizing the impact of good example in com­
petition, the resistance government propagated the 
practice of work evaluation, and promoted esteem for 
hard workers by decorating them with various titles of 
honour nca nhan xuat sacH (outstanding individual), 
udien hlnh totfl (exemplary person), "chien si thi duaM 
(competition champion). Thus, Pham Quang Dang was 
declared champion for having invented a mechanism 
which made the preparation of explosive 65 times 
faster; so was Miss Trdong thi Xin in Bghe An for hav­
ing changed her style of work andtf increased the pro-'i)
duction rate of 437^; some jjhysicians were accredited
withuthe local production of dry vaccine, penicillin,
73and so forth. '
In 1952 to compound political benefits from those 
competition campaigns, the Party and the G-overnment 
chose May Day to open the Hational congress of emu­
lation champions which gathered a total of 154 
champions from agricultural, industrial and military 
fields.
The congress voted 7 national heroes, four of 
them military heroes, the rest heroes of labour:
Cu ChinhALan (posthumous decoration),
La Van Cau, Hguyen Qu&c Tri^ Eguyen 
Thi Chien, Ego G-ia Kham, Hoang Hanh, 
and Tran Eai Kghia.
The last one was cited as "hero' brain-worker” 
for his work on explosives and weapons, which industry 
he had learned mainly while serving the G-erman arms - 
manufacturer Krupps during the second World War*
In his speech given to the "patriotic competi­
tion winners" at the Congress, Truong Chinh the 
secretax'y general of the Party, dialectically expounded 
the deep meaning of the movement:
The work of revolution must proceed 
by means of revolutionary emulation.
Patriotic emulation is our revolu­
tionary emulation, now.
..•Emulation winners are those who. 
best implement the policies of the 
Party and the Government, and are 
able to contribute good advice to 
the leading organs.
Patriotic emulation is an inexaustible 
source giving rise to new heroes ...
i.e., those who have an unshakable 
class stand.
... Patriotic emulation is an immense 
cadre-school where the teacher is the 
people and the principal is the Party.
President Ho characteristically hailed the emu­
lation movement as "one of the great victories" and 
personally delivered a long speech to push forward the 
whole movement. It is interesting to note some of
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his more persuasive lines:
Emulation fosters the unity of 
people.,.
Emulation is a practical and 
positive means of expressing 
one!s love for the country...
If we love our country we must 
compete. Those who compete 
are the most enthusiastic 
patriots.
Emulation fosters the spirit of 
internationalism...
Emulation contributes to the 
protection of peace and democracy... 
Emulation in increasing production 
and practising thrift takes place 
only in the Soviet Union, China,
Viet ham, and the other new demo­
cratic countries...
Emulation transforms man ... It has 
"intellectualised" the workers, 
peasants .and soldiers, and ,f manual- 
ised1 the intellectuals, 75
To promote the continuation of the emulation 
movement everywhere, the good humoured Uncle Ho took 
pains to please the Congress of competition winners 
by reciting some slogans rhymed together as popular 
verses:
Ugiidi ngU6i thi dua,
Nganh,ngahh thi ,dua;
Ta nhat/dinh thang,
©i ch nhat’dinh thua ,< i
Everybody competes,
Every field competes;
We are certain of victory,
G^ he enemy, of defeat.
The childlike wording and rhyming of those short 
slogans, as the amiable manners and the benign mien 
of the well-meaning Uncle Ho, may well have given the 
audience the impression of a rustic, saintly old man* 
Such a simple, favourable impression can easily dis­
arm any political objection and dissipate any suspi­
cion about the well named ’’patriotic emulation”.
But the real significance of the whole movement with 
its final direction and purpose, could only be per- 
cieved through an introductory paragraph persuasively 
uttered by the skilful, undeclared Communist leader 
in the beginning of the same speech:
Thanks to the emulation to increase 
production and to practice thrift, 
the Soviet Union in building Commun­
ism, and China builds new democracy...
Our people compete to increase pro­
duction and practice thrift in order 
to improve the living and raise the 
spirit of the army and the people, 
and to meet the needs of the Resis­
tance.
Our soldiers compete to kill the 
enemies... in order to bring the 
Resistance war to victory, carry 
out national construction, and 
achieve new democracy to advance 
to"socialism, 7^
x
x x
IX. Political mobilisation.of,the entire people.
f 1 ^ cIn his pamphlet, Khang chifen nh&t dinh thang l3i
i
(The Resistance will win), which served as ”a catechism 
of resistance” since 1947, TruongChinh cited Clausewitz
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and Karl Marx to emphasize the conviction that 
"military action is a measure by which politics are 
conducted". Yet, the same authoritarian spokesman 
of the "Indochinese Marxist Association" vehemently 
argued against those who were inclined to rely ex­
clusively on military action:
They tend to believe that every­
thing can be settled by armed 
forces, they do not apply poli­
tical mobilisation and are un­
willing to give explanations in 
order to convince people; they 
even use threats, or bring pres­
sure to bear on the people. Or, fight­
ing spiritedly, they neglect polit­
ical action; they do not seek ways of 
building ties of affection between 
officers and men, do not act in 
such a way that the army and the 
people can wholeheartedly help one 
another; and they neglect propaganda 
directed to the breaking of the 
morale of the enemy troops, 78
After six months of nation-wide resistance, Su 
That (Truth), the official paper of the Indochinese 
Marxist Association, published an article (No,79,
26 June 1947) entitled "The importance of the psycho­
logical mobilisation of the people for the long-term 
resistance". The article, signed by Tam NguySn, 
explained the reasons why the political mobilisation 
was necessary for victory and proposed concrete 
measures to implement the decision of the Party which 
had been based on the teaching of Lenin. It was 
suggested in this article that the different organisms 
of political mobilisation be re-activated and that this 
network be systematically consolidated and extended
downwards through the zones and provinces until it 
reached the district areas* To the committees of 
agit-prop already active among the workers, the peas­
ants, the youth, and the women - these had originally 
"been established in many areas as long ago as the 
1930's and 1940's - were now to be added further agit­
prop teams for operations among intellectuals, students 
(tri van), and "the religious compatriots" (giao van),
A A ,
Besides the dan van (agit-prop in the Communist con­
trolled areas), activities were urged in nguy van 
(agit-prop in "puppet" governed ageas) and dich van 
(agit-prop among the enemy i,e,, French people)*
nguy y&n and the dich van were subdivided each 
into three branches d£n van (agit-prop among the civ­
ilians) , chinh van (among politicians, civil servants), 
and binh van (among soldiers)* The following lists 
the composite elements in this somewhat complex agit­
prop mechanism;
1* cong-van (among workers)
2* nong-van (among peasants)
A* Dan van ^  J3. thanh-van(among the youth)
(among the\, , a ' , N
people in 4* P^-van (among women)
Communist 5* tri-van (among intellectuals)
areas) r . / V  , -u • \J 6^. giao-van (among religious believers)
Nguy van (l* dan van (among civilians)
government p* van (among public servants)
areas) 13. binh van (among soldiers)
van I 1. dan van (among French civilians)
(among \ 2, chinh van (among French public
Frenchmen) \ ‘ servants)
( 3. binh van (in the French army)
Mote: Agit-prop operations against the French were
not confined J,to Indochina but were carried on actively 
inside Metropolitan France and French overseas terri­
tories*
For the programme of preparation, the Su That 
article listed three points:
1* Thoroughly studying the living situation 
of the people;
2. Determining a special direction for each 
individual agit-prop campaign;
3. Training the new cadres of agit-prop.
Since different forms of agit-prop had been 
suggested in Truong Chinh*s articles and the pamphlet 
on Resistance, Su That* Ho.79, emphasized only one 
form, the most effective one, i.e., bettering the people 
living conditions:
In order to operate the mechanism 
of agit-prop more effectively and 
harmoniously, we must aim at 
bettering the people's living 
conditions, because this is the 
key to open our way into the broad 
masses of the people with a view to 
mobilising them for action.
The article then went on to recommend concrete 
measures such as good management of food supply 
so as to benefit the people, organising producers1 co­
operatives, consumers’ co-operatives, effective trans-
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portation of materials and products, reduction of land 
rents and interest rates, abolition.of fees and gifts, 
and so forth.
G-eneral To Hguyen G-iap in his pamphlet on guerilla 
warfare, also emphasized total mobilisation of the 
people as an effective counter-measure to the Autumn-
on
Winter offensive on the part of the French troops.
But the leader responsible for most exhortations
concerned with political mobilisation was always
President Ho. As early as in 1944 Ho Chi Minh had
prepared a pamphlet on guerilla warfare in which he
advised his followers to avail themselves of a correct
political line such as "fighting the French and the
Japanese for our independence", and to rely on the
masses of people because(fif the guerillas are likened
81to fishes, the people, to water".
likewise, in his "instruction to establish the 
Viet Ham propaganda unit for national liberation" 
(December 1944), Ho recommended "mobilising and .arming 
the whole people" and emphasized that "greater import-
82ance should be rather attached to the political side".
Indeed, the utmost importance had been attributed
to political mobilisation or agit-prop, wherever
Communist training or revolutionary enterprises took
place. This was the reason why, before planning the
August uprising in 1945, the Vietnamese Communist lead-
83era had prepared a "manual for political commissars"
in which minute details of political mobilisation 
drawn from Russian and Chinese docuemtns, were com­
piled to instruct the Vietnamese agents of agit-prop.
The mobilisation work was planned in three dir­
ections: "towards the soldiers", "towards the people"
and "towards the enemies". In each field, activities 
and techniques were outlined and explained with great 
care as illustrated in the following extract:
Political action in the mobilisation 
of the people.
1. Firstly, a committee should be 
created for each locality. The 
committee must include one or 
more persons who have prestige 
and enjoy the trust of the people, 
a representative of the people’s 
government, and a representative 
of the Viet Minh organisation.
The Committee should conduct an 
investigation about the total 
population, associations, those 
who can serve as soldiers, those 
who work for production, the 
mentality of the people, reaction­
ary forces.... Then, a clear plan 
of agit-prop, the number of per­
sonnel! and the period of time 
should be determined accordingly. 
Concurrently, the committee has to 
prepare materials for agit-prop 
such as handbills, posters, tactics., 
of oral propaganda, folk songs, and 
so forth.
Subsequently a meeting should be con­
vened to gather those cadres who are 
able to assist the agitation. After 
being instructed on the necessity of 
agit-prop, its plan and tactics of 
implementation, the cadres axe assig­
ned to specific areas.
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2. How to do propaganda, and agitation?
Every effort must be made to win 
the support of the people for 
the agitation.
a) The propaganda work requires much 
patience and perseverance. Very 
often the cadres must render assis­
tance to the people or mingle with 
the people and work with them in
the ricefields to do some propaganda.
b) The content of agit-prop: the 
cadres must take pains to instruct 
the people that to be a revolution­
ary soldier is a duty and honour 
for each citizen, then, to explain 
the remote and ultimate benefits 
which will be derived from the 
national liberation, and the immed­
iate benefits if the revolutionary 
forces grow stronger and score 
victory after victory.
c) Handbills and posters bearing slogans 
are good means of propaganda. But 
since live words are normally more 
effective, propaganda should be 
carried mostly by means of meetings, 
speeches, plays, folk songs (pre­
ferably with musical instruments), 
and so forth.
3. How to organise agit-prop?
All the cuu quoc (national salvation) 
associations, the armed groups, the 
defence teams, each and. every one of 
the "awakened people" must partici­
pate in the agit-prop, in such a 
manner that a wife should work to 
motivate her husband, a son his 
father, a young lady her own sister, 
everybody, everywhere, should enthus­
iastically engage in the work of 
agit-prop.
b) The more enthusiastic elements should 
be commissioned to activate the 
broad masses of people, while members
„of the defence units and resolute 
cadres of the Viet Minh Front should 
volunteer for military service to set 
a good example to others.
c) Since all of these activities should 
be observed and encouraged, the 
cadres in ..charge must file reports 
to the leading committee and the 
committee must send inspectors to 
different areas,
d) For self-protection against des­
tructive opponents we must be 
well prepared to react to their p, 
dangerous arguments and schemes.
Ho Chi. Minh, who in all probability made an import­
ant contribution to the compilation of the above manual, 
skilfully applied all its political recommendations in 
his relationships with the many people who came in con­
tact with him. Being an occomplished persuader, Ho 
naturally incorporated the tactics of agit-prop in his 
numerous presidential messages as well as in his private 
correspondence. Outstanding examples of the latter 
were Ho1s letters to Dr. Vu Dinh Tung who had lost his 
son in the violent conflicts in Hanoi, (86) to Dang
f A
Phuc Thong, an engineer who fell ill while devotedly 
serving the national cause of resistance (87), and to 
ICim-Phong, Ho1 s former comrade in China, (88)
Typical of the advice President Ho was wont to 
offer on the subject of agit-prop, are the following 
extracts from his letter to the Conference of political 
commissars in March 1948:
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1. With regard to the soldiers:
The political commissars must 
constantly take care of their 
material requirements, such as 
food, clothing, housing, rest, 
drilling, work and combative 
force. In their moral and 
intellectual life, he must pay 
attention to raising their 
sense of discipline, combating 
libertinism, developing culture 
and the political line in the 
army...
2* With regard to the people:
The people are the foundation, 
the fathers and mothers of the 
army. The political commissar 
must win their confidence, est­
eem and love. He must ensure 
that the army enjoy the people’s 
confidence, love and esteem; 
for this purpose, he must urge 
the soldiers to help the people 
and to fight the enemy valiantly,
3. With regard to the enemy:
Towards the French soldiers as 
well as foreigners and Vietnamese 
serving in the French army, the 
political commissar must know how 
to make propaganda prudently and 
realistically in order to provoke 
their thinking and win them over 
to our side, 89
Following the same line, in a report to the 1949 
conference of military leaders in Nam Bo (Oochinchina), 
Le Du&n reminded his comrades of the necessity for 
political mobilisation among the masses of people.
Since the goal of our war is 
vi dan» vi nuoc. (for the 
interests of the people and 
country), our strategem con­
sists of mobilising and arming 
the whole nation to fight the 
enemy.
Because our struggle is a struggle 
of all the people, our principle 
battlefield is the people...
...The only strategem for us is 
to rely on the forces of the 
people, the initiatives and sacri­
fices on the part of the people...
Our stratagem is to use the war 
issue. to arouse the enthusiasm 
of the entire people and to unite Qn 
the whole nation in the struggle.
To arouse the enthusiasm of the people and to 
thrust them into the battlefield, the Sxafhat newspaper 
(No.72, 25 March 1947) in a highly emotive, even 
"bloody" article, urged the deepening of hatred as an 
effective motivation:
For more than a year now the 
French reactionaries have been 
trampling the Southern part of 
o\*r land under their feet.
During the last four months, 
the crimes they have committed 
in the port city of Haiphong 
are beyond number.
Over the past three months, their 
bloody hands have plunged deeper 
into the blood of our compatriots 
throughout the country.
Yes, the blood of many a Vietnamese 
grandfather, grandmother, father, 
mother and more odiously, alas! 
the scarlet blood of many an innocent 
child and infant has been shed
abundantly by the French invaders’ 
bullets, bayonets, grenades and 
bombs.
The French invaders have not spared 
any religion nor any grouping. No, 
they thrust their bayonets indis­
criminately into the backs, the chests, 
and the faces of all Vietnamese, mak­
ing no distinction between Catholic or 
Buddhist, poor or rich, lowlander or 
highlander. Churches have been des­
troyed, statues of Buddha desecrated, 
houses burned,,,
...Dear compatriots! we already hate 
the invaders. Let us deepen our 
hatred! Let us inflame our hatred!
Let us kindle the flames of our 
hatred and intensify them constant­
ly so that no matter what our age, 
our religion, or our grouping, we 
shall always be eager to destroy 
our enemies.
...During this period, we have no 
feeling for French colonialists but 
our hatred.
...Whoever is lacking in hatred 
against the reactionary colonialists, 
is not worthy of being a Vietnamese,
To strengthen the logic of hatred, the Su That 
article resorted to the authority of Marshal Stalin 
by citing from his military order to the Red troops in 
the second World War: "You cannot defeat the enemy
unless you rekindle against him a burning hatred from 
the bottom of your hearts".
Thus the principal method of political mobilisa­
tion during the resistance war was summarized by Truong
Chinh in the slogan: "Love for the country and hatred
qi
for the enemy".
As for the result of this assiduous work of 
political mobilisation, Ho Chi Minh himself, the prime 
mover of the Vietnamese revolution, later declared 
with great satisfaction to his national assembly, con­
vened at an unnamed place towards the end of the re­
sistance war (December 1953):
Our forces lie in millions of 
peasants who are eagerly waiting 
for the Government and Party to 
organise and lead them in order 
enthusiastically to rise up and 
smash the feudal and colonial 
yoke,#. With skilful organisation 
and leadership, these forces will 
shake heaven and earth, and com­
pletely destroy all the colonial­
ists and feudalists. 92
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X, Mustering international support.
In 1945* when the Viet Minh members appeared in 
Hanoi to seize power, when Ho Chi Minh presented the 
members of his Provisional Government to the nation, 
no Vietnamese, except their very few personal friends, 
knew who they were. But since the very beginning of 
their revolutionary life i.e., from the 1920’s and 
1930*s, the undeclared Communist leaders had been 
learning to relate the important events in Indochina 
to the situation in the rest of the world. Halving 
served as veteran revolutionary organiser in France, 
Russia, China and Sdtuth-East Asia, Ho Chi Minh fully 
appreciated the value of whatever support he could 
muster from any grouping or movement anywhere in the 
world.
A wide campaign was launched in August 1945: 
the whole city of Hanoi was bustling with a colourful 
welcome for the delegation of the Allies. Banners, 
streamers and posters carried slogans written in 
Vietnaraes, English, Chinese, Russian and French. The 
slogans had been prepared in advance by the Viet Minh 
Front and were later reproduced in the Viet Minh news­
paper Dan Chu (No.3, 21 August 1945):
Independence or Death*
Down with French imperial- 
ism.
French domination: 2,000,000 
people starved to death.
Viet Ham to the Vietnamese.
Long live the Independence 
of Viet Nam.
To compound the political dividend from the visit* 
of the "international delegation", a press conference 
was scheduled on Saturday 25 August 1945 *
The same Viet Minh newspaper announced the immi­
nent arrival of theChinese Nationalist Troops as dele­
gates of the Allied Forces, and a huge welcoming demon­
stration was organised by the Viet Minh Front. People 
were urged to carry the following slogans:
Chinese and Vietnamese are friends!
Down with the imperialist invaders}"
Support the people’s revolutionary 
Government!
Likewise, in Saigon, the Viet Minh Front was at 
pains to organise a welcome to the British forces with 
similar slogans to win their support.
In the proclamation "of independence on 2 Sep- 
tember 1945, the "most enlightened" (Chi Minh) Ho did 
not neglect to quote from the American Declaration of 
Independence and the French Declaration of Human Rights. 
From that date onwards, a wide campaign was skilfully 
conducted to obtain the support of different nations, 
governments, political parties, "democratic movements^, 
cultural groups, and outstanding personalities, in 
favour of the Ho Chi Minh Government and its political 
policies, A few samples culled from the' Viet Minh 
newspapers during the last three months of 1945 will 
suffice to illustrate the far-sighted expansion of 
political mobilisation throughout the world.
Dan Chu newspaper (No.32, 1 October 1945) pub­
lished the news that Tran Huy Lieu, Minister of 
Information and Propaganda had denounced to the world 
the atrocities committed by the British, Indian, Fx^ench 
and Japanese soldiers in Nam Bo. Two days later the 
same paper (No.34, 3 October 1945) carried a letter 
from Vietnamese cultural workers addressed to British 
journalists and writers, conveying their vehement pro­
test against the British co-operation with the French 
soldiers in their attack on Saigon and their massacre 
of Vietnamese civilians.
Cuu Quoc newspaper (No.81, 2 November 1945) re­
ported that 25,000 Vietnamese residents in France had 
appealed to the British people to recall the British 
troops from Viet Nam. A later issue of Cuu Quoc 
(No. 130, 31 December 1945) happily announced that
"the British press had bitterly criticized the French 
colonialists",
During that same period, Tran Van Giau, the then 
powerful Viet Minh leader in Nam Bo (Cochinchina) 
reportedly has addressed a telegram to the British, 
American and Soviet Foreign Ministers attending the 
Moscow Conference, In the name of the Resistance 
Committee, of Nam Bo, ©iau requested the Big Powers 
to intervene so as to secure the recognition of "Viet 
N am’s Independence under the leadership of Ho Chi 
Minh" (Cuu Quoc, N o ,125, 24 December 1945).
The Chien Thang paper (No,7, 28 October 1945) 
happily reported favourable results achieved by the 
campaign:
The democratic countries such as 
the United States of America and 
China already understand our 
deep aspirations for national 
independence,
In France, in the general elec­
tion, the leftists received the 
highest number of votes, We 
hope that French colonialism 
will be completely destroyed, ^
During the year of 1946, a. "good will" delega­
tion to France, headed by Pham Van Dong, and a state 
visit by Ho Chi Minh were planned as part of the 
diplomatic campaign for international support. In 
fact, the French Communist and Socialist Parties were 
responsive to the appeals of their "Vietnamese brothers" 
and conducted a vigorous campaign against the French 
Government,
In march 1947, when the French National Assembly 
was divided by an emotional debate on the Viet Nam 
question, Su That newspaper (No,72, 25 March 1947)
published an analysis of the event and concluded that 
the Viet Nam conflict had proved to be a very divisive 
issue in France. The following issue of Su That 
(No,73, 22 April 1947) triumphantly declared: "We are
not alone in our struggle", and offered a factual 
explanation:
As soon as the French National 
Assembly adjourned, throughout 
the whole country "the movement 
of French workers arose to 
demand immediate negotiation 
with Viet Nam", pay rises and 
opposition to the reaction­
aries ,. .
The anti-war movement in France, 
the revolutionary movement for 
national liberation in the French 
colonies, and the movement of 
"Support for the Viet Nam Revolu­
tion" throughout the v/orld, these 
three movements are very helpful 
to our national struggle.
We are not alone in our struggle 
because so many friends are support­
ing us* Who are our friends? - 
The French people and the progres­
sive democratic associations in 
France; the oppressed peoples in 
the French Union; the democratic 
peace-loving forces in the world*
The French people have begun to 
oppose the war and support our 
stand.... We must close our ranks 
and struggle more stoically.
Final victory will be certainly 
ours.
In the same vein, Truong Chinla, in his pamphlet, 
The Resistance will win, (pp. 46-47), outlined the 
agenda for the Vietnamese to win their diplomatic 
battle:
In the matter of foreign policy, 
what must our people do? We 
must isolate the enemy, win more 
friends. We must act in such a 
way that the French people and 
the French colonial peoples will 
actively support us and oppose 
the reactionary French colonial­
ists, that all peace-loving forces 
in the world will defend us and 
support the aims of our resistance....
We must make the progressive forces 
throughout the world realise that we 
are making sacrifices and exerting 
efforts for the cause of world 
peace and democracy too. In the 
struggle for peace and democracy, 
these forces cannot remain indiffe­
rent to our struggle or support 
Viet Nam only by words where deeds 
are required. They must arraign 
France before the tribunal of world 
opinion, which will judge her and 
compel her to stop the war of rapine 
in Indochina, a war completely‘con­
trary to the ideals of the United 
Nations Charter. Moreover, they 
should help the Indochinese peoples 
both materially and morally, so as 
rapidly to crush the reactionary 
French colonialists, the avowed 
enemies of world-peace and democracy.
In this campaign to win international support, 
as always, President Ho took the lead by issueing his 
"Message to the French people and the peoples of the 
Allied Nations", "Letter to the French Government,
National Assembly and People” , "Telegram to the Pan-
Asian Conference", "replies to a foreign correspondent
94and so forth.  ^ Ho also gave his cadres a special 
lesson on the propaganda work:
We have not yet concentrated all 
possible means and mobilised all 
our abilities for propaganda.
That is why our transmission of 
information is still very slow 
and does not reach the broad masses 
♦...Our propaganda among the prison­
ers of war and enemy troops as well 
as abroad is still very weak. We 
have not known how to make excerpts 
from enemy newspapers which express 
anger at the colonialist military 
commanders, politicians and admini­
strative authorities for only car­
ing about having a good time and 
disputing over personal interests 
while their soldiers die on the 
battlefields" without a wreath be­
ing laid or a tear being shed for 
them".
We have failed to base ourselves 
on this material when compiling 
leaflets to foment agitation among 
the enemy1s ranks, give explana­
tions to the prisoners of war, and 
disseminate propaganda among theQt- 
population in enemy-held areas.
To foment more agitation and protest among the 
peace-loving people in the world, the Resistance 
G-overnment of Ho Chi Minh created a peach organisation 
in 1950, organised a peace congress, and despatched 
several delegations to international peace conferences
Youth festivals, trade unions congresses and so forth.
On 2 September 1951, President Ho proudly 
announced the international support which this cam­
paign had gained:
Our country is part and parcel 
of the great community of world 
democracy. People in the 
friendly countries warmly supp­
ort us. The Prench people and 
prominent personalities through­
out the world also side with us.
Therefore, I express to them our 
gratitude on behalf of our com-qg 
patriots, army and G-overnmemt. ^
Other effective means of creating a guilt complex 
in France and inciting at the same time anger and 
condemnation throughout the world, were the establish­
ment of the "committee of Peace and Repatriation" 
among the £>risoners of war, the denunciation of the 
enemy*s crimes against the poor people of Viet Nam,
and the publicity given to the "confessions" of captured
97enemy soldiers. ^ 1 Those tactics were skilfully in­
corporated in an article written by Ho Chi Minh and pub­
lished in the Cominform Review, For a lasting peace.
for a People*s Democracy, in April 1952 under the pen
98name of Din. ^
In this campaign to influence public opinion in 
the outside world, the Communist leaders, although they 
consistently refused to admit Western press correspon­
dents to the territory they controlled, nevertheless 
found it profitable to admit a few carefully selected 
foreign writers and journalists, men such as the 
Australian Communist Wilfred Burchett, a "certain
Swedish correspondent", and the like.
In fact, it was under the form of "Replies to a 
Swedish correspondent" in November 1955 that Ho Ghi 
Minh conveyed his readiness to engage in negotiations 
with the French Government, while his lieutenant Vo 
Nguyen Giap was feverishly preparing for the assault 
on Dien Bien Phu. In this message, Iio shrewdly intro­
duced innuendos to exploit "the contradictions" among 
his international enemies:
If there are neutral countries 
who try to speed up a cessation 
of hostilities in Viet Nam by 
means of negotiations, they will 
be welcomed.
...I have constantly showed my 
sympathy, affection and respect 
for the French people and the 
French peace fighters. ■ Today not 
only is the independence of Viet 
Nam seriously jeopardised but 
the independence of France is 
also gravely threatened. On the 
one hand, the U.S. imperialists 
urge the French colonialists to 
continue and expand the aggressive 
war in Viet Nam, thus weakening 
them more and more through fighting. 
and hoping to replace France in 
Indochina. On the other hand, they 
force France to ratify the 33uropean 
defence treaty which is to revive 
German militarism.
Therefore, the struggle of the 
French people to secure for France 
independence £from theU, S.pressure'] , 
democracy and peace, and to end the 
war in, Viet Nam, is one of the most 
important factors.leading to the 
settlement of the Viet Nam question 
by peaceful means. 99
To win more powerful friends, on the other hand, 
the Government of Ho Ohi Minh dedicated the whole 
month of January 1954 as the month of "Viet-Chinese- 
Russian Friendship” * Nhan Dan news-pat)er (No. 160,
16 January 1954) boasted of the friendly support, not 
only from Russia and Ohina, but also from Korea, 
Mongolia, Poland, Czechoslovakia, Hungary, Rumania, 
Bulgaria, Albania and the Democratic Republic of 
Germany.
As the date of the attack on Dien Bien Phu drew 
nearer and the fury of the anti-war movement daily 
increased in France and other countx'ies, Ho continued 
exploiting his "International Solidarity" against 
France:
On this occasion fthe seventh anni­
versary of the nation-wide resis­
tance war, 19 December 195!5J , I, on 
behalf of the Vietnamese people, convey 
my affectionate greetings to the 
French people and people in the 
French colonies. I thank the working 
people in the world for having obser­
ved this date as "International Solid­
arity Day with the Vietnamese People" 
and thank all the friends of peace 
for their warm support for our resis­
tance war.
...With the solidarity of our people 
and other peace-loving people, our 
armed resistance will certainly be 
-victorious. 100
In May 1954,,when the French forces were being
defeated at Dien Bien Phu, it was through the Antara
News Agency of Indonesia that President Ho conveyed
101his conditions for negotiations with France.
During the Geneva Conference (^ frorn 26 April to 21 July 
1954), a whole series of articles in Nhan D&n were 
aiming at "dividing enemies and winning friends" on 
the international stage: "Welcome the voices of
peace on the part of Soviet and China" (Nhfen Dan, No. 
187, 22 May 1954): "The French people support us"
(No. 188, 25 May 1954); "The Laniel Cabinet overthrown"*, 
"The French Communist Party is raising the banner of 
Independence and Democracy" (No. 195, 16 June), and 
many others.
Being entrusted with the formation of a new cab­
inet, Mendes France promised, under the pressure of 
French public opinion, to secure peace in Indochina 
within thirty days: Nhan Dan (Ho.198, 25 June)
published a special article to praise Mendes France 
for being more progressive, and to v^elcome his idea 
of "seeking peace in a short period of time". Through 
the Viet Nam News Agency, Ho Chi Minh also gladly wel­
comed the desire of the new French Premier rapidly to
102achieve a cease-fire in Indochina.
After many complicated diplomatic manoeuvres had
obtained the decisive intervention of V. Molotov
105through the co-operation of Chou En-lai the Geneva
Conference reached the "agreements on the cessation of 
hostilities in Indochina" which were signed by midnight 
20 July 1954 just as the Ho Chi Minh - Moutet Modus 
Vivendi was in the night of 14 September 1946. The 
resentment and bitterness of the Vietnamese people 
everywhere against the partition of their homeland did
not prevent Ho Chi Minh from issuing on the following 
day an appeal crowning his campaign for international 
support with a high note of triumphalism:
The G-eneva Conference has come to 
an end. It is a great victory 
for our diplomacy,...
This great victory is also due to 
the support given us. in our just 
struggle by the peoples of our 
brother countries, by the French 
people, and by the peace-loving 
people of the world..,.
From now on, we must make every 
effort to consolidate -peace and 
achieve reunification, indepen-
x
x x
Throughout the period of anti-French war 
(1946-54), by means of political mobilisation and 
patriotic emulation, the revolutionary leaders con­
sistently urged all their subjects to remain closely 
united under the strong leadership of Ho Chi Minh, 
to raise production and practice self-sufficiency 
for the purpose of "total sacrifice for the success 
of national resistance and nation-building". Simul­
taneously, all the "patriotic organisations" created 
or patronised by the revolutionaries were cemented 
into a national united front, forming a monolithic 
bloc further to consolidate the G-overnment of Resis­
tance and the leading Party whose multiplied activi­
ties and continuous growth were kept out of sight. 
Drastic changes in social and political systems were
also gradually introduced under a plan of "bettering 
the people*s living conditions" based on the pro­
letarian land-reform, and a sophisticated plan of 
"raising the people1s cultural level" which culminated 
in the firm establishment of the Marxist-Leninist 
ideology.
Such a multi-aspect and far^ reaching programme, 
attractively entitled Khang-Chien, Kien-Quoc (National 
Resistance and Nation-Building), combined with a 
highly effective military policy based on Leninist- 
Mao st strategy, strengthened by the support from 
communist countries and international "peace-loving 
democratic forces" finally led the Marxist revolu­
tionary leaders in Viet Nam to the decisive victory 
at Dien Bien Phu (May 1954) and made them masters of 
NortliViet Nam, after the Geneva Conference,i 9
Hailing the victory, Ho Chi Minh, the successful 
Marxist revolutionary leader, proposed for the next 
phase of revolutionary struggle, three new duties and 
ten immediate tasks which were summarized in the 
slogan:
PEACE - UNIFICATION - INDEPENDENCE - DEMOCRACY. 105
Some insight may be gained if such a cryptic slogan 
is compared with the plan of "linking patriotism to 
internationalism" and the conclusion of Ho Chi Minh’s 
article published in the Communist Review, %For a 
Lasting Peace, for a People1s Democracy:
The Vietnamese people’s future 
is as bright as the sun in 
Spring. Overjoyed at the rad­
iance of the sun in spring, we
392.
shall struggle for the splendid 
future of Viet Nam, for the future 
democracy, world peace and 
Socialism. We triumph at the 
present time, we shall triumph in 
the future, "because our path is 
enlightened by the great Marxist- 
Leninist doctrine. 106
Indeed, the cease-fire and the partition of Viet 
Nam in July 1954 ended the Viet - French war only to 
open a new period of struggle for the Communists: 
socialist revolution in the North and democtratic 
nationalist revolution in the South. Again©I, to 
foster political persuasion and to characterize the 
"new situation and new tasks", was coined a new 
slogan:
a' a J-
Cung co mien Bac,
on ./J a' . ... 107Ghieu co mien Nam.
Consolidate the North,
Heed the South.
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Chapter VIII
An Evaluation.
The Viet Minh movement remained unknown to most 
Vietnamese, until the moment its cadres appeared with 
their red and gold flags to organise huge rallies in 
Hanoi, Hue, Saigon and all other cities and towns in 
the second half of August 1945. Within a short per­
iod, the Viet Minh Front had succeeded in seizing 
power in Horth and Central Viet Ham, in proclaiming 
national independence (2 September 1945), and in 
establishing a provisional government in Hanoi and a 
new system of local administration throughout the 
major part of Viet Ham. While resistance was being 
organised against the French forces in the South, a 
general election was called throughout the whole of 
Viet Ham to elect a national Assembly, This body 
ratified a democratic Constitution prepared in advance 
by the Viet Minh and gave official approval to succes­
sive central governments dominated by the Viet Minh 
and led by Ho Chi Minh.
The following months witnessed complicated polit­
ical and diplomatic manoeuvres which brought about the 
withdrawal of the nationalist Chinese troops from 
Viet Ham, preliminary agreements with the French Govern­
ment, negotiation in Paris on Viet-French relations,
Ho Chi Minh*s state visit to France, and the Modus Viv­
endi of 14 September 1946,
Only three months later, the Ho Chi Minh Government 
had to leave Hanoi for the jungle to wage the national
405.
war of resistance against the French, While con­
ducting guerilla warfare, the Viet Minh huilt up its 
strength with an ever growing "people's army", merged 
into the Lien Vifet (National United Front of Viet Nam), 
and later "associated itself" with Dang Lao dong 
(the Viet Nam Workers1 Party), to consolidate the 
"people's leading power", push forward the resistance 
war to victory, and pave the road to socialism.
Undoubtedly, the Viet Minh story is one of start­
ling success, made possible by the immense strength 
which resulted from unifying the whole people. The 
essential element of that success was the winning of 
the devoted support of the entire Vietnamese people.
To understand how this was achieved, it is necessary 
not only to study the Viet Minh literature of politi­
cal persuasion but also briefly to analyze the per­
suaders and their target,i.e., the minds of the Viet­
namese people in the 1940*s.
A. THE TARGET GROUP
The basic requirement for the success of per­
suasive communication is to adjust the message to the 
emotional and motivational characters of the target 
group. Now, these characters are determined by the 
cultural values, attitudes and social norms of the 
group, as well as by their prevailing needs, aspirations, 
frustrations and anxieties. These determinants can 
be identified by a careful study of the social, politi­
cal, economic, and psychological contexts , in the 1940's, 
of the people to be persuaded.
As has been shown in the first chapter, endowed 
with a strong sense of national consciousness, the 
Vietnamese people have always cherished their perennial 
tradition of heroic struggle and amazing success against 
their foreign enemies. With understandable pride 
they loved to reaffirm the authority of their "four 
thousand years of civilisation", to recall their nat-
\ rv f
ional heroes such as Tr&n Hilng ©ao, Le L6i, Nguyen Hue
...only to conclude with Nguyen Trai:
/
Tuy manh jreu co luc khac jnhau /
Ma hao ki'et khfing bao gid thieu.
Though we have been now strong, 
now weak,
At no time have we lacked heroes.
Most appreciated among the values of their national 
heritage were family and religion, with the fatherland 
considered as a union of families under the king who, 
by the mandate of Heaven, had the duty of caring for all 
families with justice and benevolence.
Imbued with the Gonfucian doctrine, the Vietnamese
identified social and political norms with ethics.
Hence, all moral virtues, for a Vietnamese tradition-
A /
alist, were based on the two cardinal virtues: Hieu
or filial piety, and Trung or loyalty to the sovereign. 
The basic social practice was, therefore, a deep respect 
for authority: authority of father, uncle, elder,
teacher, and ruler. Consequently,people in general 
were patient, withdrawn, reticent and conformed to 
a very high degree with the authoritative traditions 
and any establishment, educational, religious, social
or political. This generally submissive attitude 
admittedlonly one exception, the right of revolution, 
which was permissible according to the teaching of 
Mencius, when an unjust ruler flagrantly violated the 
rights of the people. In such a case, assassination 
and other brutal forms of punishment were justified 
by the hatred of the people for the culprit, and were 
even considered admirable when performed by a brave 
reformer or national hero.
To these old traditional beliefs were added in 
the 20th centuray, new ideas and values which the 
younger generation had learned from modern French 
writers such as J,J. Rousseau, Victor Hugo, Robespierre, 
and the like. The new class of bourgeois intellec­
tuals described previously in Chapter II, were sensi­
tive to the new watch-words Liberte. Egalite. Frater- 
nite. and because of their acquaintance with democracy 
as practiced in France, nurtured a deeper resentment 
against the French colonial administration than did 
other less privileged Vietnamese. These frustrated 
men were generally very able and were eager, not only 
to join, but also to lead any revolutionary movement 
demanding independence for the country and freedom for 
the people.
The economic situation was deplorable, the over­
whelming majority of Vietnamese people being poor 
peasants subject to oppression and social injustice. 
Their prevailing needs were "more food, more education, 
less tax". The better educated people too were 
discontented because of the widening gap between the
rewards they received and those of similarly quali­
fied Frenchmen.
Thus, national and international political events, 
economic as well as socio-cultural contexts, all con­
verged to fashion a Vietnamese mentality of high aspir­
ations, frustrations, anxieties, and insecurity. The 
situation became highly charged when a whole generation 
grew up in frustration and confusion without a strong 
leader. People were, indeed, longing for a national 
hero while a potential revolutionary situation awaited 
only a tiny political spark to detonate an explosion 
which would engulf the whole country and people. If 
a persuader could select and formulate the appropriate 
issues, adjtist his message to the emotional and moti­
vational climate surrounding the people, and employ 
the right approach to gain the attention, arouse the 
enthusiasm, and maintain the determination and dedi­
cation of the people, he could channel all the prevail­
ing tensions into an irreversible flood which would 
sweep away the existing political structure.
B. THE PERSUADER.
The success of propaganda or agitation unquestion­
ably depends to a large extent, upon the competence, 
the prestige, the skills, and the moral virtues (probity, 
disinterest, kindness, benevolence, courage) of the 
persuader.
The most famous propagandist and agitator in Viet 
Nam during the early 1940's was the Viet Minh, a name 
attractive to Vietnamese ears, but the name of an
organisation, not an individual. Viet Minh was the 
title of a national united Front, a patriotic league 
for the Independence of Viet Ham. These objectives 
identified it with the voice of the Sacred Fatherland, 
so that it commanded the respect and the allegiance 
of the Vietnamese people, who had always revered heroic 
patriotism as part of their national tradition.
The authority of this patriotic Front was further 
enhanced when it was commended to the Vietnamese people 
by the prestigious Nguyen Ai Quoc (Nguyen, the Patriot) 
in his "Letter from Abroad", and his "Appeal for Gen- 
eral Insurrection". These two documents, authoritative 
and seemingly well informed^deeply impressed the Viet­
namese people who were still in the state of confusion 
and enforced ignorance concerning events in the out­
side world, resulting from the isolation of Viet Nam 
during World War II. In origin, Nguyen Am Quoc was 
not a personal name, but an expedient pen name coined 
by the highly respected revolutionary leader Phan 
Chau Trinh, on the occasion of signing a Vietnamese 
petition to the Versailles Conference in 1919* During 
the intervening years it had acquired the status of 
a national myth0, a symbol of Vietnamese patriotism, 
the common voice expressing the deepest aspirations of 
a nation which had lost its independence and national 
identity when it was absorbed into what the French 
conquerors called "Frenchalndochina"♦
But, if the name Nguyen Ai Quoc lent prestige to 
the Viet Minh, it also aroused popular suspicion, fear, 
and resentment in 1945, since the name had formerly
been identified with the Indochinese Communist Party 
and the Nghe Tinh Soviet movement in 1930-31.
On the eve of,.his public appearance as the 
President of the newly born Democratic Republic of 
Viet Nam, the resourceful leader of the Viet Minh, 
therefore, shrewdly decided to shed that "patriotic 
name"f The new name which the Viet Minh leader 
adopted in August 1945 was itself an inspired choice. 
The period was indeed one of confusion and imrest, 
and Vietnamese people longed for enlightened guidance 
and a strong leader: the name Ho Chi Minh (Ho, the
most enlightened) tacitly answered the aspirations of 
the people and won much respect and confidence while 
avoiding the divisive issue of Communism.
From the very first day, the "enlightened leader" 
consistently refused to show himself as a majestic 
rulervan authoritarian president, or even a "dignified" 
statesman,, but chose rather to stress the simple, grass 
roots qualities of a selfless man who was a member of 
the common people, not unlike an able peasant leader 
from the Nghe Tinh area. Presiding at the Indepen­
dence ceremony on 2 September 1945, the new president 
Ho wore a shabby khaki uniform and simple slippers.
In the midst of the solemn Proclamation of Indepen­
dence, Ho surprised the audience by inserting a homely 
acoustic testing of the microphone: "Do you hear me
clearly, fellow compatriots?"
Thereafter, President Ho always presented himself 
in his simplest garb, spoke the language of the ord­
inary Vietnamese, often inserted a few familiar verses 
into his speeches, and advised his cadres to observe
the "mass lines", that is to say, to remain close to 
the masses of people. Consequently, the ordinary 
Vietnamese working man could easily identify with his 
simple and benign leader, be proud of him, readily 
espouse his cause, and happily make Ho's political 
lines his own. In the early period, "the most en­
lightened" Ho did not reveal himself as a Marxist, a 
politician, or a constant persuader. The elderly Ho 
with his grey beard, which traditionally symbolizes 
"experience, wisdom, and benevolence" in Vietnamese 
society, succeeded in projecting himself as a Con- 
fucian gentleman who would rule the new republic by 
moral virtues, and, as the father of all families, 
care for all his compatriots.
Only a few days after the Proclamation of nation­
al Independence, President Ho wrote an affectionate 
letter to the children to wish them a Happy August Moon 
celebration, depicting himself as their "benign Uncle 
(Bac) who loved them dearly". Naturally a person 
who cherished the children must be highly esteemed by 
their parents and relatives. Prom that moment on,
"Bac Ho" became his endearing title, which expressed 
his characteristic relationship and implied a high 
level of respect and affection from his people and 
total devotedness from the fatherly president.
His quality as a successful persuader, as well as 
the basic approach he recommended in the work of agit­
ation, are well summarized by H o 1s "principle of 
affection".:
4 1 0 .
•Bi dan nhd, d dan thiiong
See to it that your close rela­
tionship with the people would 
make your stay most appreciated 
and your departure deeply re­
gretted*
To this end, using both Confucian and Christian 
terms, the gentleman Ho urged the practice of revolu™ 
tionary virtues and emphasized the attrantion of good 
example:
Our local committees must master 
the effective practice of propa­
ganda and explanation*.., and 
possess sufficient initiative to 
he efficient without hurting the 
feelings of the people. With 
regard to Industry. Economy.
Sacrifice, and Justice. our people1s 
committees must he the first ones 
to practice these in order to set 
good example for the people. 2
Hood example in the practice of revolutionary 
virtues, was set hy Ho ahove all others. All Viet­
namese revolutionary cadres have studied Ho*s manual
*7 t
of revolutionary ethics (Sda doi loi lam viec i.e.,
Let us change our style of work) and could find no 
better example than Ho himself.
Small wonder that from the very beginning of his 
presidential career, a movement was set afoot to make 
Ho Chi Minh a !l superman” . While his origin and iden­
tity were subjects of a guessing game, exciting rumours 
were freely circulated to emphasize his extraordinary 
physionomy (large ears, immense forehead, piercing eyes),
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and the "miraculous phenomenon" of double pupil in 
each eye as recorded in President H o fs photograph 
(see the reflection of two illuminating lamps in the 
inserted picture: Ho Chi Minh in 1945)*
Suddenly HolOhi Minh posters of all sizes, appeared 
in offices, buildings, market places, along the streets, 
in private homes, everywhere, and seemingly gave people 
the impression that Ho, the superman, was almighty and 
ubiquitous* A competition in displaying Ho * s images 
was further encouraged by public notices in the Viet 
WIinh newspapers such as the following:
Photographs of President Ho are 
available at the minimum of 500 
dong each. 3 Statues of Presi­
dent Ho are available at the 
Social Welfare Department (26 
By Thuong Kiet Street) in two 
models:
for desk: 46 dong each ^ 
for wall: 36 dong each*
Together with those venerable pictures and statues, 
was sold a revolutionary ideology which was reincarnated 
in the person of a Gonfucian gentleman.
Just as incense and prayers are offered in honour 
of a new hero or messiah, so exciting songs were taught 
to children:
Ai yeu Bac Ho Ohi Minh bang chung em 
nhi dong, , /
.. .Bac chung em nddc da nau vi s*dosng 
gio, , .  ^ w
Bac chung em the ciiong quyet tra thu 
nha
! l l  ! i i i M  • M  \ i f 1 N  \ \i ;‘i \ N  f M l  ( O N i .  I K M
H O  ( H I  M I N H
\<]45
f
Clil T U  H M  tH' V l n  N \ V  D A N  CHI CONti HOA.
H O  C H I  M I N I !
\<\55
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Whose love for Uncle Ho can be 
compared to our love?
♦♦.Our Uncle has been tanned with 
enduring misery
Our Uncle has vowed to cleanse the 
nation from shame♦
Later, another song was to be sung, immediately 
after the national anthem:
..*Ho Ohi Minh muSn nam!
Ho phi Minh muon naml ,
Ngiidi soi du6c sang khap 
n5dc Ham...,
Lam cho niidc Yiet Ham quang vinh.
...Long live Ho Chi Minh!
Long live Ho Chi Mihhl 
He is the light of the whole 
nation...
Making Yiet Ham a glorious country.
Before President Ho officially proclaimed the 
patriotic emulation campaign, poets already competed 
with musicians in promoting the canonization of the 
national hero Ho Chi Minh:
His voice makes several capital 
cities tremble;
His steps shake the whole universe.
With a heart as immense as the love 
of Buddha,
He is an angel enlightening our way,
And leading us to the liberation road.
Ho Chi Minh, you are a living Saint! ^
(Thus a new prophet was annointed to preach the 
conversion of Yietnamese hearts.
(Traditional beliefs require Yietnamese homes to
have an altar for the cult of ancestors which expresses 
both family and religious sentiments. The official 
Yiet Minh policy in 1945 did not advocate the tarn vo 
(the three without1s: without family, without father­
land, without religion) as did the Soviet movement in 
1930-31, but a sophisticated process of substitution 
was quietly at work. The pictures of the fatherly 
Ho displayed on ancestral altars or places of honour 
were tacitly claiming affection and respect from the
/ Avpeople. Furthermore, as Bac Ho loved to say: "Yiet
Mam is a greater family of mine11, the traditional 
loyalty to the sovereign was destined for the "beloved 
President" in whom was embodied the authority of the 
Fatherland. Thus, the Confucian basic virtues of 
Hieu (filial piety) and Trung (loyalty to the sover­
eign or Fatherland) were preserved in their traditional 
forms but progressively changed in content. After 
the emergence of the "patriotic Party" (i.e., the 
Indochinese Communist Party) under the new name of 
Yiet Mam Workers1 Party, to be welcomed by the Lien 
Yiet (United Yiet Mam) Mational Front which was to 
become later the Fatherland Front, the fundamental vir- 
’^ues Hieu and Trung were converted into a. new basic 
slogan: f 1 /
A > A
Hieu voi Ban, Trung voi -Hang 
Filial piety toward the People 
(i.e., the Proletariat), and 
Loyalty to the (Communist)
Party.
It is a great- irony that the father of the Indo­
chinese Communist Party succeeded in establishing
himself as the father of the Vietnamese nation which, 
fifteen years earlier, had stubbornly refused to accept 
the Soviet Internationalism introduced by him. A step 
further, while lavishing his "nationalist care" on the 
infant Democratic Republic to preserve its Independencet /Oand Freedom, the gentle Bac Ho quietly but resolutely 
led the country along the road to socialism-communism.
The secret of his success lies fundamentally in 
his well-judged approach and brilliant performance as 
leader and persuader. Even though he was a thorough 
Marxist-Leninist and a tough revolutionary leader, the 
"most enlightened" Ho also mastered the art of convert­
ing the traditional teachings and the predominant Con- 
fucian mentality to the advantage of his work of polit­
ical persuasion. Ho Chi Minh, the persuader, excelled 
ove3? many others in the art of "selling the new wine of 
Marxist revolution in old Confucian bottles".
The traditional Vietnamese society always attached 
the greatest importance to morals, emphasized indivi­
dual duties, and required kindness and harmony in all 
social relationships. The "most enlightened" Ho who 
had received a thorough Confucian upbringing in his 
early days, spared no efforts to present himself at 
first, not as a radical revolutionary but leather as a 
Confucian "superman", very gentle and kindly toward 
everybody, in every situation, despising wordly honours 
and material possessions, and completely dedicated to 
the just cause of defending the Fatherland and serving 
the people.
Since the majority of the people were simple and 
poor peasants, the Hplain-folk" approach and the austere 
life of the respectable president Ho, together with 
his explicit concern about the living conditions of 
the ordinary people, effectively convinced the Viet™ 
namese that Ho was the man "from the people, of the 
people, and for the people” *
On the other hand, the mass movement needed agit­
ators and leaders* Ho 1s strong criticism of the 
French colonial administration,his long training in 
abroad, his kindliness and charisma proved irresistible 
to the educated Vietnamese who had been dismayed by 
numerous social ills and wrongs, resentful against the 
French, and enthusiastic for change. These zealous 
converts were good recruits for the Viet Minh regiment 
of persuaders which already had been staffed by H o Ts 
able and dedicated disciple-comrades, such as Truong- 
Ohinh, Pham Van Dong, and Vo Hguyen Griap, With the 
full co-operation of his convinced and determined 
cadres, H o 1s magnetic personality and inspiring work- 
style deeply impressed people of all social strata, 
and powerfully incited the masses to rise and to go 
through fire and water with their beloved leader,
C. THE MESSAGE.
It is clear that, since 1945, the opinions and 
attitudes of the Vietnamese people have been changed 
radically by the well organised Communist Party.
The Party1s principal tool was a persuasive message.
The effectiveness of it's communication,derived from
a methodical approach to the work of persuasion and the 
application of a number of highly efficient techniques,
I . An elaborate method.
As a result of their thorough training and their 
turbulent experience the Communist leaders consistently 
refused to take anything for granted. Consequently, 
their work, especially in the field of political per- 
suasion, has always been extremely thorough and method- 
ical. It is true that human affairs, unlike mechani­
cal engineering, do not admit of a rigid pattern nor 
of an inflexible method capable of application to any 
situation. Nevertheless, the elaborate technique of 
persuasion employed in North Viet Nam can be summarized 
in five points: a lofty dieal, investigation and study,
careful planning, thorough training, and a revolutionary 
work style, animated with revolutionary ethics.
1. A lofty ideal.
Like any reforming or revolutionary movement, be 
it political or religious, Communism in Viet Nam began 
with a noble ideal which was made to appear even more 
desireable by the moral decay, political oppression, 
economic exploitation, and other social ills obtaining 
at the time,
Vietnamese society of the 1940!s was marked by 
suffering, resentment, frustration, and unrest. When 
the Viet Minh (i.e., the patriotic front led by the 
Communists) leaders proclaimed the ideal of "Change the 
world, build a better society", they expressed exactly 
a longing many Vietnamese people had cherished in their 
hearts *
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The idealistic aims of the movementAmethodically 
determined so that they accorded closely with, the 
aspirations of the people and the prevailing needs of 
individual periods*
Thus, political persuasion concentrated on diffe­
rent themes in different phases of the revolution, as 
has been demonstrated in the foregoing chapters:
Doc-lap, Tu-do, Hanh-phuc (Independence, Freedom,
Happiness), Chong Phap* Khang Nhat (Fight the French,
Oppose the Japanese), -Doan ket. Culu nd&c (Unite to save
^ ^ f ^ f ^ f
the country), K~.ha.ng Chien* Kien Quoc (Total Resistance, 
Nation .Building), Hoa blnh, Dan chu (Peace and Democracy)..*
The ideal served, indeed, as a magnet to attract 
many Vietnamese of conscience, especially the young, 
who dreamed of better worlds, and those who were eager 
to work for social justice, for less suffering and more 
happiness in society. In the name of this high ideal* 
the Communists made challenging demands* Thus, the 
revolutionary ideal represented a just cause for which 
to live and to fight, and inspired those enthusiasts 
who joined the movement with the willingness to sacri­
fice their money, time, everything, even life itself.
This spirit of devotion was further intensified 
by the shining examples set by President Ho and his 
cadres, by the hardships endured during the resistance 
war, and no less by the patriotic emulation campaign 
which created many envied heroes throughout the country.
In the beginning, enthusiasm was rare because most 
people were not prepared to plunge themselves into a 
hard struggle, sacrificing their own interests and what-
ever they had acquired for themselves and their families. 
Cleverly, the Communists presented a vivid picture of 
the idealistic world of Doc lap, Tu do. Hanh ohuc 
(Independence, Freedom, Happiness) which stood in sharp 
contrast to the cruel realities of foreign domination, 
oppression, and misery,.which was everywhere apparent 
in the 1940’s. Living in such circumstances, the dis­
contented people found a deep meaning in the paraphrased 
words of Marx’s manifesto: "You have nothing to lose
hut your chains, and yet a whole world to win". To 
the better educated, the Communist leaders offered an 
appropriate challenge: "Others have only tried to
explain the world, your duty,however,Is to change it".
"To change the world of exploitation, and misery 
into a world of equality, justice, co-operation and 
happiness", this lofty ideal was the soul of the Viet 
Minh movement and the dynamic source of life, growth, 
and strength for the Indochinese Communist Party in 
whatever form it emerged or submerged.
2. Investigation and Study (Dieu Nghien)
For a well trained Communist, investigation is the 
first step in determining future plans or deciding what 
action to take* The more complete and careful the 
preliminary investigation, the more favourable and 
successful will the revolutionary work be.
Any agit-prop agent assigned to a locality must 
first conduct a thorough investigation of the enemy’s 
situation (administration, military forces, political
parties, associations, policies, programmes, internal 
conflicts), of the situation of the local people (the 
living conditions of different classes, their attitudes, 
tendencies, actions and aspirations; the different 
religions, their organisations, activities, leaders*.,), 
and of those persons who might eventually serve as 
’'"bases of the movement" (Communist local agents).
Instead of performing a cursory survey, the in­
vestigator was required to obtain concrete details of 
each organisation, each group, each family, and each 
person. In a hamlet, he must compile a list of "good", 
indifferent, backward, and "bad" elements", record the 
activities and attitudes of each category and each 
individual. In August 1945, the Viet Minh cadres in 
Hue possessed numerous note-cards listing high officials 
and civil servants with detailed information about such 
matters as the number of wives, concubines, girl friends 
with their respective addresses. In February 1968, 
during the let offensive in Hue, again, the Communist 
officers operated a house to house search with "wanted 
lists" in their hands.
In the investigation of a person who might be 
susceptible to conversion into what the Communists termed 
a "base", the "Guidebook of Mass-agitation" required 
meticulous information on every single aspect of the 
potential candidate:
- His social class, family, relatives, 
friends, religion;
- His educational level, profession, 
abilities, financial situation;
- His hobbies, habits, weaknesses such 
as gambling, drinking, courting 
women;
- His relationship and attitude toward 
11 the enemy" : support or opposition,
fear or defiance, to what degree?
- His participation in revolutionary 
activities in the past; his present 
attitude to the masses and the re- „ 
volution, his spirit of struggle.*,t
The Tuyen-Huan (Propaganda - Education) Department 
of the Party also provided practical instructions con­
cerning the direct and indirect means of approach, the 
methods, and the techniques of investigation.
In a direct investigation by personal contact, for 
example, the cadre was advised firstly to make acquain­
tances and friends by social contacts, business con­
tacts, home visits, in recreation or mutual services*
Only later would he gradually develop a more intimate 
relationship}injecting suggestions at opportune moments 
in their private conversations. Before suggesting 
any question or topic, so the investigator was instructed, 
he must begin with informal and friendly conversations 
concerning the daily life, work or business; of the tar­
get, then carry on to progress from trivialities to 
politics, from remote the more relevant topics, and 
finally guide the conversation towards the question un­
der investigation* The cadre was cautioned against 
arousing suspicion by posing repeated questions, and ad­
vised to continue the conversation ;&n a natural way so 
that his companion would remain unaware of the investi­
gation being made*
When contacting manual workers, the method of Gdi 
kho, ke kho (recalling miseries,,narrating miseries) 
was recommended, as an excellent means of agitation and 
the most fruitful method of investigation* Actually 
this method of &£>i kho was one of the principal feat­
ures in the prepatory campaign for the land reform 
which commenced in 1953s the cadres went from home 
to home for tham ngheo hoi kho (visiting the poor, in- 
quiring about miseries) then gdi kho* gay hdn (recalling 
miseries, spuring hatred).
The age-old principle that "like attracts like" 
was also applied in the Communist art of investigation* 
People having something in common, -.whether living con­
ditions, social position, religion, or political lean­
ings, people working together "for the enemy", belong­
ing to the same "enemy-controlled organisation", or 
being mutual friends, naturally tended to confide priv­
ate matters or personal aspirations to one another 
with much more ease* Therefore, Communist cadres were 
exhorted to spare no efforts in establishing "bases" 
within each social class, religious denomination and 
enemy-controlled organisation. Those "bases" i.e., 
planted agents, were greatly appreciated by the Party 
for the invaluable help they offered in furthering in­
vestigations among rich men, bourgeois, landlords, and 
the non-communist institutions,
Cadx,es were also urged to achieve adequate invest­
igation not simply by listening to the words of others
8but also by observing their attitudes and actions*
The Communist leaders rightly emphasized the 
importance and the methodical rigour of investigation, 
because other procedures or plans necessarily depended 
upon the results of investigation, which served as 
their starting point* The next step, which received 
no less attention, was study*
The necessity of study was emphasized in North 
'Viet Nam by two famous slogans, one from lenin and the 
other from Confucius:
Study, study more, study unceasingly*
Study ceaselessly, Teach tirelessly*
The study sessions too, were organised methodi­
cally, employing a"realistic approach” which portrayed 
a global struggle taking place in a decisive period 
between capitalism, colonialism, imperialism or selfis- 
ness, on the one hand, and the poor workers, colonised, 
oppressed but heroically fighting for their human rights 
and their happiness on the other* The presentation 
was deliberately calculated to spur moral indignation 
and to inspire all Communist Party members, and above 
all the cadres, with an iron determination to engage 
themselves in a great crusade on the side of good and 
against evil* Linking knowledge with action, Marxism - 
Leninism was offered as a. science, tested and confirmed 
by contemporary history, as a source of light, of 
strength, and of hope, ensuring final victory over the 
evil forces, and guiding the people in the large, power­
ful Democratic camp to peace and happiness*
The one-sided imparting of information in an 
environment isolated from the outside world, the dedi­
cation of the tutors, and other powerful techniques, 
all contributed to instil into the Communist Party 
members and its supporters deep convictions which 
prompted them to respond heroically to the heavy de­
mands of the Party and further to disseminate the 
ideas they had learned to imbue other compatriots with 
their own convictions;,
3* Careful Planning,
The results of thorough investigations, submitted 
to a dialectic materialist interpretation under the 
light of Marxism-Leninism led the Communist cadres on 
to careful pre-planning before undertaking any action.
In planning, they examined the objective and sub­
jective conditions, considered the sitxiation of the 
world, of their own country, and of the local area, 
distinguished foes from friends, carefully weighed 
their own abilities against the opposing forces and 
calculated the eventual reactions to be expected from 
others.
In the work of persuasion, the cadres discussed 
their themes at length among themselves, selected appro­
priate issues, anticipated possible arguments or objec­
tions, prepared counter-arguments and answers, against 
the background of information already obtained by in­
vestigation and study.
The manoeuvres to secure the abdication of Bao 
Lai, the feverish preparations to seize power after the 
Japanese surrender and before the arrival of the Allied 
forces, the 11 dissolution" of the Indochinese Communist
Party, tlie formation of several "governments of 
national unity" and several "national united fronts", 
the negotiations and agreements with the Chinese 
nationalist forces and the French Government in accord-
x A*» j
ance with the Hoa de tien (conciliation for future 
advance) tactic, the Khang Ghien Rifen Quoc (Total 
resistance and Nation-building) programme coupled with 
the consolidation of the Peoplefs Government, all were 
effective results of the Communist methodical planning.
An outstanding illustration of minutely detailed 
and skilful planning was given in the propaganda 
campaign (1-30 May 1951) for the introduction of the 
newly formed Workers1 Party to the people and an 
explanation of its name. To ensure success of the 
campaign, on 10 April 1951, the Propaganda Service of 
Ha Bong province issued a pamphlet giving clear and 
specific instructions to party cells at village level, 
xhe pamphlet contained a "general guide", and intro­
duction, two sets of advice for "Propaganda within the 
Party", and "Propaganda among the People", a list of 
"Particular Points to be emphasized in Propaganda", and 
a well prepared catechism giving specimen answers to 
anticipated questions. Not neglecting the post-cam­
paign period, the provincial Committee offered at the 
end a "Programme to be followed after the purpose and 
policy of the Party had been explained".
In the Propaganda among the people, the cadres 
were instructed to explain the primary purpose of the 
Party as "to unify the nation, to lead the Resistance 
to a final conclusion, and to work for the interest of
all”. To eliminate any possible objection from the 
more sensitive elements of the population, five "more 
specific aims" were listed, including "assistance to 
intellectuals", "encouragement of private enterprise" 
and "freedom of conscience". To avoid the danger of 
unsuccessful confrontation, cadres were advised against 
conducting oral propaganda among property owners, in­
tellectuals, and Catholics, For these elements, 
provincial headquarters provided "carefully prepared 
and printed documents and pamphlets", and party members 
had "carefully to follow the programme of distribution".
Practical hints such as "Strive to obtain popular 
acclamation of the Party" and "attribute all military 
successes to the work of the Party", were given to 
help demonstrate that the Party was "the most patriotic 
party", "most firmly resolved to lead the Resistance 
to final victory".
When arranging propaganda meetings, cadres were to 
bear in mind no less than six memoranda, including a 
highly politic one; "Send a telegram expressing the meet­
ing1 s support for the Party". The thoroughness of 
planning was apparent, not only in the preparation of 
cadres, but also in the selection and accommodation of 
the audience:
The audience should be carefully 
selected -children who may dis­
turb the discipline of the meet­
ing should be refused admission.
The proportion of Party to non- 
party members should be one to 
three. 9
For the pogt-campaign "follow up", it was recom­
mended "to arrange for repeated demonstrations of 
popular acclamation for the Party".
Concerning the subt3.e relationship between the 
Viet Nam Workers1 Party and the Indochinese Communist 
Party, the Party Central Committee Secretariat offered 
a general but no less subtle guideline:
If someone asks you about the 
difference between the Workers1 
Party and the Communist Party, 
you will answer: "The Workers1
Party continues the work of the 
Communist Party? To our par­
ticularly reliable sympathizers, 
you may say the Workers* Party 
is the Communist Party, Towards 
those who deliberately assert 
that the Workers' Party is the 
Communist Party, y<pu must observe
After digesting the Party Central Committee's 
directive, the Ha Bong Propaganda Office formulated a 
very clever answer to be used in the Propaganda among 
the People:
The Workers' Party inherits the 
achievements of the parties 
which |>r©eeded it, including those 
of the Communist Party, There 
is nothing contradictory to Comm­
unism in the programme of the 
Workers' Party but it is not al­
together Communist. The Commun­
ist Party is a party for Indo­
china while the Workers' Party is 
a party for Viet Nam, The 
Programme of the Communist Party is 
Communism while the programme of the 
Workers* Party is Popular Bemocratic 
Socialism. 11
Such a sophisticated reply, well-prepared in 
advance, was the result of a long and arduous mental 
distillation or thorough planning, which constituted 
the hallmark of Communist leadership, and a decisive 
element leading to Communist success.
4. Thorough Training.
In May 1935* while Ho Chi Minh, under the name
of Liu, was studying the art of revolution in Moscow,
Stalin launched the slogan "Cadres decide everything".
Some ten years later, Ho Chi Minh incorporated Stalin's
12slogan in his Manual for training cadres and force­
fully explained the great importance of this owrk as 
a decisive element of the growth of Communism:
Cadres are the ones who explain 
the policies of the organisation 
(i.e., the Communist Party) and 
the Government to make the people 
understand and Implement them.
At the same time, cadres are the 
ones who report the situation of 
the people to the organisation 
and the Government to help draft­
ing correct policies.
Hence, cadres are basic to every­
thing and the training of cadres 
is the basic work of the organiza­
tion. 13
Communist training In North Yiet Nam, as expounded 
by Ho, covered four fields:
a) Cultural instruction i.e., the kind of normal 
education given in ordinary schools.
b) Specialized instruction related to the type of 
work to be assigned to the cadre - administrative, 
Military, financial, educational, medical, propaganda 
etc.
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c) Political instruction: analysis of news and 
events; study of resolutions, programmes, and de­
clarations issued by the organisation (i.e., Party) 
and the Government. The cadres in charge of propa­
ganda and organisation were expected to receive fuller 
political instruction than cadres in other fields.
d) Marxist-Leninist dialectic applied to Vietnamese 
realities.
This kind of thorough training was intended to 
inculcate into the cadres deep intellectual and moral 
convictions, to inspire them with a sense of purpose, 
determination, and faith in final victory , to equip 
them with efficient methods, techniques, and moral 
qualities so that they might become Marxist revolu-
—  v  wncnaw— B«B3WijMnn n i n i ii'm n,nninniun> m [Hmumuirm
tionary leaders i.e., "men of special mould” .
With such well trained cadres and a highly effec-
1 4-tive "policy of cadres” , the Communists considered 
their px'oblem of mass-agitation basically solved, 
which claim contempoi*ary events in Viet Nam seemingly 
proved correct.
In his lectures delivered at the Sverdlov Uni­
versity in 1924, Stalin described the Leninist style 
in work as having two specific features.
a) Russian revolutionary sweep i.e., "the life-giving 
force which stimulates thought, impels things forward, 
breaks the past and opens up new perspectives";
b) American efficiency i.e., "that indomitable force 
which neither knows nor recognizes obstacles;... which
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1 Rcontinues at a task once started until it is finished1'.
Ho Chi Minh, a graduate of Lenin University, found 
both of these indispensable features in the history 
of the Vietnamese people, whom he proudly described as 
"an indomitable people", "a heroic people"*
The revolutionary style in work which Ho advocated, 
may best be described by the principle: "Prom the
people and to the people". Pormulation came from Mao 
Tse~tung but its application in Viet Ham was entirely 
the work of Ho Chi Minh; Communist cadres were trained 
to live and to work among the people as "fishes in the 
stream". This simile became a cliche, but its content 
remained an inexhaustible source of inspiration for 
revolutionary cadres, and proved to be the key to 
Communist success.
Scarcely less important than Revolutionary style in 
work,-was a second element, Revolutionary Ethics.
Before 1945? anti-communist literature had frequent­
ly depicted Communism to the Vietnamese people as an 
immoral doctrine. Most Vietnamese appeared readily to 
have accepted this description, especially since the 
nightmare of the Hghe finh Soviet, which had become 
popularly known as "the Red Terror of 1930-3111.
However, the Viet Minh movement in 1945-46 made no 
mention of Communism but stressed only oati^iotism. Ho 
Chi Minh, the respectable Viet Minh leader, on the other 
hand, seemed to be obsessed by the idea of Revolutionary 
Ethics. His innumerable letters and speeches, espe­
cially his "Letter to the Comrades in Bac Bo" and his
booklet "Let us change the style of work” , never failed 
to appeal to the moral sense of the people* The 
Gonfucian virtues highly esteemed by the Vietnamese 
were cited, explained, and urged on them at every poss­
ible occasion* The terms Ghi cSng v'o tu (Justice to 
the highest degree), Can, ICi§m* M e m * Chinh (Indust- 
riousness, Economy, Honesty, Righteousness), Thanh y . 
chinh tarn (Right the heart, correct the mind) were re­
interpreted, given a revolutionary content with a 
Marxist direction, and presented as Revolutionary Ethics 
to the disconcerted Vietnamese public.
II.Efficie:
To make the revolutionary message more attractive, 
more acceptable to the Vietnamese people, the Communist 
cadres resorted to very large numbers of techniques,of 
persuasion. To list all these here would be imprac­
tical, but all the techniques were merely variations of 
the following ten basic ones.
1*
Recognizing the idealism which exists in the heart 
of every man, the Communist leaders went to extreme 
lengths to aqppeal to the noble sentiments of Humanity, 
Patriotism, Godliness, Fraternity, and the like. Con­
sequently, messages of persuasion never failed to include 
"glittering generalities” such as hoc lap. Tu do. Hanh 
phuc (Independence, Freedom, Happiness), •itoan ket (Union), 
Dan chu (Democracy), Thong nhat (Unification), Hoa binh 
(Peace).... Ho Chi Minh!s Appeal for general insurrection” 
(August 1945) and "Declaration of Independence” (2 Sep­
tember 1945), for example, repeated the terms Independence 
and Freedom, some 30 times.
The revolutionary leaders endeavoured to express 
the deep aspirations of the people and depicted them­
selves as the true champions of the people1s rights 
and interests, This gave the people a ^ist cause for 
which to fight and a strong motivation to join the 
battle already started by those "self-sacrificing 
leaders"•
This technique demanded the abundant use of slo­
gans, posters, pictures, streamers, signboards or 
positive symbols of all kinds, - on the eve of the 1973 
ceasefire in South Viet lam this phenomenon was termed 
by foreign journalists "the battle of the flags",
2, Emotional arousal.
In their everyday lives, men tend to be motivated 
more frequently by emotional rather than national 
stimuli. It it is to be effective, propaganda must win 
control of the feelings and emotions of the target group 
especially when it is applied to the masses. Hence, 
name-calling abounded in the literature of political 
persuasion, as has been shown in earlier chapters: 
colonialist, fascist, invader, imperialist, feudalist, 
reactionary, Viet gian (Viet traitor), counter-revolu­
tionary, and many other emotive terms designed to 
arouse anger, protest, opposition, and a fighting spirit.
This is the reason why such language was used to 
portray the global struggle between the "loving-peace 
Democratic Gamp" (Communist) and the "war-like Imper­
ialist agressors" (non-Communist), between the "patriot! 
progressive elements" (Viet Minh) and the "traitorous, 
reactionary lackeys" (anti-communist Vietnamese). In
his speech delivered during the first days of the re­
sistance war in South Viet ham (November 1945), and 
in his "message to the Vietnamese people, the French 
people, and the people of the Allied Nations" during 
the first days of the nation-wide war (December 1946), 
Ho Chi Minh employed terms of abuse to refer to the 
French, no fewer than thirty and forty ^ .respectively* 
Nevertheless, during the conciliation period (Hoa de 
tien), H o 1s reply to Prime Minister Bidault in Paris 
(2 July 1946) and his proclamation to the people upon 
return from France after negotiations (23 October 
1946) lavished on the French unrestrained praise and 
employed friendly terminology: "Paris, a heroic
and generous city"; French Union, "humanitarian organ­
isation" ,, sincerity and mutual confidence", "sincere 
friendship", "friendly manner", "peaceful atmosphere1.1..
This technique underlay the depiction of invasion 
threats, blockade, "indiscriminate destruction", "mass 
killing", and other allegations against "the enemies 
and their lackeys.1 (See for examples: Truong Chinh,
The Resistance will win, p.44; Ho Chi Minh, Selected 
Works, Vol.Ill, p.284). Recommended as one of the 
most effective means of persuasion (Rf. Cong tac quan
i
chung, Vol.I, p. 11), this technique produced an inten­
sive campaign of hatred against the French (Su That.
No.72, 25 March 1947), and against the landowners 
(Nhan Dan. No.118, 16-20 June 1953).
3. Challenge and Competition.
The Communists undertook their self-appointed 
task in an unpromising and difficult situation. The
following year (1946), their circumstances seemed to 
be desperate and many Vietnamese nationalists were 
convinced that Communist failure was imminent. Under 
the banner of the just cause, the Communists addressed 
a challenge to every Vietnamese citizen and encountered 
a generous response.
The war against the French troops appeared to be 
a "mission impossible", but, imbued with the lofty 
ideal of cuu quoc (national salvation) and encouraged 
by the extraordinary examples of their national heroes 
in the past, the Vietnamese people responded to the 
exceedingly heavy demands in a way that outside obser­
vers find it difficult to understand. Natural resour­
ces and agricultural production were woefully inade­
quate in North Viet Nam, but throughout the nine years 
of war, people practised such industry and thrift that 
they continued to maintain a subsistance-level exist­
ence and thereby achieved self-stifficiency. Such
outstanding achievements as these resulted from the 
technique of challenge and competition, which was 
cleverly applied in an endless succession of campaigns, 
military, economic and political as well. The powerful 
psychological motive force was justly named "Patriotic 
Emulation", and later reinforced by a whole regiment of 
contemporary heroes, champions or competition winners.
4* Popular approach.
The Communist leaders, from President Ho to the 
local cadres, were living a simple life, free of luxury 
and ostentation. In their efforts to maintain close 
and friendly relations with the masses, they went to
vei’y great lengths to ascertain the interests of the 
people, speak their language, and act in the same 
way as they did,
The revolutionary message was presented in simple 
terms, under popular forms (folk-songs, popular rhymes, 
etc.), and very often in a casual way. Advising 
Communist members prudently to avoid overt boasting 
of their party membership, for example, a Party dir­
ective did not hesitate to employ a homely figure of 
speech: "President Ho is like a pregnant woman; he
does not boast at all but everybody seeing him knows".
Moreover, the daily needs of the people were 
emphasized, and practical measures designed to help 
the people were brought home in the form of peasant-
o  t *
slogans; com no ao Em (sufficient rice and clothing) 
an no danh thang (sufficient food, many victories), 
trong cay, nuoi l&n (planting trees, rearing pigs), trii
-V ^  ",,n
ruoi ,tr\i chuot (eliminating flies and rats). This 
popular approach was warmly welcomed and proved to 
be highly effective, which in turn increased the people1 
faith in and loyalty to the Government,
5♦ Substitution,
Instead of abolishing traditional values, attack­
ing religions, and rejecting the familiar ethical 
principles, the Communist cadres were trained to take 
advantage of traditional forms in order to exploit their 
revolutionary content,
Religions and family sentiments, the basic virtues 
°£ Hieu (filial piety to parents) and Trunjs; (loyalty to
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the Fatherland), Oonfucian principles, and other 
traditions, were all reinterpreted so as to convey 
new meanings favouring the revolution (Kf* Ho Chi Minh,
"■» o  o r
Tuyen lap. p.305; Siia doi loi lam viec. p.36; Selected 
Works, Vol.IV, p.175).
Traditionally, the Vietnamese loved processions 
and the parade of colorful ’’five-element-banners”
(cd ngu hanh). After the 1945 power-seizure, they 
were replaced by political rallies and red flags with 
golden five-pointed stars. While Jesus Christ was 
praised as a first class revolutionary, ancestral tab­
lets and holy pictures gave way to Uncle H o Ts posters 
and busts. The term $ Dsin (People) in Confucius and 
Mencius was still repeated, only to mean the pro­
letariat. In the same vein, "People1s Democracy” con­
veyed the dictatorship of the proletariat.
Thus, the technique of substitution, while ful­
filling revolutionary purposes, helped the Government 
to avoid antagonism and resentment.
6, Isolation.
One way to foster the conversion of minds is to 
change the climate of opinion. To this end, the 
Communist authorities severed all communications with 
the outside world, restricted and controlled the move­
ment of persons, confiscated all radio and electronic 
equipment, and monopolised news and information (Rf. 
Truong Chinh, The resistance will win, p.114). After 
thorough elmination of competitors, the one-way infor­
mation system continued to make people more receptive 
to the official news, and conditioned them to applaud
whatever the ’’mighty and clear-sighted1’ Party had to 
declare in public.
If a little window was to be opened to a friendly 
diplomat, a sympathizing visitor, or a ’’progressive 
democratic” reporter, all safety measures were mobil­
ized to ensure that a guided tour did not disturb the 
insulated sector of the population.
To such a fearful atmosphere were added some 
organised denunciations among the people to increase 
the bitterness of mutual mistrust and discourage any 
conspiracy, or even mutual consultation or the seeking 
of advice of any kind. The atmosphere of isolation 
was then used to foster ’’guided rumours” directed against 
those who refused to be persuaded .
On the other hand, after remaining in enforced
ignorance of anything happening outside the confines 
of their villages for a period of time, the psycholo­
gical resistance of the non-communist people was rapidly 
weakened and gave way to resignation and compromise.
Thus, isolation proved to be an effective catalyst 
for political persuasion.
7. Card-stacking.
This technique consits of selecting, distorting 
or falsifying facts and figures so that these appear
to support the theme of the propagandist. A dialect­
ical justification of card-stacking was adroitly 
suggested by Ho Chi Minh in his speech delivered to 
intellectuals attending the political course of the Viet 
Ham People’s University (Hanoi);
Since our regime is a democratic one 
there should he freedom of thought* 
What is freedom? In all matters, 
everyone is free to express his own 
view, thereby contributing to the 
establishing of the truth* * *
After everyone’s view has been 
expressed and truth has been estab­
lished, freedom of thought turns
Truth is what is beneficial to the 
Fatherland and to the people* What 
is detrimental to the interests of 
the Fatherland and people is not 
truth* To strive to serve the 
Fatherland and the people is to obey 
the truth. 16
Examples of card-stacking abounded in military 
and economic reports, the stories of labour and mili­
tary heroes, the list of victories, successes and 
spoils* The "Resistance Calendar" (Gu6c Khang Ohien
**■ '  MrnrmiMjH fcr.nmmnwftntewa— ihbm— f t r i B M  n w n m w  t e'wmi'h.t\ /
Than Thanh* Vol.I, p*317)? for example, listed the 
"battle of Tan Dinh (Saigon)" with the "success of 
killing 200 French enemies", whereas French authorities 
bitterly protested against what they described as the 
abduction and killing of about 150 residents of the 
Herault Residential area in Tan Dinh on 24 September 
1945* The list of military feats from 19 December 1946 
to 21 July 1954 recorded 466,172 enemies killed, 255 
canons seized, 435 airplanes destroyed (Cuoc Khang 
Ohien Than Thanh* Vol.IV, p.451)* A young lady Truong 
thi Xin in Nghe An was crowned competition winner "for 
having changed her style of work and increased the pro­
duction rate by 437$.ff The Viet Minh newspaper Tin Tuc 
(20 June 1952) reported that sixty French soldiers had
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raped seven hundred women in one afternoon (sic) at 
My-Loc’
To make President Ho two years older, Hanoi 
asserted that Ho was born in 1890 (instead of 1892 
which seems more accurate). To this end, writers had 
to falsify any figure having connection with Ho ’ s 
birth date. ^
8. Band Wagon.
The ordinary people normally want to side with 
the majority.for practical reasons. The "band wagon" 
technique consists in telling people that "everybody’s 
doing it - better come along",
This psychological device was employed in Ho *s 
appeals in 1941 (letter from abroad), and in 1945 
(Appeal for general insurrection) with no small succ­
ess, When the Viet Nam Workers’ Party made its public 
appearance in a joint-meeting of Viet Minh - Lien Viet 
delegates, the arrangements were so organised as to 
give the impression that the Workers’ Party was a 
"national party" being welcomed by the delegates of 
"the whole nation",
The Party directive concerning the exp3.anation of 
the Viet Nam Workers’ Party did not neglect this tech­
nique when it advised the Party cadres to "endeavour 
to obtain popular acclamation for the Party, and after 
propaganda meetings to send a telegram expressing the 
meeting’s support for the Party". The shouting of
slogans, the applause or ovation given to the Party 
speakers and Uncle Ho at the end of every meeting, also 
illustrated the technique of Band Wagon and proved its 
practical effects at the same time.
9. Testimonial.
To give more prestige to the Party and Government, 
the Communist press cited the approval or supporting 
statements from public officials, senators, politi­
cians, scientists, legal experts, religious leaders, 
and other prestigious personalities throughout the 
world.
On the one hand, the declaration of Ex-emperor
i
Bao Dai made Supreme Counsellor of theViet Minh Govern­
ment, the letters of Ex-Queen Mam Phuong and the four 
Vietnamese Bishops in 1945 were shrewdly converted into 
powerful credentials for the Government of Ho Chi Minh 
which was hitherto unknown to the outside world.
On the other hand, during H o 1s visit to France and 
the Viet-Frencli negotiations at Eontainbleau, state­
ments from French Communists and Socialists opposing 
the French Government were generously quoted in the Viet 
Minh press. During the time of war and the Geneva. 
Conference period, the declarations from Moscow, Peking, 
the editorials of Pravda. People’s Daily, Humanite, and 
any opinion favourable to the Communist Government, were 
cited and interpreted with a view to raising the prestige 
of the Party and Government.
Related to this technique is the practice of citing 
excerpts and reproducing interpretations of news and
events as published in foreign newspapers, especially 
the letters, rallies, demonstrations protesting against 
the war in Viet Nam, and the compliments for the Viet 
Minli fighters. This served to demoralize the French 
troops in Viet Mara as well as the people in France.
10. Incrimination.
From 1945 onwards any Vuetnamese who was reluc­
tant to co-operate with the Viet Minh was accused of 
being "pro-French1*, cowardly, and Viet gian (traitorous) 
To eliminate competition, the nationalist parties such 
as the Viet Quoc and Viet Gach were accused of being 
pro-Chinese, reactionary, corrupt and traitorous.
Many nationalist leaders in the North and in the South 
were sentenced to death and executed without trial. 
Those who dared to defend the victims would incriminate 
themselves and were unlikely to escape from official 
reprisals,
Facing the two exclusive alternatives, either 
Viet Minh or Viet gian. just as the good and the evil, 
many a Vietnamese had to adopt a practical attitude 
for physical survival. Others, inspired by patriotism 
joined the Viet Minh to fulfil their duties to the 
Fatherland.
This incrimination process was shrewdly included 
in the Communist policy concerning religion and land 
reform. A religious believer or a priest was not 
arrested and sentenced as a believer or a priest, but 
rather as a "guilty citizen". All landowners were 
seventy punished, not because of their private owner­
ship, but because all landowners were "wicked bullies,
Viet traitors, and cruel exploiters". To condemn and 
to eliminate these "guilty citizens", "unwor’thy re­
ligious members", "wicked exploiters" was, therefore, 
a duty of every citizen, a favour to Vietnamese society 
in general, and to the related Church in particular. 
Furthermore the incrimination technique also served 
well the cause of the Communist Viet Minh on the inter­
national stage.
From the very beginning of the Viet-French conflict 
the Communists were at pains to make clear that the 
innocent and helpless Vietnamese people did not do any 
harm to anybody but, being invaded attacked by French 
troops, they were forced to fight a war of self-defence* 
Thus the name "Resistance War" was in itself a basic 
argument in favour of the Vietnamese.
Then, all guilt and guile were attributed to the 
French side. The "proofs" of rapacity, pillage, law­
lessness, cruelty, malice, depravity, wickedness and 
satanism were compiled and published for a double effect 
On the Vietnamese side, those stories of brutality, 
destruction, mass killing, religious desecration and 
s4tanic crimes promoted a universal hate against the 
French, spurred their spirit of revenge, and thrust them 
to the battlefront* On the other side, those incrimin­
ating accounts generated disgust, revulsion, moral 
indignation)deepened the sense of guilt among the French 
people^ promoted an increasing protest movement, and 
finally demoralized the French people and Government*
Besides, this technique gave rise to anger among 
other peoples in the world and induced many person­
alities and Governments throughout the world to join 
the Soviet Union and Communist China in the public 
condemnation of the French Government. It also con­
tributed to the reluctance and refusal of the American 
Government to commit American forces to aid the French 
at the critical moment of Dien Bien Phu.
Ironically, the same technique of propaganda 
seems to have been responsible for the hostile attitude 
of the French public towards America during the.Viet 
Nam War in the 1960*s, and finally for the general 
demoralizing of the American people after the alleged 
My^lai massacre*
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Conclusion
Through the centuries, the Vietnamese have suffer­
ed invasion, political oppression, and social ills.
The history of Viet Nam records long periods of harsh 
sufferings followed by glorious victories won by the 
extraordinary efforts of the whole nation when united 
under the strong leadership of inspired heroes. These 
great victories, on the one hand, constitute the most 
cherished part of Viet Nam's national heritage, and 
serve as an inexhaustible source of inspiration for the 
entire people. On the other hand, the common longing 
for independence and suffering borne together produce 
a social cement to unite the Vietnamese people, when­
ever a national crisis confronts them. Consequently 
their well developed national consciousness has always 
been reinforced by a deep resentment against foreigners 
imposing alien rule by superior military might, - the 
Chinese in early times, the French and the Japanese in 
modern times. Any threat, real or imaginary, to 
national sovereignty invariably intensifies Vietnamese 
fighting spirit and renders the £>eople more ready to 
sacrifice their private interests for the larger national 
cause.
In the true tradition of Viet Nam's ".indomitable 
spirit", political groups in the first part of the 
twentieth century, successively organised audacious 
uprisings to end the French rule. Their efforts, how­
ever, were repeatedly thwarted.
The Indochinese Communist Party, in it's precocious 
infancy, also attempted violent insurrections to over­
throw both “imperialism and colonialism", I.e., the 
old royal regime and the French rule, but encountered 
a decade of disastrous failures ranging from the 1930 
Nghe Tmnh Soviet to the 1940 Oochinchina Insurrection. 
Throughout the period the Communists overtly advocated 
proletarianism and internationalism.
Learning from their setbacks, the Communists 
adopted an entirely different approach which used pol­
itical persuasion, rather than revolutionary violence.
During the Second World War, the Communists, to­
gether with other Vietnamese political parties in 
Southern China pledged co-operation with the Chinese 
Nationalists and the Allied Nations against the Japan­
ese, who had gradually replaced the French in Viet Nam. 
Commissioned to organise anti-Japanese guerilla act­
ivities in Viet Nam, they chose at the same time to 
propagate their revolutionary cause in the name of the 
United League for the Independence of Viet Nam or the 
Viet Minh League. Concealing both their political 
allegience and their ideological aims, the Viet Minh 
Leaders raised the banner of Doc Lap (Independence), 
stressed the just cause of Tu do (Freedom), and promised 
Hanh phue.(Happiness) to all the Vietnamese. Their 
persuasive appeal to join the national united front of 
Viet Minh in its patriotic struggle for Cuu Quoc 
(Saving the Country), received a spontaneous and enthus­
iastic response from the Vietnamese people, whose resent- 
ment against the French and the Japanese was further 
deepened by famine and suffering.
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In august 1945, when the Japanese were defeated 
by the Allied forces and the Royal Government in Hue 
had become confused and paralyzed, the resourceful 
Viet Minh Leaders called for a general insurrection 
and engineered a successful power-seizure before the 
arrival of the Allied forces. They immediately 
established in Hanoi a Provisional Government headed 
by Ho Chi Minh whom they introduced as a great national 
Leader.
After securing the abdication of Bao Dai, and pro­
claiming the Independence of the Democratic Republic 
of Viet Nam, Ho and liis thoroughly trained cadres set 
out to consolidate their newly acquired power. Skill­
fully combining flexibility, and a highly developed 
sense of timing, they appealed for national unity and 
active participation in national affairs, applied 
their alliance policy to attract all social strata, 
political and religious elements into various Cuu Quoc 
organisations which all claimed to work for the realis­
ation of Doc-Lap, Tu-do, Hanh-phuc. Subsequently by
implementing their adroit political plans which embodied 
a general election, a national assembly, a coalition 
government, and a “democratic constitution", they 
successfully conferred official status on a new 
“Democratic Government" of national unity which was, in 
fact, dominated by it's Viet Minh members.
When faced with competition from other nationalist 
political parties, the opposition of Chinese Nationalist 
forces and the French Government, the Viet Minh Leaders 
shrewdly defused the highly charged situation by means
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of their tactical policy of Hoa de tien (conciliation 
fox1 future advance). On the one hand, the Indo­
chinese Communist Party declared it's own dissolution, 
and the Ho Chi Minh Government offered political con­
cessions to the Viet Quoc and Viet Cach Parties, - 
only to eliminate them later, after the departure of 
their Chinese Nationalist Protectors. On the other 
hand, while striving to reach an accommodation with 
the Chinese Nationalist Forces, the Hanoi leaders 
adopted a flexible attitude towards France, despite 
the violent Viet-French conflicts in the South.
When China agreed to permit the French Forces to 
replace hers in Viet Nam (North of the 16th Parallel),
Ho Chi Minh signed the Viet-French Preliminary Agree­
ments (6 March 1946) which paved the way for the 
Fontainbleau negotiations and President H o 's visit to 
France, events which they hoped would be generally 
interpreted as a de facto recognition of the Hanoi 
Democratic Government. After the official negotiations 
had failed, Ho Chi Minh, showing a very high degree of 
self-control, signed a compromising Modus Vivendi with 
Moutet, the Minister of French Colonies. This unortho­
dox and flexible gesture later proved to be a prudent 
diplomatic move which won for the Viet Minh the time 
necessary for political consolidation and military pre­
paration.
When the Viet-French military conflicts in the 
South were spread to the North, convincing the Viet Minh 
leaders that the French Government was resolutely de­
termined to reoccupy Viet Nam, they executed a volte- 
face and withdrew to the jungle to wage a guerilla war
against the French.
Determined to obtain the full participation of 
a united nation in the building of a "People's Army" 
to fight a "People's War" to the end, the undeclared 
Communists conducted a x*elentless campaign of Khang 
Chien, Kien Quoc. (National Resistance and National 
Building). The first part of this multi-aspect cam­
paign consisted of the five axioms of Resistance, to 
be inculcated into the mind of everyVietnamese citizens 
the Resistance War is a just cause and must be waged 
by the whole nation, in all fields and activities; it 
demands total sacrifice over a long period but it will 
win. The ubiquitous network of agit-prop employed 
all available devices to instill into the people a 
lofty ideal to fight for, an unshakeable faith in final 
victory, and a greater confidence in the leadership of 
the Ho Chi Minh Government. The Army, the Regional 
forces or Guerillas, and the Militia were exhorted to 
concentrate all their efforts and sacrifices on winn­
ing the war at all costs. During the same period, 
the Viet Minh merged with the Lien Viet, another nation­
al united front, to promote an elaborate programme of 
Kien Quoc which left no stone unturned to pave the 
road toward a socialist regime, euphamistically intro­
duced as "people's democracy'.'
Benefitting from the experience, the support, and 
the all important victory (1949) of the Chinese Comm­
unist Party, the Vietnamese Communists cautiously pre­
pared to make their clandestine Party, public once 
more, under the ambiguous name of Dang Lao Dong Viet Nam,
(the Viet Nam Workers' Party). The re-emergence of 
the Party carried out under the pretext of strengthen­
ing national leadership and,^consolidating the people's 
government, was so timed as to coincide with prepar­
ations for a total offensive against the French. The 
Communist aim was to credit the Party with achieving 
the final victory it was hoped the offensive would win 
and restoring peace to the nation.
Thus in 1954, after the sensational battle of 
Dien bien phu in which hundreds of thousands of Viet­
namese were sacrificed for a national ideal, when 
I-Ioa-binh (Peace) so much desired by people throughout 
the world, was re-established, the regime of Dan-chu 
Nhan-dan (people's democracy) already stood on firm 
foundations. Empowered by the Geneva accords to rule 
over half the country, the Vietnamese Communists 
proudly set out to consolidate the North and to make 
it a powerful socialist base which would assist the 
South in its achiement at the same two-stage revolu­
tion.
Thus, the story of Viet Minh begins with patriot­
ism and national independence, winds its way through 
a long war of national resistance, and ends in social­
ism- communism. If the period 1930-1940 was a decade 
of failure for the Indochinese Communist Party, the 
following decade from 1941 (official birth date of the 
Viet Minh) to 1951 (official appearance of the Lao Dong 
Party) represented a phase of rapid Communist growth 
leading to the spectacular success of the Party in 1954*
The essential element which made possible this 
great achievment, was the immense strength of a un­
ited people, completely devoted to a national cause, 
and willing to ^ sacrifice everything for final victory. 
This itself was created by the arduous work of politi­
cal persuasion which the Viet Minh leaders carried out 
with such great skill, cunning, and perseverence.
Since national power had to be seized before any 
Communist plan became feasible, the basic adroutness 
of the Viet Minh resided in the concealment of Commun­
ism and the emphasis of nationalism. They combined 
opportunity and flexibility so as to make "more friends 
and less foes", and methodically employed efficient 
techniques to win hearts and minds.
Firstly, the Viet Minh agit-prop used every poss­
ible means to stress the revolutionary ideal, which 
itself had been designed to reflect the deep aspira­
tions and the prevailing needs of the Vietnamese, and 
to portray it as a just cause. To stimulate enthus­
iasm and total dedication in the people, the propagan­
dist recalled the memories of common suffering and 
national glory throughout history, holding up the shin­
ing examples of Viet Nam's most revered heroes. Then, 
the noble ideals of Independence, Freedom, and Happines 
were expounded in simple and clear terms, which evoked 
familiar traditonal images and recalled the well-known 
Confucian ethics. Y/hen this conditioning process had 
been completed, and the people had been.subjected to 
the technique of, for example, isolation and guided
rumours, only then was the revolutionary message pre­
sented. It was introduced most discretely, with 
careful selection of issues and arguments so that these 
accorded with local characteristics and the personal 
interests of the people.
Such a message, well adapted to the motivational 
and emotional characters of the target group, ascer­
tained by metriculous investigations and methodical 
study, proved irresistably persuasive. It was planned 
and delivered by a core of cadres thoroughly trained 
in the revolutionary ethics and work-style, whose 
principal characteristics were determination, dedica­
tion, and discipline. Their inspiring way of life 
which was continually improved by criticism, self- 
criticism, and patriotic emulation, made their work of 
persuasion even more attractive and convincing.
Furthermore, the whole Communist programme of 
political persuasion, faithfully implemented by con­
vinced followers, owes its immense effectiveness to the 
superb leadership of Ho Chi Minh, a persuader par 
excellence, who possessed the rare combination of iron- 
wili and flexibility.
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T a  d im  le cu t  d a u  khuAt p h u c  
Liixn ngira  t r im d e o  n h u c  m a i  ru  t 
K h o n g !  k h o n g  1 n o i  g idng  Au-ca  
N g h in  r a m  t r a n h  d&u d £ n  n a y  k h d n g  m a  
D ang  C ong  s a n  n£u  c d  p h u c  q u 6 c 
Kim goi  ai y e u  n i rdc  t l n r a n g  noi  
N ao  ai  k h i n h  k ie p  ?di doi  
N ao  ai m u o n  s o n g  c u d c  d d i  tir do  
Mau d i rng  d ird i  n g o n  co1 p h a n  d 5 
N ghin  tay  g i u  n h i r  th e  n ip t  lay 
D uo i  th&ng N ha t ,  d i i t  t h a n g  TA\ 
T l iam  c[uan b a o  cliiia ra  tay t i eu  tr i r  
Bao n h a  m a y  qu im  t lm thu  lay 
Deni  g iao  ch o  h£t t h a y  I l ia  th u y e n  
U i ing  cua  Tay ,  d a t  d o n  d i e n  
Ticli thu  g iao  1 ai l o a n  q u y e n  n d n g  d a n  
Bao  thud  m a  n<y n a n  xd a  l.et 
T h u £  chi  thu  d  cue n h a  g ia u  
L a p  xo  v ie t  tir d a n  b a n  »
L o n g  n d n g  g ia i  c^p d u n g  d a n  l idn hang  
L a c  d a n  toe n g a n g  h a n g  tir q u y e t  
T ay  c a m  tav k ie n  th ie t  tiromg lai 
B inh  q u y e n  gai c u n g  nh i r  t r a i  
Dirt d a y  x ieng  x ich  d a p  d d i  x ie n g  gong  
L a p  q u a n  d d i  c 6 ng n d n g  each  m a n g  
L in h  n h i r  d a n  d i r o c  h i r b n g  cdng  q u v e n  
D n o c  t r o u g  d a i  cd  phAn d i c n  
K h o n g  x a m  lirrrc ch i  p h u n g  h ien  n i rdc  nha 
Grid h ie n  la i  la g id  giai  p h d n g  
Man d i rng  ten  n o i  g io n g  L ac - long  
Dirng len  th e o  n g o n  c d  h o n g  
Dirng xav  the gid i  da i  d o n g  l i ro n g  lai.
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B m  Ca Viet M inh
B o n g  bao  h<Vi Xivo'c n h a  tan  nat ,
C am  gian  they  X i i a t — Chap  h u n g  ian,
K e  U r  C h a p  m a t  g i a n g  s a i l ,
P e - t a n h  n h u c  n h a  dau  h a n g  l l i l - lc;
D an  th u o c  din t r a m  be d a u  kho,
Hon D d - c n (l) eha i ig  lid g i rom  dao ,
I toe  x i rong ,  nao  tuy  d o n g  bao,  
l l e i  l ang  s u n  th ue  lai d a o  lac (jwyen.
Hiing iiu m a c  doe quyen chung ban,
K ho bac  vang  vo tan cru ing  v a ,
Dan ia da xac nhir vd
Lai t h e m  di ) inh di jihu (ham sau.
T r a n  Phiip — Lire, l ay Au khitng  ki\ i£p,  
T h a n  ng ira  Iran  d a n  Viet n a o  nu n g ,
C h o n g  Xiem,  bao  ke a n h  hung  
L a m  jiia do  d a n  dun long  n h a u  r lu r a ?
Doi Die t h a m  k h o n g  el to than  van ,
Mieng l iu ro n g  d a n  k h e p  an  led Jit,
Hoi ai I r a n h  dau  Uv do,
Kia g i rom  m ay  ehbm ,  kia m o  tang  l ln rong ,  
Kin nh i rng  vu do t  l ang  e u o p  cua ,
Kia iih.u ng th a n  nen i  1)6 h o i  song,
H ac-son  bao  Ice dau  long,
X ant -ky  bao  c a n b  vo  c u n g  d ieu  i inh.
N g a m  n d n g  noi  led  b in h  co mol,o o
N hin  g iang  s o n  c h u a  xot  k h d n g  hai,  
D d n g - d i m n g  ia da t  cua  ai 
Mil l a y  den i  m o t  p h a n  n u to i  d an g  X ie m ?  
V ong  no  le c a n g  th e m  no  le,
Ddi xot  xa can g  do xol  xa,
T h i r o n g  n h a u  th a n  p h a n  dan  la 
X e n i  viio giae  Phiip,  ti ing ra  giae liin !
X h a  th o n  xorn,  'bay don ,  X ha l  duo i ,
4 5 9 .
4 6 0 .
Mil dug  clin phai  hi/i phai  dao ,
Ngay  ngay  nlu'it k i e m  ngon  dao ,
Ai th a n ,  ai k h o c .  ai gao  m ac  ai.
R o n  nili n ir  xot dd'i t r in h  liet,
Q u a n  b a o  ta n  no i  xiet  d a m  o,
Biet b a o  n i ro n g  d o  r u d n g  ngd 
B e n  ngay an  q u a  con  lo plui m an .
H a n g  cho* biia iia n h a u  c lu ing  cirdrp,
D an  t rd n g  day  n o in  n o p  roi  song,
Vi d im  b o m  d a n  hai  hung ,
Vi d a u  na t  th i t  tan long nh i r  c h o i ?
• o
T h a n  la the,  6 i do i  ta the !
N g h 7 n g u d n  c a n  nhir  xe tarn can ,
Dong h a o  hay  d a p  cho  tan,
Hay d a n h  n in  n h in ,  hay  c a m  toi d d i ?  
Khdng,  k h d n g  d i rov  ! ( ; idng  noi  H ong  Viet
• - • O  O  «
Quyel  k ien  cang  k h d n g  d i e t  hao  gio1!
T r a i  N a m  v o n  tir n g ay  xi ra
Bao plien bao  tap  ngon  cd1 cao  bay,
Van n g a o  nghd nl ifrng ngav  o a n h  Iiet,o  . o  o  o  * •
Kia anli  h u n g  h a o  k ic t  oa i  d a n h  :
T i l i n g  V irong  m a  n gh ie p  M i- tha nh
T r a n  lu rng  D ao  pha  tan t a n h  q u a n  Nguyen ,
Ke T h a i  id ch ieu  h ien  giet giae,
N g u y e n  q u a n g  T r u n g  g iep Bac  b inh  N a m ; 
Ti r  ngay  P h a p  keo  q u a n  sang ,
T i e n g  iid p h a n  de  van  v a n g  s a n  ha.
Siing Vi i -quang  t r u y e n  q u a  Bai  Say,
Yen-the. h o  goi day  T h n i -n g u y e n ,
Ken  Yen-bid  llnic q u a n  ten ,
La c a  Nghe TTnh co n  in m a n  hong .
T h e o  l i eng  goi n o n  s o n g  id q u o c  
Dan B a c - s o n  l)ao lirp lung  hoarih,
N a m -k y  d u n g  cam  g iao  t r a n h ,
D d - l i r a n g  giet g iae  c i rdp  than li  kia ai.
D ong  bao  ho i  day ldi  tain huyet ,
Day  l ien nh itn  d a  v ie t  cho  ta,
K h u y c n  ta gifr lav n u d e  nlia,
K h u v e n  la d i rng  day  d u n g  c a  tir d o ;
K hong  ch iu  d a u  h an g  quai l  ac  doc,
K h o n g  ch iu  l a m  dim toe o d a n h ,
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T u o n g  chi  la  g idng  ho i  tanli  
Ke oiii ' l a y  [ rang  nguaYi t r a n h  Xhat  vang .  
Hon q u a n  P liap  gia d i rd n g  n h a n  ng ino  
K h u y e n  d o n g  h a o  ch ia  se ha t  coin,
Hay th a n  X hat ,  ay c o n  luion
(iia d a n h  Gach mang* d ira  h o n  Q u o c  gia.
Vi tir 1 cri vini i i ioa pliu quy,
M u o n  d a n  ta no  le  g ia m  c a m ;
Ay loa i  t a n  hao  h v o n g  tain,
T e n  t r o n g  q u o c  t ich n g a n  n a m  x o a  rbi.  
Nghe  th e o  c h u n g  n h f rn g  1 cri d i r o n g  mat 
L a  m a c  m in i  giae N ha t ,  g iae  l a y ,
La  de in  d a n g  n i rd c  n o n  nay  
Cho n u a n  Lb do i ,  ch o  bilv soi l a n g ;X *■
L a  c a m  chin  d a u  h a n g  k h t m  n a n ,
La  d e m  Hum tir hi on q u a n  t h u ;
Dong  h a o  h d i ! t n r d c  n g u y  co’
N h a  tan m r o c  m a t  hay  g id  Loi ai ?
D i rong  ci iu n i r d c  ciru n 6 i duy  n h a t  
Co* Vic I Minh  d a p] Lit Iren  d au ,
C ung  n h a n  ta  n a m  lay  n h a u
K h o n g  p h a n  Ion g iao ,  n g h e o  giau ,  gai t rai .
V»>r. l i s t e n  lift rd mr m 'v i  n o l i T n  k h i .-  * —,* o *
X a o  n h a n  d a n  ai i:e an i l  ini,
N a o  t i oan ,  n a o  hoi  n ln i n g  ai,
N hf rng  ai yen  n irdc ,  ai ngvrbi Y ie t -n a m ?  
N ln rn g  ai m u o n  d a n h  tan  g iae  Pliap,  
Nhfrng  ai m o n g  ciru thoa l  g idng  noi ,
Viet M inh  ih a  I hint  c k a o  mod
M an vao  Mat I r an  diet  loa i  xam  lang,
Cac  d o a n  the  Y ie t -n a m  cum q u o c  
D a n g  ra tay l ion r u d e  a n  can ,
Thor th u y c n ,  h in h  l inh ,  n d n g  dan ,
T h a n h  n icn ,  plm nfr. van  n h a n ,  nlii dong ,  
Car. p h u  lfio, p lm  ong,  d ia  chu,
Hue ky  hao ,  d ic n  la), thivcmg gia,
\ Hrri h d n  d a n  toe q u o c  gia,
Man m a n  tu t a p  d ird i  c.d Viet Minh I 
Mircrng, M an ,  T h b  ba t  l )inh P h a p  X ha t  
Tha i ,  Mien,  L a o  cu n g  do t  D o n g -d i r an g ,
N ui  r i rn g  to chi  hid-n ngang ,
n Cll}'Vn h irdc  iOm d i ro n g  d a u  t r a n h ,✓
T a n ,  A n-do  m £ n h  m 6 ng da t  ni rdc,
Dien,  Tr ieu-l iOn m a y  l d p  l ion song .
T r im  l ien hi im h a  xun g  phong ,
Vi£t Minh nguvOn ket  dai  d o n g  t r a o  n h a u .
T o  a n d a n  toe A -c h a u  k h o  ai,
Yiyt M inh  d e u  th a n  ai n a m  tay,
Nhf rng  n g u d i  du  X ha t  dii Tay
T r o n g  q u y e n  (U\n elm m o n g  ngay  tir do,
Coi plui t-xit  la thu  so m o t ,
G ian  tha in  tan  m u o n  tud l  guomi ra,
Yi£t M inh  m o n g  iroc giin xa
C u n g  d a n  N a m -v ic t  x o n g  p h a  eh ien  t r i rd n g .
D o n g  b a o  h d i ,  con  d i r o n g  s o n g  n id i
Day v i n h  q u a n g  cho i  loi tuxvng lai,
L i c n - x 6 a n h  di ing  tuye t  vdi  
1 l o n g  q u a n  d a n g  kdl l i eu  d a i  I l i t- lc;
Q u a n  A n h  My d a n g  tlii n h a u  liCm,
Ca d a n  T a u  d a n g  c l iuyen  the  cong,
Ld  t h a n  each  m a n g  d i r a n g  hong ,
Gio d i ra  n g o n  li ra d u n g  d u n g  l£n cao.
rm.i n/»n 1)1,. • n r}r»^irf (t n /\ I !>«»-»-*-» !*lunn Viini vuv; i i»u j/ m u m  m u v  j/,
Lu soi i im hao  xitft lo au,
1 lai q u a n  X h a t  P h a p  d a n h  nhau ,
N hat  m o n g  dud i  P h a p ,  P h a p  can N h a t  tan .  
T h a n h  Idem n o  r .hieu p h e n  da  tuo t ,
L i rd i  le kia t h in g  tout h a o  lan ,
N h a t  d a n g  do*i p h u t  t a n  t a n ln
Deni th e m  d ac  l ining m u o n  p h a n  c h o  la.
D o n g  hao  hd i ,  thd i  co1 d a  d e n !
T ie n  len  m a n ,  quytf t l i en  len m a u l  
T h e o  g i rong  t r a n h  dSu n a m  cliau,
Moi gan  N hat ,  P l iap,  hen  d a u  Yiel gian .
D u d i  c d  d o  sao  v a n g  n a m  ca n h ,  
l lb i  d o n g  b a o  sat  c a n h  chen  vai ,
Y ie t -n a m  r i e n g  m o t  goc t r d i  
Nay n e n  d o c  lap  m u o n  d d i  tir do.
(Klwyct danh)
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THE POLITICAL PROGRAMME 
OF
THE INDOCHINESE COMMUNIST PARTY 
IN 1930
nhCPng KHAU HlfU L&S d£ RA 
TRONG bXn LU$N CUONO 1930I
1) Danh do de quoc chu~ngh:Ea Phaptphong kien va dja chu.
2 ) L9P chfnh phu con^,nong,
3) TJch thu hot thay ru§n^ dat cua b?n dj.a chu ng9ai 
quoc,ban xu va cac giao hqi'giao ruqng dat cho trung 
va baaj( nongf quyen so hrni ruqng dat ve chfnh phu 
cong nong,
4) Sung cong hot thay cac can nghifp Ion cua b9n tir- 
ban ngo^i quoc*
5) Bo cac thu thu© hi$n thoif l£p ra thue luy tien «
6 ) Ngay lam 8 giof sua dot s\f sinh ho^t cho thq* thuyen 
va quan chung lao kho.
7) Xtr Dong-durmg ho'an toan dqc l|Lp| thua nh^n dan- 
t§c t\f quyot.
8 ) L9P quan d§i cong,nong.
9) Nam no binh quyen.
10) tng h§ Lien-bang xo-viet,lion ket voi vo san giai 
cap toan the gioi va phong trao each »9ng thuqc- 
d^a va ban thu^c d|a.
APPENDIX B3
Kfiu GQ1 DAU TRANH 
(Xo-viet Hghf-Tlnh 1930-31)
Lu ailing xanh may du’q quan tnrcmg 
Lay cua ai ma vong vang nhan b^cr
Byn hao ly <190 ngang ngang dye,
Hope’ co dan dem thoc lay tien,
39 n nha Ron xiSn xo xo xion,
lupa quan chung :b$c tie a clam thung gi ay!
Giet quan royt thara theo Tay,
Giet quan phan dang,giet bay thsun quan. 
Giet nhu'xi^ ; ty:L thong gag on ky lyc,
Ctr thoo Tay luc nhuc timg dan.
Giet quan lfnh trang ngu dan,
Vai fuang khau sung khong hang,phan dan. 
Giot nlitmg tyi nioi ra nhcrn nhac,
Di tuan phong lac cac trong dan.
Giet bay hao trircmg v&o than,
Cu* ngoi cyy the cyy than hiep dan.
Ngyn ugur pUo Lion 1
TRf,ph£,d j a ,h Ao , d a o t Jn g 6c , Tltflc t |n Rfc
„ „„ CHO TRUONG VA CHINH SACH CCA PAT TRAN "V IlS T -ilV .APPKKDIX B4 466.
05C LAP DONG IIIMH" (Vi St-MIWH) TUYSn bC DAU Tlalt 
• • •
(Trich Dnn bno so 6b7 xunc bon o’ 6 \I ddi' 
N goy 2 b T hn n g b n i m 19 6 3 ) 
A) V* G h l m  TRI
1)- ‘a’hi hnnh lunt pho thong dnu phieu, ni co quoc-tich Viet I 
(gom cn moi s&c toe miiotag, - ion, Tho v.v. . . ) khong cu! trni hny ; ;:j on?
. ?  T  ~  , ?  . I  '  T T  • ~  X  A  7  N  ✓tuoi tro* len, neu khong p h m  In Viet-ginn cieu co quycr: buyer, cu’ vn iv 
cu!.
2)- bo cnc quyen t \t do don chu: Tu’-do tu3 tu’o’n.g, t o9do hi; 
ngifcfrig, tu’-do to chub, tii-do hoi hop, tu’-do di Ini trong nutate, bu'-d 
xunt dufctog, tu’-do ngon lunn, tu'-cio b ')0 chi v,v...
» <3 /  ?  A  *  \  A  A  A  /
3)- To chu’c hni luc khony qunn, thnnh lnp doi ounn Cnch . 
Viet-Nnm vn vo trnng dnn churg. ThSng tny triing tri bon Viot ~inn ph.
• . ^  / Vv / ■ J A
quoc, giu’ vu’ng chinh quyen cnch rnnng.
4)- Thn hot chinh tri phnrn vn xet Ini do nn xn thute’ng phnn:
• * • • •
3)- Thu’c hi on Nnm Nu bmh-quycn
6)- ±hifn nhnn quyen dnn toe tu!-quyet doi vo’i cnc ann icc chi:
so
?)- tien hiep thnn thien vo’i tnt cn cnc dnn toe nho you dnng
? ? X *  ^ ~ * . •
trnnh thu chu quyen doc lnp
. ? ? X ? M A . / « , / / / ✓
b)- Huy bo tnt cn nhu’ng hi op u’cte cun Phnp an xy vbi cnc n u’cte
~  X  /  A  , / ,  r , A  *
nhu’ng vnn do co lien qunn to'i viet-Inm
• xs s \ s <  7 ~
9)- ivien auyet ebony Ini tnt cn nhu’ng lu’c 1 deter phnn don -' tr« 
vn ngoni nu'o’c co xnm phnm to’i chu quyen tu’-do vn doc lnp cun Viot-k.'t
B) VE KINK TE
1)- Bo thue thnn vn moi suu dich cun Thong kicn vn Thu’c-dnn !
A / X / > fw # /^ / (  ^ A / ^ \ #
mot thu! thue lc/i tute vn luy tien, de thue khon du’o’c cony b e i n g  hote.
• • ; •
x w % 7 *? f f \
2) Tich thu het nhu’ng tni snn cun bon hhnt-xit vn bon chny t
/ f • A  X  ^  ^  ^ ^
Fhnt-xit trong cuoc chien trnnh, vo lunn ngu’di dn trdng hny dn vnn£> 
ngoni auoc hriy bnn din.* \ ? # X rw X / / A \
Khxjfug tni snn ny se quoc huu hon hny phnu wni sun:; conp; tuy 
theo tinh chnt.
3)- Quoc h5u hoa nhu’ng nha b&ng da concr tac vc?i ouan doi T h a i  
xit trong cuoc chien trnnh. Lap mot quoc gin ngan hang. 467#
. ? / \ m A /' \ M A 2
4)- ..c? rnnng cac nganh ley nghe, nhat la ky nrhe nSng do cuo nX X / ^ xv / ' ✓ \ , xs * . ^  * « '•
kirih to quoc gin phat trien mol', each mau chong va aoc lap. hhuycrx^jch:V / #v  ^ 7 'V * * * '
in o’ mang cac ky nghe thu cong.
5)- Chia lai cony uicri moo each con;-; bang
6)- Qinh che lai dia to( glam nhe cho nonr dan)
• ^ 4  • ** ' •
' V * A ^
7)- &ien thiet cony trinh thuv lo’i , ooi dap do dieu dap cony 
lam cho nghc nong phht tri on.
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The preliminary Franco-Vietnamese 
Convezilion of March the 6 th 1946
There has been arranged between the aftermentioned high er nUact ing 
parties : the Government of the French Republic, represented by M. Sain- 
teny delegated by the French High Commissioner regularly manda ted  
by  Admiral  d ’Argenlieu, French High Commissioner, deposi tary of the 
powers of the French Republic, on the one hand,  and  the  Vietnamese" 
Government,  represented by its president Mr. Ho Chi Minh and  the special 
delegate of the Council of Ministers, Mr. Vuliong Khanh ,  on the other  
hand,  the  following a g re e m e n t :
1° The French Government recognises the Vietnamese Republic as a free 
State, having its Government, its parliament, its army and its finances, forming 
part of the Indo-Chinese Federation and of the French Union.
As regard the reunion of the three “Kys” the French Government under­
takes to ratify the decisions made by the population, consulted by referendum.
2° The Vietnamese Government declares itself ready to welcome the 
French army in a friendly manner, when, in accordance with the international 
agreements, it will replace the Chinese troops.
An agreement annexed to the present preliminary convention will fix the 
modalities according to which the operations of replacement will take place.
3° The liereabove stipulations will be enforced immediately. As soon as 
the signatures have been exchanged, each of the high contracting parties 
wall take the necessary mesures in order to cause all hostilities to stop imme­
diately, to keep the troops in their respective positions and to create the 
favourable atmosphere necessary to the immediate opening of friendly and 
frank negotiations.
These negotiations W’ill bear specially on the diplomatic relations of Viet 
Nam with foreign States, the future status of Indochina and the French 
economic and cultural interests in Viet Nam.
Either Hanoi, Saigon or Paris can be chosen as the seat of the conference.
Agreement appended
to  the preliminary Conference which took place b etw een  the  
G overnm ent of the French Republic and the G overnm ent of the  
V iet-N am
The high contract ing parties  mentioned in the prel iminary Conven­
t ion have made the following a g re e m e n t ;
1° The relief troops will be composed of :
a)  10,000 Vietnamese with their Vietnamese officers, responsible before 
the Vietnamese military authorities;
b) 15,000 French, including the French Forces stationed a t the present 
moment in Vietnamese Territory North of the lGth parallel. The said elements 
must be composed only of Frenchmen of metropolitan origin with the excep­
tion of the troops entrusted with the guard of the Japanese prisoners.
The whole of these forces will be put under the French High Command 
assisted by Vietnamese delegates. The progression, the settlem ent and the 
use of these forces will be defined at a general staff conference between the 
representatives of the French command and the Vietnamese command, which 
will take place as soon as the French units have landed.
Joint commissions will be created in all the ranks in order to  ensure, in a 
spirit of friendly collaboration, the liaison between the French and Vietnamese 
troops.
2° The French elements of the relief forces will be divided into three parts:
a)  The units entrusted with the guard of the Japanese prisoners of w ar: 
these units will be repatriated as soon as their mission is no larger necessary 
owing to the evacuation of the Japanese prisoners, and, in any case, within a 
maximum period of ten months.
b) The units entrusted, in collaboration with the Vietnamese army with 
the keeping of public order and security in the Vietnamese territory. One 
fifth of these units will be relieved each year by the Vietnamese arm y; this 
change will, therefore, be completely carried out within a period of five years.
c) The units entrusted with the defence of the Vietnamese bases will hold 
their garrisons, strictly limited zones of billeting will be assigned to them.
3° The French Government undertakes not to use Japanese prisoners for 
military purposes.
Hanoi, Gth March 1946.
Signed  : Sainleny, Salan, Vo Xguyen  Gfiap.
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The Franco-Vietnamese modus vivendi
signed in Paris, September the 14th 1946
Article 1
The Vietnamese citizens in France, and the French citizens in Viet Nam 
will enjoy the same liberty of establishment as the natives of the country, as 
well as liberty of opinion, of teaching, of trading and of traffic and, in general, 
all democratic liberties.
Article 2
French property and enterprises in Viet-Nam will not be subjected to a 
more severe regime than th a t reserved to the property and enterprises of Viet­
namese citizens especially as regards fiscal regulations and the laws concerning 
labour. This equality of status will be recognised reciprocally in connection 
with the property and enterprises of Vietnamese citizens in the territories of 
the French Union.
The status of French property and enterprises which are in Viet Nam 
cannot be changed except by joint agreement between the French Republic 
and the Democratic Republic of Viet Nam.
All French property requisitioned by the Vietnamese Government, of which 
persons or companies have been deprived by the Vietnamese authorities will 
be returned to their proprietors and beneficiaries. A joint committee will be 
formed to determine the modalities of this restitution.
Article 3
In  order to resume from now on the cultural relations which France and 
Viet-Nam are equally eager to develop, French schools of the varied degrees, 
may function freely in Viet Nam. They will carry out the French official 
programme. By special agreement, these schools will be granted all the 
buildings necessary to their administration. They will be opened to Viet­
namese pupils.
Scientific research and the opening by French citizens of Scientific Institu ­
tions will be authorized on all the Vietnamese territory. The same rights 
will be granted in Franco to the Vietnamese citizens.
The Pasteur Instituto will be restored in all its rights and properties. A 
joint commission will decide the terms under whioh the Ecole Franyaise d ’Ex- 
treme-Orient will resume its activity.
Article 4
The Government of the Democratic Republic of Viet Nam will call upon 
French citizens by proferenoe whenever it needs counsellors, technicians or
experts The priority right granted to french citizens will only cease when
it is impossible for France to supply the staff required.
Article 5
As soon as the present problem of monetary harmonization is solved, only 
one and the same currency will have legal tender in the territories which are 
under the authority of the Democratic Republic of Viet Nam and in the other 
territories of Indo-China.
This currency is the Indo-Chinese piastre, issued a t present by the Bank 
of Indo-China, pending the creation of a Bank of Issue.
The statute of the Bank will be studied in a joint commission in which all 
the members of the Federation will bo represented. This commission will 
also have to coordinate the currency and the questions relative to foreign 
exchanges. The Indo-Chinese piastre will be included in the franc area.
Article 6
Viet Nam will form a Customs Union with the other countries of the Indo- 
Chinese Federation. In consequence, there will be no inland customs barriers 
and the same tariffs will be carried out everywhere a t the entry and exit of 
Indo-Chinese territory.
A committee for the coordination of the Customs and foreign trade, which 
may, besides, be the same as th a t entrusted with the questions of currency and 
foreign exchanges, will study the appropriate means of applying and preparing 
the organization of the Custom Houses in Indo-China.
Article 7
A joint committee for the coordination of communications will study the
measures necessary to reestablish and improve the traffic between Viet-Nam 
and the other countries of the Indo-Chinese Federation and the French Union : 
land, sea and air transports, postal, telephonic, telegraphic and radio-electric 
communications.
Article 8
Pending the conclusion between the French Government, and the Govern­
ment of Democratic Pvepublic of \  iet Nam of a definite agreement putting 
in order the question of the diplomatic relations of Viet Nam writh Foreign 
countries, a joint franeo-victnameso commission will determine the provisions 
to be made to ensure the consular representation of Viet Nam in the neigh­
bouring countries and its relations with the foreign consuls.
Article 9
Tn order to reestablish as soon as possible in Gochinchine and South Annam 
the public order which is as necessary to democratic liberties as to the resump­
tion of commercial transactions, and fully aware of the happv repercussions 
which the suspension of all acts of hostility and violence would have on this 
point, the French Government and the Government of the Democratic Repu­
blic of \  iet Nam havo agreed upon the following measures:
a) All acts of hostility and violence on both sides will bo suspended.
b) Agreements between the French and the Vietnamese H igh Commands 
will regulate the conditions of application and control of the measures prev­
iously agreed in common.
c) I t  is specified th a t all prisoners presently detained for political reasons 
will be freed, with the exception of those charged with crimes and breaches of 
common law.
This will also apply to prisoners taken during the military operations.
Viet Nam guarantees tha t no action will be undertaken nor any act of 
violence tolerated against any person, in consequence of his attachm ent or 
his loyalty to France. The French Government guarantees reciprocally tha t 
no action will be undertaken nor any act of violence tolerated against any 
person in consequence of his attachm ent to Viet Nam.
d) The exercise of democratic liberties defined by the first article will be 
reciprocally guaranteed.
. e) All unfriendly propaganda on both sides will be suspended.
f)  The French Government and the Government of the Democratic 
Republic of Viet Nam will collaborate so as to mako it impossible for all ex­
enemy citizens to cause harm.
g) A personality appointed by the Government of the Democratic Republic 
of Viet Nam and accepted by the French Government will be accredited to the 
High Commissioner to establish the cooperation necessary for the carrying-out 
of the present agreements.
Article 10
The Government of the French Republic and the Governement of the 
Democratic Republic of Viet Nam agree to study in common the conclusion 
of special agreements on all the questions which may arise with a view to 
strengthening their friendly relations and to pave the way for a definite 
treaty. Negotiations for this purpose will be resumed as soon as possible 
and no later than January  1947.
Article 11
All the provisions of the present modus vivendi, made out in duplicate* 
will be enforced on October the 30th 1946.
Paris, fourtenth September, nineteen hundred 
and forty six.
For the Provisional Governement of French 
Republic.
The French Minister for Overseas Territories 
Signed : MARIUS MOUTET.
For the Government of the Democratic Republic 
of Viet Nam.
The President of the Government.
Signed : HO CHI MINH.
Appended declaration
of the  G overnm ents of the  French Republic and the D em ocratic  
Republic of V iet-N am
The G overnm ent of the French Republic and the G overnm ent of the  
D em ocratic Republic of Viet Nam are firm ly decided to  pursue, in  a 
sp irit of m utual tru s t, the  policy of agreem ent and  collaboration begun 
by the  prelim inary convention of March the  Gth 1940 and enforced during  
th e  Franco-V ietnam ese conferences of D ala t and 'F ontainebleau .
Convinced th a t  th is  policy is the only which corresponds to  the 
perm anen t interests of the  two countries and to  their dem ocratic tr a d i­
tions, the two G overnm ents consider, while abiding by th e  convention 
of the six th  of M arch 1946 which rem ains in force, th a t  th e  tim e has 
come to m ark fu rther progress in the developm ent of relations betw een 
F ranee and Viet N am , until circum stances perm it the conclusion of a 
to ta l and definite agreem ent. In  a sp irit of friendship and  of m u tu a l 
understanding , the G overnm ent of the French Republic and  the G overn­
m ent of the D em ocratic R epublic of \  iet Nam have signed a modus 
vivendi which, w ithin the  fram e of lim ited agreem ent, brings tem porary  
solutions to  the m ain questions of im m ediate in terest ou tstan d in g  
between F rance and  Viet N am .
As regards the referendum  provided for in the prelim inary  convention 
of M arch the  6th, the  two G overnm ents reserve the ir rights to  determ ine 
la ter its da te  and modalities.
They are convinced th a t  all the m easures contained in the  modus 
vivendi will con tribu te  to create  in the near fu ture a qu ie ter and  safer 
atm osphere which will perm it the pu rsu it of definite negotiations.
U nder these circum stances they  consider th a t the w ork u n d ertak en  
by the 1’ranco -\ ietnainese in Fontainebleau  can be resum ed in J a n u a rv  
1947,
Paris, September the 14th 1940 .
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